ARIEL  BOOKLETS. 


A  series  of  productions  complete  in 
small  compass,  which  have  been  ac- 
cepted as  classics  of  their  kind. 


For  full  list  see  end  of  this  volume. 


Cbe  {Thought 
Bin        r  fl>.  &u 


.mi 


The  Antonine  Column  in  the  Piazza  Colonna — Rome 


i 


3fno>I — CfinoIo'J  ssxcr'JHB .  ni  nrriukO  sninoinA 


TLbc  XLbouobts 


of  tbe 


Emperor  fll>.  Hurelius 
Hntoninus 

Translates  b^ 

George  %owq 


1Rc\v  !?orfe  .*n&  lonJion 

<3.  |p.  Putnam's  Sons 

TLbc  IKnfcfcerbocfcer  press 


CONTENTS. 


PAGE 

M.  Aurelius  Antoninus i 

The  Philosophy  of  Antoninus  37 

M.  Antoninus .90 

Index „    309 


M.    AURKLIUS   ANTONINUS 


M.  AURELIUS  ANTONINUS. 

M  ANTONINUS  was  born  at  Rome  a.d. 
.  121,  on  the  26th  of  April.  His  father, 
Annius  Verus,  died  while  he  was  praetor.  His 
mother  was  Domitia  Calvilla,  also  named  L,u- 
cilla.  The  Emperor  T.  Antoninus  Pius  married 
Annia  Galeria  Faustina,  the  sister  of  Annius 
Verus,  and  was  consequently  the  uncle  of  M.  An- 
toninus. When  Hadrian  adopted  Antoninus  Pius 
and  declared  him  his  successor  in  the  empire 
Antoninus  Pius  adopted  both  L.  Ceionius  Corn- 
modus,  the  son  of  J31ius  Caesar  and  M.  Anto- 
ninus, whose  original  name  was  M.  Annius 
Verus.  Antoninus  then  took  the  name  of  M. 
^Elius  Aurelius  Verus,  to  which  was  added  the 
title  of  Caesar  in  a.d.  139  :  the  name  iElius  be- 
longed to  Hadrian's  family,  and  Aurelius  was 
the  name  of  Antoninus  Pius.  When  M.  Anto- 
ninus became  Augustus,  he  dropped  the  name 
of  Verus  and  took  the  name  of  Antoninus. 
Accordingly  he  is  generally  named  M.  Aurelius 
Antoninus  or  simply  M.  Antoninus. 

The  youth  was  most  carefully  brought  up. 
He  thanks  the  gods  (i,  17)  that  he  had  good 


2  jflfc.  Burelius  Bntonfnus 

grandfathers,  good  parents,  a  good  sister,  good 
teachers,  good  associates,  good  kinsmen  and 
friends, — nearly  every  thing  good.  He  had  the 
happy  fortune  to  witness  the  example  of  his 
uncle  and  adoptive  father,  Antoninus  Pius,  and 
he  has  recorded  in  his  work  (i.,  16  ;  vi.,  30)  the 
virtues  of  this  excellent  man  and  prudent  ruler. 
Ivike  many  young  Romans  he  tried  his  hand  at 
poetry  and  studied  rhetoric.  Herodes  Atticus 
and  M.  Cornelius  Fronto  were  his  teachers  in 
eloquence.  There  are  extant  letters  between 
Fronto  and  Marcus,*  which  show  the  great 
affection  of  the  pupil  for  the  master,  and  the 
master's  great  hopes  of  his  industrious  pupil. 
M.  Antoninus  mentions  Fronto  (i.,  11)  among 
those  to  whom  he  was  indebted  for  his  education. 
When  he  was  eleven  years  old,  he  assumed 
the  dress  of  philosophers,  something  plain  and 
coarse,  became  a  hard  student,  and  lived  a  most 
laborious  abstemious  life,  even  so  far  as  to  in- 
jure his  health.  Finally,  he  abandoned  poetry 
and  rhetoric  for  philosophy,  and  he  attached 
himself  to  the  sect  of  the  Stoics.  But  he  did 
not  neglect  the  study  of  law,  which  was  a  use- 
ful preparation  for  the  high  place  which  he  was 
designed  to  fill.  His  teacher  was  L.  Volusi- 
anus   Maecianus,    a   distinguished  jurist.     We 

*"  M.  Cornelii Frontonis  Reliquiae,"  Berlin,  1816.  There 
are  a  few  letters  between  Fronto  and  Antoninus  Pius. 


/Ifc.  Burelfus  Bntoninus  3 

must  suppose  that  he  learned  the  Roman  dis- 
cipline of  arms,  which  was  a  necessary  part  of 
the  education  of  a  man  who  afterwards  led  his 
troops  to  battle  against  a  warlike  race. 

Antoninus  has  recorded  in  his  first  book  the 
names  of  his  teachers  and  the  obligations  which 
he  owed  to  each  of  them.  The  way  in  which 
he  speaks  of  what  he  learned  from  them  might 
seem  to  savor  of  vanity  or  self-praise,  if  we  look 
carelessly  at  the  way  in  which  he  expressed 
himself;  but  if  any  one  draws  this  conclusion 
he  will  be  mistaken.  Antoninus  means  to 
commemorate  the  merits  of  his  several  teachers, 
what  they  taught  and  what  a  pupil  might  learn 
from  them.  Besides,  this  book,  like  the  eleven 
other  books,  was  for  his  own  use,  and  if  we 
may  trust  the  note  at  the  end  of  the  first  book, 
it  was  written  during  one  of  M.  Antoninus' 
campaigns  against  the  Quadi,  at  a  time  when 
the  commemoration  of  the  virtues  of  his  illus- 
trious teachers  might  remind  him  of  their  les- 
sons and  the  practical  uses  which  he  might 
derive  from  them. 

Among  his  teachers  of  philosophy  was  Sextus 
of  Chaeroneia,  a  grandson  of  Plutarch.  What 
he  learned  from  this  excellent  man  is  told  by 
himself  (i.,  9).  His  favorite  teacher  was  Q. 
Junius  Rusticus  (i.,  7),  a  philosopher  and  also 
a  man  of  practical  good  sense  in  public  affairs. 


4  M.  Burelius  Bntoninus 

Rusticus  was  the  adviser  of  Antoninus  after  he 
became  emperor.  Young  men  who  are  des- 
tined for  high  places  are  not  often  fortunate  in 
those  who  are  about  them,  their  companions 
and  teachers  ;  and  I  do  not  know  any  example 
of  a  young  prince  having  had  an  education 
which  can  be  compared  with  that  of  M.  Anto- 
ninus. Such  a  body  of  teachers  distinguished 
by  their  acquirements  and  character  will  hardly 
be  collected  again  ;  and  as  to  the  pupil,  we 
have  not  had  one  like  him  since. 

Hadrian  died  in  July,  a.d.  138,  and  was  suc- 
ceeded by  Antoninus  Pius.  M.  Antoninus  mar- 
ried Faustina,  his  cousin,  the  daughter  of  Pius, 
probably  about  a.d.  146,  for  he  had  a  daughter 
born  in  147.  He  received  from  his  adoptive 
father  the  title  of  Caesar,  and  was  associated 
with  him  in  the  administration  of  the  state. 
The  father  and  the  adopted  son  lived  together 
in  perfect  friendship  and  confidence.  Anto- 
ninus was  a  dutiful  son,  and  the  Emperor  Pius 
loved  and  esteemed  him. 

Antoninus  Pius  died  in  March,  a.d.  161. 
The  Senate,  it  is  said,  urged  M.  Antoninus  to 
take  the  sole  administration  of  the  empire,  but 
he  associated  with  himself  the  other  adopted 
son  of  Pius,  L.  Ceionius  Commodus,  who  is  gen- 
erally called  Iy.  Verus.  Thus  Rome  for  the 
first  time  had  two  emperors.     Verus  was  an  in- 


dfo.  Burelius  Bntontnus  5 

dolent  man  of  pleasure  and  unworthy  of  his 
station.  Antoninus,  however,  bore  with  him, 
and  it  is  said  that  Verus  had  sense  enough  to 
pay  to  his  colleague  the  respect  due  to  his  char- 
acter. A  virtuous  emperor  and  a  loose  partner 
lived  together  in  peace,  and  their  alliance  was 
strengthened  by  Antoninus  giving  to  Verus  for 
wife  his  daughter  Lucilla. 

The  reign  of  Antoninus  was  first  troubled  by 
a  Parthian  war,  in  which  Verus  was  sent  to 
command,  but  he  did  nothing,  and  the  success 
that  was  obtained  by  the  Romans  in  Armenia 
and  on  the  Euphrates  and  Tigris  was  due  to  his 
generals.  This  Parthian  war  ended  in  a.d. 
165.  Aurelius  and  Verus  had  a  triumph  (a.d. 
166)  for  the  victories  in  the  east.  A  pestilence 
followed  which  carried  off  great  numbers  in 
Rome  and  Italy,  and  spread  to  the  west  of  Eu- 
rope. 

The  north  of  Italy  was  also  threatened  by  the 
rude  people  beyond  the  Alps  from  the  borders 
of  Gallia  to  the  eastern  side  of  the  Hadri- 
atic.  These  barbarians  attempted  to  break 
into  Italy,  as  the  Germanic  nations  had  at- 
tempted near  three  hundred  years  before  ;  and 
the  rest  of  the  life  of  Antoninus,  with  some 
intervals,  was  employed  in  driving  back  the 
invaders.  In  169  Verus  suddenly  died,  and 
Antoninus  administered  the  state  alone. 


6  /ift.  Burelius  Bntontnus 

During  the  German  wars  Antoninus  resided 
for  three  years  on  the  Danube  at  Carnuntum. 
The  Marcomanni  were  driven  out  of  Pannonia 
and  almost  destroyed  in  their  retreat  across  the 
Danube  ;  and  in  a.d.  174  the  emperor  gained  a 
great  victory  over  the  Quadi. 

In  a.d.  175  Avidius  Cassius,  a  brave  and  skil- 
ful Roman  commander,  who  was  at  the  head  of 
the  troops  in  Asia,  revolted  and  declared  him- 
self Augustus.  But  Cassius  was  assassinated  by 
some  of  his  officers,  and  so  the  rebellion  came 
to  an  end.  Antoninus  showed  his  humanity  by 
his  treatment  of  the  family  and  the  partisans 
of  Cassius,  and  his  letter  to  the  senate  in  which 
he  recommends  mercy  is  extant.  (Vulcatius, 
"Avidius  Cassius,"  c.  12.) 

Antoninus  set  out  for  the  east  on  hearing  of 
Cassius'  revolt.  Though  he  appears  to  have 
returned  to  Rome  in  a.d.  174,  he  went  back  to 
prosecute  the  war  against  the  Germans,  and  it 
is  probable  that  he  marched  direct  to  the  east 
from  the  German  war.  His  wife  Faustina,  who 
accompanied  him  into  Asia,  died  suddenly  at 
the  foot  of  the  Taurus,  to  the  great  grief  of  her 
husband.  Capitolinus,  who  has  written  the  life 
of  Antoninus,  and  also  Dion  Cassius,  accuses  the 
empress  of  scandalous  infidelity  to  her  husband 
and  of  abominable  lewdness.  But  Capitolinus 
says  that  Antoninus  either  knew  it  not  or  pre- 


dfc.  Burelius  Sntontnus  7 

tended  not  to  know  it.  Nothing  is  so  common 
as  such  malicious  reports  in  all  ages,  and  the 
history  of  imperial  Rome  is  full  of  them.  An- 
toninus loved  his  wife,  and  he  says  that  she 
was  "obedient,  affectionate,  and  simple."  The 
same  scandal  had  been  spread  about  Faustina's 
mother,  the  wife  of  Antoninus  Pius,  and  yet  he 
too  was  perfectly  satisfied  with  his  wife.  An- 
toninus Pius  says  after  her  death  in  a  letter  to 
Fronto  that  he  would  rather  have  lived  in  exile 
with  his  wife  than  in  his  palace  at  Rome  with- 
out her.  There  are  not  many  men  who  would 
give  their  wives  a  better  character  than  these 
two  emperors.  Capitolinus  wrote  in  the  time 
of  Diocletian.  He  may  have  intended  to  tell 
the  truth,  but  he  is  a  poor,  feeble  biographer. 
Dion  Cassius,  the  most  malignant  of  historians, 
always  reports,  and  perhaps  he  believed,  any 
scandal  against  anybody. 

Antoninus  continued  his  journey  to  Syria 
and  Egypt,  and  on  his  return  to  Italy  through 
Athens  he  was  initiated  into  the  Bleusinian 
mysteries.  It  was  the  practice  of  the  emperor 
to  conform  to  the  established  rites  of  the  age 
and  to  perform  religious  ceremonies  with  due 
solemnity.  We  cannot  conclude  from  this  that 
he  was  a  superstitious  man,  though  we  might 
perhaps  do  so  if  his  book  did  not  show  that  he 
was  not.     But  this  is  only  one  among  many  in- 


8  /IB.  Burelius  Bntontnus 

stances  that  a  ruler's  public  acts  do  not  always 
prove  his  real  opinions.  A  prudent  governor 
will  not  roughly  oppose  even  the  superstitions 
of  his  people,  and  though  he  may  wish  that 
they  were  wiser,  he  will  know  that  he  cannot 
make  them  so  by  offending  their  prejudices. 

Antoninus  and  his  son  Commodus  entered 
Rome  in  triumph,  perhaps  for  some  German 
victories,  on  the  23d  of  December,  a.d.  176. 
In  the  following  year  Commodus  was  associated 
with  his  father  in  the  empire,  and  took  the 
name  of  Augustus.  This  year  a.d.  177  is 
memorable  in  ecclesiastical  history.  Attalus 
and  others  were  put  to  death  at  Lyon  for  their 
adherence  to  the  Christian  religion.  The  evi- 
dence of  this  persecution  is  a  letter  preserved 
by  Eusebius  (E.  H.  v.  1  ;  printed  in  Routh's 
"Reliquiae  Sacrae,"  vol.  i.,  with  notes).  The 
letter  is  from  the  Christians  of  Vienna  and 
IvUgdunum  in  Gallia  (Vienne  and  Lyon)  to  their 
Christian  brethren  in  Asia  and  Phrygia  ;  and  it 
is  preserved  perhaps  nearly  entire.  It  contains 
a  very  particular  description  of  the  tortures  in- 
flicted on  the  Christians  in  Gallia,  and  it  states 
that  while  the  persecution  was  going  on,  At- 
talus, a  Christian  and  a  Roman  citizen,  was 
loudly  demanded  by  the  populace  and  brought 
into  the  amphitheatre,  but  the  governor  ordered 
him  to  be  reserved  with  the  rest  who  were  in 


iHb.  Burelius  Sntoninus  9 

prison,  until  he  had  received  instructions  from 
the  emperor.  Many  had  been  tortured  before 
the  governor  thought  of  applying  to  Antoninus. 
The  imperial  rescript,  says  the  letter,  was  that 
the  Christians  should  be  punished,  but  if  they 
would  deny  their  faith,  they  must  be  released. 
On  this  the  work  began  again.  The  Christians 
who  were  Roman  citizens  were  beheaded ;  the 
rest  were  exposed  to  the  wild  beasts  in  the 
amphitheatre.  Some  modern  writers  on  ecclesi- 
astical history,  when  they  use  this  letter,  say 
nothing  of  the  wonderful  stories  of  the  martyrs' 
sufferings.  Sanctus,  as  the  letter  says,  was 
burnt  with  plates  of  hot  iron  till  his  body  was 
one  sore  and  had  lost  all  human  form,  but  on 
being  put  to  the  rack  he  recovered  his  former 
appearance  under  the  torture,  which  was  thus 
a  cure  instead  of  a  punishment.  He  was  after- 
wards torn  by  beasts,  and  placed  on  an  iron 
chair  and  roasted.     He  died  at  last. 

The  letter  is  one  piece  of  evidence.  The 
writer,  whoever  he  was,  that  wrote  in  the  name 
of  the  Gallic  Christians,  is  our  evidence  both 
for  the  ordinary  and  the  extraordinary  circum- 
stances of  the  story,  and  we  cannot  accept  his 
evidence  for  one  part  and  reject  the  other.  We 
often  receive  small  evidence  as  a  proof  of  a 
thing  which  we  believe  to  be  within  the  limits 
of  probability  or  possibility,  and  we  reject  ex- 


io  d&.  Burelius  Bntoninus 

actly  the  same  evidence,  when  the  thing  to 
which  it  refers,  appears  very  improbable  or  im- 
possible. But  this  is  a  false  method  of  inquiry, 
though  it  is  followed  by  some  modern  writers, 
who  select  what  they  like  from  a  story  and 
reject  the  rest  of  the  evidence  ;  or  if  they  do  not 
reject  it,  they  dishonestly  suppress  it.  A  man 
can  only  act  consistently  by  accepting  all  this 
letter  or  rejecting  it  all,  and  we  cannot  blame 
him  for  either.  But  he  who  rejects  it  may  still 
admit  that  such  a  letter  may  be  founded  on 
real  facts ;  and  he  would  make  this  admission 
as  the  most  probable  way  of  accounting  for  the 
existence  of  the  letter  ;  but  if,  as  he  would  sup- 
pose, the  writer  has  stated  some  things  falsely, 
he  cannot  tell  what  part  of  his  story  is  worthy 
of  credit. 

The  war  on  the  northern  frontier  appears  to 
have  been  uninterrupted  during  the  visit  of  An- 
toninus to  the  east,  and  on  his  return  the  em- 
peror again  left  Rome  to  oppose  the  barbarians. 
The  Germanic  people  were  defeated  in  a  great 
battle  a.d.  179.  During  this  campaign  the  em- 
peror was  seized  with  some  contagious  malady, 
of  which  he  died  in  the  camp  at  Sirmium  (Mit- 
rovitz)  on  the  Save  in  Lower  Pannonia,  but  at 
Vindebona  (Vienna)  according  to  other  authori- 
ties, on  the  17th  of  March,  a.d.  180,  in  the  fifty- 
ninth  year  of  his  age.     His  son  Commodus  was 


iTIb.  Surelius  Bntoninus  u 

with  him.  The  body  or  the  ashes  probably  ot 
the  emperor  were  carried  to  Rome,  and  he  re- 
ceived the  honor  of  deification.  Those  who 
could  afford  it  had  his  statue  or  bust,  and  when 
Capitolinus  wrote,  many  people  still  had  statues 
of  Antoninus  among  the  Dei  Penates  or  house- 
hold deities.  He  was  in  a  manner  made  a  saint. 
Commodus  erected  to  the  memory  of  his  father 
the  Antonine  column,  which  is  now  in  the 
Piazza  Colon n a  at  Rome.  The  bassi  rilievi 
which  are  placed  in  a  spiral  line  round  the 
shaft  commemorate  the  victories  of  Antoninus 
over  the  Marcomanni  and  the  Quadi,  and  the 
miraculous  shower  of  rain  which  refreshed  the 
Roman  soldiers  and  discomfited  their  enemies. 
The  statue  of  Antoninus  was  placed  on  the 
capital  of  the  column,  but  it  was  removed  at 
some  time  unknown,  and  a  bronze  statue  of  St. 
Paul  was  put  in  the  place  by  Pope  Sixtus  the 
fifth. 

The  historical  evidence  for  the  times  of  An- 
toninus is  very  defective,  and  some  of  that 
which  remains  is  not  credible.  The  most  curi- 
ous is  the  story  about  the  miracle  which  hap- 
pened A.D.  174,  during  the  war  with  the  Quadi. 
The  Roman  army  was  in  danger  of  perishing 
by  thirst,  but  a  sudden  storm  drenched  them 
with  ram,  while  it  discharged  fire  and  hail  on 
their  enemies,  and  the  Romans  gained  a  great 


12  .flfe,  B'urelius  Bntoninus 

victory.  All  the  authorities  which  speak  of  the 
battle  speak  also  of  the  miracle.  The  Gentile 
writers  assign  it  to  their  gods,  and  the  Chris- 
tians to  the  intercession  of  the  Christian  legion 
in  the  emperor's  army.  To  confirm  the  Chris- 
tian statement  it  is  added  that  the  emperor  gave 
the  title  of  Thundering  to  this  legion  ;  but 
Dacier  and  others  who  maintain  the  Christian 
report  of  the  miracle,  admit  that  this  title  of 
Thundering  or  Lightning  was  not  given  to  this 
legion  because  the  Quadi  were  struck  with 
lightning,  but  because  there  was  a  figure 
of  lightning  on  their  shields,  and  that  this 
title  of  the  legion  existed  in  the  time  of 
Augustus. 

Scaliger  also  had  observed  that  the  legion 
was  called  Thundering  {HspavvofioXoS,  or 
xspavvocpopoS)  before  the  reign  of  Antoninus. 
We  learn  this  from  Dion  Cassius  (Lib.  55,  c.  23, 
and  the  note  of  Reimarus)  who  enumerates  all 
the  legions  of  Augustus'  time.  The  name 
Thundering  or  Lightning  also  occurs  on  an  in- 
scription of  the  reign  of  Trajan,  which  was 
found  at  Trieste.  Eusebius  (v.,  5)  when  he  re- 
lates the  miracle,  quotes  Apolinarius,  bishop  of 
Hierapolis,  as  authority  for  this  name  being 
given  to  the  legion  Melitene  by  the  emperor  in 
consequence  of  the  success  which  he  obtained 
through  their  pra}'ers  ;  from  which  we  may  es~ 


yiR.  Burclius  Bntomnus  13 

timate  the  value  of  Apolinarius'  testimony. 
Eusebius  does  not  say  in  what  book  of  Apoli- 
narius the  statement  occurs.  Dion  says  that 
the  Thundering  legion  was  stationed  in  Cappa- 
docia  in  the  time  of  Augustus.  Valesius  also 
observes  that  in  the  Notitia  of  the  Imperium 
Romanum  there  is  mentioned  under  the  com- 
mander of  Armenia  the  Prsefectura  of  the 
twelfth  legion  named  "Thundering  Melitene"  ; 
and  this  position  in  Armenia  will  agree  with 
what  Dion  says  of  its  position  in  Cappadocia. 
Accordingly  Valesius  concludes  that  Melitene 
was  not  the  name  of  the  legion,  but  of  the  town 
in  which  it  was  stationed.  Melitene  was  also 
the  name  of  the  district  in  which  this  town  was 
situated.  The  legions  did  not,  he  says,  take 
their  name  from  the  place  where  they  were  on 
duty,  but  from  the  country  in  which  they  were 
raised,  and  therefore,  what  Eusebius  says  about 
the  Melitene  does  seem  probable  to  him.  Yet 
Valesius,  on  the  authority  of  Apolinarius  and 
Tertullian,  believed  that  the  miracle  was 
worked  through  the  prayers  of  the  Christian 
soldiers  in  the  emperor's  army.  Rufinus  does 
not  give  the  name  of  Melitene  to  this  legion, 
says  Valesius,  and  probably  he  purposely  omit- 
ted it,  because  he  knew  that  Melitene  was  the 
name  of  a  town  in  Armenia  Minor,  where  the 
legion  was  stationed  in  his  time. 


i4  /lfc.  Suretlus  Bntontnus 

The  emperor,  it  is  said,  made  a  report  of  this 
victory  to  the  Senate,  which  we  may  believe, 
for  such  was  the  practice  ;  but  we  do  not  know 
what  he  said  in  his  letter,  for  it  is  not  extant. 
Dacier  assumes  that  the  emperor's  letter  was 
purposely  destroyed  by  the  Senate  or  the  ene- 
mies of  Christianity,  that  so  honorable  a  testi- 
timony  to  the  Christians  and  their  religion 
might  not  be  perpetuated.  The  critic  has, 
however,  not  seen  that  he  contradicts  himself 
when  he  tells  us  the  purport  of  the  letter,  for 
he  says  that  it  was  destroyed,  and  even  Euse- 
bius  could  not  find  it.  But  there  does  exist  a 
letter  in  Greek  addressed  by  Antoninus  to  the 
Roman  people  and  the  sacred  Senate  after  this 
memorable  victory.  It  is  sometimes  printed 
after  Justin's  first  Apology,  but  it  is  totally  un- 
connected with  the  Apologies.  This  letter  is 
one  of  the  most  stupid  forgeries  of  the  many 
which  exist,  and  it  cannot  be  possibly  founded 
even  on  the  genuine  report  of  Antoninus  to  the 
Senate.  If  it  were  genuine,  it  would  free  the 
emperor  from  the  charge  of  persecuting  men 
because  they  were  Christians,  for  he  says  in 
this  false  letter  that  if  a  man  accuse  another 
only  of  being  a  Christian,  and  the  accused 
confess  and  there  is  nothing  else  against 
him,  he  must  be  set  free;  with  this  mons- 
trous  addition,    made   by    a   man   inconceiva- 


/Ifc.  Burelfue  Bntonfnus  15 

bly  ignorant,  that  the  informer  must  be  burnt 
alive.* 

During  the  time  of  Antoninus  Pius  and  Mar- 
cus Antoninus  there  appeared  the  first  Apology 
of  Justinus,  and  under  M.  Antoninus  the  Ora- 
tion of  Tatian  against  the  Greeks,  which  was 
a  fierce  attack  on  the  established  religions  ; 
the  address  of  Athenagoras  to  M.  Antoninus  on 
behalf  of  the  Christians,  and  the  Apology  of 
Melito,  bishop  of  Sardes,  also  addressed  to  the 
emperor,  and  that  of  Apolinarius.  The  first 
Apology  of  Justinus  is  addressed  to  T.  Antoni- 
nus Pius  and  his  two  adopted  sons,  M.  Antoni- 
nus and  L.  Verus  ;  but  we  do  not  know  whether 
they  read  it.f  The  second  Apology  of  Justinus 
is  entitled  "to  the  Roman  Senate"  ;  but  this 
superscription  is  from  some  copyist.  In  the 
first  chapter  Justinus  addresses   the   Romans. 

*  Eusebius  (v.,  5)  quotes  Tertullian's  Apology  to  the 
Roman  Senate  in  confirmation  of  the  story.  Tertul- 
lian,  he  says,  writes  that  letters  of  the  emperor  were 
extant,  in  which  he  declares  that  his  army  was  saved 
by  the  prayers  of  the  Christian  ;  and  that  he  "  threat- 
ened to  punish  with  death  those  who  ventured  to  accuse 
us."  It  is  possible  that  the  forged  letter  which  is  now 
extant  may  be  one  of  those  which  Tertullian  had  seen, 
for  he  uses  the  plural  number,  "letters."  A  great  deal 
has  been  written  about  this  miracle  of  the  Thundering 
Legion,  and  more  than  is  worth  reading.  There  is  a 
dissertation  on  this  supposed  miracle  in  Moyle's  Works, 
London,  1726. 

fOrosius,  vii.,  14,  says  that  Justinus  the  philosopher 
presented  to  Antoninus  Pius  his  work  in  defence  of 
the  Christian  religion,  and  made  him  merciful  to  the 
Christians. 


i 6  /|ft.  Burclius  Bntonfnus 

In  the  second  chapter  he  speaks  of  an  affair 
that  had  recently  happened  in  the  time  of  M. 
Antoninus  and  Iy.  Verus,  as  it  seems ;  and  he 
also  directly  addresses  the  emperor,  saying  of  a 
certain  woman,  "she  addressed  a  petition  to 
thee  the  emperor,  and  thou  didst  grant  the  pe- 
tition." In  other  passages  the  writer  addresses 
the  two  emperors,  from  which  we  must  con- 
clude that  the  Apology  was  directed  to  them. 
Eusebius  (E.  H.  iv.,  18)  states  that  the  sec- 
ond Apology  was  addressed  to  the  successor  of 
Antoninus  Pius,  and  he  names  him  Antoninus 
Verus,  meaning  M.  Antoninus.  In  one  passage 
of  this  second  Apology  (c.  8),  Justinus,  or  the 
writer  whoever  he  may  be,  says  that  even  men 
who  followed  the  Stoic  doctrines,  when  they 
ordered  their  lives  according  to  ethical  reason, 
were  hated  and  murdered,  such  as  Heraclitus, 
Musonius  in  his  own  times,  and  others  ;  for  all 
those  who  in  any  way  labored  to  live  according 
to  reason  and  avoided  wickedness  were  always 
hated  ;  aud  this  was  the  effect  of  the  work  of 
daemons. 

Justinus  himself  is  said  to  have  been  put  to 
death  at  Rome,  because  he  refused  to  sacrifice 
to  the  gods.  It  cannot  have  been  in  the  reign 
of  Hadrian,  as  one  authority  states  ;  nor  in  the 
time  of  Antoninus  Pius,  if  the  second  Apology 
was  written  in  the  time  of  M.  Antoninus  ;  and 


/Ifc.  Burclius  Bntonimis  17 

there  is  evidence  that  this  event  took  place  un- 
der M.  Antoninus  and  L.  Verus,  when  Rusticus 
was  prefect  of  the  city.* 

The  persecution  in  which  Polycarp  suf- 
fered at  Smyrna  belongs  to  the  time  of  M. 
Antoninus.  The  evidence  for  it  is  the  letter 
of  the  church  of  Smyrna  to  the  churches  of 
Philomelium  and  the  other  Christian  churches, 
and  it  is  preserved  by  Eusebius  (E.  H.  iv.,  15). 
But  the  critics  do   not   agree  about  the  time 

*See  the  "Martyrium  Sanctorum  Justini,"  etc.,  in 
the  works  of  Justinius,  ed.  Otto,  vol.  ii.,  559.  "Junius 
Rusticus  Praeiectus  Urbi  erat  sub  imperatoribus  M. 
Aurelio  et  L.  Vero,  id  quod  liquet  ex  Themistii  Orat. 
xxxiv.  Dindorf,  p.  451,  et  ex  quodam  illorum  rescripto, 
Dig.  49.  1.  1,  §  2."  (Otto.)  The  rescript  contains  the 
words  "Junium  Rusticum  amicum,  nostrum,  Prsefec- 
tum  Urbi."  The  Martyrium  of  Justinus  and  others  is 
written  in  Greek.  It  begins,  "  In  the  time  of  the  wicked 
defenders  of  idolatry,  impious  edicts  were  published 
against  the  pious  Christians,  both  in  cities  and  country 
places,  for  the  purpose  of  compelling  them  to  make 
offerings  of  vain  idols.  Accordingly  the  holy  men  (Jus- 
tinus, Chariton,  a  woman  Charito,  Paeon,  I^iberianus, 
and  others)  were  brought  before  Rusticus,  the  prefect 
of  Rome." 

The  Martyrium  gives  the  examination  of  the  accused 
by  Rusticus.  All  of  them  professed  to  be  Christians. 
Justinus  was  asked  if  he  expected  to  ascend  into  heaven 
and  to  receive  a  reward  for  his  sufferings,  if  he  was  con- 
demned to  death.  He  answered  that  he  did  not  expect ; 
he  was  certain  of  it.  Finally  the  test  of  obedience  was 
proposed  to  the  prisoners  :  they  were  required  to  sacri- 
fice to  the  gods.  All  refused,  and  Rusticus  pronounced 
the  sentence,  which  was,  that  those  who  refused  to  sac- 
rifice to  the  gods  and  obey  the  emperor's  order,  should 
be  whipped  and  beheaded  according  to  the  law.  The 
martyrs  were  then  led  to  the  usual  place  of  execution 
and  beheaded.  Some  of  the  faithful  secretly  carried  off 
the  bodies  and  deposited  them  in  a  fit  place. 


i8  d&.  ^lurcliue  Bntoninus 

of  Polycarp's  death,  differing  in  the  two  ex- 
tremes to  the  amount  of  twelve  years.  The 
circumstances  of  Polycarp's  martrydom  were 
accompanied  by  miracles,  one  of  which  Euse- 
bius  (iv.,  15)  has  omitted,  but  it  appears  in 
the  oldest  Latin  version  of  the  letter,  which 
Usher  published,  and  it  is  supposed  that  this 
version  was  made  not  long  after  the  time  of 
Eusebius.  The  notice  at  the  end  of  the  letter 
states  that  it  was  transcribed  by  Caius  from  the 
copy  of  Irenaeus,  the  disciple  of  Polycarp,  then 
transcribed  by  Socrates  at  Corinth;  "after 
which  I  Pionius  again  wrote  it  out  from  the 
copy  above  mentioned,  having  searched  it  out 
by  the  revelation  of  Polycarp,  who  directed  me 
to  it,  etc."  The  story  of  Polycarp's  martrydom 
is  embellished  with  miraculous  circumstances 
which  some  modern  writers  on  ecclesiastical 
history  take  the  liberty  of  omitting.* 

In  order  to  form  a  proper  notion  of  the  con- 
dition of  the  Christians  under  M.  Antoninus  we 


*  Conyers  Middleton,  An  Inquiry  into  the  Miraculous 
Powers,  etc.  p.  126.  Middleton  says  that  Eusebius  omit- 
ted to  mention  the  dove,  which  flew  out  of  Polycarp's 
body,  and  Dodwell  and  Archbishop  Wake  have  done  the 
the  same.  Wake  says,  ' '  I  am  so  little  a  friend  to  such 
miracles  that  1  thought  it  better  with  Eusebius  to  omit 
that  circumstance  than  to  mention  it  from  Bp.  Usher's 
Manuscript,"  which  manuscript  however,  says  Middle- 
ton,  he  afterwards  declares  to  be  so  well  attested 
that  we  need  not  any  further  assurance  of  the  truth 
of  it. 


flh.  Sureltus  Bntonfnus  19 

must  go  back  to  Trajan's  time.  When  the 
younger  Pliny  was  governor  of  Bithynia,  the 
Christians  were  numerous  in  those  parts,  and 
the  worshippers  of  the  old  religion  were  falling 
off.  The  temples  were  deserted,  the  festivals 
neglected,  and  there  were  no  purchasers  of  vic- 
tims for  sacrifice.  Those  who  were  interested 
in  the  maintenance  of  the  old  religion  thus 
found  their  profits  were  in  danger.  Christians 
of  both  sexes  and  of  all  ages  were  brought 
before  the  governor,  who  did  not  know  what  to 
do  with  them.  He  could  come  to  no  other  con- 
clusion than  this,  that  those  who  confessed  to 
be  Christians  and  persevered  in  their  religion 
ought  to  be  punished  ;  if  for  nothing  else,  for 
their  invincible  obstinacy.  He  found  no  crimes 
proved  agains  the  Christians,  and  he  could  only 
characterize  their  religion  as  a  depraved  and  ex- 
travagant superstition,  which  might  be  stopped, 
if  the  people  were  allowed  the  opportunity  of 
recanting.  Pliny  wrote  this  in  a  letter  to  Tra- 
jan (Plinius,  Ep.  x.,  97).  He  asked  for  the 
emperor's  directions,  because  he  did  not  know 
what  to  do.  He  remarks  that  he  had  never 
been  engaged  in  judicial  inquiries  about  the 
Christians,  and  that  accordingly  he  did  not 
known  what  to  inquire  about  or  how  far  to  in- 
quire and  punish.  This  proves  that  it  was  not 
a  new  thing  to  examine  into  a  man's  profession 


20  /IR.  Bureltus  Bntouiuus 

of  Christianity  and  to  punish  him  for  it.*  Tra- 
jan's Rescript  is  extant.  He  approved  of  the 
governor's  judgment  in  the  matter  ;  but  he  said 
that  no  search  must  be  made  after  the  Christ- 
ians. If  a  man  was  charged  with  the  new  reli- 
gion and  convicted,  he  must  not  be  punished, 
if  he  affirmed  that  he  was  not  a  Christian  and 
confirmed  his  denial  by  showing  his  reverence 
for  the  heathen  gods.  He  added  that  no  notice 
must  be  taken  of  anonymous  informations,  for 
such  things  were  of  bad  example.  Trajan  was 
a  mild  and  sensible  man,  and  both  motives  of 
mercy  and  policy  probably  also  induced  him  to 
take  as  little  notice  of  the  Christians  as  he 
could  ;  to  let  them  live  in  quiet,  if  it  were  pos- 
sible. Trajan's  Rescript  is  the  first  legislative 
act  at  the  head  of  the  Roman  state  with  refer- 
ence to  Christianity,  which  is  known  to  us.  It 
does  not  appear  that  the  Christians  were  further 
disturbed  under  his  reign.  The  martyrdom  of 
Ignatius  by  the  order  of  Trajan  himself  is  not 
universally  admitted  to  be  a  historical  fact.f 

*  Orosius(vii.,  12)  speaksof  Trajan's  persecution  of  the 
Christians,  and  of  Pliny's  application  to  him  having  led 
the  emperor  to  mitigate  his  severity.  The  punishment 
by  the  Mosaic  law  for  those  who  attempted  to  seduce  the 
Jews  to  follow  new  gods,  was  death.  If  a  man  was 
secretly  enticed  to  such  new  worship,  he  must  kill  the 
seducer,  even  if  the  seducer  were  brother,  son,  daughter, 
wife,  or  friend.     (Deut.  xiii.) 

+  The  Martyrium  Ignatii,  first  published  in  I^atin  by 
Archbishop  Usher,  is"the  chief  evidence  for  the  circum- 
stances of  Ignatius'  death. 


/ift.  Burcltus  Bntoninus  21 

In  the  time  of  Hadrian  it  was  no  longer  pos- 
sible for  the  Roman  government  to  overlook  the 
great  increase  of  the  Christians  and  the  hostili- 
ty of  the  common  sort  to  them.  If  the  gov- 
ernors in  the  provinces  were  willing  to  let  them 
alone,  they  could  not  resist  the  fanaticism  of  the 
heathen  community,  who  looked  on  the  Christ- 
ians as  atheists.  The  Jews  too  who  were  set- 
tled all  over  the  Roman  Empire  were  as  hostile 
to  the  Christian  as  the  Gentiles  were.*  With 
the  time  of  Hadrian  begin  the  Christian  Apolo- 
gies, which  show  plainly  what  the  popular 
feeling  towards  the  Christians  then  was.  A 
rescript  of  Hadrian  to  Minucius  Fundanus  the 
Proconsul  of  Asia,  which  stands  at  the  end  of 
Justin's  first  Apology,  f  instructs  the  governor 
that  innocent  people  must  not  be  troubled  and 
false   accusers  must  not  be  allowed   to  extort 

*  We  have  the  evidence  of  Justinus  (ad  Diognetum,  c. 
5)  to  this  effect:  "The  Christians  are  attacked  by  the 
Jews  as  if  they  were  men  of  a  different  race,  and  are  per- 
secuted by  the  Greeks  ;  and  those  who  hate  them  cannot 
give  the  reason  of  their  enmity. ' ' 

t  And  in  Eusebius  (E.H.  iv  ,8,  9.)  Orosius  (vii.,  13)  says 
that  Hadrian  sent  this  Rescript  to  Minucius  Fundanus 
proconsul  of  Asia  after  being  instructed  in  books  written 
on  the  Christian  religion  by  Quadratus,  a  disciple  of  the 
Apostles  and  Aristides  an  Athenian,  an  honest  and  wise 
man,  and  Serenus  Granius.  In  the  Greek  text  of 
Hadrian's  Rescript  there  is  mentioned  Serenius  Grani- 
anus,  the  predecessor  of  Minucius  Fundanus  in  the 
government  of  Asia. 

This  Rescript  of  Hadrian  has  clearly  been  added  to  the 
Apology  by  some  editor.  The  Apology  ends  with  the 
words  :  6  ^lAoy  r<p  Oew,  toCto  yeuiadoi' 


22  /ift,  Burelius  Antoninus 

money  from  them  ;  the  charges  against  the 
Christians  must  be  made  in  due  form  and  no 
attention  must  be  paid  to  popular  clamors ; 
when  Christians  were  regularly  prosecuted  and 
convicted  of  illegal  acts,  they  must  be  punished 
according  to  their  deserts  ;  and  false  accusers 
also  must  be  punished.  Antoninus  Pius  is  said 
to  have  published  rescripts  to  the  same  effect. 
The  terms  of  Hadrian's  Rescript  seem  very 
favorable  to  the  Christians ;  but  if  we  under- 
stand it  in  this  sense,  that  they  were  only  to  be 
punished  like  other  people  for  illegal  acts,  it 
would  have  no  meaning,  for  that  could  have 
been  done  without  asking  the  emperor's  advice. 
The  real  purpose  of  the  Rescript  is  that  Chris- 
tians must  be  punished  if  they  persisted  in  their 
belief,  and  would  not  prove  their  renunciation 
of  it  by  acknowledging  the  heathen  religion. 
This  was  Trajan's  rule,  and  we  have  no  reason 
for  supposing  that  Hadrian  granted  more  to 
the  Christians  than  Trajan  did.  There  is  also 
printed  at  the  end  of  Justin's  first  Apology  a 
Rescript  of  Antoninus  Pius  to  the  Commune  of 
Asia  (ro  hoivov  rrj$'>A6La<i),  and  is  also  in  Buse- 
bius  (B.  H.  iv.,  13).  The  date  of  the  Rescript 
is    the   third   consulship   of  Antoninus  Pius.* 

*  Eusebius  (E.  H.  iv.,  12)  after  the  beginning  of  Jus- 
tinus'  First  Apology,  which  contains  the  address  to  T. 
Antoninus  and  his  two  adopted  sons,  adds  :  "  The  same 
emperor  being  addressed  by  other  brethren  in  Asia  hon- 


/Ift.  Burelius  Bntonfnus  23 

The  Rescript  declares  that  the  Christians,  for 
they  are  meant,  though  the  name  Christians 
does  not  occur  in  the  Rescript,  were  not  to  be 
disturbed,  unless  they  were  attempting  some- 
thing against  the  Roman  rule,  and  no  man  was 
to  be  punished  simply  for  being  a  Christian. 
But  this  Rescript  is  spurious.  Any  man  moder- 
ately acquainted  with  Roman  history  will  see 
by  the  style  and  tenor  that  it  is  a  clumsy 
forgery. 

In  the  time  of  M.  Antoninus  the  opposition 
between  the  old  and  the  new  belief  was  still 
stronger,  and  the  adherents  of  the  heathen  re- 
ligion urged  those  in  authority  to  a  more  regu- 
lar resistance  to  the  invasions  of  the  Christian 
faith.     Melito  in  his  Apology  to  M.  Antoninus 

ored  the  Commune  of  Asia  with  the  following  Rescript." 
This  Rescript,  which  is  in  the  next  chapter  of  Eusebius 
(E.  H.  iv,.  13),  is  in  the  sole  name  of  Caesar  Marcus  Aure- 
lius  Antoninus  Augustus  Armenius,  though  Eusebius 
had  just  before  said  that  he  was  going  to  give  us  a  Re- 
script of  Antoninus  Pius.  There  are  some  material  vari- 
ations between  the  two  copies  of  the  rescript  besides  the 
difference  in  the  title,  which  difference  makes  it  impos- 
sible to  say  whether  the  forger  intended  to  assign  this 
rescript  to  Pius  or  to  M.  Antoninus. 

The  author  of  the  Alexandrine  Chronicum  says  that 
Marcus  being  moved  by  the  entreaties  of  Meltto  and 
other  heads  of  the  church  wrote  an  Epistle  to  the  Com- 
mune of  Asia  in  which  he  forbade  the  Christians  to  be 
troubled  on  account  of  their  religion.  Valesius  supposes 
this  to  be  the  letter  or  rescript  which  is  contained  in 
Eusebius  (iv.,  13),  and  to  be  the  answer  to  the  Apology  of 
Melito  of  which  I  shall  soon  give  the  substance.  But 
Marcus  certainly  did  not  write  this  letter  which  is  in 
Eusebius,  and  we  know  not  what  answer  he  made  to 
Melito. 


24  OS.  Burelius  Bntoninus 

represents  the  Christians  of  Asia  as  persecuted 
under  new  imperial  orders.  Shameless  inform- 
ers, he  says,  men  who  were  greedy  after  the 
property  of  others,  used  these  orders  as  a 
means  of  robbing  those  who  were  doing  no 
harm.  He  doubts  if  a  just  emperor  could  have 
ordered  any  thing  so  unjust ;  and  if  the  last 
order  was  really  not  from  the  emperor,  the 
Christians  entreat  him  not  to  give  them  up  to 
their  enemies.*  We  conclude  from  this  that 
there  were  at  least  imperial  rescripts  or  con- 
stitutions of  M.  Antoninus,  which  were  made 
the  foundation  of  these  persecutions.  The  fact 
of  being  a  Christian  was  now  a  crime  and  pun- 

*"Eusebius,"  (iv.,  26);  and  Routh's  "Reliquiae  Sac- 
rse,"  vol.  i.,  and  the  notes.  The  interpretation  of  this 
Fragment  is  not  easy.  Mosheim  misunderstood  one 
passage  so  far  as  to  affirm  that  Marcus  promised  re- 
wards to  those  who  denounced  the  Christians  ;  an  inter- 
pretation which  is  entirely  false.  Melito  calls  the  Chris- 
tian religion  "  our  philosophy,"  which  began  among 
barbarians  (the  Jews),  and  flourished  among  the  Roman 
subjects  in  the  time  of  Augustus,  to  the  great  advantage 
of  the  empire,  for  from  that  time  the  power  of  the  Ro- 
mans grew  great  and  glorious.  He  says  that  the  em- 
peror has  and  will  have  as  the  successor  to  Augustus' 
power  the  good  wishes  of  men,  if  he  will  protect  that 
philosophy  which  grew  up  with  the  empire  and  began 
with  Augustus,  which  philosophy  the  predecessors  of 
Antoninus  honored  in  addition  to  the  other  religions. 
He  further  says  that  the  Christian  religion  had  suffered 
no  harm  since  the  time  of  Augustus,  but  on  tne  con- 
trary had  enjoyed  all  honor  and  respect  that  any  man 
could  desire.  Nero  and  Domitian,  he  says,  were  alone 
persuaded  by  some  malicious  men  to  calumniate  the 
Christian  religion,  and  this  was  the  origin  of  the  false 
charges  against  the  Christians.  But  this  was  corrected 
by  the  emperors,  who  immediately  preceded  Antoninus, 


/!&.  Burelius  Bntontnug  25 

ished,  unless  the  accused  denied  their  religion. 
Then  come  the  persecutions  at  Smyrna,  which 
some  modern  critics  place  in  a.d.  167,  ten 
years  before  the  persecution  of  Lyon.  The 
governors  of  the  provinces  under  M.  Antoni- 
nus might  have  found  enough  even  in  Trajan's 
Rescript  to  warrant  them  in  punishing  Chris- 
tians, and  the  fanaticism  of  the  people  would 
drive  them  to  persecution,  even  if  they  were 
unwilling.  But  besides  the  fact  of  the  Chris- 
tians rejecting  all  the  heathen  ceremonies,  we 
must  not  forget  that  they  plainly  maintained 
that  all  the  heathen  religions  were  false.  The 
Christians     thus     declared     war     against    the 

who  often  by  their  rescripts  ieproved  those  who  at- 
tempted to  trouble  the  Christians.  Hadrian,  Antoninus' 
grandfather,  wrote  to  many,  and  among  them  to  Fun- 
danus,  the  governor  of  Asia.  Antoninus  Pius,  when 
Marcus  was  associated  with  him  in  the  empire,  wrote  to 
the  cities  that  they  must  not  trouble  the  Christians ; 
among  others  to  the  people  of  Larissa,  Thessalonica, 
the  Athenians  and  all  the  Greeks.  Melito  concluded 
thus  :  We  are  persuaded  that  thou  who  hast  about  these 
things  the  same  mind  that  they  had,  nay  rather  one 
much  more  humane  and  philosophical,  wilt  do  all  that 
we  ask  thee.  This  apology  was  written  after  a.d.  169, 
the  year  in  which  Verus  died,  for  it  speaks  of  Marcus 
only  and  his  son  Commodus.  According  to  Melito's  tes- 
timony, Christians  had  only  been  punished  for  their  re- 
ligion in  the  time  of  Nero  and  Domitian,  and  the  perse- 
cutions began  again  in  the  time  of  M.  Antoninus  and 
were  founded  on  his  orders,  which  were  abused  as  he 
seems  to  mean.  He  distinctly  affirms  ' '  that  the  race  of 
the  godly  is  now  persecuted  and  harassed  by  fresh  im- 
perial orders  in  Asia,  a  thing  which  had  never  happened 
before."  But  we  know  that  all  this  is  not  true,  and  that 
Christians  had  been  punished  in  Trajan's  time. 


26  dfc.  Bureliue  Bntoninus 

heathen  rites,  and  it  is  hardly  necessary  to 
observe  that  this  was  a  declaration  of  hostility 
against  the  Roman  government,  which  toler- 
ated all  the  various  forms  of  superstition  that 
existed  in  the  empire,  and  could  not  consist- 
ently tolerate  another  religion,  which  declared 
that  all  the  rest  were  false  and  all  the  splendid 
ceremonies  of  the  empire  only  a  worship  of 
devils. 

If  we  had  a  true  ecclesiastical  history,  we 
should  know  how  the  Roman  emperors  at- 
tempted to  check  the  new  religion,  how  they 
enforced  their  principle  of  finally  punishing 
Christians,  simply  as  Christians,  which  Justin 
in  his  Apology  affirms  that  they  did,  and  I 
have  no  doubt  that  he  tells  the  truth  ;  how  far 
popular  clamor  and  riots  went  in  this  matter, 
and  how  far  many  fanatical  and  ignorant 
Christians,  for  there  were  many  such,  contrib- 
uted to  excite  that  fanaticism  on  the  other  side 
and  to  embitter  the  quarrel  between  the  Roman 
government  and  the  new  religion.  Our  extant 
ecclesiastical  histories  are  manifestly  falsified, 
and  what  truth  they  contain  is  grossly  exag- 
gerated ;  but  the  fact  is  certain  that  in  the  time 
of  M.  Antoninus  the  heathen  populations  were 
in  open  hostility  to  the  Christians,  and  that 
under  Antoninus'  rule  men  were  put  to  death 
because  they  were   Christians.      Eusebius,   in 


flh.  Burelius  Zlntoninus  27 

the  preface  to  his  fifth  book  remarks  that  in 
the  seventeenth  year  of  Antoninus'  reign,  in 
some  parts  of  the  world  the  persecution  of  the 
Christians  became  more  violent,  and  that  it 
proceeded  from  the  populace  in  the  cities  ;  and 
he  adds,  in  his  usual  style  of  exaggeration, 
that  we  may  infer  from  what  took  place  in  a 
single  nation  that  myriads  of  martyrs  were 
made  in  the  habitable  earth.  The  nation  which 
he  alludes  to  is  Gallia  ;  and  he  then  proceeds 
to  give  the  letter  of  the  churches  of  Vienna 
and  1/ugdunum.  It  is  probable  that  he  has  as- 
signed the  true  cause  of  the  persecutions,  the 
fanaticism  of  the  populace,  and  that  both  gov- 
ernors and  emperor  had  a  great  deal  of  trouble 
with  these  disturbances.  How  far  Marcus  was 
cognizant  of  these  cruel  proceedings  we  do  not 
know,  for  the  historical  records  of  his  reign  are 
very  defective.  He  did  not  make  the  rule 
against  the  Christians,  for  Trajan  did  that ;  and 
if  we  admit  that  he  would  have  been  willing  to 
let  the  Christians  alone,  we  cannot  affirm  that 
it  was  in  his  power,  for  it  would  be  a  great  mis- 
take to  suppose  that  Antoninus  had  the  unlim- 
ited authority,  which  some  modern  sovereigns 
have  had.  His  power  was  limited  by  certain 
constitutional  forms,  by  the  Senate,  and  by  the 
precedents  of  his  predecessors.  We  cannot 
admit  that  such  a  man  was  an  active  persecu- 


2S  /lib.  Burelius  Bntoninus 

tor,  for  there  is  no  evidence  that  he  was,* 
though  it  is  certain  that  he  had  no  good  opin- 
ion of  the  Christians,  as  appears  from  his  own 
words. f  But  he  knew  nothing  of  them  except 
their  hostility  to  the    Roman  religion,  and  he 


*  Except  that  of  Orosius  (vii.,  15),  who  says  that  during 
the  Parthian  war  there  were  grievous  persecutions  of 
the  Christians  in  Asia  and  Gallia  under  the  orders  of 
Marcus  (praecepto  ejus),  and  "  many  were  crowned  with 
the  martyrdom  of  saints." 

t  See  xi.  3.  The  emperor  probably  speaks  of  such 
fanatics  as  Clemens  (quoted  by  Gataker  on  this  passage) 
mentions.  The  rational  Christians  admitted  no  fellow- 
ship with  them.  "Some  of  these  heretics,"  says  Cle- 
mens, "  show  their  impiety  and  cowardice  by  loving  their 
lives,  saying  that  the  knowledge  of  the  really  existing 
God  is  true  testimony  (martyrdom),  but  that  a  man  is  a 
self-murderer  who  bears  witness  by  his  death.  We  also 
blame  those  who  rush  to  death,  for  there  are  some,  not 
of  us,  but  only  bearing  the  same  name,  who  give  them- 
selves up.  We  say  of  them  that  they  die  without  being 
martyrs,  even  if  they  are  publicly  punished  ;  and  they 
give  themselves  up  to  a  death  that  avails  nothing,  as  the 
Indian  Gymnosophists  give  themselves  up  foolishly  to 
fire."  Cave,  in  his  "Primitive  Christianity"  (ii.,  c.  7), 
says  of  the  Christians  :  "  They  did  nock  to  the  place  of 
torment  faster  than  droves  of  beasts  that  are  driven  to 
the  shambles.  They  even  longed  to  be  in  the  arms  of 
suffering.  Ignatius,  though  then  in  his  journey  to 
Rome  in  order  to  his  execution,  yet  by  the  way  as  he 
went  could  not  but  vent  his  passionate  desire  of  it :  '  O 
that  I  might  come  to  those  wild  beasts,  that  are  pre- 
pared for  me  ;  I  heartily  wish  that  I  may  presently 
meet  with  them  ;  I  would  invite  and  encourage  them 
speedily  to  devour  me,  and  not  be  afraid  to  set  upon  me 
as  they  have  been  to  others  •  nay,  should  they  refuse  it, 
I  would  even  force  them  to  it'  "  ;  and  more  to  the  same 
purpose  from  Eusebius.  Cave,  an  honest  and  good 
man,  says  all  this  in  praise  of  the  Christians  ;  but  I 
think  that  he  mistook  the  matter.  We  admire  a  man 
who  holds  to  his  principles  even  to  death  ;  but  these 
fanatical  Christians  are  the  Gymnosophists  whom  Cle- 
mens treats  with  disdain. 


/IB.  Bureltus  Bntoninus  29 

probably  thought  that  they  were  dangerous  to 
the  state,  notwithstanding  the  professions, 
false  or  true,  of  some  of  the  Apologists.  So 
much  I  have  said,  because  it  would  be  unfair 
not  to  state  all  that  can  be  urged  against  a 
man  whom  his  contemporaries  and  subse- 
quent ages  venerated  as  a  model  of  virtue  and 
benevolence.  If  I  admitted  the  genuineness 
of  some  documents,  he  would  be  altogether 
clear  from  the  charge  of  even  allowing  any 
persecutions  ;  but  as  I  seek  the  truth  and  am 
sure  that  they  are  false,  I  leave  him  to  bear 
whatever  blame  is  his  due.  -  I  add  that  it  is 
quite  certain  that  Antoninus  did  not  derive 
any  of  his  Ethical  principles  from  a  religion 
of  which  he  knew  nothing. f 

There  is  no  doubt  that  the  Emperor's  "  Re- 
flections," or  his  "Meditations,"  as  they  are 
generally  named,  is  a  genuine  work.  In  the 
first  book  he  speaks  of  himself,  his  family,  and 
his  teachers,  and  in  the  other  books  he  men- 
tions  himself.     Suidas  (v.    MdpxoS)   notices  a 

*  Dr.  F.  C.  Baur  in  his  work,  entitled  "Das  Christen- 
thum  und  die  Christliche  Kirche  der  drei  ersten  Jahr- 
hunderte,"  etc.,  has  examined  this  question  with  great 
good  sense  and  fairness,  and  I  believe  he  has  stated  the 
truth  as  near  as  our  authorities  enable  us  to  reach  it. 

t  In  the  Digest,  48,  19,  30,  there  is  the  following  ex- 
cerpt from  Modestinus  :  Si  quis  aliquid  fecerit,  quoleves 
hominum  animi  superstitione  nuministerrerentur,  divus 
Marcus  hujusmodi  homines  in  insulam  relegari  rescrip- 
sit." 


30  /ifc.  Bureltus  Bntonfnua 

work  of  Antoninus  in  twelve  books,  which  he 
names  the  "conduct  of  his  own  life,"  and  he 
cites  the  book  under  several  words  in  his  Dic- 
tionary, giving  the  emperor's  name,  but  not  the 
title  of  the  work.  There  are  also  passages  cited 
by  Suidas  from  Antoninus  without  mention  of 
the  emperor's  name.  The  true  title  of  the 
work  is  unknown.  Xylander,  who  published 
the  first  edition  of  this  book  (Zurich,  1558,  8vo, 
with  a  Latin  version),  used  a  manuscript,  which 
contained  the  twelve  books,  but  it  is  not  known 
where  the  manuscript  is  now.  The  only  other 
complete  manuscript  which  is  known  to  exist  is 
in  the  Vatican  library,  but  it  has  no  title  and  no 
inscriptions  of  the  several  books  :  the  eleventh 
only  has  the  inscription  Mapuov  avroxparopoS 
marked  with  an  asterisk.  The  other  Vatican 
manuscripts  and  the  three  Florentine  contain 
only  excerpts  from  the  emperor's  book..  All  the 
titles  of  the  excerpts  nearly  agree  with  that 
which  Xylander  prefixed  to  his  edition  Mapxov 
Mvroovivov  AvroxparopoS  tgdv  eiS  kavrov 
fiiftXia  ifi.  This  title  has  been  used  by  all  sub- 
sequent editors.  We  cannot  tell  whether  An- 
toninus divided  his  work  into  books  or  some- 
body else  did  it.  If  the  inscriptions  at  the  end 
of  the  first  and  second  books  are  genuine,  he 
may  have  made  the  division  himself. 

It  is  plain  that  the  emperor  wrote  down  his 


flb.  Burelius  Bntoninus  31 

thoughts  or  reflections  as  the  occasion  arose, 
and  since  they  were  intended  for  his  own  use, 
it  is  not  improbable  conjecture  that  he  left  a 
complete  copy  behind  him  written  with  his 
own  hand  ;  for  it  is  not  likely  that  so  diligent  a 
man  would  use  the  labor  of  a  transcriber  for 
such  a  purpose,  and  expose  his  most  secret 
thoughts  to  any  other  eye.  He  may  have  also 
intended  the  book  for  his  son  Commodus,  who, 
however,  had  no  taste  for  his  father's  phi- 
losophy. Some  careful  hand  preserved  the  pre- 
cious volume,  and  a  work  by  Antoninus  is  men- 
tioned by  other  late  writers  besides  Suidas. 

Many  critics  have  labored  on  the  text  of 
Antoninus.  The  most  complete  edition  is  that 
by  Thomas  Gataker,  1652,  4to.  The  second 
edition  of  Gataker  was  superintended  by  George 
Stanhope,  1697,  4to.  There  is  also  an  edition 
of  1704.  Gataker  made  and  suggested  many 
good  corrections,  and  he  also  made  a  new  Latin 
version,  which  is  not  a  very  good  specimen  of 
Latin,  but  it  generally  expresses  the  sense  of 
the  original,  and  often  better  than  some  of  the 
more  recent  translations.  He  added  in  the 
margin  opposite  to  each  paragraph  references 
to  the  other  parallel  passages,  and  he  wrote  a 
commentary,  one  of  the  most  complete  that  has 
been  written  on  any  ancient  author.  This  com- 
mentary contains  the  editor's  exposition  of  the 


32  dfc.  Burelius  Bntonfnus 

more  difficult  passages,  and  quotations  from  all 
the  Greek  and  Roman  writers  for  the  illustra- 
tion of  the  text.  It  is  a  wonderful  monument 
of  learning  and  labor,  and  certainly  no  English- 
man has  yet  done  any  thing  like  it.  At  the  end 
of  his  Preface  the  editor  says  that  he  wrote  it  at 
Rotherhithe,  near  I/ondon,  in  a  severe  winter, 
when  he  was  in  the  seventy-eighth  year  of  his 
age,  165 1,  a  time  when  Milton,  Selden,  and 
other  great  men  of  the  Commonwealth  time 
were  living,  and  the  great  French  scholar 
Saumaise  (Salmasius),  with  whom  Gataker  cor- 
responded and  received  help  from  him  for  his 
edition  of  Antoninus.  The  Greek  text  has 
also  been  edited  by  J.  M.  Schultz,  Leipzig,  1802, 
8vo,  and  by  the  learned  Greek  Adamantinus 
Corais,  Paris,  1816,  8vo.  The  text  of  Schultz 
was  republished  by  Tauchnitz,  1821. 

There  are  English,  German,  French,  Italian, 
and  Spanish  translations  of  M.  Antoninus,  and 
there  may  be  others.  I  have  not  seen  all  the 
English  translations.  There  is  one  by  Jeremy 
Collier,  1702,  8vo,  a  most  coarse  and  vulgar 
copy  of  the  original.  The  latest  French  transla- 
tion by  Alexis  Pierron  in  the  collection  of 
Charpentier  is  better  than  Dacier's,  which  has 
been  honored  with  an  Italian  version  (Udine, 
1772).  There  is  an  Italian  version  (1675)  which 
I  have  not  seen.      It  is  by    a  cardinal.      "A 


/Ifc.  Bureltus  Bntonfnu*  33 

man  illustrious  in  the  church,  the  Cardinal 
Francis  Barberini  the  elder,  nephew  of  Pope 
Urban  VIII.,  occupied  the  last  years  of  his  life 
in  translating  into  his  native  language  the 
thoughts  of  the  Roman  emperor,  in  order  to 
diffuse  among  the  faithful  the  fertilizing  and 
vivifying  seeds.  He  dedicated  this  translation 
to  his  soul,  to  make  it,  as  he  says  in  his  ener- 
getic style,  redder  than  his  purple  at  the  sight 
of  the  virtues  of  this  Gentile"  (Pierron, 
Preface). 

I  have  made  this  translation  at  intervals  after 
having  used  the  book  for  many  years.  It  is 
made  from  the  Greek,  but  I  have  not  always 
followed  one  text,  and  I  have  occasionally  com- 
pared other  versions  with  my  own.  I  made 
this  translation  for  my  own  use,  because  I  found 
that  it  was  worth  the  labor  ;  but  it  may  be  use- 
ful to  others  also,  and  therefore  I  determined  to 
print  it.  As  the  original  is  sometimes  very  dif- 
ficult to  understand,  and  still  more  difficult  to 
translate,  it  is  not  possible  that  I  have  always 
avoided  error.  But  I  believe  that  I  have  not 
often  missed  the  meaning,  and  those  who  will 
take  the  trouble  to  compare  the  translation 
with  the  original  should  not  hastily  conclude 
that  I  am  wrong  if  they  do  not  agree  with  me. 
Some  passages  do  give  the  meaning,  though  at 
first  sight  they  may  not  appear  to  do  so,  and 


34  ilft.  Burelfus  Bntoninus 

when  I  differ  from  the  translators  I  think  that 
in  some  places  they  are  wrong,  and  in  other 
places  I  am  sure  that  they  are.  I  have  placed 
in  some  passages  a  f,  which  indicates  corrup- 
tion in  the  text  or  great  uncertainty  in  the 
meaning.  I  could  have  made  the  language 
more  easy  and  flowing,  but  I  have  preferred  a 
ruder  style  as  being  better  suited  to  express 
the  character  of  the  original,  and  sometimes 
the  obscurity  which  may  appear  in  the  version 
is  a  fair  copy  of  the  obscurity  of  the  Greek.  If 
I  should  ever  revise  this  version  I  would  gladly 
make  use  of  any  corrections  which  may  be  sug- 
gested. I  have  added  an  index  of  some  of  the 
Greek  terms  with  the  corresponding  English. 
If  I  have  not  given  the  best  words  for  the 
Greek,  I  have  done  the  best  that  I  could,  and  in 
the  text  I  have  always  given  the  same  transla- 
tion of  the  same  word. 

The  last  reflection  of  the  Stoic  philosophy 
that  I  have  observed  is  in  Simplicius'  "Com- 
mentary on  the  Enchiridion  of  Epictetus." 
Simplicius  was  not  a  Christian,  and  such  a  man 
was  not  likely  to  be  converted  at  a  time  when 
Christianity  was  grossly  corrupted.  But  he  was 
a  really  religious  man,  and  he  concludes  his 
commentary  with  a  prayer  to  the  Deity,  which 
no  Christian  could  improve.  From  the  time  of 
Zeno  to  Simplicius,  a  period  of  about  nine  hun- 


/IB.  Bureaus  Bntontnus  35 

dred  years,  the  Stoic  philosophy  formed  the 
characters  of  some  of  the  best  and  greatest 
men.  Finally  it  became  extinct,  and  we  hear 
no  more  of  it  till  the  revival  of  letters  in  Italy. 
Angelo  Poliziano  met  with  two  very  inaccurate 
and  incomplete  manuscripts  of  Epictetus' 
"  Enchiridion,"  which  he  translated  into  Latin, 
and  dedicated  to  his  great  patron  Lorenzo 
de'  Medici,  in  whose  collection  he  had  found 
the  book.  Poliziano's  version  was  printed  in 
the  first  Bale  edition  of  the  "Enchiridion," 
a.d.  1531  (apud  And.  Cratandrum).  Poliziano 
recommends  the  "  Enchiridion  "  to  Lorenzo  as 
a  work  well  suited  to  his  temper,  and  useful  in 
the  difficulties  by  which  he  was  surrounded. 

Epictetus  and  Antoninus  have  had  readers 
ever  since  they  were  first  printed.  The  little 
book  of  Antoninus  has  been  the  companion  of 
some  great  men.  Machiavelli's  "  Art  of  War  " 
and  "Marcus  Antoninus  "  were  the  two  books 
which  were  used  when  he  was  a  young  man  by 
Captain  John  Smith,  and  he  could  not  have 
found  two  writers  better  fitted  to  form  the 
character  of  a  soldier  and  a  man.  Smith  is  al- 
most unknown  and  forgotten  in  England,  his 
native  country,  but  not  in  America,  where  he 
saved  the  young  colony  of  Virginia.  He  was 
great  in  his  heroic  mind  and  his  deeds  in  arms, 
but  greater  still  in  the  nobleness  of  his  charac- 


36  .flfc.  Burelius  Bntoninus 

ter.  For  a  man's  greatness  lies  not  in  wealth 
and  station,  as  the  vulgar  believe,  nor  yet  in 
his  intellectual  capacity,  which  is  often  associ- 
ated with  the  meanest  moral  character,  the 
most  abject  servility  to  those  in  high  places, 
and  arrogance  to  the  poor  and  lowly ;  but 
a  man's  true  greatness  lies  in  the  consciousness 
of  an  honest  purpose  in  life,  founded  on  a  just 
estimate  of  himself  and  every  thing  else,  on 
frequent  self-examination,  and  a  steady  obe- 
dience to  the  rule  which  he  knows  to  be  right, 
without  troubling  himself,  as  the  emperor  says 
he  should  not,  about  what  others  may  think  or 
say,  or  whether  they  do  or  do  not  do  that  which 
he  thinks  and  says  and  does. 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  ANTONINUS. 


IT  has  been  said  that  the  Stoic  philosophy 
first  showed  its  real  value  when  it  passed 
from  Greece  to  Rome.  The  doctrines  of  Zeno 
and  his  successors  were  well  suited  to  the  grav- 
ity and  practical  good  sense  of  the  Romans,  and 
even  in  the  Republican  period  we  have  an  ex- 
ample of  a  man,  M.  Cato  Uticensis,  who  lived 
the  life  of  a  Stoic,  and  died  consistently  with 
the  opinions  which  he  professed.  He  was  a 
man  says  Cicero,  who  embraced  the  Stoic  phi- 
losophy from  conviction,  not  for  the  purpose  of 
vain  discussion,  as  most  did,  but  in  order  to 
make  his  life  conformable  to  the  Stoic  precepts. 
In  the  wretched  times,  from  the  death  of  Au- 
gustus to  the  murder  of  Domitian,  there  was 
nothing  but  the  Stoic  philosophy  which  could 
console  and  support  the  followers  of  the  old  re- 
ligion under  imperial  tyranny  and  amidst  uni- 
versal corruption.  There  were  even  then  noble 
minds  that  could  dare  and  endure,  sustained  by 
a  good  conscience  and  an  elevated  idea  of  the 


38       Gbe  flMMlosopb£  of  Bntontnus 

purposes  of  man's  existence.  Such  were  Paetus 
Thrasse,  Helvidius  Priscus,  Cornutus,  C.  Muso- 
nius  Rufus,*and  the  poets  Persius  and  Juvenal, 
whose  energetic  language  and  manly  thoughts 
may  be  as  instructive  to  us  now  as  they  might 
have  been  to  their  contemporaries.  Persius 
died  under  Nero's  bloody  reign,  hut  Juvenal 
had  the  good  fortune  to  survive  the  tyrant 
Domitian,  and  to  see  the  better  times  of  Nerva, 
Trajan,  and  Hadrian. f  His  best  precepts  are 
derived  from  the  Stoic  school,  and  they  are  en- 
forced in  his  finest  verses  by  the  unrivalled 
vigor  of  the  Latin  language. 

The  two  best  expounders  of  the  later  Stoical 
philosophy  were  a  Greek  slave  and  a  Roman 
emperor.  Epictetus,  a  Phrygian  Greek,  was 
brought  to  Rome,  we  know  not  how,  but  he 
was  there  the  slave  and  afterwards  the  freedman 
of  an  unworthy  master,  Epaphroditus  by  name, 
himself  a  freedman   and  a   favorite   of  Nero. 

*I  have  omitted  Seneca,  Nero's  preceptor.  He  was, 
in  a  sense,  a  Stoic,  and  he  has  said  many  good  things  in 
a  very  fine  way.  There  is  a  judgment  of  Gellius  (xii.,  2) 
on  Seneca,  or  rather  a  statement  of  what  some  people 
thought  of  his  philosophy,  and  it  is  not  favorable.  His 
writings  and  his  life  must  be  taken  together,  and  I  have 
nothing  more  to  say  of  him  here.  The  reader  will  find 
a  notice  of  Seneca  and  his  philosophy  in  "  Seekers  After 
God,"  by  the  Rev.  F.  W.  Farrar.    Macmillan  &  Co. 

t  Ribbeck  has  labored  to  prove  that  those  Satires  which 
contain  philosophical  precepts  are  not  the  work  of  the 
real,  but  of  a  false  Juvenal,  a  declamator.  Still  the 
verses  exist,  and  were  written  by  somebody  who  was  ac- 
quainted with  the  Stoic  doctrines, 


Gbe  iDbilosopbg  of  Bntontnus       39 

Bpictetus  may  have  been  a  hearer  of  C.  Muso- 
nius  Rufus,  while  he  was  still  a  slave,  but  he 
could  hardly  have  been  a  teacher  before  he  was 
made  free.  He  was  one  of  the  philosophers 
whom  Domitian's  order  banished  from  Rome. 
He  retired  to  Nicopolis  in  Epirus,  and  he  may 
have  died  there.  Like  other  great  teachers  he 
wrote  nothing,  and  we  are  indebted  to  his 
grateful  pupil  Arrian  for  what  we  have  of  Epic- 
tetus'  discourses.  Arrian  wrote  eight  books  of 
the  discourses  of  Epictetus,  of  which  only  four 
remain  and  some  fragments.  We  have  also 
from  Arrian' s  hand  the  small  Enchiridion,  or 
Manual  of  the  chief  precepts  of  Epictetus. 
There  is  a  valuable  commentary  on  the  Enchir- 
idion by  Simplicius,  who  lived  in  the  time  of 
the  Emperor  Justinian.* 

Antoninus,  in  his  first  book  (i,  7),  in  which 
he  gratefully  commemorates  his  obligations  to 
his  teachers,  says  that  he  was  made  acquainted 
by  Junius  Rusticus  with  the  discourses  of  Epic- 
tetus, whom  he  mentions  also  in  other  passages 
(iv.,  41  ;  xi.,  34,  36).  Indeed,  the  doctrines 
of  Epictetus  and  Antoninus  are  the  same,  and 
Epictetus  is  the  best  authority  for  the  explana- 
tion of  the  philosophical  language  of  Antoninus, 

♦There  is  a  complete  edition  of  Arrian 's  Epictetus 
with  the  commentary  of  Simplicius  by  J  Schweighseuser, 
b  vols.,  8vo.,  1799,  1S00.  There  is  also  an  English  transla- 
tion of  Epictetus  by  Mrs.  Carter. 


4o       Gbc  jpbtlosopbE  of  Bntoninus 

and  the  exposition  of  his  opinions.  But  the 
method  of  the  two  philosophers  is  entirely  dif- 
ferent. Epictetus  addressed  himself  to  his 
hearers  in  a  continuous  discourse,  and  in  a 
familiar  and  simple  manner.  Antoninus  wrote 
down  his  reflections  for  his  own  use  only,  in 
short  unconnected  paragraphs,  which  are  often 
obscure. 

The  Stoics  made  three  divisions  of  philosophy : 
Physic  (cpv6iHov),  Ethic  (rjBixov),  and  Logic 
(Xoyixov)  (viii.,  13).  This  division,  we  are 
told  by  Diogenes,  was  made  by  Zeno  of  Citium, 
the  founder  of  the  Stoic  sect,  and  by  Chrysippus  ; 
but  these  philosophers  placed  the  three  divi- 
sions in  the  following  order :  Logic,  Physic, 
Ethic.  It  appears,  however,  that  this  division 
was  made  before  Zeno's  time,  and  acknowledged 
by  Plato,  as  Cicero  remarks  (Acad.  Post,  i.,  5). 
Logic  is  not  synonymous  with  our  term  logic 
in  the  narrower  sense  of  that  word. 

Cleanthes,  a  Stoic,  subdivided  the  three  divi- 
sions, and  made  six:  Dialectic  and  Rhetoric, 
comprised  in  Logic ;  Ethic  and  Politic  ;  Physic 
and  Theolog]-.  This  division  was  merely  for 
practical  use,  for  all  Philosophy  is  one.  Even 
among  the  earliest  Stoics  logic  or  dialectic 
does  not  occupy  the  same  place  as  in  Plato  ;  it 
is  considered  only  as  an  instrument  which  is  to 
be  used  for  the  other  divisions  of  philosophy. 


Gbe  pbil09opb£  of  Bntonfnus       41 

An  exposition  of  the  earlier  Stoic  doctrines  and 
of  their  modifications  would  require  a  volume. 
My  object  is  to  explain  only  the  opinions  of 
Antoninus,  so  far  as  they  can  be  collected  from 
his  book. 

According  to  the  subdivision  of  Cleanthes, 
Physic  and  Theology  go  together,  or  the  study 
of  the  nature  of  Things,  and  the  study  of  the 
nature  of  the  Deity,  so  far  as  man  can  under- 
stand the  Deity,  and  of  his  government  of  the 
universe.  This  division,  or  subdivision,  is  not 
formally  adopted  by  Antoninus,  for,  as  already 
observed,  there  is  no  method  in  his  book  but 
it  is  virtually  contained  in  it. 

Cleanthes  also  connects  Ethic  and  Politic,  or 
the  study  of  the  principles  of  morals,  and  the 
study  of  the  constitution  of  civil  society ;  and 
undoubtedly  he  did  well  in  subdividing  Ethic 
into  two  parts,  Ethic  in  the  narrower  sense  and 
Politic,  for,  though  the  two  are  intimately  con- 
nected, they  are  also  very  distinct,  and  many 
questions  can  only  be  properly  discussed  by 
carefully  observing  the  distinction.  Antoninus 
does  not  treat  of  Politic.  His  subject  is  Ethic, 
and  Ethic  in  its  practical  application  to  his  own 
conduct  in  life  as  a  man  and  as  a  governor. 
His  Ethic  is  founded  on  his  doctrines  about 
man's  nature,  the  Universal  nature,  and  the  re- 
lation of  every  man  to  every  thing  else.     It  is 


42       Sbe  ipbilosopbB  of  Bntoninus 

therefore  intimately  and  inseparably  connected 
with  Physic,  or  the  nature  of  Things,  and  with 
Theology,  or  the  Nature  of  the  Deity.  He  ad- 
vises us  to  examine  well  all  the  impressions  on 
our  minds  (cpavradiai),  and  to  form  h  right 
judgment  of  them,  to  make  just  concl  Isions, 
and  to  inquire  into  the  meanings  of  words,  and 
so  far  to  apply  Dialectic,  but  he  has  no  attempt 
at  any  exposition  of  Dialectic,  and  his  philos- 
ophy is,  in  substance,  purely  moral  and  practi- 
cal. He  says  (viii.,  13):  "Constantly,  and,  if 
it  be  possible,  on  the  occasion  of  every  impres- 
sion on  the  soul,*  apply  to  it  the  principles  of 
Physic,  of  Ethic,  and  of  Dialectic  "  ;  which  is 
only  another  way  of  telling  us  to  examine  the 
impression  in  every  possible  way.  In  another 
passage  (iii.,  11)  he  says  :  "  To  the  aids  which 
have  been  mentioned  let  this  one  still  be  added 
make  for  thyself  a  definition  or  description  of 
the  object  {to  cpavra6rov)  which  is  presented 
to  thee,  so  as  to  see  distinctly  what  kind  of  a 
thing  it  is  in  its  substance,  in  its  nudity,  in  its 

*  The  original  is  eVi  ndo-ris  4>avTacri.as.  We  have  no 
word  which  expresses  ^avraaia,  for  it  is  not  only  the 
sensuous  appearance  which  comes  from  an  external  ob 
ject,  which  object  is  called  to  ^ai-rao-rdi',  but  it  is  also  the 
thought  or  feeling  or  opinion  which  is  produced  even 
when  there  is  no  corresponding  external  object  before 
us.  Accordingly,  every  thing  which  moves  the  soul  is 
<t>ai>ra(n6u  and  produces  a  4><^vraoCa- 

In  this  extract  Antoninus  says,  ^vo-toAoyeiv,  naQoXoytlv, 
bi <i\eKTt.Keve<T0ai..  I  have  translated  na9o\oyeii>  by  using 
the  word  Moral  (Ethic),  and  that  is  the  meaning  here. 


Zbe  pbilosopbE  of  Bntoninue      43 

complete  entirety,  and  tell  thyself  its  proper 
name,  and  the  names  of  the  things  of  which  it 
has  been  compounded,  and  into  which  it  will 
be  resolved."  Such  an  examination  implies 
a  use  of  Dialectic,  which  Antoninus  accordingly 
employed  as  a  means  towards  establishing  his 
Physical,  Theological,  and  Ethical  principles. 

There  are  several  expositions  of  the  Physical, 
Theological,  and  Ethical  principles,  which  are 
contained  in  the  work  of  Antoninus  ;  and  more 
expositions  than  I  have  read.  Ritter  ("  Ges- 
chichte  der  Philosophic,"  iv.,  241)  after  explain- 
ing the  doctrines  of  Epictetus,  treats  very  briefly 
and  insufficiently  those  of  Antoninus.  But  he 
refers  to  a  short  essay,  in  which  the  work  is 
done  better.*  There  is  also  an  essay  on  the 
Philosophical  Principles  of  M.  Aurelius  Anto- 
ninus by  J.  M.  Schultz,  placed  at  the  end  of  his 
German  translation  of  Antoninus  (Schleswig, 
1799).  With  the  assistance  of  these  two  useful 
essays  and  his  own  diligent  study  a  man  may 
form  a  sufficient  notion  of  the  principles  of  An- 
toninus ;  but  he  will  find  it  more  difficult  to 
expound  them  to  others.  Besides  the  want  of 
arrangement  in  the  original  and  of  connection 
among  the  numerous  paragraphs,  the  corruption 


*  De  Marco  Aurelio  Antonino  ...  ex  ipsius  Corn- 
men  tariis.  Scriptio  Philologica.  Instituit  Nicolaus 
fjachius,  lyipsi  :.  - 


44       Gbe  ipbilosopbg  of  Bntoninus 

of  the  text,  the  obscurity  of  the  language  and 
the  style,  and  sometimes  perhaps  the  confusion 
in  the  writer's  own  ideas, — besides  all  this  there 
is  occasionally  an  apparent  contradiction  in  the 
emperor's  thoughts,  as  if  his  principles  were 
sometimes  unsettled,  as  if  doubt  sometimes 
clouded  his  mind.  A  man  who  leads  a  life  of 
tranquillity  and  reflection,  who  is  not  disturbed 
at  home  and  meddles  not  with  the  affairs  of  the 
world,  may  keep  his  mind  at  ease  and  his 
thoughts  in  one  even  course.  But  such  a  man 
has  not  been  tried.  All  his  ethical  philosophy 
and  his  passive  virtue  might  turn  out  to  be 
idle  words,  if  he  were  once  exposed  to  the  rude 
realities  of  human  existence.  Fine  thoughts 
and  moral  dissertations  from  men  who  have  not 
worked  and  suffered  may  be  read,  but  they  will 
be  forgotten.  No  religion,  no  ethical  philos- 
ophy is  worth  any  thing,  if  the  teacher  has  not 
lived  the  "life  of  an  apostle,"  and  been  ready 
to  die  "the  death  of  a  martyr."  "  Not  in  pas- 
sivity (the  passive  effects)  but  in  activity  lie  the 
evil  and  the  good  of  the  rational  social  animal, 
just  as  his  virtue  and  his  vice  lie  not  in  pas- 
sivity, but  in  activity  "  (ix.,  16).  The  Emperor 
Antoninus  was  a  practical  moralist.  From  his 
youth  he  followed  a  laborious  discipline,  and 
though  his  high  station  placed  him  above  all 
want  or  the  fear  of  it,  he  lived  as  frugally  and 


Cbe  ipbilosopbg  of  Bntoninus        45 

temperately  as  the  poorest  philosopher.  Epic- 
tetus  wanted  little,  and  it  seems  that  he  always 
had  the  little  that  he  wanted,  and  he  was  con- 
tent with  it,  as  he  had  been  with  his  servile 
station.  But  Antoninus  after  his  accession  to 
the  empire  sat  on  an  uneasy  seat.  He  had  the 
administration  of  an  empire  which  extended 
from  the  Euphrates  to  the  Atlantic,  from  the 
cold  mountains  of  Scotland  to  the  hot  sands  of 
Africa  ;  and  we  may  imagine,  though  we  can- 
not know  it  by  experience,  what  must  be  the 
trials,  the  troubles,  the  anxiety  and  the  sorrows 
of  him  who  has  the  world's  business  on  his 
hands  with  the  wish  to  do  the  best  that  he  can, 
and  the  certain  knowledge  that  he  can  do  very 
little  of  the  good  which  he  wishes. 

In  the  midst  of  war,  pestilence,  conspiracy, 
general  corruption,  and  with  the  weight  of  so 
unwieldy  an  empire  upon  him,  we  may  easily 
comprehend  that  Antoninus  often  had  need  of 
all  his  fortitude  to  support  him.  The  best  and 
the  bravest  men  have  moments  of  doubt  and  of 
weakness,  but  if  they  are  the  best  and  the  brav- 
est, they  rise  again  from  their  depression  by 
recurring  to  first  principles,  as  Antoninus  does. 
The  emperor  says  that  life  is  smoke,  a  vapor, 
and  St.  James  in  his  Epistle  is  of  the  same 
mind  ;  that  the  world  is  full  of  envious,  jealous, 
malignant  people,   and  a  man  might  be  well 


46        CTbe  pbtlosopbg  of  Bntoninus 

content  to  get  out  of  it.  He  has  doubts  perhaps 
sometimes  even  about  that  to  which  he  holds 
most  firmly.  There  are  only  a  few  passages  of 
this  kind,  but  they  are  evidence  of  the  struggles 
which  even  the  noblest  of  the  sons  of  men  had 
to  maintain  against  the  hard  realities  of  his 
daily  life.  A  poor  remark  it  is  which  I  have 
seen  somewhere,  and  made  in  a  disparaging 
way,  that  the  emperor's  reflections  show  that 
he  had  need  of  consolation  and  comfort  in  life, 
and  even  to  prepare  him  to  meet  his  death. 
True  that  he  did  need  comfort  and  support,  and 
we  see  how  he  found  it.  He  constantly  recurs 
to  his  fundamental  principle  that  the  universe 
is  wisely  ordered,  that  every  man  is  a  part  of  it 
and  must  conform  to  that  order  which  he  can- 
not change,  that  whatever  the  Deity  has  done  is 
good,  that  all  mankind  are  a  man's  brethren, 
that  he  must  love  and  cherish  them  and  try  to 
make  them  better,  even  those  who  would  do 
him  harm.  This  is  his  conclusion  (ii.,  17)  : 
"What  then  is  that  which  is  able  to  conduct  a 
man  ?  One  thing  and  only  one,  Philosophy. 
But  this  consists  in  keeping  the  divinity  within 
a  man  free  from  violence  and  unharmed,  supe- 
rior to  pains  and  pleasures,  doing  nothing  with- 
out a  purpose  nor  yet  falsely  and  with  hypoc- 
risy, not  feeling  the  need  of  another  man's 
doing  or  not  doing  any  thinj 


Zbc  lPbilosopbs  of  Bntoninus      47 

cepting  all  that  happens  and  all  that  is  allotted, 
as  coming  from  thence,  wherever  it  is,  from 
whence  he  himself  came  ;  and  finally  waiting 
for  death  with  a  cheerful  mind  as  being  nothing 
else  than  a  dissolution  of  the  elements,  of  which 
every  living  being  is  compounded.  But  if  there 
is  no  harm  to  the  elements  themselves  in  each 
continually  changing  into  another,  why  should 
a  man  have  any  apprehension  about  the  change 
and  dissolution  of  all  the  elements  [himself]  ? 
for  it  is  according  to  nature  ;  and  nothing  is 
evil  that  is  according  to  nature. ' ' 

The  Physic  of  Antoninus  is  the  knowledge  of 
the  Nature  of  the  Universe,  of  its  government, 
and  of  the  relation  of  man's  nature  to  both.  He 
names  the  universe  (#  tgdv  oXoov  ov6ia,  vi.,  i),* 

*  As  to  the  word  ovola,  the  reader  may  see  the  Index. 
I  add  here  a  few  examples  of  the  use  of  the  word  ;  Anto- 
ninus has  (v.,  24),  t)  crvixTTacra  ovcrt'a,  "  the  universal  sub- 
stance." He  says  (xii.,  30),  "  there  is  one  common  sub- 
stance "  (ouo-ia),  distributed  among  countless  bodies. 
In  Stobaeus  (torn.  i.  lib.  i,  tit.  14)  there  is  this  defi- 
nition, ovtriav  oe  $aaii>  to>v  oj'Tioi'  anavTwv  rrjy  irpuiTrjy 
i/Arjf.  (In  viii.,  11),  Antoninus  speaks  of  to  ovcn.d>5e?  ko.1 
v\lkov,  "the  substantial  and  the  material  "  ;  and  (vii.,  10) 
he  says  that  "every  thing  material  "_  (ivvkov)  disappears 
in  the  substance  of  the  whole  (tt)  rif  oAmc  owia).  The 
ovaia.  is  the  generic  name  of  that  existence,  which  we 
assume  as  the  highest  or  ultimate,  because  we  con- 
ceive no  existence  which  can  be  co-ordinated  with  it  and 
none  above  it.  It  is  the  philosopher's  "substance  "  ;  it 
is  the  ultimate  expression  for  that  which  we  conceive  or 
suppose  to  be  the  basis,  the  being  of  a  thing.  !  From  the 
Divine,  which  is  substance  in  itself,  or  the  only  and  sole 
substance,  all  and  every  thing  that  is  created  exists." 
(Swedenborg,  "  Angelic  Wisdom,"  198.) 


43       Zhe  UMMlosopb£  of  Bntonfmis 

"the  universal  substance,"  and  lie  adds  that 
"reason"  [\6yoS)  governs  the  universe.  He 
also  (vi.,  9)  uses  the  terms  "universal  La- 
ture  "  or  "  nature  of  the  universe."  He  (vi.,  25) 
calls  the  universe  "the  one  and  all,  which  we 
name  Cosmos  or  Order  (xodjuos).  If  he  ever 
seems  to  use  these  general  terms  as  significant 
of  the  All,  of  all  that  man  can  in  any  way  con- 
ceive to  exist,  he  still  on  other  occasions  plainly 
distinguishes  between  Matter,  Material  things 
(v\7],  vXikov,)  and  Cause,  Origin,  Reason 
{airier,  ainwdei,  \6yoS).*      This    is   conform- 

*  I  remark,  in  order  to  anticipate  any  misapprehen- 
sion, that  all  these  general  terms  involve  a  contradiction. 
The  "one  and  all,"  and  the  like  and  "  the  whole,"  im- 
ply limitation.  "One"  is  limited;  "all"  is  limited ; 
the  "  whole  "  is  limited.  We  cannot  help  it.  We  can- 
not find  words  to  express  that  which  we  cannot  fully 
conceive.  The  addition  of  "absolute"  or  any  other 
such  word  does  not  mend  the  matter.  Even  the  word 
God  is  used  by  most  people,  often  unconsciously,  in  such 
away  that  limitation  is  implied,  and  yet  at  the  same 
time  words  are  added  which  are  intended  to  deny  limita- 
tion. A  Christian  martyr,  when  he  was  asked  what  God 
was,  is  said  to  have  answered  that  God  has  no  name 
like  a  man  ;  and  Justin  says  the  same  (Apol.  ii.,  6),  "  the 
names  like  Father,  God,  Creator,  L,ord  and  Master  are 
not  names,  but  appellations  derived  from  benefactions 
and  acts."  (Compare  Seneca  De  Benef.  iv.,  8).  We  can 
conceive  the  existence  of  a  thing,  or  rather  we  may 
have  the  idea  of  an  existence,  without  an  adequate 
notion  of  its  "  adequate  "  meaning  co-extensive  and  co- 
equal with  the  thing.  We  have  a  notion  of  limited  space 
derived  from  the  dimensions  of  what  we  call  a  material 
thing,  though  of  space  absolute,  if  I  may  use  the  term, 
we  have  no  notion  at  all ;  and  of  infinite  space  the  no- 
tion is  the  same,  no  notion  at  all ;  and  yet  we  conceive 
it  in  a  sense,  though  I  know  not  how,  and  we  believe 
that  space  is  infinite,  and  we  cannot  conceive  it  to  be 
finite. 


Gbe  fl>bilosopbs  of  Bntoninus       49 

able  to  Zeno's  doctrine  that  there  are  two 
original  principles  {dpxoci)  of  all  things,  that 
which  acts  (rd  noiovv)  and  that  which  is  acted 
upon  (to  7tddxov).  That  which  is  acted  on  is 
the  formless  matter  {vXrf) :  that  which  acts  is 
the  reason  (\6yo<),  God,  who  is  eternal  and 
operates  through  all  matter,  and  produces  all 
things.  So  Antoninus  (v.,  32)  speaks  of  the  rea- 
son {\6yoz)  which  pervades  all  substance 
(ov6ia),  and  through  all  time  by  fixed  peri- 
ods (revolutions)  administers  the  universe  (rd 
Ttdv).  God  is  eternal,  and  Matter  is  eternal.  It 
is  God  who  gives  form  to  matter,  but  he  is  not 
said  to  have  created  matter.  According  to  this 
view,  which  is  as  old  as  Anaxagoras,  God  and 
matter  exist  independently,  and  God  governs 
matter.  This  doctrine  is  simply  the  expression 
of  the  fact  of  the  existence  both  of  matter  and 
of  God.  The  Stoics  did  not  perplex  themselves 
with  the  insoluble  question  of  the  origin  and 
nature  of  matter.*      Antoninus  also  assumes  a 

*The  notions  of  matter  and  of  space  are  inseparable. 
We  derive  the  notion  of  space  from  matter  and  form. 
But  we  have  no  adequate  conception  either  of  matter  or 
of  space.  Matter  in  its  ultimate  resolution  is  as  unin- 
telligible as  what  men  call  mind,  spirit,  or  by  whatever 
other  name  they  may  express  the  power  which  makes 
itself  known  by  acts.  Anaxagoras  laid  down  the  dis- 
tinction between  intelligence  (vows)  and  matter,  and  he 
said  that  intelligence  impressed  motion  on  matter,  and 
so  separated  the  elements  of  matter  and  gave  them 
order ;  but  he  probably  only  assumed  a  beginning,  as 
Simplicius  says,  as  a  foundation  of  his   philosophical 


so       tTbe  jpbilosopbs  of  Bntoninus 

beginning  of  things,  as  we  now  know  them ; 
but  his  language  is  sometimes  very  obscure.  I 
have  endeavored  to  explain  the  meaning  of  one 
difficult  passage  (vii.,  75,  and  the  note). 

Matter  consists  of  elemental  (6roixeia)  of 
which  all  material  objects  are  made.  But  noth- 
ing is  permanent  in  form.  The  nature  of  the 
universe,  according  to  Antoninus'  expression 
(iv.,  36),  "loves  nothing  so  much  as  to  change 
the  things  which  are,  and  to  make  new  things 
like  them.  For  every  thing  that  exists  is  in  a 
manner  the  seed  of  that  which  will  be.  But 
thou  art  thinking  only  of  seeds  which  are  cast 
into  the  earth  or  into  a  womb  ;  but  this  is  a 
very  vulgar  notion."  All  things,  then,  are  in  a 
constant  flux  and  change  ;  some  things  are  dis- 
solved into  the  elements,  others  come  in  their 
places;  and  so  the  "  whole  universe  continues 
ever  young  and  perfect"  (xii.,  23). 

teaching1.  Empedocles  said  "The  universe  always  ex- 
isted." He  had  no  idea  of  what  is  called  creation.  Ocel- 
lus Lucanus  (1,  §  2)  maintained  that  the  Universe  (to 
■nav)  was  imperishable  and  uncreated.  Consequently  it 
is  eternal.  He  admitted  the  existence  of  God  ;  but  his 
Theology  would  require  some  discussion.  On  the  con- 
trary, the  Brachmans,  according  to  Strabo  (p.  713,  ed. 
Cas.),  taught  that  the  universe  was  created  and  perish- 
able ;  and  the  creator  and  administrator  of  it  pervades 
the  whole.  The  author  of  the  book  of  Solomon's  Wis- 
dom say  (xi.,  17)  :  "  Thy  Almighty  hand  made  the  world 
of  matter  without  form,"  which  may  mean  that  matter 
existed  already. 

The  common  Greek  word  which  we  translate  "  mat- 
ter '"  is  uAjj.    It  is  the  stuff  that  things  are  made  of. 


XLbc  pbtlosopbg  of  Bntoninud       51 

Antoninus  has  some  obscure  expressions 
about  what  he  calls  "seminal  principles" 
(67tep/.ianxoi  Xoyoi).  He  opposes  them  to 
the  Epicurean  atoms  (vi.,  24),  and  consequent- 
ly his  "seminal  principles"  are  not  material 
atoms  which  wander  about  at  hazard,  and  com- 
bine nobody  knows  how.  In  one  passage 
(iv.  21)  he  speaks  of  living  principles,  souls 
(ipvxai)  after  the  dissolution  of  their  bodies 
being  received  into  the  "seminal  principle  of 
the  universe."  Schultz  thinks  that  by  "sem- 
inal principles  Antoninus  means  the  rela- 
tions of  the  various  elemental  principles, 
which  relations  are  determined  by  the  Deity 
and  by  which  alone  the  production  of  or- 
ganized beings  is  possible."  This  may  be 
the  meaning,  but  if  it  is,  nothing  of  any 
value  can  be  derived  from  it.*  Antoninus 
often  uses  the  word  "  Nature  "  (<pv(5iS),  and  we 
must  attempt  to  fix  its  meaning.  The  simple 
etymological  sense  of  q>v6i$  is  "production," 
the  birth  of  what  we  call  Things.  The  Romans 
used  Natura,  which  also  means  "birth  "   origi- 

*  Justin  (Apol.   ii.,  8)  has  the   words    Kara  oirep^ariKOv 

\6yov  nipos,  where  he  is  speaking  of  the  Stoics  ;  but  he 
uses  this  expression  in  a  peculiar  sense  (note,  11).  The 
early  Christian  writers  were  familiar  with  the  Stoic 
terms,  and  their  writings  show  that  the  contest  was  be- 
gun between  the  Christian  expositors  and  the  Greek 
philosophy.  Even  in  the  second  Epistle  of  St.  Peter  (ii., 
1,  v.,  4)  we  find  a  Stoic  expression,  ivaSta  tovtihv  yivrivde 

0€<.a<;  kolviovoI  <f>v(T((»f» 


52       XLbc  pbUosopbE  of  Bntoninus 

nally.  But  neither  the  Greeks  nor  the  Romans 
stuck  to  this  simple  meaning,  nor  do  we.  An- 
toninus says  (x.,  6)  :  "  Whether  the  universe  is 
[a  concourse  of]  atoms  or  Nature  [is  a  system], 
let  this  first  be  established  that  I  am  a  part  of 
the  whole  which  is  governed  by  nature."  Here 
it  might  seem  as  if  nature  were  personified  and 
viewed  as  an  active,  efficient  power,  as  some- 
thing which,  if  not  independent  of  the  Deity, 
acts  by  a  power  which  is  given  to  it  by  the 
Deity.  Such,  if  I  understand  the  expression 
right,  is  the  way  in  which  the  word  Nature  is 
often  used  now,  though  it  is  plain  that  many 
writers  use  the  word  without  fixing  any  exact 
meaning  to  it.  It  is  the  same  with  the  expres- 
sion, Laws  of  Nature,  which  some  writers  may 
use  in  an  intelligible  sense,  but  others  as  clear- 
ly use  in  no  definite  sense  at  all.  There  is  no 
meaning  in  this  word  Nature,  except  that  which 
Bishop  Butler  assigns  to  it  when  he  says :  "  The 
only  distinct  meaning  of  that  word  Natural  is 
Stated,  Fixed  or  Settled  ;  since  what  is  natural 
as  much  requires  and  presupposes  an  intelligent 
agent  to  render  it  so,  i.e.,  to  effect  it  continu- 
ally or  at  stated  times,  as  what  is  supernatural 
or  miraculous  does  to  effect  it  at  once."  This 
is  Plato's  meaning  (De  Leg.  iv.,  715),  when  he 
says,  that  God  holds  the  beginning  and  end 
and   middle   of  all   that   exists,    and    proceeds 


Gbe  UMMIosopbE  of  Bntontnus       53 

straight  on  his  course,  making  his  circuit  ac- 
cording to  nature  (that  is,  by  a  fixed  order)  ; 
and  he  is  continually  accompanied  by  justice, 
who  punishes  those  who  deviate  from  the  di- 
vine law,  that  is,  from  the  order  or  course  which 
God  observes. 

When  we  look  at  the  motions  of  the  planets 
the  action  of  what  we  call  gravitation,  the  ele- 
mental combination  of  unorganized  bodies  and 
their  resolution,  the  production  of  plants  and 
of  living  bodies,  their  generation,  growth,  and 
their  dissolution,  which  we  call  their  death,  we 
observe  a  regular  sequence  of  phenomena,  which 
within  the  limits  of  experience  present  and 
past,  so  far  as  we  know  the  past,  is  fixed  and 
invariable.  But  if  this  is  not  so,  if  the  order 
and  sequence  of  phenomena,  as  known  to  us, 
are  subject  to  change  in  the  course  of  an  infi- 
nite progression, — and  such  change  is  conceiv- 
able,— we  have  not  discovered,  nor  shall  we 
ever  discover,  the  whole  of  the  order  and  se- 
quence of  phenomena,  in  which  sequence 
there  may  be  involved  according  to  its  very 
nature,  that  is,  according  to  its  fixed  order, 
some  variation  of  what  we  now  call  the  Order 
or  Nature  of  Things.  It  is  also  conceivable 
that  such  changes  have  taken  place,  changes 
in  the  order  of  things,  as  we  are  compelled  by 
the  imperfection  of  language  to  call  them,  but 


54       Gbe  pbiIosopb£  of  Bntoninus 

which  are  no  changes ;  and  further,  it  is  cer- 
tain that  our  knowledge  of  the  true  sequence 
of  all  actual  phenomena,  as,  for  instance,  the 
phenomena  of  generation,  growth,  and  dis- 
solution, is,  and  ever  must  be,  imperfect. 

We  do  not  fare  much  better  when  we  speak 
of  Causes  and  Effects  than  when  we  speak  of 
Nature.  For  the  practical  purposes  of  life  we 
may  use  the  terms  cause  and  effect  conveni- 
ently, and  we  may  fix  a  distinct  meaning  to 
them,  distinct  enough  at  least  to  prevent  all 
misunderstanding.  But  the  case  is  different 
when  we  speak  of  causes  and  effects  as  of  things. 
All  that  we  know  is  phenomena,  as  the  Greeks 
called  them,  or  appearances  which  follow  one 
another  in  a  regular  order,  as  we  conceive  it,  so 
that  if  some  one  phenomenon  should  fail  in 
the  series,  we  conceive  that  there  must  either 
be  an  interruption  of  the  series,  or  that  some- 
thing else  will  appear  after  the  phenomenon 
which  has  failed  to  appear,  and  will  occupy 
the  vacant  place  ;  and  so  the  series  in  its  pro- 
gression may  be  modified  or  totally  changed. 
Cause  and  effect  then  mean  nothing  in  the 
sequence  of  natural  phenomena  beyond  what  I 
have  said  ;  and  the  real  cause,  or  the  transcen- 
dent cause,  as  some  would  call  it,  of  each  suc- 
cessive phenomenon  is  in  that  which  is  the 
cause  of  all  things  which  are,  which  have  been, 


Zbe  pbilosopbg  of  Bntoninus        55 

and  which  will  be  for  ever.  Thus  the  word 
Creation  may  have  a  real  sense  if  we  consider 
it  as  the  first,  if  we  can  conceive  a  first,  in  the 
present  order  of  natural  phenomena  ;  but  in  the 
vulgar  sense  a  creation  of  all  things  at  a  cer- 
tain time,  followed  by  a  quiescence  of  the  first 
cause  and  an  abandonment  of  all  sequences  of 
Phenomena  to  the  laws  of  Nature,  or  to  the 
other  words  that  people  may  use,  is  absolutely 
absurd.* 

Now,  though  there  is  great  difficulty  in  un- 
derstanding all  the  passages  of  Antoninus,  in 
which  he  speaks  of  Nature,  of  the  changes  of 
things,  and  of  the  economy  of  the  universe,  I 
am  convinced  that  his  sense  of  Nature  and 
Natural  is  the  same  as  that  which  I  have  stated  ; 
and  as  he  was  a  man  who  knew  how  to  use 
words  in  a  clear  way  and  with  strict  consist- 
ency, we  ought  to  assume,  even  if  his  meaning 

*  Time  and  space  are  the  conditions  of  our  thought ; 
but  time  infinite  and  space  infinite  cannot  be  objects  of 
thought,  except  in  a  very  imperfect  way.  Time  and 
space  must  not  in  any  way  be  thought  of  when  we  think 
of  the  Deity.  Swedenborg  says .  "The  natural  man  may 
believe  that  he  would  have  no  thought,  if  the  ideas  of 
time,  of  space,  and  of  things  material  were  taken  away  ; 
for  upon  those  is  founded  all  the  thought  that  man  has. 
But  let  him  know  that  the  thoughts  are  limited  and 
confined  in  proportion  as  they  partake  of  time,  space, 
and  of  what  is  material ;  and  that  they  are  not  limited 
and  are  extended,  in  proportion  as  they  do  not  partake 
of  those  things  ;  since  the  mind  is  so  far  elevated  above 
the  things  corporal  and  worldly"  (Concerning  Heaven 
and  Hell,  169). 


56       Gbe  fl>bilosopb£  of  ftntoninue 

in  some  passages  is  doubtful,  that  his  view  of 
Nature  was  in  harmony  with  his  fixed  belief  in 
the  all-pervading,  ever  present,  and  ever  active 
energy  of  God  (ii.,  4;  iv.,  40;  x.,  1;  vi.,  40; 
and  other  passages.  Compare  Seneca,  De 
Benef.,  iv.,  7.     Swedenborg,  Angelic  Wisdom, 

349-357). 

There  is  much  in  Antoninus  that  is  hard  to 
understand,  and  it  might  be  said  that  he  did 
not  fully  comprehend  all  that  he  wrote  ;  which 
would  however  be  in  no  way  remarkable,  for  it 
happens  now  that  a  man  may  write  what 
neither  he  nor  any  body  can  understand.  An- 
toninus tells  us  (xii.,  10)  to  look  at  things  and 
see  what  they  are,  resolving  them  into  the  ma- 
terial (vX?;),  the  causal  (ai'rior),  and  the  rela- 
tion (avacpopd),  or  the  purpose,  by  which  he 
seems  to  mean  something  in  the  nature  of  what 
we  call  effect,  or  end.  The  word  Cause  [atria) 
is  the  difficulty.  There  is  the  same  word  in  the 
Sanscrit  (hetu)  ;  and  the  subtle  philosophers  of 
India  and  of  Greece,  and  the  less  subtle  phi- 
losophers of  modern  times  have  all  used  this 
word,  or  an  equivalent  word,  in  a  vague  way. 
Yet  the  confusion  sometimes  may  be  in  the  in- 
evitable ambiguity  of  language  rather  than  in 
the  mind  of  the  writer,  for  I  cannot  think  that 
some  of  the  wisest  of  men  did  not  know  what 
they  intended  to  say.     When  Antoninus  says 


Gbe  lpbilosopbE  ot  Bntoninus       57 

(iv.,  36),  "  that  every  thing  that  exists  is  in  a 
manner  the  seed  of  that  which  will  be,"  he 
might  be  supposed  to  say  what  some  of  the  In- 
dian philosophers  have  said,  and  thus  a  pro- 
found truth  might  be  converted  into  a  gross 
absurdity.  But  he  says,  "in  a  manner,"  and  in 
a  manner  he  said  true  ;  and  in  another  manner, 
if  you  mistake  his  meaning,  he  said  false. 
When  Plato  said,  "  Nothing  ever  is,  but  is  al- 
ways becoming"  (del  ylyvz vai),  he  delivered 
a  text,  out  of  which  we  may  derive  something ; 
for  he  destroys  by  it  not  all  practical,  but  all 
speculative  notions  of  cause  and  effect.  The 
whole  series  of  things,  as  they  appear  to  us, 
must  be  contemplated  in  time,  that  is,  in  suc- 
cession, and  we  conceive  or  suppose  intervals 
between  one  state  of  things  and  another  state 
of  things,  so  that  there  is  priority  and  sequence, 
and  interval,  and  Being,  and  a  ceasing  to  Be, 
and  beginning  and  ending.  But  there  is  noth- 
ing of  the  kind  in  the  Nature»of  Things.  It  is 
an  everlasting  continuity  (iv.,  45  ;  vii.,  75). 
When  Antoninus  speaks  of  generation  (v.,  26), 
he  speaks  of  one  cause  (airia)  acting,  and  then 
another  cause  taking  up  the  work,  which  the 
former  left  in  a  certain  state,  and  so  on  ;  and  we 
might  perhaps  conceive  that  he  had  some  no- 
tion like  what  has  been  called  "  the  self-evolv- 
ing power  of  nature  "  ;    a  fine  phrase  indeed, 


58       XTbe  pbilosopbg  of  Bntoninus 

the  full  import  of  which  I  believe  that  the 
•writer  of  it  did  not  see,  and  thus  he  laid  himself 
open  to  the  imputation  of  being  a  follower  of 
one  of  the  Hindu  sects,  which  makes  all  things 
come  by  evolution  out  of  nature  or  matter,  or 
out  of  something  which  takes  the  place  of 
deity,  but  is  not  deity.  I  would  have  all  men 
think  as  they  please,  or  as  they  can,  and  I  only 
claim  the  same  freedom  which  I  give.  When 
a  man  writes  any  thing,  we  may  fairly  try  to 
find  out  all  that  his  words  must  mean,  even  if 
the  result  is  that  they  mean  what  he  did  not 
mean ;  and  if  we  find  this  contradiction,  it  is 
not  our  fault,  but  his  misfortune.  Now  An- 
toninus is  perhaps  somewhat  in  this  condition 
in  what  he  says  (x.,  26),  though  he  speaks  at 
the  end  of  the  paragraph  of  the  power  which 
acts,  unseen  by  the  eyes,  but  still  no  less  clearly. 
But  whether  in  this  passage  (x.,  26)  he  means 
that  the  power  is  conceived  to  be  in  the  differ- 
ent successive  caiises  (atrial),  or  in  something 
else,  nobody  can  tell.  From  other  passages, 
however,  I  do  collect  that  his  notion  of  the 
phenomena  of  the  universe  is  what  I  have 
stated.  The  Deity  works  unseen,  if  we  may  use 
such  language  and  perhaps  I  may,  as  Job  did, 
or  he  who  wrote  the  book  of  Job.  "In  him 
we  live,  and  move,  and  are,"  said  St.  Paul  to 
the  Athenians,   and  to  show  his  hearers  that 


Cbe  ipbtlosopbE  ot  Bntoninus        59 

this  was  no  new  doctrine,  he  quoted  the  Greek 
poets.  One  of  these  poets  was  the  Stoic  Cle- 
anthes,  whose  noble  hymn  to  Zeus  or  God  is 
an  elevated  expression  of  devotion  and  philoso- 
phy. It  deprives  Nature  of  her  power  and 
puts  her  under  the  immediate  government  of 
the  Deity. 

"  Thee  all  this  heaven,  which  whirls  around  the  earth, 
Obeys  and  willing  follows  where  thou  leadest.— 
Without  thee,  God,  nothing  is  done  on  earth, 
Nor  in  the  aetherial  realms,  nor  in  the  sea, 
Save  what  the  wicked  through  their  folly  do." 

Antoninus'  conviction  of  the  existence  of  a 
divine  power  and  government  was  founded  on 
his  perception  of  the  order  of  the  universe. 
Like  Socrates  (Xen.  Men.,  iv.  3,  13,  etc.),  he 
says  that  though  we  cannot  see  the  forms  of  di- 
vine powers,  we  know  that  they  exist,  because 
we  see  their  works. 

"To  those  who  ask,  Where  hast  thou  seen 
the  gods,  or  how  dost  thou  comprehend  that 
they  exist  and  so  worshippest  them  ?  I  answer, 
in  the  first  place,  that  they  may  be  seen  even 
with  the  eyes ;  in  the  second  place,  neither 
have  I  seen  my  own  soul  and  yet  I  honor  it. 
Thus,  then,  with  respect  to  the  gods,  from  what 
I  constantly  experience  of  their  power,  from 
this  I  comprehend  that  they  exist  and  I  vene- 
rate them  "    (xii.    28,    and    the  note.     Comp. 


60       Zbc  fl>bilo6opb£  of  Bntoninus 

Aristotle  de  Mundo,  c.  6  ;  Xen.  Mem.  i.,  4,  9; 
Cicero,  Tuscul.  i.  28,  29  ;  St.  Paul's  Epistle  to 
the  Romans,  i.  19,  20  ;  and  Montaigne's  Apol- 
ogy for  Raimond  de  Sebonde  ii.,  c.  12).  This 
is  a  very  old  argument  which  has  always  had 
great  weight  with  most  people  and  has  ap- 
peared sufficient.  It  does  not  acquire  the  least 
additional  strength  by  being  developed  in  a 
learned  treatise.  It  is  as  intelligible  in  its  sim- 
ple enunciation  as  it  can  be  made.  If  it  is  re- 
jected; there  is  no  arguing  with  him  who  re- 
jects it ;  if  it  is  worked  out  into  innumerable 
particulars,  the  value  of  the  evidence  runs  the 
risk  of  being  buried  under  a  mass  of  words. 

Man,  being  conscious  that  he  is  a  spiritual 
power  or  an  intellectual  power,  or  that  he  has 
such  a  power,  in  whatever  way  he  conceives 
that  he  has  it — for  I  wish  simply  to  state  a  fact 
— from  this  power  which  he  has  in  himself,  he 
is  led,  as  Antoninus  says,  to  believe  that  there 
is  a  greater  power,  which,  as  the  old  Stoics  tell 
us,  pervades  the  whole  universe  as  the  intel- 
lect* (vovS)  pervades  man     (Compare  Kpicte- 

*  I  have  always  translated  the  word  vous,  "  intelli- 
gence," or  "  intellect."  It  appears  to  be  the  word  used 
by  the  oldest  Greek  philosophers  to  express  the  notion 
of  "  intelligence  "  as  opposed  to  the  notion  of  "  mat- 
ter." I  have  always  translated  the  word  Ad-yo?  by  "rea- 
son," and  Aoyixd?  by  the  word  "rational"  or  perhaps, 
sometimes  "reasonable,"  as  I  have  translated  voepo?  by 
the  word  "intellectual."  Every  man  who  has  thought 
and  has  read  any  philosophical  writings  knows  the  dif- 
ficulty of  finding  words  to  express  certain  notions,  how 


Zbe  fl>bUosopb£  of  Bntoninus        61 

tus'    Discourses,  i.,    14  ;    and  Voltaire  a  Made. 

Necker,  vol.  lxvii.,  p.  278,  ed.  Lequien). 

imperfectly  words  express  these  notions,  and  how  care- 
lessly the  words  are  often  used.  The  various  senses  of 
the  word  Aoyo?  are  enough  to  perplex  any  man.  Our 
translators  of  the  New  Testament  (St.  John,  c.  i.)  have 
simply  translated  6  A6yo?  by  "the  word,"  as  the  Ger- 
mans translated  it  by  "das  Wort  "  ;  but  in  their  theolo- 
gical writings  they  sometimes  retain  the  original  term, 
Logos.  The  Germans  have  a  term,  Vernunft,  which 
seems  to  come  nearest  to  our  word  Reason,  or  the  neces- 
sary and  absolute  truths,  which  we  cannot  conceive  as 
being  other  than  what  they  are.  Such  are  what  some 
people  have  called  the  laws  of  thought,  the  conceptions 
of  space  and  of  time,  and  axioms  or  first  principles, 
which  need  no  proof  and  cannot  be  proved  or  denied. 
Accordingly  the  Germans  can  say,  "  Gott  ist  die  hochste 
Vernunft,  "the  Supreme  Reason.  The  Germans  have  also 
a  word  Verstand, which  seems  to  represent  our  word  "  un- 
derstanding," "intelligence,"  "intellect,"  notasathing 
absolute,  which  exists  by  itself,  but  as  a  thing  connected 
with  an  individual  being,  as  a  man.  Accordingly  it  is 
the  capacity  of  receiving  impressions  (Vorstellungen, 
QavTacnai),  and  forming  from  them  distinct  ideas  (Be- 
griffe),  and  perceiving  differences.  I  do  not  think  that 
these  remarks  will  help  the  reader  to  the  understanding 
of  Antoninus,  or  his  use  of  the  words  »ou?  and  A6709. 
The  Emperor's  meaning  must  be  got  from  his  own 
words,  and  if  it  does  not  agree  altogether  with  modern 
notions,  it  is  not  our  business  to  torce  it  into  agreement, 
but  simply  to  find  out  what  his  meaning  is,  if  we  can. 

Justinus  (ad  Diognetum,  c.  vii.)  says,  that  the  om- 
nipotent, all-creating,  and  invisible  God  has  fixed  truth 
and  the  holy,  incomprehensible  Logos  in  men's  hearts  ; 
and  this  Logos  is  the  architect  and  creator  of  the  Uni- 
verse. In  the  first  Apology  (c.  xxxii.)  he  says  that  the 
seed  (a-TTepfxa)  from  God  is  the  Logos,  which  dwells  in 
those  who  believe  in  God.  So  it  appears  that  according 
to  Justinus  the  Logos  is  only  in  such  believers.  In  the 
second  Apology  (c.  viii.)  he  speaks  of  the  seed  of  the 
Logos  being  implanted  in  all  mankind:  but  those  who 
order  their  lives  according  to  Logos,  such  as  the  Stoics, 
have  only  a  portion  of  the  Logos  (tcara  a-ntptxaiiKoo  Xoyov 
juepo?),  and  have  not  the  knowledge  and  contemplation 
of  the  entire  Logos,  which  is  Christ.  Swedenborg's  re- 
marks (Angelic  Wisdom.  240)  are  worth  comparing  with 
Justinus.  The  modern  philosopher,  in  substance, 
agrees  with  the  ancient ;  but  is  more  precise. 


62       Zbe  jpbilosopbg  of  Bntomnus 

God  exists,  then,  but  what  do  we  know  of 
his  nature  ?  Antoninus  says  that  the  soul  of 
man  is  an  efflux  from  the  divinity.  We  have 
bodies  like  animals,  but  we  have  reason,  intel- 
ligence, as  the  gods.  Animals  have  life  (ipvx?/), 
and  what  we  call  instincts,  or  natural  principles 
of  action  ;  but  the  rational  animal  man  alone 
has  a  rational,  intelligent  soul  (ipvxrf  Xoyixrj 
roepd).  Antoninus  insists  on  this  continually  : 
God  is  in  man,-  and  so  we  must  constantly  at- 
tend to  the  divinit}7  within  us,  for  it  is  only  in 
this  way  that  we  can  have  any  knowledge  of 
the  nature  of  God.  The  human  soul  is,  in  a 
sense,  a  portion  of  the  divinity,  and  the  soul 
alone  has  any  communication  with  the  Deity, 
for,  as  he  says  (xii.,  2)  :  "  With  his  intellectual 
part  alone  God  touches  the  intelligence  only 
which  has  flowed  and  been  derived  from  him- 
self into  these  bodies."  In  fact,  he  says  that 
what  is  hidden  within  a  man  is  life,  that  is  the 
man  himself.  All  the  rest  is  vesture,  covering, 
organs,  instrument,  which  the  living  man,  the 
real  man,f  uses  for  the  purpose  of  his  present 

*  Com.  Ep.  to  the  Corinthians,  i.,  3,  17,  and  James  iv., 
8,  "Draw  nigh  to  God  and  he  will  draw  nigh  to  you." 

t  This  is  also  Swedenborg's  doctrine  of  the  soul.  "  As 
to  what  concerns  the  soul,  of  which  it  is  said  that  it 
shall  live  after  death,  it  is  nothing  else  but  the  man 
himself,  who  lives  in  the  body,  that  is,  the  interior  man, 
who  by  the  body  acts  in  the  world  and  from  whom  the 
body  itself  lives"  (quoted  by  Clissold,  p.  456  of  "  The 
Practical  Nature  of  the  Theological  Writings  of  Eman- 
uel Swedenborg,  in  a  letter  to'the  Archbishop  of  Dub- 


TLbe  jpbilosopbg  of  Bntoninus        63 

existence.  The  air  is  universally  diffused  for 
him  who  is  able  to  respire,  and  so  for  him  who 
is  willing  to  partake  of  it  the  intelligent 
power,  which  holds  within  it  all  things,  is  dif- 
fused as  wide  and  free  as  the  air  (viii.,  54). 
It  is  by  living  a  divine  life  that  man  approaches 
to  a  knowledge  of  the  divinity.-     It  is  by  fol- 

lin  (Whately),"  second  editicn,  1859;  a  book  which  the- 
ologians might  read  with  profit)  This  is  an  old 
doctrine  of  the  soul,  which  has  been  often  proclaimed, 
but  never  better  expressed  than  by  the  "  Auctor  de 
Mundo,"  c.  6,  quoted  by  Gataker  in  his  Antoninus, 
p.  436.  "  The  soul  by  which  we  live  and  have  cities  and 
houses  is  invisible,  but  it  is  seen  by  its  works ;  for  the 
whole  method  of  life  has  been  devised  by  it  and  ordered, 
and  by  it  is  held  together.  In  like  manner,  we  must 
think  also  about  the  Deity,  who  in  power  is  most 
mighty,  in  beauty  most  comely,  in  life  immortal,  and  in 
virtue  supreme  ;  wherefore  though  he  is  invisible  to  hu- 
man nature,  he  is  seen  by  his  very  works.' '  Other  pas- 
sages to  the  same  purpose  are  quoted  by  Gataker  (p. 
382).  Bishop  Butler  has  the  same  as  to  the  soul  :  "  Upon 
the  whole,  then,  our  organs  of  sense  and  our  limbs  are 
certainly  instruments,  which,  the  living  persons,  our- 
selves, make  use  of  to  perceive  and  move  with."  If  this 
is  not  plain  enough,  he  also  says:  "It  follows  that  our 
organized  bodies  are  no  more  ourselves,  or  part  of  our- 
selves than  any  other  matter  around  us  "  (Compare 
Anton,  x.,  38). 

*  The  reader  may  consult  Discourse  V.  "  Of  the  exist- 
ence and  nature  of  God,"  in  John  Smith's  "  Select  Dis- 
courses." He  has  prefixed  asa  text  to  this  Discourse, 
the  striking  passage  of  Agapetus,  Paraenes,  §  3:  "He 
who  knows  himself  will  know  God  ;  and  he  who  knows 
God  will  be  made  like  to  God  ;  and  he  will  be  made  like 
to  God,  who  has  become  worthy  of  God ;  and  he  be- 
comes worthy  of  God,  who  does  nothing  unworthy  of 
God,  but  thinks  the  things  that  are  his,  and  speaks 
what  he  thinks,  and  does  what  he  speaks."  I  suppose 
that  the  old  saying,  "  Know  thyself,"  which  is  attributed 
to  Socrates  and  others,  had  a  larger  meaning  than  the 
narrow  sense  which  is  generally  given  to  it  (Agapetus. 
ed.  Stephan.  Schoning,  Franeker,  1608.  This  volume 
contains  also  the  Paraenesis  of  Nilus). 


64  '      Gbe  fl>bilosopb2  of  Hntonfnus 

lowing  the  divinity  within,  Saijuaov  or  OeoS  as 
Antoninus  calls  it,  that  man  comes  nearest  to 
the  Deity,  the  supreme  good,  for  man  can  never 
attain  to  perfect  agreement  with  his  internal 
guide  (to  ?}yejiiovixov).  "Iyive  with  the  gods. 
And  he  does  live  with  the  gods,  who  constantly 
shows  to  them  that  his  own  soul  is  satisfied 
with  that  which  is  assigned  to  him,  and  that  it 
does  all  the  daemon  (Sain  gov)  wishes,  which 
Zeus  hath  given  to  every  man  for  his  guardian 
and  guide,  a  portion  of  himself.  And  this 
daemon  is  every  man's  understanding  and  rea- 
son" (v.,  27). 

There  is  in  man,  that  is,  in  the  reason,  the 
intelligence,  a  superior  faculty  which,  if  it  is 
exercised,  rules  all  the  rest.  This  is  the  ruling 
faculty  (to  r/ya/novixov),  to  which  Cicero  (De 
Natura  Deorum,  ii.,  n)  renders  by  the  Latin 
word  Principatus,  "to  which  nothing  can  or 
ought  to  be  superior."  Antoninus  often  uses 
this  term,  and  others  which  are  equivalent. 
He  names  it  (vii.,  64)  "the  governing  intelli- 
gence." The  governing  faculty  is  the  master 
of  the  soul  (v.,  26).  A  man  must  reverence 
only  his  ruling  faculty,  and  the  divinity  within 
him.  As  we  must  reverence  that  which  is 
supreme  in  the  universe,  so  we  must  reverence 
that  which  is  supreme  in  ourselves,  and  this  is 
that  which  is  of  like  kind  with  that  which  is 


Gbe  fl>bilo50pb£  of  Bntontnus       65 

supreme  in  the  universe  (v.,  21).  So,  as 
Plotinus  says,  the  soul  of  man  can  only  know 
the  divine,  so  far  as  it  knows  itself.  In  one 
passage  (xi.,  19)  Antoninus  speaks  of  a  man's 
condemnation  of  himself,  when  the  diviner  part 
within  him  has  been  overpowered  and  yields  to 
the  less  honorable  and  to  the  perishable  part, 
the  body,  and  its  gross  pleasures.  In  a  word, 
the  views  of  Antoninus  on  this  matter,  however 
his  expressions  may  vary,  are  exactly  what 
Bishop  Butler  expresses,  when  he  speaks  of 
"the  natural  supremacy  of  reflection  or  con- 
science," of  the  faculty  "which  surveys,  ap- 
proves, or  disapproves  the  several  affections  of 
our  mind  and  actions  of  our  lives." 

Much  matter  might  be  collected  from  Anto- 
ninus on  the  notion  of  the  universe  being  one 
animated  Being.  But  all  that  he  says  amounts 
to  no  more,  as  Schultz  remarks,  than  this  :  the 
soul  of  man  is  most  intimately  united  to  his 
body,  and  together  they  make  one  animal, 
which  we  call  man  ;  so  the  Deity  is  most  inti- 
mately united  to  the  world  or  the  material  uni- 
verse, and  together  they  form  one  whole.  But 
Antoninus  did  not  view  God  and  the  material 
universe  as  the  same,  any  more  than  he  viewed 
the  body  and  soul  of  man  as  one.  Antoninus 
has  no  speculations  on  the  absolute  nature  of 
the  Deity,     It  was  not  his  fashion  to  waste  his 


66       Gbe  ipbUosopbg  of  Bntontnus 

time  on  what  man  cannot  understand.*  He 
was  satisfied  that  God  exists,  that  he  governs 
all  things,  that  man  can  only  have  an  imperfect 
knowledge  of  his  nature,  and  he  must  attain 
this  imperfect  knowledge  by  reverencing  the 
divinity  which  is  within  him,  and  keeping  it 
pure. 

From  all  that  has  been  said  it  follows  that  the 
universe  is  administered  by  the  Providence  of 
God  {itpovoia),  and  that  all  things  are  wisely 
ordered.  There  are  passages  in  which  Anto- 
ninus expresses  doubts,  or  states  different  pos- 
sible theories  of  the  constitution  and  govern- 
ment of  the  universe,  but  he  always  recurs  to 
his  fundamental  principle  that,  if  we  admit  the 
existence  of  a  Deity,  we  must  also  admit  that 
he  orders  all  things  wisely  and  well  (iv.,  27  ; 
vi.,  1;  ix.,  28;  xii.,  5;  and  many  other  pas- 
sages). Epictetus  says  (i.,  6)  that  we  can  dis- 
cern the  Providence  which  rules  the  world  if  we 
possess  two  things,  the  power  of  seeing  all  that 
happens  with  respect  to  each  thing,  and  a 
grateful  disposition. 

But  if  all  things  are  wisely  ordered,  how  is 
the  world  so  full  of  what  we  call  evil,  physical 
and  moral  ?     If,  instead  of  saying  that  there  is 


*,!  God,  who  is  infinitely  beyond  the  reach  of  our  nar- 
row capacities."  Locke,  Essay  Concerning  the  Human 
"Jnderstanding,  ii.,  chap.  17. 


Gbe  fl>bilosopb£  of  Sntonfnus        67 

evil  in  the  world,  we  used  the  expression  which 
I  have  used,  "what  we  call  evil,"  we  have 
partly  anticipated  the  Emperor's  answer.  We 
see  and  feel  and  know  imperfectly  very  few 
things  in  the  few  years  that  we  live,  and  all  the 
knowledge  and  all  the  experience  of  all  the 
human  race  is  positive  ignorance  of  the  whole, 
which  is  infinite.  Now,  as  our  reason  teaches 
as  that  every  thing  is  in  some  way  related  to 
and  connected  with  every  other  thing,  all  notion 
of  evil  as  being  in  the  universe  of  things  is  a 
contradiction,  for,  if  the  whole  comes  from  and 
is  governed  by  an  intelligent  being,  it  is  impos- 
sible to  conceive  any  thing  in  it  which  tends  to 
the  evil  or  destruction  of  the  whole  (viii., 
55  ;  x.,  6).  Every  thing  is  in  constant  muta- 
tion, and  yet  the  whole  subsists.  We  might 
imagine  the  solar  system  resolved  into  its  ele- 
mental parts,  and  yet  the  whole  would  still 
subsist  "ever  young  and  perfect." 

All  things,  all  forms,  are  dissolved  and  new 
forms  appear.  All  living  things  undergo  the 
change  which  we  call  death.  If  we  call  death 
an  evil,  then  all  change  is  an  evil.  Living 
beings  also  suffer  pain,  and  man  suffers  most  of 
all,  for  he  suffers  both  in  and  by  his  body,  and 
by  his  intelligent  part.  Men  suffer  also  from 
one  another,  and  perhaps  the  largest  part  of 
human  suffering  comes  to  man  from  those  whom 


68       <Sbe  ipbUosopbs  of  Bntomnus 

he  calls  his  brothers.  Antoninus  says  (viii., 
55)  :  "  Generally,  wickedness  does  no  harm  at 
all  to  the  universe  ;  and  particularly,  the  wick- 
edness [of  one  man]  does  no  harm  to  another. 
It  is  only  harmful  to  him  who  has  it  in  his 
power  to  be  released  from  it  as  soon  as  he  shall 
choose."  The  first  part  of  this  is  perfectly  con- 
sistent with  the  doctrine  that  the  whole  can 
sustain  no  evil  or  harm.  The  second  part  must 
be  explained  by  the  Stoic  principle  that  there  is 
no  evil  in  any  thing  which  is  not  in  our  power. 
What  wrong  we  suffer  from  another  is  his  evil, 
not  ours.  But  this  is  an  admission  that  there  is 
evil  in  a  sort,  for  he  who  does  wrong  does  evil, 
and  if  others  can  endure  the  wrong,  still  there 
is  evil  in  the  wrong-doer.  Antoninus  (xi.,  18) 
gives  many  excellent  precepts  with  respect  to 
wrongs  and  injuries,  and  his  precepts  are  prac- 
tical. He  teaches  us  to  bear  what  we  cannot 
avoid,  and  his  lessons  may  be  just  as  useful  to 
him  who  denies  the  being  and  the  government 
of  God  as  to  him  who  believes  in  both.  There 
is  no  direct  answer  in  Antoninus  to  the  objec- 
tions which  may  be  made  to  the  existence  and 
providence  of  God  because  of  the  moral  disor- 
der and  suffering  which  are  in  the  world,  except 
this  answer,  which  he  makes  in  reply  to  the 
supposition  that  even  the  best  men  may  be  ex- 
tinguished by  death.     He  says,  if  it  is  so,  we 


Zbc  ipbiloeopbg  of  Bntonlnus       69 

may  be  sure  that  if  it  ought  to  have  been  other- 
wise, the  gods  would  have  ordered  it  otherwise 
(xii.,  5).  His  conviction  of  the  wisdom  which 
we  may  observe  in  the  government  of  the  world 
is  too  strong  to  be  disturbed  by  any  apparent 
irregularities  in  the  order  of  things.  That  these 
disorders  exist  is  a  fact,  and  those  who  would 
conclude  from  them  against  the  being  and  gov- 
ernment of  God  conclude  too  hastily.  We  all 
admit  that  there  is  an  order  in  the  material 
world,  a  Nature,  in  the  sense  in  which  that 
word  has  been  explained,  a  constitution  (xaTcx- 
dxEvr/),  what  we  call  a  system,  a  relation  of 
parts  to  one  another,  and  a  fitness  of  the  whole 
for  something.  So,  in  the  constitution  of  plants 
and  of  animals,  there  is  an  order,  a  fitness  for 
some  end.  Sometimes  the  order,  as  we  conceive 
it,  is  interrupted,  and  the  end,  as  we  conceive  it, 
is  not  attained.  The  seed,  the  plant,  or  the  ani- 
mal sometimes  perishes  before  it  has  passed 
through  all  its  changes,  and  done  all  its  uses. 
It  is  according  to  Nature,  that  is,  a  fixed  order, 
for  some  to  perish  early,  and  for  others  to  do  all 
their  uses  and  leave  successors  to  take  their 
place.  So  man  has  a  corporeal  and  intellectual 
and  moral  constitution  fit  for  certain  uses,  and, 
on  the  whole,  man  performs  these  uses,  dies, 
and  leaves  other  men  in  his  place.  So  society 
exists,  and  a  social  state  is  manifestly  the  Na- 


70        Zbc  ipbilosopb^  of  Sntoninus 

tural  State  of  man,  the  state  for  which  his  Na- 
ture fits  him  ;  and  society,  amidst  innumerable 
irregularities  and  disorders,  still  subsists ;  and 
perhaps  we  may  say  that  the  history  of  the  past 
and  our  present  knowledge  give  us  a  reasonable 
hope  that  its  disorders  will  diminish,  and  that 
order,  its  governing  principle,  may  be  more 
firmly  established.  As  order  then,  a  fixed 
order,  we  may  say,  subject  to  deviations  real  or 
apparent,  must  be  admitted  to  exist  in  the 
whole  Nature  of  things,  that  which  we  call  dis- 
order or  evil  as  it  seems  to  us,  does  not  in  any 
way  alter  the  fact  of  the  general  constitution  of 
things  having  a  Nature  or  fixed  order.  Nobody 
will  conclude  from  the  existence  of  disorder 
that  order  is  not  the  rule,  for  the  existence  of 
order,  both  physical  and  moral,  is  proved  by 
daily  experience  and  all  past  experience.  We 
cannot  conceive  how  the  order  of  the  universe 
is  maintained  :  we  cannot  even  conceive  how 
our  own  life,  from  day  to  day,  is  continued,  nor 
how  we  perform  the  simplest  movements  of  the 
body,  nor  how  we  grow  and  think  and  act, 
though  we  know  many  of  the  conditions  which 
are  necessary  for  all  these  functions.  Knowing 
nothing,  then,  of  the  unseen  power  which  acts 
in  ourselves  except  by  what  is  done,  we  know 
nothing  of  the  power  which  acts  through  what 
we  call  all  time  and  all  space;  but,  seeing  that 


Gbe  H>bilosopb£  of  Bntontnus       71 

there  is  a  nature  or  fixed  order  in  all  things 
known  to  us,  it  is  conformable  to  the  nature  of 
our  minds  to  believe  that  this  universal  nature 
has  a  cause  which  operates  continually,  and 
that  we  are  totally  unable  to  speculate  on  the 
reason  of  any  of  those  disorders  or  evils  which 
we  perceive.  This,  I  believe,  is  the  answer 
which  may  be  collected  from  all  that  Antoninus 
has  said.* 

The  origin  of  evil  is  an  old  question.  Achil- 
les tells  Priam  (Iliad,  24,  527)  that  Zeus  has 
two  casks,  one  filled  with  good  things,  and  the 
other  with  bad,  and  that  he  gives  to  men  out 
of  each  according  to  his  pleasure  ;  and  so  we 
must  be  content,  for  we  cannot  alter  the  will  of 
Zeus.  One  of  the  Greek  commentators  asks 
how  must  we  reconcile  this  doctrine  with  what 
we  find  in  the  first  book  of  the  Odyssey,  where 
the  king  of  the  gods  says,  men  say  that  evil 
comes  to  them  from  us,  but  they  bring  it  on 
themselves  through  their  own  folly.  The  an- 
swer is  plain  enough  even  to  the  Greek  com- 
mentator. The  poets  make  both  Achilles  and 
Zeus  speak  appropriately  to  their  several  char- 
acters.    Indeed  Zeus  says  plainly  that  men  do 

*  Cleanthes  says  in  his  Hymn  : 

'•'  For  all  things  good  and  bad  to  One  thou  formest, 

So  that  One  everlasting  reason  governs  all." 
See  Bishop  Butler's  Sermons.    Sermon  xv.,   "Upon 
the  Ignorance  of  Man." 


72       XLbc  ipbdosopbg  of  Bntonfnus 

attribute  their  sufferings  to  the  gods,  but  they 
do  it  falsely,  for  they  are  the  cause  of  their  own 
sorrows. 

Epictetus  in  his  Enchiridion  (c.  27)  makes 
short  work  of  the  question  of  evil.  He  says, 
"As  a  mark  is  not  set  up  for  the  purpose 
of  missing  it,  so  neither  does  the  nature  of  evil 
exist  in  the  Universe."  This  will  appear  obscure 
enough  to  those  who  are  not  acquainted  with 
Epictetus,  but  he  always  knows  what  he  is 
talking  about.  We  do  not  set  up  a  mark  in 
order  to  miss  it,  though  we  may  miss  it.  God, 
whose  existence  Epictetus  assumes,  has  not 
ordered  all  things  so  that  his  purpose  shall  fail. 
Whatever  there  may  be  of  what  we  call  evil, 
the  nature  of  evil,  as  he  expresses  it,  does 
not  exist ;  that  is,  evil  is  not  a  part  of  the  con- 
stitution or  nature  of  things.  If  there  were  a 
principle  of  evil  {apxv)  m  the  constitution  of 
things,  evil  would  no  longer  be  evil,  as  Simpli- 
cius  argues,  but  evil  would  be  good.  Simpli- 
cius  (c.  34,  [27])  has  a  long  and  curious  discourse 
on  this  text  of  Epictetus,  and  it  is  amusing  and 
instructive. 

One  passage  more  will  conclude  this  matter. 
It  contains  all  that  the  emperor  could  say  (ii., 
11):  "To  go  from  among  men,  if  there  are 
gods,  is  not  a  thing  to  be  afraid  of,  for  the  gods 
will  not  involve  thee  in  evil ;   but  if  indeed 


Gbe  jpbilosopbE  of  Bntoninus       73 

they  do  not  exist,  or  if  they  have  no  concern 
about  human  affairs,  what  is  it  to  me  to  live  in 
a  universe  devoid  of  gods  or  devoid  of  provi- 
dence ?  But  in  truth  they  do  exist,  and  they 
do  care  for  human  things,  and  they  have  put 
all  the  means  in  man's  power  to  enable  him 
not  to  fall  into  real  evils.  And  as  to  the  rest, 
if  there  was  any  thing  evil,  they  would  have 
provided  for  this  also,  that  it  should  be  alto- 
gether in  a  man's  power  not  to  fall  into  it. 
But  that  which  does  not  make  a  man  worse, 
how  can  it  make  a  man's  life  worse  ?  But  nei- 
ther through  ignorance,  nor  having  the  knowl- 
edge, but  not  the  power  to  guard  against  or 
correct  these  things,  is  it  possible  that  the  na- 
ture of  the  universe  has  overlooked  them  ;  nor 
is  it  possible  that  it  has  made  so  great  a  mis- 
take, either  through  want  of  power  or  want  of 
skill,  that  good  and  evil  should  happen  indis- 
criminately to  the  good  and  the  bad.  But 
death  certainly  and  life,  honor  and  dishonor, 
pain  and  pleasure,  all  these  things  equally  hap- 
pen to  good  and  bad  men,  being  things  which 
make  us  neither  better  nor  worse.  Therefore 
they  are  neither  good  nor  evil." 

The  Ethical  part  of  Antoninus'  Philosophy 
follows  from  his  general  principles.  The  end 
of  all  his  philosophy  is  to  live  conformably  to 
nature,  both  a  man's  own  nature  and  the  na- 


74       ^be  ipbtlosopbg  of  Bntontnus 

ture  of  the  universe.  Bishop  Butler  has  ex- 
plained what  the  Greek  philosophers  meant 
when  they  spoke  of  living  according  to  nature, 
and  he  says  that  when  it  is  explained,  as  he  has 
explained  it  and  as  they  understood  it,  it  is  "a 
manner  of  speaking  not  loose  and  undetermi- 
nate,  but  clear  and  distinct,  strictly  just  and 
true."  To  live  according  to  nature  is  to  live 
according  to  man's  whole  nature,  not  accord- 
ing to  a  part  of  it,  and  to  reverence  the  divinity 
within  him  as  the  governor  of  all  his  actions. 
"  To  the  rational  animal  the  same  act  is  accord- 
ing to  nature  and  according  to  reason  "  *  (vii., 
u).  That  which  is  done  contrary  to  reason  is 
also  an  act  contrary  to  nature,  to  the  whole 
nature,  though  it  is  certainly  conformable  to 
some  part  of  man's  nature,  or  it  could  not  be 
done.  Man  is  made  for  action,  not  for  idleness 
or  pleasure.  As  plants  and  animals  do  the 
uses  of  their  nature,  so  man  must  do  his  (v.,  i). 
Man  must  also  live  conformably  to  the  uni- 
versal nature,  conformably  to  the  nature  of  all 
things  of  which  he  is  one  ;  and  as  a  citizen  of  a 
political  community  he  must  direct  his  life 
and  actions  with  reference  to  those  among 
whom,  and  for  whom,  among  other  purposes, 

*  This  is  what  Juvenal  means  when  he  says  (xiv, , 
321)— 

Nunquam  aliud  Natura  aliud  Sapientia  dicit. 


£be  pbilosopbE  of  Bntontnus       75 

be  lives.  *  A  man  must  not  retire  into  solitude 
and  cut  himself  off  from  his  fellow-men.  He 
must  be  ever  active  to  do  his  part  in  the  great 
whole.  All  men  are  his  kin,  not  only  in  blood, 
but  still  more  by  participating  in  the  same  in- 
telligence and  by  being  a* portion  of  the  same 
divinity.  A  man  cannot  really  be  injured  by 
his  brethren,  for  no  act  of  theirs  can  make 
him  bad,  and  he  must  not  be  angry  with  them 
nor  hate  them  :  ' '  For  we  are  made  for  coopera- 
tion, like  feet,  like  hands,  like  eyelids,  like 
the  rows  of  the  upper  and  lower  teeth.  To  act 
against  one  another  then  is  contrary  to  nature ; 
and  it  is  acting  against  one  another  to  be  vexed 
and  to  turn  away  "  (ii.,  i). 

Further  he  says :  "  Take  pleasure  in  one 
thing  and  rest  in  it,  in  passing  from  one  social 
act  to  another  social  act,  thinking  of  God  " 
(vi.,  7).  Again:  "Love  mankind.  Follow 
God"  (vii.,  31).  It  is  the  characteristic  of 
the  rational  soul  for  a  man  to  love  his  neigh- 
bor (xi.,  1).  Antoninus  teaches  in  various 
passages  the  forgiveness  of  injuries,  and  we 
know  that  he  also  practised  what  he  taught. 
Bishop  Butler  remarks  that  "  this  divine  pre- 
cept to  forgive  injuries  and  to  love  our  enemies, 
though  to  be  met  with  in  Gentile  moralists,  yet 
is  in  a  peculiar  sense  a  precept  of  Christianity, 
*  See  viii.,  52  ;  and  Persius,  iii.,  66, 


76       Gbe  ipbtlosopbg  of  Bntoninus 

as  our  Saviour  has  insisted  more  upon  it  than  on 
any  other  single  virtue."  The  practice  of  this 
precept  is  the  most  difficult  of  all  virtues.  An- 
toninus often  enforces  it  and  gives  us  aid  tow- 
ards following  it.  When  we  are  injured,  we  feel 
anger  and  resentment,  and  the  feeling  is  natu- 
ral, just,  and  useful  for  the  conservation  of  so- 
ciety. It  is  useful  that  wrong-doers  should  feel 
the  natural  consequences  of  their  actions, 
among  which  is  the  disapprobation  of  society 
and  the  resentment  of  him  who  is  wronged. 
But  revenge,  in  the  proper  sense  of  that  word, 
must  not  be  practised.  "The  best  way  of 
avenging  thyself,"  says  the  Emperor,  "  is  not 
to  become  like  the  wrong-doer. "  It  is  plain  by 
this  that  he  does  not  mean  that  we  should  in 
any  case  practise  revenge  ;  but  he  says  to  those 
who  talk  of  revenging  wrongs,  Be  not  like  him 
who  has  done  the  wrong.  Socrates  in  the  Crito 
(c.  10)  says  the  same  in  other  words,  and  St. 
Paul  (Bp.  to  the  Romans  xii.,  17).  "When  a 
man  has  done  thee  any  wrong,  immediately 
consider  with  what  opinion  about  good  or  evil 
he  has  done  wrong.  For  when  thou  has  seen 
this,  thou  wilt  pity  him  and  wilt  neither  won- 
der nor  be  angry  "  (vii.,  26).  Antoninus 
would  not  deny  that  wrong  naturally  produces 
the  feeling  of  anger  and  resentment,  for  this  is 
implied  on  the  recommendation  to  reflect  on 


Cbe  fcbilosopbv?  of  Bntoninus       77 

the  nature  of  the  man's  mind  who  has  done 
the  wrong,  and  then  you  will  have  pity  instead 
of  resentment ;  aud  so  it  comes  to  the  same  as 
St.  Paul's  advice  to  be  angry  and  sin  not ; 
which,  as  Butler  well  explains  it,  is  not  a  rec- 
ommendation to  be  angry,  which  nobody 
needs,  for  anger  is  a  natural  passion,  but  it  is  a 
warning  against  allowing  anger  to  lead  us  into 
sin.  In  short,  the  Emperor's  doctrine  about 
wrongful  acts  is  this  :  wrong-doers  do  not  know 
what  good  and  bad  are  ;  they  offend  out  of  ig- 
norance, and,  in  the  sense  of  the  Stoics,  this  is 
true.  Though  this  kind  of  ignorance  will 
never  be  admitted  as  a  legal  excuse,  and  ought 
not  to  be  admitted  as  a  full  excuse  in  any  way 
by  society,  there  may  be  grievous  injuries,  such 
as  it  is  in  a  man's  power  to  forgive  without 
harm  to  society  ;  and  if  he  forgives  because  he 
sees  that  his  enemies  know  not  what  they  do, 
he  is  acting  in  the  spirit  of  the  sublime  prayer, 
"  Father,  forgive  them,  for  they  know  not  what 
they  do." 

The  Emperor's  moral  philosophy  was  not  a 
feeble,  narrow  system,  which  teaches  a  man  to 
look  directly  to  his  own  happiness,  though  a 
man's  happiness  or  tranquillity  is  indirectly 
promoted  by  living  as  he  ought  to  do.  A  man 
must  live  conformably  to  the  universal  nature, 
which  means,  as'  the   Emperor  explains  it  in 


78       Zbe  ipbilosopbs  of  Bntoninus 

many  passages,  that  a  man's  actions  must  be 
conformable  to  his  true  relations  to  all  other 
human  beings,  both  as  a  citizen  of  a  political 
community  and  as  a  member  of  the  whole  hu- 
man family.  This  implies,  and  he  often  ex- 
presses it  in  the  most  forcible  language,  that  a 
man's  words  and  actions,  so  far  as  they  affect 
others,  must  be  measured  by  a  fixed  rule,  which 
is  their  consistency  with  the  conservation  and 
the  interests  of  the  particular  society  of  which 
he  is  a  member,  and  of  the  whole  human  race. 
To  live  conformably  to  such  a  rule,  a  man  must 
use  his  rational  faculties  in  order  to  discern 
clearly  the  consequences  and  full  effect  of  all 
his  actions  and  of  the  actions  of  others ;  he 
must  not  live  a  life  of  contemplation  and  re- 
flection only,  though  he  must  often  retire  with- 
in himself  to  calm  and  purify  his  soul  by 
thought,*  but  he  must  mingle  in  the  work  of 
man  and  be  a  fellow  laborer  for  the  general 
good. 

A  man  should  have  an  object  or  purpose  in 
life,  that  he  may  direct  all  his  energies  to  it , 
of  course,  a  good  object  (ii.,  7).  He  who  has 
not  one  object  or  purpose  of  life,  cannot  be 
one  and  the  same  all  through  his  life  (xi.,  21). 
Bacon  has  a  remark  to  the  same  effect,  on  the 

*  "  Ut  nemo  in  sese  tentat  descendere,  nemo  !  "- 
Persius,  iv.,  23. 


Gbe  ipbflosopb£  of  Bntonlnus        79 

best  means  of  "  reducing  of  the  mind  unto  vir- 
tue and  good  estate  ;  which  is,  the  electing  and 
propounding  unto  a  man's  self  good  and  virtu- 
ous ends  of  his  life,  such  as  may  be  in  a  reason- 
able sort  within  his  compass  to  attain."  He  is  a 
happy  man  who  has  been  wise  enough  to  do  this 
when  he  was  young  and  has  had  the  opportuni- 
ties ;  but  the  Emperor  seeing  well  that  a  man 
cannot  always  be  so  wise  in  his  youth,  encour- 
ages himself  to  do  it  when  he  can,  and  not  to  let 
life  slip  away  before  he  has  begun.  He  who  can 
propose  to  himself  good  and  virtuous  ends  of  life, 
and  be  true  to  them,  cannot  fail  to  live  conform- 
ably to  his  own  interest  and  the  universal  in- 
terest, for  in  the  nature  of  things  they  are  one. 
If  a  thing  is  not  good  for  the  hive,  it  is  not  good 
for  the  bee  (vi.,  54). 

One  passage  may  end  this  matter.  "If  the 
gods  have  determined  about  me  and  about  the 
things  which  must  happen  to  me,  they  have 
determined  well,  for  it  is  not  easy  even  to  im- 
agine a  deity  without  forethought ;  and  as  to 
doing  me  harm,  why  should  they  have  any 
desire  towards  that  ?  For  what  advantage 
would  result  to  them  from  this  or  to  the 
whole,  which  is  the  special  object  of  their 
providence  ?  But  if  they  have  not  determined 
about  me  individually,  they  have  certainly  de- 
termined about  the  whole   at  least ;    and   the 


8o      Gbe  ifcbilosopbg  of  Bntoninus 

things  which  happen  by  way  of  sequence  in 
this  general  arrangement  I  ought  to  accept 
with  pleasure  and  to  be  content  with  them. 
But  if  they  determine  about  nothing — which 
it  is  wicked  to  believe,  or  if  we  do  believe  it, 
let  us  neither  sacrifice  nor  pray  nor  swear  by 
them,  nor  do  any  thing  else  which  we  do  as  if 
the  gods  were  present  and  lived  with  us, — but 
if,  however,  the  gods  determine  about  none  of 
the  things  which  concern  us,  I  am  able  to  de- 
termine about  myself,  and  I  can  inquire  about 
that  which  is  useful  ;  and.  that  is  useful  to 
every  man  which  is  conformable  to  his  own 
constitution  (Kara6xevr/)  and  nature.  But  my 
nature  is  rational  and  social  ;  and  my  city  and 
country,  so  far  as  I  am  Antoninus,  is  Rome  ; 
but  so  far  as  I  am  a  man,  it  is  the  world.  The 
things,  then,  which  are  useful  to  these  cities 
are  alone  useful  to  me  "  (vi.,  44). 

It  would  be  tedious,  and  it  is  not  necessary  to 
state  the  Emperor's  opinions  on  all  the  ways  in 
which  a  man  may  profitably  use  his  under- 
standing towards  perfecting  himself  in  practi- 
cal virtue.  The  passages  to  this  purpose  are  in 
all  parts  of  his  book,  but  as  they  are  in  no  or- 
der or  connection,  a  man  must  use  the  book  a 
long  time  before  he  will  find  out  all  that  is  in 
it.  A  few  words  may  be  added  here.  If  we 
analyze  all  other  things,  we  find  how  insuffi- 


XLbc  ipbilosopbg  of  Bntoninus       81 

cient  they  are  for  human  life,  and  how  truly 
worthless  many  of  them  are.  Virtue  alone  is 
indivisible,  one,  and  perfectly  satisfying.  The 
notion  of  virtue  cannot  be  considered  vague 
or  unsettled,  because  a  man  may  find  it  diffi- 
cult to  explain  the  notion  fully  to  himself  or 
to  expound  it  to  others  in  such  a  way  as  to 
prevent  cavilling.  Virtue  is  a  whole,  and  no 
more  consists  of  parts  than  man's  intelligence 
does,  and  yet  we  speak  of  various  intellectual 
faculties  as  a  convenient  way  of  expressing  the 
various  powers  which  man's  intellect  shows  by 
his  works.  In  the  same  way  we  may  speak 
of  various  virtues  or  parts  of  virtue,  in  a  prac- 
tical sense,  for  the  purpose  of  showing  what 
particular  virtues  we  ought  to  practise  in  order 
to  the  exercise  of  the  whole  virtue,  that  is,  as 
much  as  man's  nature  is  capable  of. 

The  prime  principle  in  man's  constitution  is 
social.  The  next  in  order  is  not  to  yield  to  the 
persuasions  of  the  body,  when  they  are  not 
conformable  to  the  rational  principle,  which 
must  govern.  The  third  is  freedom  from  error 
and  from  deception.  "  Let  then  the  ruling 
principle  holding  fast  to  these  things  go  straight 
on,  and  it  has  what  is  its  own"  (vii.,  55). 
The  Emperor  selects  justice  as  the  virtue  which 
is  the  basis  of  all  the  rest  (x.,  11),  and  this  had 
been  said  long  before  his  time. 


32       Zhc  fl>btlosopb£  of  Bntonfnud 

It  is  true  that  all  people  have  some  notion  of 
what  is  meant  by  justice  as  a  disposition  of  the 
mind,  and  some  notion  about  acting  in  con- 
formity to  this  disposition ;  but  experience 
shows  that  men's  notions  about  justice  are  as 
confused  as  their  actions  are  inconsistent  with 
the  true  notion  of  justice.  The  Emperor's  no- 
tion of  justice  is  clear  enough,  but  not  practical 
enough  for  all  mankind.  "Let  there  be  free- 
dom from  perturbations  with  respect  to  the 
things  which  come  from  the  external  cause ; 
and  let  there  be  justice  in  the  things  done  by 
virtue  of  the  internal  cause,  that  is,  let  there 
be  movement  and  action  terminating  in  this,  in 
social  acts,  for  this  is  according  to  thy  nature" 
(ix.,  31).  In  another  place  (ix.,  1)  he  says 
that  "he  who  acts  unjustly  acts  impiously," 
which  follows  of  course  from  all  that  he  says  in 
various  places.  He  insists  on  the  practice  of 
truth  as  a  virtue  and  as  a  means  to  virtue, 
which  no  doubt  it  is  ;  for  lying  even  in  indiffer- 
ent things  weakens  the  understanding ;  and 
lying  maliciously  is  as  great  a  moral  offence  as 
a  man  can  be  guilty  of,  viewed  both  as  showing 
an  habitual  disposition,  and  viewed  with  respect 
to  consequences.  He  couples  the  notion  of 
justice  with  action.  A  man  must  not  pride 
himself  on  having  some  fine  notion  of  justice 
in  his  head,  but  he  must  exhibit  bis  justice  in 


Zhc  pbilosopbB  ot  Bntoninus       83 

act,  like  St.  James'  notion  of  faith.     But  this 
is  enough. 

The  Stoics,  and  Antoninus  among  them,  call 
some  things  beautiful  (kccXcc)  and  some  ugly 
{aiCxpd),  and  as  they  are  beautiml  so  they  are 
good,  and  as  they  are  ugly  so  they  are  evil  or 
bad  (ii.,  1).  All  these  things,  good  and  evil, 
are  in  our  power,  absolutely  some  of  the  stricter 
Stoics  would  say ;  and  in  a  manner  only,  as 
those  who  would  not  depart  altogether  from 
common  sense  would  say  ;  practically  they  are 
to  a  great  degree  in  the  power  of  some  persons 
and  in  some  circumstances,  but  in  a  small  de- 
gree only  in  other  persons  and  in  other  circum- 
stances. The  Stoics  maintain  man's  free  will 
as'to  the  things  which  are  in  his  power  ;  for  as 
to  the  things  which  are  out  of  his  power,  free 
will  terminating  in  action  is  of  course  excluded 
by  the  very  terms  of  the  expression.  I  hardly 
know  if  we  can  discover  exactly  Antoninus' 
notion  of  the  free  will  of  man,  nor  is  the  ques- 
tion worth  the  inquiry.  What  he  does  mean 
and  does  say  is  intelligible.  All  the  things 
which  are  not  in  our  power  {arcpaipEza)  are 
indifferent ;  they  are  neither  good  nor  bad,  mor- 
ally. Such  are  life,  health,  wealth,  power,  dis- 
ease, poverty,  and  death.  Life  and  death  are 
all  men's  portion.  Health,  wealth,  power,  dis- 
ease, and  poverty,  happen  to  men  indifferently 


84       Gbe  lpbilosopbs  of  Bntontnus 

to  the  good  and  to  the  bad  ;  to  those  who  live 
according  to  nature,  and  to  those  who  do  not.* 
"Life,"  says  the  Emperor,  "is  a  warfare  and  a 
stranger's  sojourn,  and  after  fame  is  oblivion  " 
(ii.,  17).  After  speaking  of  those  men  who 
have  disturbed  the  world  and  then  died,  and 
of  the  death  of  philosophers  such  as  Heraclitus 
and  Democritus,  who  was  destroyed  by  lice, 
and  of  Socrates  whom  other  lice  (his  enemies) 
destroyed,  he  says:  "What  means  all  this? 
Thou  hast  embarked,  thou  hast  made  the  voy- 
age, thou  art  come  to  shore  ;  get  out.  If  in- 
deed to  another  life,  there  is  no  want  of  gods, 
not  even  there.  But  if  to  a  state  without  sensa- 
tion, thou  wilt  cease  to  be  held  by  pains  and 
pleasures,  and  to  be  a  slave  to  the  vessel  whfch 
is  as  much  inferior  as  that  which  serves  it  is 
superior ;  for  the  one  is  intelligence  and  deity  ; 
the  other  is  earth  and  corruption  "  (iii.,  3). 
It  is  not  death  that  a  man  should  fear,  but  he 
should  fear  never  beginning  to  live  according 
to  nature  (xiii.,  1).  Every  man  should  live 
in  such  a  way  as  to  discharge  his  duty,  and  to 

*  "  All  events  come  alike  to  all ;  there  is  one  event  to 
the  righteous  and  to  the  wicked  ;  to  the  good  and  to  the 
clean,  and  to  the  unclean,"  etc.  Ecclesiastes,  ix.,  v.  2  ; 
and  v.  3.  "This  is  an  evil  among  all  things  that  are 
done  under  the  sun,  that  there  is  one  event  unto  all." 
In  what  sense  "  evil  "  is  meant  here  seems  rather  doubt- 
ful. There  is  no  doubt  about  the  Emperor's  meaning. 
Compare  Epictetus,  Enchiridou,  c.  1.,  etc.  ;  and  the 
doctrine  of  the  Brachmans  (Strabo,  p.  713,  ed.  Cas.)  ; 

dyoBoV  Si    7}  KO.KOV  IAf)&€V  eu    U    TU>J>  CrVlLBaiVOVTixiV  duOoiOTTOLi. 


Gbe  iDbilosoobE  of  Bntoninus       85 

trouble  himself  about  nothing  else.  He  should 
live  such  a  life  that  he  shall  always  be  ready 
for  death,  and  shall  depart  content  when  the 
summons  comes.  For  what  is  death  ?  "A  ces- 
sation of  the  impressions  through  the  senses, 
and  of  the  pulling  of  the  strings  which  move 
the  appetites  and  of  the  discursive  movements 
of  the  thoughts,  and  of  the  service  to  the  flesh  " 
(vi.,  28).  Death  is  such  as  generation  is,  a 
mystery  of  nature  (ix.,  5).  In  another  pas- 
sage, the  exact  meaning  of  which  is  perhaps 
doubtful  (ix.,  3),  he  speaks  of  the  child  which 
leaves  the  womb,  and  so  he  says  the  soul  at 
death  leaves  its  envelope.  As  the  child  is  born 
or  comes  into  life  by  leaving  the  womb,  so  the 
soul  may  on  leaving  the  body  pass  into  another 
existence  which  is  perfect.  I  am  not  sure  if 
this  is  the  Emperor's  meaning.  Butler  com- 
pares it  with  a  passage  in  Strabo  (p.  713)  about 
the  Brachmans'  notion  of  death  being  the  birth 
into  real  life  and  a  happy  life  to  those  who 
have  philosophized  ;  and  he  thinks  that  Anto- 
ninus may  allude  to  this  opinion.* 

*  Seneca  (Ep.,  102)  has  the  same,  whether  an  ex- 
pression of  his  own  opinion,  or  merely  a  fine  saying  of 
others  employed  to  embellish  his  writings,  I  know  not. 
After  speaking  of  the  child  being  prepared  in  the  womb 
to  live  this  life,  he  adds  :  "  Sic  per  hoc  spatium,  quod  ab 
infantia  patet  in  senectutem,  in  alium  naturae  sumimur 
partum.  Alia  origo  nos  expectat,  alius  rerum  status." 
See  Ecclesiastes,  xii.,  7  ;  and  L,ucan,  i.,  457  : 
"  Longae  canitis  si  cognita,  vitae 
Mors  media  est," 


86       Gbe  pbflosopbE  of  Bntoninus 

Antoninus'  opinion  of  a  future  life  is  nowhere 
clearly  expressed.  His  doctrine  of  the  nature 
of  the  soul  of  necessity  implies  that  it  does 
not  perish  absolutely,  for  a  portion  of  the 
divinity  cannot  perish.  The  opinion  is  at  least 
as  old  as  the  time  of  Epicharmus  and  Eu- 
ripides ;  what  comes  from  earth  goes  back  to 
earth,  and  what  comes  from  heaven,  the  divin- 
ity, returns  to  him  wTho  gave  it.  But  I  find 
nothing  clear  in  Antoninus  as  to  the  notion  of 
the  man  existing  after  death  so  as  to  be  con- 
scious of  his  sameness  with  that  soul  which 
occupied  his  vessel  of  clay.  He  seems  to  be 
perplexed  on  this  mattter,  and  finally  to  have 
rested  in  this,  that  God  or  the  gods  will  do  what- 
ever is  best  and  consistent  with  the  university 
of  things. 

Nor  I  think  does  he  speak  conclusively  on 
another  Stoic  doctrine,  which  some  Stoics 
practised,  the  anticipating  the  regular  course 
of  nature  by  a  man's  own  act.  The  reader  will 
find  some  passages  in  which  this  is  touched  on, 
and  he  may  make  of  them  what  he  can.  But 
there  are  passages  in  which  the  Emperor  en- 
courages himself  to  wait  for  the  end  patiently 
and  with  tranquillity  ,  and  certainly  it  is  con- 
sistent with  all  his  best  teaching  that  a  man 
should  bear  all  that  falls  to  his  lot  and  do  use- 
ful acts   as  long   as   he  lives.     He  should  not 


Gbe  pbiiosopbE  ot  Bntonfnus       87 

therefore  abridge  the  time  of  his  usefulness  by 
his  own  act.  Whether  he  contemplate  any- 
possible  cases  in  which  a  man  should  die  by  his 
own  hand,  I  cannot  tell,  and  the  matter  is  not 
worth  a  curious  inquiry,  for  I  believe  it  would 
not  lead  to  any  certain  result  as  to  his  opinion 
on  this  point.  I  do  not  think  that  Antoninus, 
who  never  mentions  Seneca,  though  he  must 
have  known  all  about  him,  would  have  agreed 
with  Seneca  when  he  gives  as  a  reason  for  sui- 
cide, that  the  eternal  law,  whatever  he  means, 
has  made  nothing  better  for  us  than  this,  that 
it  has  given  us  only  one  way  of  entering  into 
life  and  many  ways  of  going  out  of  it.  The 
ways  of  going  out  indeed  are  many,  and  that  is 
a  good  reason  for  a  man  taking  care  of  himself.  * 
Happiness  was  not  the  direct  object  of  a  Sto- 
ic's life.  There  is  no  rule  of  life  contained  in 
the  precept  that  a  man  should  pursue  his  own 
happiness.  Many  men  think  that  they  are 
seeking  happiness  when  they  are  only  seeking 
the  gratification  of  some  particular  passion,  the 
strongest  that  they  have.  The  end  of  a  man  is, 
as  already  explained,  to  live  conformably  to  na- 
ture, and  he  will  thus  obtain  happiness,  tran- 
quillity of  mind,  and  contentment,  (iii.,  12  ; 
viii.,  1,  and  other  places).     As  a  means  of  living 

*  See  Plinius,  H.  N.  11.  c.  7  ;  Seneca,  De  Provid.  c.  6  ; 
and  Ep.  70,  "Nihil  melius  seterna  lex,"  etc. 


88       Gbe  ipbilosopbE  of  Bntontnus 

conformably  to  nature  he  must  study  the  four 
chief  virtues,  each  of  which  has  its  proper 
sphere :  wisdom,  or  the  knowledge  of  good  and 
evil ;  justice,  or  the  giving  to  every  man  his 
due  ;  fortitude,  or  the  enduring  of  labor  and 
pain  ;  and  temperance,  which  is  moderation  in 
all  things.  By  thus  living  conformably  to  na- 
ture, the  Stoic  obtained  all  that  he  wished  or 
expected.  His  reward  was  in  his  virtuous  life, 
and  he  was  satisfied  with  that.  Some  Greek 
poet  long  ago  wrote  : 

For  virtue  only  of  all  human  things 

Takes  her  reward  not  from  the  hands  of  others. 

Virtue  herself  rewards  the  toils  of  virtue. 

Some  of  the  Stoics  indeed  expressed  them- 
selves in  very  arrogant,  absurd  terms,  about  the 
wise  man's  self-sufhciency  ;  they  elevated  him 
to  the  rank  of  a  deity.*  But  these  were  only 
talkers  and  lecturers,  such  as  those  in  all  ages 
who  utter  fine  words,  know  little  of  human  af- 
fairs, and  care  only  for  notoriety.  Epictetus 
and  Antoninus,  both  by  precept  and  example, 
labored  to  improve  themselves  and  others  ;  and 
if  we  discover  imperfections  in  their  teachings, 
we  must  still  honor  these  great  men  who  at- 

*  J.  Smith,  in  his  Select  Discourses  on  "  The  Excel- 
lency and  Nobleness  of  True  Religion  "  (c.  vi.),  has  re- 
marked on  this  Stoical  arrogance.  He  finds  it  in  Seneca 
and  others.  In  Seneca  certainly,  and  perhaps  something 
of  it  in  Epictetus  ;  but  it  is  not  in  Antoninus. 


Zhc  i£>bil080pbE  of  Bntoninus       s9 

tempted  to  show  that  there  is  in  man's  nature 
and  in  the  constitution  of  things  sufficient  rea- 
son for  living  a  virtuous  life.  It  is  difficult 
enough  to  live  as  we  ought  to  live,  difficult  even 
for  any  man  to  live  in  such  a  way  as  to  satisfy 
himself,  if  he  exercises  only  in  a  moderate  de- 
gree the  power  of  reflecting  upon  and  reviewing 
his  own  conduct ;  and  if  all  men  cannot  be 
brought  to  the  same  opinions  in  morals  and 
religion,  it  is  at  least  worth  while  to  give  them 
good  reasons  for  as  much  as  they  can  be  per- 
suaded to  accept. 


M.  ANTONINUS. 


FROM   my  grandfather  Verus*  [I  learned] 
good  morals  and  the  government  of  my 
temper. 

2.  From  the  reputation  and  remembrance  of 
my  father,!  modesty  and  a  manly  character. 

3.  From  my  mother,  J  piety  and  beneficence, 
and  abstinence,  not  only  from  evil  deeds,  but 
even  from  evil  thoughts  ;  and  further,  simpli- 
city in  my  way  of  living,  far  removed  from  the 
habits  of  the  rich. 

4.  From  my  great-grandfather,  \  not  to  have 

*  Antiius  Verus  was  his  grandfather's  name.  There  is 
no  verb  in  this  section  connected  with  the  word  "  from," 
nor  in  the  following  sections  of  this  book  ;  and  it  is  not 
quite  certain  what  verb  should  be  supplied.  "What  I 
have  added  may  express  the  meaning  here,  though  there 
arc  sections  which  it  will  not  fit.  If  he  does  not  mean 
to  say  that  he  learned  all  these  good  things  from  the 
several  persons  whom  he  mentions,  he  means  that  he 
observed  certain  good  qualities  in  them,  or  received  cer- 
tain benefits  from  them,  and  it  is  implied  that  he  was 
the  better  for  it,  or  at  least  might  have  been  ;  for  it 
would  be  a  mistake  to  understand  Marcus  as  saying  that 
he  possessed  all  the  virtues  which  he  observed  in  his 
kinsmen  and  teachers. 

t  His  father's  name  was  Annius  Verus. 

i  His  mother  was  Domitia  Calvilla,  named  also  I,ucilla, 

\  Perhaps  his  mother's  grandfather  Catilius  Severus. 


/!&♦  Bntoninus  91 

frequented  public  schools,  and  to  have  had  good 
teachers  at  home,  and  to  know  that  on  such 
things  a  man  should  spend  liberally. 

5.  From  my  governor,  to  be  neither  of  the 
green  nor  of  the  blue  party  at  the  games  in  the 
Circus,  nor  a  partisan  either  of  the  Parmularius 
or  the  Scutarius  at  the  gladiators'  fights ;  from 
him  too  I  learned  endurance  of  labor,  and  to 
want  little,  and  to  work  with  my  own  hands, 
and  not  to  meddle  with  other  people's  affairs, 
and  not  to  be  ready  to  listen  to  slander. 

6.  From  Diognetus,*  not  to  busy  myself  about 
trifling  things,  and  not  to  give  credit  to  what  was 
said  by  miracle-workers  and  jugglers  about  in- 
cantations and  the  driving  away  of  daemons  and 
such  things  ;  and  not  to  breed  quails  [for  fight- 
ing], nor  to  give  myself  up  passionately  to  such 
things  ;  and  to  endure  freedom  of  speech  ;  and 
to  have  become  intimate  with  philosophy  ;  and 
to  have  been  a  hearer,  first  of  Bacchius,  then  of 
Tandasis  and  Marcianus  ;   and  to  have  written 

*  In  the  works  of  Justinus  there  is  printed  a  letter  to 
one  Diognetus,  whom  the  writer  names  ''most  excel- 
lent." He  was  a  Gentile,  but  he  wished  very  much  to 
know  what  the  religion  of  the  Christians  was,  what  God 
they  worshipped,  and  how  this  worship  made  them  de- 
spise the  world  and  death,  and  neither  believe  in  the 
gods  of  the  Greeks  nor  observe  the  superstition  ot  the 
Jews  ;  and  what  was  this  love  to  one  another  which  they 
had,  and  why  this  new  kind  of  religion  was  introduced 
now  and  not  before.  My  friend  Mr.  Jenkins,  rector  of 
Lyminge  in  Kent,  has  suggested  to  me  that  this  Diogne- 
tus may  have  been  the  tutor  of  M.  Antoninus. 


92  /Bb.  Bntoninus 

dialogues  in  my  youth  ;  to  have  desired  a  plank 
bed  and  skin,  and  whatever  else  of  the  kind  be- 
longs to  the  Grecian  discipline. 

7.  From  Rusticus*  I  received  the  impression 
that  my  character  required  improvement  and 
discipline  ;  and  from  him  I  learned  not  to  be 
led  astray  to  sophistic  emulation,  nor  to  writing 
on  speculative  matters,  nor  to  delivering  little 
hortatory  orations,  nor  to  showing  myself  off  as 
a  man  who  practises  much  discipline,  or  does 
benevolent  acts  in  order  to  make  a  display ; 
and  to  abstain  from  rhetoric,  and  poetry,  and 
fine  writing;  and  not  to  walk  about  in  the 
house  in  my  outdoor  dress,  nor  to  do  other 
things  of  the  kind  ;  and  to  write  my  letters 
with  simplicity,  like  the  letter  which  Rus- 
ticus  wrote  from  Sinuessa  to  my  mother ;  and 
with  respect  to  those  who  have  offended  me  by 
words,  or  done  me  wrong,  to  be  easily  dis- 
posed to  be  pacified  and  reconciled,  as  soon  as 
they  have  shown  a  readiness  to  be  reconciled  ; 
and  to  read  carefully,  and  not  to  be  satisfied 
with  a  superficial  understanding  of  a  book  ;  nor 

*  Q.  Junius  Rusticus  was  a  Stoic  philosopher,  whom 
Antoninus  valued  highly,  and  often  took  his  advice. 
(Capitol.  M.  Antoninus,  hi.). 

Antoninus  says,Tois  'En-t/cTjjTet'ot?  vno/jivrjfjLaa ii>,  which 
must  not  be  translated,  "  the  writings  of  Epictetus,"  for 
Epictetus  wrote  nothing.  His  pupil  Arrian,  who  has 
preserved  for  us  all  that  we  know  of  Epictetus,  says, 

Taiira    eneipa.07)v  viro^vrjixaTa   ejaavTW   $t,a<}>v\a£an.  ttjs  eKtlJ'QU 

diavoias.    (Ep.  ad  Gell.). 


/lib.  Bntoninus  93 

hastily  to  give  my  assent  to  those  who  talk  over- 
much ;  and  I  am  indebted  to  him  for  being  ac- 
quainted with  the  discourses  of  Epictetus,  which 
he  communicated  to  me  out  of  his  own  recol- 
lection. 

8.  From  Apollonius*  I  learned  freedom  of  will 
and  undeviating  steadiness  of  purpose  ;  and  to 
look  to  nothing  else,  not  even  for  a  moment, 
except  to  reason  ;  and  to  be  always  the  same,  in 
sharp  pains,  on  the  occasion  of  the  loss  of  a  child, 
and  in  long  illness  ;  and  to  see  clearly  in  a  living 
example  that  the  same  man  can  be  most  reso- 
lute and  yielding,  and  not  peevish  in  giving  his 
instruction  ;  and  to  have  had  before  my  eyes  a 
man  who  clearly  considered  his  experience  and 
his  skill  in  expounding  philosophical  principles 
as  to  the  smallest  of  his  merits  ;  and  from  him 
I  learned  how  to  receive  from  friends  what  are 
esteemed  favors,  without  being  either  humbled 
by  them  or  letting  them  pass  unnoticed. 

9.  From  Sextus,f  a  benevolent  disposition, 
and  the  example  of  a  family  governed  in  a 
fatherly  manner,  and  the  idea  of  living  conform- 
ably to  nature  ;  and  gravity  without  affectation, 
and  to  look  carefully  after  the  interests  of 
friends,  and  to  tolerate  ignorant  persons,  and 

*  Apollonius  of  Chalcis  came  to  Rome  in  the  time  of 
Pius  to  be  Marcus'  preceptor.     He  was  a  rigid  Stoic. 

+  Sextus  of  Chseronea,  a  grandson  of  Plutarch,  or 
nephew,  as  some  say  ;  but  more  probably  a  grandson, 


94  tf&.  Bntonfnus 

those  who  form  opinions  without  considera- 
tion :  he  had  the  power  of  readily  accommo- 
dating himself  to  all,  so  that  intercourse  with 
him  was  more  agreeable  than  any  flattery ;  and  at 
the  same  time  he  was  most  highly  venerated  by 
those  who  associated  with  him  ;  and  he  had  the 
faculty  both  of  discovering  and  ordering,  in  an 
intelligent  and  methodical  way,  the  principles 
necessary  for  life  ;  and  he  never  showed  anger 
or  any  other  passion,  but  was  entirely  free  from 
passion,  and  also  most  affectionate ;  and  he 
could  express  approbation  without  noisy  dis- 
play, and  he  possessed  much  knowledge  with- 
out ostentation. 

10.  From  Alexander*  the  grammarian,  to  re- 
frain from  fault-finding,  and  not  in  a  reproach- 
ful way  to  chide  those  who  uttered  any  barba- 
rous or  solecistic  or  strange-sounding  expres- 
sion ;  but  dexterously  to  introduce  the  very 
expression  which  ought  to  have  been  used,  and 
in  the  way  of  answer  or  giving  confirmation,  or 
joining  in  an  inquiry  about  the  thing  itself,  not 
about  the  word,  or  by  some  other  fit  suggestion. 

ii.  From  Fronto  f  I  learned  to  observe  what 

*  Alexander  was  a  Grammaticus,  a  native  of  Phrygia. 
He  wrote  a  commentary  on  Homer  ;  and  the  rhetorician 
Aristides  wrote  a  panegyric  on  Alexander  in  a  funeral 
oration. 

t  M.  Cornelius  Fronto  was  a  rhetorician,  and  in  great 
favor  with  Marcus.  There  are  extant  various  letters  be- 
tween Marcus  and  Fronto. 


rt&.  Bntoninus  95 

envy,  and  duplicity,  and  Irypocrisy  are  in  a  ty- 
rant, and  that  generally  those  among  us  who 
are  called  Patricians  are  rather  deficient  in  pa- 
ternal affection. 

12.  From  Alexander  the  Platonic,  not  fre- 
quently nor  without  necessity  to  say  to  any  one, 
or  to  write  in  a  letter,  that  I  have  no  leisure  ; 
nor  continually  to  excuse  the  neglect  of  du- 
ties required  by  our  relation  to  those  with  whom 
we  live,  by  alleging  urgent  occupations. 

13.  From  Catulus,*  not  to  be  indifferent  when 
a  friend  finds  fault,  even  if  he  should  find  fault 
without  reason,  but  to  try  to  restore  him  to  his 
usual  disposition  ;  and  to  be  ready  to  speak  well 
of  teachers,  as  it  is  reported  of  Domitius  and 
Athenodotus  ;  and  to  love  my  children  truly. 

14.  From  my  brother  |  Severus,  to  love  my 
kin,  and  to  love  truth,  and  to  love  justice  ;  and 
through  him  I  learned  to  know  Thrasea,  Hel- 
vidius,  Cato,  Dion,  Brutus  \\  and  from  him  I 
received  the  idea  of  a  polity  in  which  there  is 
the  same  law  for  all,  a  polity  administered  with 

*  Cinna  Catulus,  a  Stoic  philosopher. 

f  The  word  brother  may  not  be  genuine.  Antoninus 
had  no  brother.  It  has  been  supposed  that  he  may  mean 
some  cousin.  Schultz  in  his  translation  omits  ' '  brother, ' ' 
and  says  that  this  Severus  is  probably  Claudius  Severus, 
a  pe.ipatetic. 

X  We  know,  from  Tacitus  (Annal  xiii.,  xvi.  21  ;  and 
other  passages),  who  Thrasea  and  Helvidius  were. 
Plutarch  has  written  the  lives  of  the  two  Catos,  and  of 
Dion  and  Brutus.  Antoninus  probably  alludes  to  Cato  of 
Utica,  who  was  a  Stoic. 


96  /lib.  Antoninus 

regard  to  equal  rights  and  equal  freedom  of 
speech,  and  the  idea  of  a  kingly  government 
which  respects  most  of  all  the  freedom  of  the 
governed ;  I  learned  from  him  also  f  consistency 
and  undeviating  steadiness  in  my  regard  for 
philosophy  ;  and  a  disposition  to  do  good,  and 
to  give  to  others  readily,  and  to  cherish  good 
hopes,  and  to  believe  that  I  am  loved  by  my 
friends ;  and  in  him  I  observed  no  concealment 
of  his  opinions  with  respect  to  those  whom  he 
condemned,  and  that  his  friends  had  no  need 
to  conjecture  what  he  wished  or  did  not  wish, 
but  it  was  quite  plain. 

15.  From  Maximus  *  I  learned  self-govern- 
ment, and  not  to  be  led  aside  by  any  thing  ;  and 
cheerfulness  in  all  circumstances,  as  well  as  in 
illness;  and  a  just  admixture  in  the  moral  charac- 
ter of  sweetness  and  dignity,  and  to  do  what  was 
set  before  me  without  complaining.  I  observed 
that  everybody  believed  that  he  thought  as  he 
spoke,  and  that  in  all  that  he  did  he  never  had 
any  bad  intention  ;  and  he  never  showed  amaze- 
ment and  surprise,  and  was  never  in  a  hurry, 
and  never  put  off  doing  a  thing,  nor  was  per- 
plexed nor  dejected,  nor  did  he  ever  laugh  to 
disguise  his  vexation,  nor,  on  the  other  hind, 

*  Claudius  Maximus  was  a  Stoic  philosopher,  who  was 
highly  esteemed  also  by  Antoninus  Pius,  Marcus'  pre- 
decessor. The  character  of  Maximus  is  that  of  a  perfect 
man  (See  viii.,  25). 


dft.  Bntoninus  97 

was  he  ever  passionate  or  suspicious.  He  was 
accustomed  to  do  acts  of  beneficence,  and  was 
ready  to  forgive,  and  was  free  from  all  false- 
hood ;  and  he  presented  the  appearance  of  a 
man  who  could  not  be  diverted  from  right  rather 
than  of  a  man  who  had  been  improved.  I  ob- 
servedj  too,  that  no  man  could  ever  think  that 
he  was  despised  by  Maximus,  or  ever  venture 
to  think  himself  a  better  man.  He  had  also  the 
art  of  being  humorous  in  an  agreeable  way.  f 

16.  In  my  father*  I  observed  mildness  of 
temper,  and  unchangeable  resolution  in  the 
things  which  he  had  determined  after  due  de- 
liberation, and  no  vain-glory  in  those  things 
which  men  call  honors,  and  a  love  of  labor 
and  perseverance,  and  a  readiness  to  listen  to 
those  who  had  any  thing  to  propose  for  the 
common  weal,  and  undeviating  firmness  in 
giving  to  every  man  according  to  his  deserts 
and  a  knowledge  derived  from  experience  of 
the  occasions  for  vigorous  action  and  for  remis- 
sion. And  I  observed  that  he  had  overcome  all 
passion  for  boys  ;  and  he  considered  himself  no 
more  than  any  other  citizen, f  and  he  released 
his  friends  from  all  obligation  to  sup  with  him  or 
to  attend  him  of  necessity  when  he  went  abroad, 

*  He  means  his  adoptive  father,  his  predecessor,  the 
Emperor  Antoninus  Pius.     Compare  vi.,  30. 
t  He  uses   the  word    x.oi.i>ovor)iJ.oovvT).     See  Gataker's 

note. 


98  /ifo.  Bntontnus 

and  those  who  had  failed  to  accompany  him, 
by  reason  of  any  great  circumstances,  always 
found  him  the  same.  I  observed  too  his  habit 
of  careful  inquiry  in  all  matters  of  deliberation, 
and  his  persistency,  and  that  he  never  stopped 
his  investigation  through  being  satisfied  with 
appearances  which  first  present  themselves ; 
and  that  his  disposition  was  to  keep  his  friends, 
and  not  to  be  soon  tired  of  them,  nor  yet  to  be 
extravagant  in  his  affection  ;  and  to  be  satisfied 
on  all  occasions,  and  cheerful ;  and  to  foresee 
things  a  long  way  off,  and  to  provide  for  the 
smallest  without  display ;  and  to  check  imme- 
diately popular  applause  and  all  flattery  ;  and 
to  be  ever  watchful  over  the  things  which  were 
necessary  for  the  administration  of  the  empire, 
aud  to  be  a  good  manager  of  the  expenditure, 
and  patiently  to  endure  the  blame  which  he 
got  for  such  conduct ;  and  he  was  neither 
superstitious  with  respect  to  the  gods,  nor  did 
he  court  men  by  gifts  or  by  trying  to  please 
them,  or  by  flattering  the  populace  ;  but  he 
showed  sobriety  in  all  things  and  firmess,  and 
never  any  mean  thoughts  or  action,  nor  love 
of  novelty.  And  the  things  which  conduce 
in  any  way  to  the  commodity  of  life,  and  of 
which  fortune  gives  an  abundant  supply,  he 
used  without  arrogance  and  without  excusing 
himself,   so  that  when   he  had  them  he  en- 


Afo.  Bntontnus  99 

joyed  them  without  affectation,  and  when  he 
had  them  not  he  did  not  want  them.  No  one 
could  ever  say  of  him  that  he  was  either  a 
sophist,  or  a  [home-bred]  flippant  slave,  or  a 
pedant ;  but  every  one  acknowledged  him  to 
be  a  man  ripe,  perfect,  above  flattery,  able 
to  manage  his  own  and  other  men's  affairs. 
Besides  this,  he  honored  those  who  were  true 
philosophers,  and  he  did  not  reproach  those 
who  pretended  to  be  philosophers,  nor  yet  was 
he  easily  lead  by  them.  He  was  also  easy  in 
conversation,  and  he  made  himself  agreeable 
without  any  offensive  affectation.  He  took  a 
reasonable  care  of  his  body's  health,  not  as  one 
who  was  greatly  attached  to  life,  nor  out  of  re- 
gard to  personal  appearance,  nor  yet  in  a  care- 
less way,  but  so  that  through  his  own  attention 
he  very  seldom  stood  in  need  of  the  physician's 
art  or  of  medicine  or  external  applications. 
He  was  most  ready  to  give  way  without  envy 
to  those  who  possessed  any  particular  faculty, 
such  as  that  of  eloquence  or  knowledge  of  the 
law  or  of  morals,  or  of  any  thing  else  ;  and  he 
gave  them  his  help,  that  each  might  enjoy 
reputation  according  to  his  deserts  ;  and  he 
always  acted  conformably  to  the  institutions  of 
his  country,  without  showing  any  affectation  of 
doing  so.  Further,  he  was  not  fond  of  change, 
nor  unsteady,  but  he  loved  to  stay  in  the  same 


too  /lib.  Bntontnus 

places,  and  to  employ  himself  about  the  same 
things  ;  and  after  his  paroxysms  of  headache 
he  came  immediately  fresh  and  vigorous  to  his 
usual  occupations.  His  secrets  were  not  many, 
but  very  few  and  very  rare,  and  these  only  about 
public  matters  ;  and  he  showed  prudence  and 
economy  in  the  exhibition  of  the  public  spec- 
tacles and  the  construction  of  public  buildings, 
his  donations  to  the  people,  and  in  such  things, 
for  he  was  a  man  who  looked  to  what  ought  to 
be  done,  not  to  the  reputation  which  is  got  by 
a  man's  acts.  He  did  not  take  the  bath  at  un- 
seasonable hours  ;  he  was  not  fond  of  building 
houses,  nor  curious  about  what  he  ate,  nor 
about  the  texture  and  color  of  his  clothes,  nor 
about  the  beauty  of  his  slaves.*  His  dress 
came  from  Lorium,  his  villa  on  the  coast, 
and  from  Lanuvium  generally.!  We  know 
how  he  behaved  to  the  toll-collector  at  Tuscu- 
lum  who  asked  his  pardon  ;  and  such  was  all 
his  behavior.  There  was  in  him  nothing  harsh, 
nor  implacable,  nor  violent,  nor,  as  one  may 
say,  any  thing  carried  to  the  sweating  point ; 
but  he  examined  all  things  severally,  as  if  he 
had  abundance  of  time,  and  without  confusion, 


*  This  passage  is  corrupt,  and  the  exact  meaning  is 
uncertain. 

t  Lorium  was  a  villa  on  the  coast  north  of  Rome,  and 
there  Antoninus  was  brought  up  and  he  died  there.  This 
also  is  corrupt. 


fib.  Bntontnus  101 

in  an  orderly  way,  vigorously  and  consistently. 
And  that  might  be  applied  to  him  which  is 
recorded  of  Socrates.*  that  he  was  able  both  to 
abstain  from  and  to  enjoy  those  things  which 
many  are  too  weak  to  abstain  from  and  cannot 
enjoy  without  excess.  But  to  be  strong  enough 
both  to  bear  the  one  and  to  be  sober  in  the 
other  is  the  mark  of  a  man  who  has  a  perfect 
and  invincible  soul,  such  as  he  showed  in  the 
illness  of  Maximus. 

17.  To  the  gods  I  am  indebted  for  having 
good  grandfathers,  good  parents,  a  good  sister, 
good  teachers,  good  associates,  good  kinsmen 
and  friends,  nearly  every  thing  good.  Further, 
I  owe  it  to  the  gods  that  I  was  not  hurried  into 
any  offence  against  any  of  them,  though  I  had 
a  disposition  which,  if  opportunity  had  offered, 
might  have  led  me  to  do  something  of  this 
kind  ;  but  through  their  favor  there  never  was 
such  a  concurrence  of  circumstances  as  put  me 
to  the  trial.  Further,  I  am  thankful  to  the 
gods  that  I  was  not  longer  brought  up  with  my 
grandfather's  concubine,  and  that  I  preserved 
the  flower  of  my  youth,  and  that  I  did  not 
make  proof  of  my  virility  before  the  proper 
season,  but  even  deferred  the  time ;  that  I  was 
subjected  to  a  ruler  and  a  father  who  was  able 
to  take  away  all  pride  from  me,  and  to  bring  me 
*  Xenophon,  Memorab.  I.,  3,  15. 


102  /ift.  Bntoninus 

to  the  knowledge  that  it  is  possible  for  a  man 
to  live  in  a  palace  without  wanting  either 
guards  or  embroidered  dresses,  or  torches  and 
statues,  and  such-like  show  ;  but  that  it  is  in 
such  a  man's  power  to  bring  himself  very  near 
to  the  fashion  of  a  private  person,  without  being 
for  this  reason  either  meaner  in  thought  or 
more  remiss  in  action  with  respect  to  the  things 
which  must  be  done  for  the  public  interest  in  a 
manner  that  befits  a  ruler.  I  thank  the  gods 
for  giving  me  such  a  brother,'5'"  who  was  able  by 
his  moral  character  to  rouse  me  to  vigilance 
over  myself,  and  who  at  the  same  time  pleased 
me  by  his  respect  and  affection  ;  that  my  chil- 
dren have  not  been  stupid  nor  deformed  in 
body  ;  that  I  did  not  make  more  proficiency  in 
rhetoric,  poetry,  and  the  other  studies,  in  which 
I  should  perhaps  have  been  completely  en- 
gaged if  I  had  seen  that  I  was  making  pro- 
gress in  them  ;  that  I  made  haste  to  place  those 
who  brought  me  up  in  the  station  of  honor  which 
they  seemed  to  desire,  without  putting  them 
off  with  hope  of  my  doing  it  some  time  after, 
because  they  were  then  still  young;  that  1 
knew  Apollonius,  Rusticus,  Maximus  ;  that  I 
received  clear  and  frequent  impressions  about 
living  according  to  nature,  and  what  kind  of 

*  The  Emperor  had  no  brother,  except  I,.  Verus,  his 
brother  by  adoption. 


dfo.  Bntoninud  103 

a  life  that  is,  so  that  so  far  as  depended  on  the 
gods,  and  their  gifts,  and  help,  and  inspira- 
tions, nothing  hindered  me  from  forthwith  liv- 
ing according  to  nature,  though  I  still  fall 
short  of  it  through  my  own  fault  and  through 
not  observing  the  admonitions  of  the  gods, 
and  I  may  almost  say,  their  direct  instructions  ; 
that  my  body  has  held  out  so  long  in  such 
a  kind  of  life  ;  that  I  never  touched  either 
Benedicta  or  Theodotus,  and  that  after  hav- 
ing fallen  into  amatory  passions  I  was  cured  ; 
and,  though  I  was  often  out  of  humor  with 
Rusticus,  I  never  did  any  thing  of  which  I  had 
occasion  to  repeut  ;  that  though  it  was  my 
mother's  fate  to  die  young,  she  spent  the  last 
years  of  her  life  with  me  ;  that  whenever  I 
wished  to  help  any  man  in  his  need,  or  en  any 
other  occasion,  I  was  never  told  that  I  had  not 
the  means  of  doing  it  ;  and  that  to  myself  the 
same  necessity  never  happened  to  receive  any 
thing  from  another;  that  I  have  such  a  wife,* 
so  obedient,  and  so  affectionate,  and  so  simple  ; 
that  I  had  abundance  of  good  masters  for  my 
children  ;  and  that  remedies  have  been  shown 
to  me  by  dreams,  both  others,  and  against 
bloodspitting  and  giddiness  f  .  .  .  ;  and  that 
when  I  had  an  inclination  to  philosophy  I  did 
not  fall  into  the  hands  of  any  sophists,  and  that 
*  See  the  "  Life  of  Antoninus."         f  This  is  corrupt. 


104  /IB,  IHntoninus 

I  did  not  waste  my  time  on  writers  [of  histories] , 
or  in  the  resolution  of  syllogisms,  or  occupy 
myself  about  the  investigation  of  appearances 
in  the  heavens  ;  for  all  these  things  require  the 
help  of  the  gods  and  fortune. 

Among  the  Quadi  at  the  Granua."* 

*  The  Quadi  lived  in  the  southern  part  of  Bohemia 
and  Moravia,  and  Antoninus  made  a  campaign  against 
them  (See  the  Life),  Granua  is  probably  the  river 
Graan,  which  flows  into  the  Danube. 

If  these  words  are  genuine,  Antoninus  may  have  writ- 
ten this  first  book  during  the  war  with  the  Quadi.  In 
the  first  edition  of  Antoninus  and  in  the  older  editions 
the  first  three  sections  of  the  second  book  make  the 
conclusion  of  the  first  book.  Gataker  placed  them  at 
the  beginning  of  the  second  book. 


II. 


BEGIN  the  morning  by  saying  to  thyself,  I 
shall  meet  with  the  busybody,  the  un- 
grateful, arrogant,  deceitful,  envious,  unsocial. 
All  these  things  happen  to  them  by  reason  of 
their  ignorance  of  what  is  good  and  evil.  But 
I  who  have  seen  the  nature  of  the  good  that  it 
is  beautiful,  and  of  the  bad  that  it  is  ugly,  and 
the  nature  of  him  who  does  wrong,  that  it  is 
akin  to  me,  not  [only]  of  the  same  blood  or 
seed,  but  that  it  participates  in  [the  same]  in- 
telligence and  [the  same]  portion  of  the  divin- 
ity, I  can  neither  be  injured  by  any  of  them, 
for  no  one  can  fix  on  me  what  is  ugly,  nor  can 
I  be  angry  with  my  kinsman,  nor  hate  him. 
For  we  are  made  for  cooperation,  like  feet, 
like  hands,  like  eyelids,  like  the  rows  of  the 
upper  and  lower  teeth.*  To  act  against  one 
another,  then,  is  contrary  to  nature ;  and  it  is 
acting  against  one  another  to  be  vexed  and  to 
turn  away. 

*  Xenophon,  Mem.  ii.,  3,  18, 


106  ^ift,  Bntoninue 

2.  Whatever  this  is  that  I  am,  it  is  a  little 
flesh  and  breath,  and  the  ruling  part.  Throw 
away  thy  books  ;  no  longer  distract  thyself:  it 
is  not  allowed ;  but  as  if  thou  wast  now  dy- 
ing despite  the  flesh ;  it  is  blood  and  bones 
and  a  network,  a  contexture  of  nerves,  veins, 
and  arteries.  See  the  breath  also,  what  kind 
of  a  thing  it  is,  air,  and  not  always  the  same, 
but  every  moment  sent  out  and  again  sucked 
in.  The  third,  then,  is  the  ruling  part ;  con- 
sider thus :  Thou  art  an  old  man  ;  no  longer 
let  this  be  a  slave,  no  longer  be  pulled  by  the 
strings  like  a  puppet  to  unsocial  movements, 
no  longer  be  either  dissatisfied  with  thy  present 
lot,  or  shrink  from  the  future. 

3.  All  that  is  from  the  gods  is  full  of  provi- 
dence. That  which  is  from  fortune  is  not  sepa- 
rated from  nature  or  without  an  interweaving 
and  involution  with  the  things  which  are  or- 
dered by  providence.  From  thence  all  things 
flow  ;  and  there  is,  besides,  necessity,  and  that 
which  is  for  the  advantage  of  the  whole  uni- 
verse, of  which  thou  art  a  part.  But  that  is 
good  for  every  part  of  nature  which  the  nature 
of  the  whole  brings,  and  what  serves  to  main- 
tain this  nature.  Now  the  universe  is  pre- 
served, as  by  the  changes  of  the  elements  so 
by  the  changes  of  things  compounded  of  the 
elements.     Let  these  principles  be  enough  for 


/lib.  Bntoninus  107 

thee,  let  them  always  be  fixed  opinions.  But 
cast  away  the  thirst  after  books,  that  thou  may- 
est  not  die  murmuring,  but  cheerfully,  truly, 
and  from  thy  heart  thankful  to  the  gods. 

4.  Remember  how  long  thou  hast  been  put- 
ting off  these  things,  and  how  often  thou  hast 
received  an  opportunity  from  the  gods,  and  yet 
dost  not  use  it.  Thou  must  now,  at  last,  per- 
ceive of  what  universe  thou  art  a  part,  and  of 
what  administrator  of  the  universe  thy  exist- 
ence is  an  efflux,  and  that  a  limit  of  time  is 
fixed  for  thee,  which,  if  thou  dost  not  use  for 
clearing  away  the  clouds  from  thy  mind,  it 
will  go  and  thou  wilt  go,  and  it  will  never 
return. 

5.  Every  moment  think  steadily  as  a  Roman 
and  a  man  to  do  what  thou  hast  in  hand  with 
perfect  and  simple  dignity,  and  feeling  of  affec- 
tion, and  freedom,  and  justice  ;  and  to  give  thy- 
self relief  from  all  other  thoughts.  And  thou 
wilt  give  thyself  relief,  if  thou  dost  every  act 
of  thy  life  as  if  it  were  the  last,  laying  aside  all 
carelessness  and  passionate  aversion  from  the 
commands  of  reason,  and  all  hypocrisy,  and 
self-love,  and  discontent  with  the  portion  which 
has  been  given  to  thee.  Thou  seest  how  few 
the  things  are,  the  which  if  a  man  lays  hold  of, 
he  is  able  to  live  a  life  which  flows  in  quiet,  and 
is  like  the  existence  of  the  gods  ;  for  the  gods, 


108  flfc,  Bntoninus 

on  their  part,  will  require  nothing  more  from 
him  who  observes  these  things. 

6.  Do  wrong  *  to  thyself,  do  wrong  to  thyself, 
my  soul  ;  but  thou  wilt  no  longer  have  the  op- 
portunity of  honoring  thyself.  Every  man's 
life  is  sufficient.f  But  thine  is  nearly  finished, 
though  thy  soul  reverences  not  itself,  but  places 
thy  felicity  in  the  souls  of  others. 

7.  Do  the  things  external  which  fall  upon 
thee,  distract  thee  ?  Give  thyself  time  to  learn 
something  new  and  good,  and  cease  to  be 
whirled  around.  But  then  thou  must  also 
avoid  being  carried  about  the  other  way.  For 
those,  too,  are  triflers  who  have  wearied  them- 
selves in  life  by  their  activity,  and  yet  have  no 
object  to  which  to  direct  every  movement,  and, 
in  a  word,  all  their  thoughts. 

8.  Through  not  observing  what  is  in  the  mind 
of  another  a  man  has  seldom  been  seen  to  be 
unhappy  ;  but  those  who  do  not  observe  the 
movements  of  their  own  minds  must,  of  neces- 
sity be  unhappy. 

9.  This  thou  must  always  bear  in  mind,  what 
is  the  nature  of  the  whole,  and  what  is  my 
nature,  and  how  this  is  related  to  that,  and 
what  kind  of  a  part  it  is  of  what  kind  of  a 
whole,  and  that  there  is  no  one  who   hinders 

*  Perhaps  it  should  be  "thou  art  doing  violence  to  thy- 
self," v/3pi£ei?  not  i>/3pi£e. 


dB.  Bntontnus  109 

thee  from  always  doing  and  saying  the  things 
which  are  according  to  the  nature  of  which 
thou  art  a  part. 

10.  Theophrastus,  in  his  comparison  of  bad 
acts — such  a  comparison  as  one  would  make  in 
accordance  with  the  common  notions  of  man- 
kind— says,  like  a  true  philosopher,  that  the 
offences  which  are  committed  through  desire 
are  more  blameable  than  those  which  are 
committed  through  anger.  For  he  who  is 
excited  by  anger  seems  to  turn  away  from 
reason  with  a  certain  pain  and  unconscious 
contraction  ;  but  he  who  offends  through  de- 
sire, being  overpowered  by  pleasure,  seems  to 
be  in  a  manner  more  intemperate  and  more 
womanish  in  his  offences.  Rightly,  then,  and 
in  a  way  worthy  of  philosophy,  he  said  that  the 
offence  which  is  committed  with  pleasure  is 
more  blameable  than  that  which  is  committed 
with  pain  ;  and,  on  the  whole,  the  one  is  more 
like  a  person  who  has  been  first  wronged  and 
through  pain  is  compelled  to  be  angry  ;  but  the 
other  is  moved  by  his  own  impulse  to  do  wrong, 
being  carried  towards  doing  something  by  de- 
sire. 

11.  Since  it  is  possible  *  that  thou  mayest 
depart  from   life   this  very    moment,  regulate 

*  Or  it  may  mean  ::  since  it  is  in  thy  power  to  de- 
part "*  which  gives  a  meaning  somewhat  different. 


no  dib.  Bntoninu6 

every  act  and  thought  accordingly.*  But  to  go 
away  from  among  men,  if  there  are  gods,  is  not 
a  thing  to  be  afraid  of,  for  the  gods  will  not  in- 
volve thee  in  evil ;  but  if  indeed  they  do  not 
exist,  or  if  they  have  no  concern  about  human 
affairs,  what  is  it  to  me  to  live  in  a  universe 
devoid  of  gods  or  devoid  of  providence  ?  But  in 
truth  they  do  exist,  and  they  do  care  for  human 
things,  and  they  have  put  all  the  means  in 
man's  power  to  enable  him  not  to  fall  into  real 
evils.  And  as  to  the  rest,  if  there  was  any  thing 
evil,  they  would  have  provided  for  this  also,  that 
it  should  be  altogether  in  a  man's  power  not  to 
fall  into  it.  Now  that  which  does  not  make  a 
man  worse,  how  can  it  make  a  man's  life  worse  ? 
But  neither  through  ignorance,  nor  having  the 
knowledge,  but  not  the  power  to  guard  against 
or  correct  these  things,  is  it  possible  that  the 
nature  of  the  universe  has  overlooked  them  ; 
nor  is  it  possible  that  it  has  made  so  great  a  mis- 
take, either  through  want  of  power  or  want  of 
skill,  that  good  and  evil  should  happen  indis- 
criminately to  the  good  and  the  bad.  But  death 
certainly,  and  life,  honor,  and  dishonor,  pain 
and  pleasure,  all  these  things  equally  happen  to 
good  men  and  bad,  being  things  which  make  us 
neither  better  nor  worse.  Therefore  they  are 
neither  good  nor  evil. 

*  See  Cicero,  Tuscul.  i.,  40, 


/ifc.  Bntoninus  m 

12.  How  quickly  all  things  disappear,  in  the 
universe  the  bodies  themselves,  but  in  time  the 
remembrance  of  them  ;  what  is  the  nature  of  all 
sensible  things,  and  particularily  those  which 
attract  with  the  bait  of  pleasure  or  terrify  by 
pain,  or  are  noised  abroad  by  vapory  fame ; 
how  worthless,  and  contemptible,  and  sordid, 
and  perishable,  and  dead  they  are — all  this  it  is 
the  part  of  the  intellectual  faculty  to  observe. 
To  observe  too  who  these  are  whose  opinions 
and  voices  give  reputation  ;  what  death  is,  and 
the  fact  that,  if  a  man  looks  at  it  in  itself,  and 
by  the  abstractive  power  of  reflections  resolves 
into  their  parts  all  the  things  which  present 
themselves  to  the  imagination  in  it,  he  will  then 
consider  it  to  be  nothing  else  than  an  operation 
of  nature  ;  and  if  any  one  is  afraid  of  an  opera- 
tion of  nature,  he  is  a  child.  This,  however,  is 
not  only  an  operation  of  nature,  but  it  is  also  a 
thing  which  conduces  to  the  purposes  of  nature. 
To  observe  too  how  man  comes  near  to  the 
Deity,  and  by  what  part  of  him,  and  when  this 
part  of  man  is  so  disposed  f  (vi.,  28). 

13.  Nothing  is  more  wretched  than  a  man  who 
traverses  every  thing  in  a  round,  and  prys  into 
the  things  beneath  the  earth,  as  the  poet  *  says, 
and  seeks  by  conjecture  what  is  in  the  minds  of 
his  neighbors,  without  perceiving  that  it  is  suffi- 

*  Pindar  in  the  Theaetetus  of  Plato.    See  xi.,  1, 


ii2  /ir.  Bntoninus 

cient  to  attend  to  the  daemon  within  him,  and 
to  reverence  it  sincerely.  And  reverence  of  the 
daemon  consists  in  keeping  it  pure  from  passion 
and  thoughtlessness,  and  dissatisfaction  with 
what  comes  from  gods  and  men.  For  the  things 
from  the  gods  merit  veneration  for  their  excel- 
lence ;  and  the  things  from  men  should  be  dear 
to  us  by  reason  of  kinship ;  and  sometimes  even, 
in  a  manner,  they  move  our  pity  by  reason  of 
men's  ignorance  of  good  and  bad ;  this  defect 
being  not  less  than  that  which  deprives  us  of 
the  power  of  distinguishing  things  that  are 
white  and  black. 

14.  Though  thou  shouldst  be  going  to  live 
three  thousand  years,  and  as  many  times  ten 
thousand  years,  still  remember  that  no  man 
loses  any  other  life  than  this  which  he  now 
lives,  nor  lives  any  other  than  this  which  he 
now  loses.  The  longest  and  shortest  are  thus 
brought  to  the  same.  For  the  present  is  the 
same  to  all,  though  that  which  perishes  is  not 
the  same  ;f*  and  so  that  which  is  lost  appears 
to  be  a  mere  moment.  For  a  man  cannot  lose 
either  the  past  or  the  future :  for  what  a  man 
has  not,  how  can  any  one  take  this  from  him  ? 
These  two  things  then  thou  must  bear  in  mind ; 
the  one,  that  all  things,  from  eternity  are  of  like 
forms  and  come  around  in  a  circle,  and  that  it 
*  See  Gataker's  note. 


Aft.  Bntoninus  113 

makes  no  difference  whether  a  man  shall  see  the 
same  things  during  a  hundred  years  or  two 
hundred,  or  an  infinite  time;  and  the  second 
that  the  longest  liver  and  he  who  will  die  soon- 
est lose  just  the  same.  For  the  present  is  the 
only  thing  of  which  a  man  can  be  deprived, 
if  it  is  true  that  this  is  the  only  thing  which  he 
has,  and  that  a  man  cannot  lose  a  thing  if  he 
has  it  not. 

15.  Remember  that  all  is  opinion.  For  what 
was  said  by  the  Cynic  Monimus  is  manifest : 
and  manifest  too  is  the  use  of  what  was  said, 
if  a  man  receives  what  may  be  got  out  of  it  as 
far  as  it  is  true. 

16.  The  soul  of  man  does  violence  to  itself, 
first  of  all,  when  it  becomes  an  abscess  and,  as 
it  were,  a  tumor  on  the  universe,  so  far  as  it  can. 
For  to  be  vexed  at  any  thing  which  happens  is  a 
separation  of  ourselves  from  nature,  in  some 
part  of  which  the  natures  of  all  other  things 
are  contained.  In  the  next  place,  the  soul  does 
violence  to  itself  when  it  turns  away  from  any 
man,  or  even  moves  towards  him  with  the  in- 
tention of  injuring,  such  as  are  the  souls  of 
those  who  are  angry.  In  the  third  place,  the 
soul  does  violence  to  itself  when  it  is  overpow- 
ered by  pleasure  or  by  pain.  Fourthly,  when  it 
plays  a  part,  and  does  or  says  any  thing  insin- 
cerely and   untruly.     Fifthly,    when    it  allows 


ri4  /Ifc.  Bntoninus 

any  act  of  its  own  and  any  movement  to  be 
without  an  aim,  and  does  any  thing  thoughtless- 
ly and  without  considering  what  it  is,  it  being  a 
right  that  even  the  smallest  things  be  done  with 
reference  to  an  end  ;  and  the  end  of  rational 
animals  is  to  follow  the  reason  and  the  law  of 
the  most  ancient  city  and  polity. 

17.  Of  human  life  the  time  is  a  point,  and  the 
substance  is  in  a  flux,  and  the  perception  dull, 
and  the  composition  of  the  whole  body  subject 
to  putrefaction,  and  the  soul  a  whirl,  and  fortune 
hard  to  divine,  and  fame  a  thing  devoid  of 
judgment.  And,  to  say  all  in  a  word,  every 
thing  which  belongs  to  the  body  is  a  stream, 
and  what  belongs  to  the  soul  is  a  dream  and 
vapor,  and  life  is  a  warfare  and  a  stranger's 
sojourn,  and  after-fame  is  oblivion.  What  then 
is  that  which  is  able  to  conduct  a  man  ?  One 
thing  and  only  one,  philosophy.  But  this 
consists  in  keeping  the  daemon  within  a  man 
free  from  violence  and  unharmed,  superior 
to  pains  and  pleasures,  doing  nothing  with- 
out a  purpose,  nor  yet  falsely  and  with 
hypocrisy,  not  feeling  the  need  of  another 
man's  doing  or  not  doing  any  thing ;  and 
besides,  accepting  all  that  happens,  and  all 
that  is  alloted,  as  coming  from  thence,  where- 
ever  it  is,  from  whence  he  himself  came  ;  and, 
finally,  waiting  for  death  with  a  cheerful  mind, 


flfc,  Bntoninu6  115 

as  being  nothing  else  than  a  dissolution  of  the 
elements  of  which  every  living  being  is  com- 
pounded. But  if  there  is  no  harm  to  the  ele- 
ments themselves  in  each  continually  changing 
into  another,  why  should  a  man  have  any  ap- 
prehension about  the  change  and  dissolution  of 
all  the  elements  ?  For  it  is  according  to  nature, 
and  nothing  is  evil  which  is  according  to  nature. 
This  in  Carnuntum.* 

*  Carnuntum  was  a  town  of  Pannonia,  on  the  south 
side  of  the  Danube,  about  thirty  miles  east  of  Vindobona 
(Vienna).  Orosius  (vii.,  15)  and  Eutropius  (viii.,  13)  say 
that  Antoninus  remained  three  years  at  Carnuntum 
during  his  war  with  the  Marcomanni. 


■K|$ 


III. 


WK  ought  to  consider  not  only  that  our 
life  is  daily  wasting  away  and  a  smaller 
part  of  it  is  left,  but  another  thing  also  must  be 
taken  into  the  account,  that  if  a  man  should 
live  longer,  it  is  quite  uncertain  whether  the 
understanding  will  still  continue  sufficient  for 
the  comprehension  of  things,  and  retain  the 
power  of  contemplation  which  strives  to  acquire 
the  knowledge  of  the  divine  and  the  human. 
For  if  he  shall  begin  to  fall  into  dotage,  perspir- 
ation and  nutrition  and  imagination  and  appe- 
tite, and  whatever  else  there  is  of  the  kind,  will 
not  fail ;  but  the  power  of  making  use  of  our- 
selves, and  filling  up  the  measure  of  our  duty, 
and  clearly  separating  all  appearances,  and  con- 
sidering whether  a  man  should  now  depart  from 
life,  and  whatever  else  of  the  kind  absolutely  re- 
quires a  disciplined  reason,  all  this  is  already 
extinguished.  We  must  make  haste  then,  not 
only  because  we  are  daily  nearer  to  death,  but 


/lib.  Bntonfnus  117 

also  because  the  conception  of  things  and  the 
understanding  of  them  cease  first. 

2.  We  ought  to  observe  also  that  even  the 
things  which  follow  after  the  things  which  are 
produced  according  to  nature  contain  something 
pleasing  and  attractive.  For  instance,  when 
bread  is  baked  some  parts  are  split  at  the  sur- 
face, and  these  parts  which  thus  open,  and  have 
a  certain  fashion  contrary  to  the  purpose  of  the 
baker's  art,  are  beautiful  in  a  manner,  and  in  a 
peculiar  way  excite  a  desire  for  eating.  And 
again,  figs,  when  they  are  quite  ripe,  gape  open, 
and  in  the  ripe  olives  the  very  circumstance  of 
their  being  near  to  rottenness  adds  a  peculiar 
beauty  to  the  fruit.  And  the  ears  of  corn  bend- 
ing down,  and  the  lion's  eyebrows,  and  the 
foam  which  flows  from  the  mouth  of  wild  boars, 
and  many  other  things — though  they  are  far  from 
being  beautiful,  if  a  man  should  examine  them 
severally, — still,  because  they  are  consequent 
upon  the  things  which  are  formed  by  nature, 
help  to  adorn  them,  and  they  please  the  mind  ; 
so  that  if  a  man  should  have  a  feeling  and 
deeper  insight  with  respect  to  the  things  which 
are  produced  in  the  universe,  there  is  hardly 
one  of  those  which  follow  by  way  of  conse- 
quence which  will  not  seem  to  him  to  be  in  a 
manner  disposed  so  as  to  give  pleasure.  And  so 
he  will  see  even  the  real  gaping  jaws  of  wild 


u8  jflft.  Bntonfnus 

beasts  with  no  less  pleasure  than  those  which 
painters  and  sculptors  show  by  imitation,  and 
in  an  old  woman  and  an  old  man  he  will  be 
able  to  see  a  certain  maturity  and  comeliness, 
and  the  attractive  loveliness  of  young  persons 
he  will  be  able  to  look  on  with  chaste  eyes, 
and  many  such  things  will  present  themselves, 
not  pleasing  to  every  man,  but  to  him  only  who 
has  become  truly  familiar  with  nature  and  her 
works. 

3.  Hippocrates,  after  curing  many  diseases, 
himself  fell  sick  and  died.  The  Chaldsei  fore- 
told the  deaths  of  many,  and  then  fate  caught 
them  too.  Alexander,  and  Pompeius,  and 
Caius  Caesar,  after  so  often  completely  destroy- 
ing whole  cities,  and  in  battle  cutting  to  pieces 
many  ten  thousands  of  cavalry  and  infantry, 
themselves  too  at  last  departed  from  life. 
Heraclitus,  after  so  many  speculations  on  the 
conflagration  of  the  universe,  was  filled  with 
water  internally,  and  died  smeared  all  over 
with  mud.  And  lice  destroyed  Democritus,  and 
other  lice  killed  Socrates.  What  means  all 
this?  Thou  hast  embarked,  thou  hast  made 
the  voyage,  thou  art  come  to  shore ;  get  out. 
If  indeed  to  another  life,  there  is  no  want  of 
gods,  not  even  there.  But  if  to  a  state  without 
sensation,  thou  wilt  cease  to  be  held  by  pains 
and  pleasures,  and  to  be  a  slave  to  the  vessel, 


/ifc.  Bntoninus  119 

which  is  as  much  inferior  as  that  which  serves 
it  is  superior  :  f  for  the  one  is  intelligence  and 
deity  ;  the  other  is  earth  and  corruption. 

4.  Do  not  waste  the  remainder  of  thy  life  in 
thoughts  about  others,  when  thou  dost  not  refer 
thy  thoughts  to  some  object  of  common  utility. 
For  thou  losest  the  apportunity  of  doing  some- 
thing else  when  thou  hast  such  thoughts  as 
these,  What  is  such  a  person  doing,  and  why, 
and  what  is  he  saying,  and  what  is  he  thinking 
of,  and  what  is  he  contriving,  and  whatever 
else  of  the  kind  makes  us  wander  away  from 
the  observation  of  our  own  ruling  power.  We 
ought  then  to  check  in  the  series  of  our  thoughts 
every  thing  that  is  without  a  purpose  and  use- 
less, but  most  of  all  the  over-curious  feeling  and 
the  malignant,  and  a  man  should  use  himself 
to  think  of  those  things  only  about  which  if  one 
should  suddenly  ask,  What  hast  thou  now  in 
thy  thoughts?  with  perfect  openness  thou 
mightest  immediately  answer,  This  or  That ;  so 
that  from  thy  words  it  should  be  plain  that 
every  thing  in  thee  is  simple  and  benevolent, 
and  such  as  befits  a  social  animal,  and  one  that 
cares  not  for  thoughts  about  pleasure  or  sensual 
enjoyments  at  all,  nor  has  any  rivalry  or  envy 
and  suspicion,  or  any  thing  else  for  which  thou 
wouidst  blush  if  thou  shouldst  say  that  thou 
hadst  it  in  thy  mind.     For  the  man  who  is  such 


120  /lib,  Hntoninus 

and  no  longer  delays  being  among  the  number 
of  the  best,  is  like  a  priest  and  minister  of  the 
gods,  using,  too,  the  [deity]  which  is  planted 
within  him,  which  makes  the  man  uncontami- 
nated  by  pleasure,  unharmed  by  any  pain,  un- 
touched by  any  insult,  feeling  no  wrong,  a 
fighter  in  the  noblest  fight,  one  who  cannot  be 
overpowered  by  any  passion,  dyed  deep  with 
justice,  accepting  with  all  his  soul  every  thing 
which  happens  and  is  assigned  to  him  as  his 
portion  ;  and  not  often,  nor  yet  without  great 
necessity,  and  for  the  general  interest,  imagin- 
ing what  another  says,  or  does,  or  thinks.  For 
it  is  only  what  belongs  to  himself  that  he 
makes  the  matter  for  his  activity,  and  he  con- 
stantly thinks  of  that  which  is  allotted  to  him- 
self out  of  the  sum  total  of  things,  and  he 
makes  his  own  acts  fair,  and  he  is  persuaded 
that  his  own  portion  is  good.  For  the  lot 
which  is  assigned  to  each  man  is  carried  along 
with  him,  and  carries  him  along  with  it.  And 
remembers  also  that  every  rational  animal  is 
his  kinsman,  and  that  to  care  for  all  men  is  ac- 
cording to  a  man's  nature,  and  a  man  should 
hold  on  to  the  opinion  not  of  all,  but  of  those 
only  who  confessedly  live  according  to  nature. 
But  as  to  those  who  live  not  so,  he  always  bears 
in  mind  what  kind  of  men  they  are  both  at 
home  and  from  home,  both  by  night  and  by  day, 


/IB.  Sntonfnus  121 

and  what  they  are,  and  with  what  men  they  live 
an  impure  life.  Accordingly,  he  does  not  value 
at  all  the  praise  which  comes  from  such  men, 
since  they  are  not  even  satisfied  with  themselves. 

5.  Labor  not  unwillingly,  nor  without  regard 
to  the  common  interest,  nor  without  due  con- 
sideration, nor  with  distraction  ;  nor  let  studied 
ornament  set  off  thy  thoughts,  and  be  not  either 
a  man  of  many  words,  or  busy  about  too  many 
things.  And  further,  let  the  deity  which  is  in 
thee  be  the  guardian  of  a  living  being,  manly 
and  of  ripe  age,  and  engaged  in  matter  political, 
and  a  Roman,  and  a  ruler,  who  has  taken  his 
post  like  a  man  waiting  for  the  signal  which 
summons  him  from  life,  and  ready  to  go,  hav- 
ing need  neither  of  oath  nor  of  any  man's  testi- 
mony. Be  cheerful  also,  and  seek  not  external 
help  nor  the  tranquillity  which  others  give.  A 
man  then  must  stand  erect,  not  be  kept  erect 
by  others. 

6.  If  thou  findest  inhuman  life  any  thing  bet- 
ter than  justice,  truth,  temperance,  fortitude, 
and,  in  a  word,  any  thing  better  than  thy  own 
mind's  self-satisfaction  in  the  things  which  it 
enables  thee  to  do  according  to  right  reason, 
and  in  the  condition  that  is  assigned  to  thee 
without  thy  own  choice;  if,  I  say,  thou  seest 
any  thing  better  than  this,  turn  to  it  with  all 
thy  soul,  and  enjoy  that  which  thou  hast  found 


122  /lib.  Bntoninus 

to  be  the  best.  But  if  nothing  appears  to  be 
better  than  the  deity  which  is  planted  in  thee, 
which  has  subjected  to  itself  all  thy  appetites 
and  carefully  examines  all  the  impressions,  and, 
as  Socrates  said,  has  detached  itself  from  the 
persuasions  of  sense,  and  has  submitted  itself  to 
the  gods,  and  cares  for  mankind  ;  if  thou  findest 
every  thing  else  smaller  and  of  less  value  than 
this,  give  place  to  nothing  else,  for  if  thou  dost 
once  diverge  and  incline  to  it  thou  wilt  no 
longer  without  distraction  be  able  to  give  the 
preference  to  that  good  thing  which  is  thy 
proper  possession  and  thy  own  ;  for  it  is  not 
right  that  any  thing  of  any  other  kind,  such  as 
praise  from  the  many,  or  power,  or  enjoyment 
of  pleasure,  should  come  into  competition  with 
that  which  is  rationally  and  politically  [or 
practically]  good.  All  these  things,  even 
though  they  may  seem  to  adapt  themselves 
[to  the  better  things]  in  a  small  degree,  obtain 
the  superiority  all  at  once,  and  carry  us  away. 
But  do  thou,  I  say,  simply  and  freely  choose 
the  better,  and  hold  to  it.  But  that  which  is 
useful  is  the  better.  Well  then,  if  it  is  useful 
to  thee  as  a  rational  being,  keep  to  it ;  but  if  it 
is  only  useful  to  thee  as  an  animal,  say  so,  and 
maintain  thy  judgment  without  arrogance  : 
only  take  care  that  thou  makest  the  inquiry  by 
a  sure  method. 


/Ifc.  Bntontnus  123 

7.  Never  value  any  thing  as  profitable  to  thy- 
self which  shall  compel  thee  to  break  thy  prom- 
ise, to  lose  thy  self-respect,  to  hate  any  man,  to 
suspect,  to  curse,  to  act  the  hypocrite,  to  desire 
any  thing  which  needs  walls  and  curtains  :  for 
he  who  has  preferred  to  every  thing  else  his  own 
intelligence  and  daemon  and  the  worship  of  its 
excellence,  acts  no  tragic  part,  does  not  groan, 
will  not  need  either  solitude  or  much  company ; 
and,  what  is  chief  of  all,  he  will  live  without 
either  pursuing  or  flying  from  [death]  ;  *  but 
whether  for  a  longer  or  shorter  time  he  shall 
have  the  soul  enclosed  in  the  body,  he  cares  not 
at  all :  for  even  if  he  must  depart  immediately,  he 
will  go  as  readily  as  if  he  were  going  to  do  any 
thing  else  which  can  be  done  with  decency  and 
order  ;  taking  care  of  this  only  all  through  life, 
that  his  thoughts  turn  not  away  from  any  thing 
which  belongs  to  an  intelligent  animal  and  a 
member  of  a  civil  communit)'. 

8.  In  the  mind  of  one  who  is  chastened  and 
purified  thou  wilt  find  no  corrupt  matter,  no  im- 
purity not  any  sore  skinned  over.  Nor  is  his  life 
incomplete  when  fate  overtakes  him,  as  one 
may  say  of  an  actor  who  leaves  the  stage  before 
ending  and  finishing  the  play.  Besides,  there 
is  in  him  nothing  servile,  nor  affected,  nor 
too  closely  bound  [to   other  things],  nor  yet 

*  Comp.  ix.,  3. 


124  /lib.  Bntoninus 

detached  *  [from  other  things],  nothing  wor- 
thy of  blame,  nothing  which  seeks  a  hiding- 
place. 

9.  Reverence  the  faculty  which  produces 
opinion.  On  this  faculty  it  entirely  depends 
whether  there  shall  exist  in  thy  ruling  part  any 
opinion  inconsistent  with  nature  and  the  con- 
stitution of  the  rational  animal.  And  this  fac- 
ulty promises  freedom  from  hasty  judgment, 
and  friendship  towards  men,  and  obedience  to 
the  gods. 

10.  Throwing  away  then  all  things,  hold  to 
these  only  which  are  few  ;  and  besides  bear  in 
mind  that  every  man  lives  only  this  present 
time,  which  is  an  indivisible  point,  and  that  all 
the  rest  of  his  life  is  either  past  or  it  is  uncertain. 
Short  then  is  the  time  which  every  man  lives, 
and  small  the  nook  of  the  earth  where  he  lives ; 
and  short  too  the  longest  posthumous  fame,  and 
even  this  only  continued  by  a  succession  of  poor 
human  beings,  who  will  very  soon  die,  and  who 
know  not  even  themselves,  much  less  him  who 
died  long  ago. 

11.  To  the  aids  which  have  been  mentioned 
let  this  one  still  be  added  : — Make  for  thyself  a 
definition  or  description  of  the  thing  which  is 
presented  to  thee,  so  as  to  see  distinctly  what 
kind  of  a  thing  it  is  in  its  substance,  in  its 

*  viii.,  34. 


dfc.  Sntoninus  125 

nudity,  in  its  complete  entirety,  and  tell  thyself 
its  proper  name,  and  the  names  of  the  things  of 
which  it  has  been  compounded,  and  into  which 
it  will  be  resolved.  For  nothing  is  so  produc- 
tive of  elevation  of  mind  as  to  be  able  to  ex- 
amine methodically  and  truly  every  object 
which  is  presented  to  thee  in  life,  and  always  to 
look  at  things  so  as  to  see  at  the  same  time 
what  kind  of  universe  this  is,  and  what  kind  of 
use  every  thing  performs  in  it,  and  what  value 
every  thing  has  with  reference  to  the  whole, 
and  what  with  reference  to  man,  who  is  a  citi- 
zen of  the  highest  city,  of  which  all  other  cities 
are  like  families ;  what  each  thing  is,  and  of 
what  it  is  composed,  and  how  long  it  is  the 
nature  of  this  thing  to  endure  which  now  makes 
an  impression  on  me,  and  what  virtue  I  have 
need  of  with  respect  to  it,  such  as  gentleness, 
manliness,  truth,  fidelity,  simplicity,  content- 
ment, and  the  rest.  Wherefore,  on  every  occa- 
sion a  man  should  say  :  this  comes  from  God ; 
and  this  is  according  to  the  apportionment  and 
spinning  of  the  thread  of  destiny,  and  such-like 
coincidence  and  chance ;  and  this  is  from  one 
of  the  same  stock,  and  a  kinsman  and  partner, 
one  who  knows  not  however  what  is  according 
to  his  nature.  But  I  know ;  for  this  reason  I 
behave  towards  him  according  to  the  natural 
law  of  fellowship  with  benevolence  and  justice. 


126  flh.  Bntonlnus 

At  the  same  time,  however,  in  things  indif- 
ferent* I  attempt  to  ascertain  the  value  of 
each. 

12.  If  thou  work  est  at  that  which  is  before 
thee,  following  right  reason  seriously,  vigor- 
ously, calmly,  without  allowing  any  thing  else 
to  distract  thee,  but  keeping  thy  divine  part 
pure,  as  if  thou  shouldst  be  bound  to  give  it 
back  immediately  ;  if  thou  holdest  to  this,  ex- 
pecting nothing,  fearing  nothing,  but  satisfied 
with  thy  present  activity  according  to  nature, 
and  with  heroic  truth  in  every  word  and  sound 
which  thou  utterest,  thou  wilt  live  happy. 
And  there  is  no  man  who  is  able  to  prevent 
this. 

13.  As  physicians  have  always  their  instru- 
ments and  knives  ready  for  cases  which  sud- 
denly require  their  skill,  so  do  thou  have  prin- 
ciples ready  for  the  understanding  of  things 
divine  and  human,  and  for  doing  every  thing, 
even  the  smallest,  with  a  recollection  of  the 
bond  which  unites  the  divine  and  human  to  one 
another.  For  neither  wilt  thou  do  any  thing 
well  which  pertains  to  man  without  at  the  same 
time  having  a  reference  to  things  divine ;  nor 
the  contrary. 

14.  No  longer  wander  at  hazard ;  for  neither 

*  "  Est  et  horum  quae  media  appellatnus  grande  dis- 
crimen."— Seneca,  Ep.  82. 


.flft.  Bntoninus  127 

wilt  thou  read  thy  own  memoirs,*  nor  the  acts 
of  the  ancient  Romans  and  Hellenes,  and  the 
selections  from  books  which  thou  wast  reserv- 
ing for  thy  old  age.f  Hasten  then  to  the  end 
which  thou  hast  before  thee,  and,  throwing 
away  idle  hopes,  come  to  thy  own  aid,  if  thou 
carest  at  all  for  thyself,  while  it  is  in  thy  power. 

15.  They  know  not  how  many  things  are  sig- 
nified by  the  words  stealing,  sowing,  buying, 
keeping  quiet,  seeing  what  ought  to  be  done  ; 
for  this  is  not  effected  by  the  eyes,  but  by  an- 
other kind  of  vision. 

16.  Body,  soul,  intelligence  :  to  the  body  be- 
long sensations,  to  the  soul  appetites,  to  the 
intelligence  principles.  To  receive  the  im- 
pressions of  forms  by  means  of  appearances 
belongs  even  to  animals ;  to  be  pulled  by  the 
strings  X  of  desire  belongs  both  to  wild  beasts 
and  to  men  who  have  made  themselves  into 
women,  and  to  a  Phalaris  and  a  Nero  :  and  to 
have  the  intelligence  that  guides  to  the  things 
which  appear  suitable  belongs  also  to  those  who 
do  not  believe  in  the  gods,  and  who  betray  their 

*  viroy.vr)ixaTa  :  or  memoranda,  notes  and  the  like.  See 
i.,  17. 

t  Compare  Fronto,  ii.,  9  ;  a  letter  of  Marcus  to  Fronto, 
who  was  then  consul :  "  Feci  tamen  mihi  per  hos  dies 
excerpta  ex  libris  sexaginta  in  quinque  tomis."  But  he 
says  some  of  them  were  small  books. 

X  Compare  Plato,  De  Legibus,  i.,  p.  644,  6ti  raina  to. 
ndOr], etc.,  and  Antoninus,  ii.,  2  ;  vii.,  3  ;  xii.,  19. 


128  dfc.  Bntoninus 

country,  and  do  their  impure  deeds  when  they 
have  shut  the  doors.  If  then  every  thing  else  is 
common  to  all  that  I  have  mentioned,  there 
remains  that  which  is  peculiar  to  the  good  man, 
to  be  pleased  and  content  with  what  happens, 
and  with  the  thread  which  is  spun  for  him  ; 
and  not  to  defile  the  divinity  which  is  planted 
in  his  breast,  nor  disturb  it  by  a  crowd  of 
images,  but  to  preserve  it  tranquil,  following  it 
obediently  as  a  god,  neither  saying  any  thing 
contrary  to  the  truth,  nor  doing  any  thing  con- 
trary to  justice.  And  if  all  men  refuse  to  believe 
that  he  lives  a  simple,  modest,  and  contented  life, 
he  is  neither  angry  with  any  of  them,  nor  does  he 
deviate  from  the  way  which  leads  to  the  end  of 
life,  to  which  a  man  ought  to  come  pure,  tran- 
quil, ready  to  depart,  and  without  any  com- 
pulsion perfectly  reconciled  to  his  lot. 


IV. 


THAT  which  rules  within,  when  it  is  accord- , 
ing  to  nature,  is  so  affected  with  respect  to 
the  events  which  happen,  that  it  always  easily 
adapts  itself  to  that  which  is  possible  and  is 
presented  to  it.  For  it  requires  no  definite  ma- 
terial, but  it  moves  towards  its  purpose,*  under 
certain  conditions,  however  ;  and  it  makes  a 
material  for  itself  out  of  that  which  opposes  it, 
as  fire  lays  hold  of  what  falls  into  it,  by  which 
a  small  light  would  have  been  extinguished  ; 
but  when  the  fire  is  strong,  it  soon  appropriates 
to  itself  the  matter  which  is  heaped  on  it,  and 
consumes  it,  and  rises  higher  by  means  of  this 
very  material. 

2.  Let  no  act  be  done  without  a  purpose,  nor 
otherwise  than  according  to  the  perfect  prin- 
ciples of  art. 

3.  Men  seek  retreats  for  themselves,  houses 

in  the  country,  sea-shores,  and  mountains  ;  and 

*  Trpb?  to.  riyovfjLeva,  literally,  "towards  that  which 
leads,"  The  exact  translation  is  doubtful.  See  Gata- 
ker's  note. 


130  >lfc.  Bntonfnus 

thou  art  wont  to  desire  such  things  very  much. 
But  this  is  altogether  a  mark  of  the  most  com- 
mon sort  of  men,  for  it  is  in  thy  power  when- 
ever thou  shalt  choose  to  retire  into  thyself. 
For  nowhere  either  with  more  quiet  or  more 
freedom  from  trouble  does  a  man  retire  than 
into  his  own  soul,  particularly  when  he  has 
within  him  such  thoughts  that,  by  looking 
into  them,  he  is  immediately  in  perfect 
tranquillity  ;  and  I  affirm  that  tranquillity  is 
nothing  else  than  the  good  ordering  of  the 
mind.  Constantly,  then,  give  to  thyself  this 
retreat,  and  renew  thyself;  and  let  thy  prin- 
ciples be  brief  and  fundamental,  which,  as  soon 
as  thou  shalt  recur  to  them,  will  be  sufficient  to 
cleanse  the  soul  completely,  and  to  send  thee 
back  free  from  all  discontent  with  the  things 
to  which  thou  returnest.  For  with  what  art 
thou  discontented  ?  With  the  badness  of  men  ? 
Recall  to  thy  mind  this  conclusion,  that  ration- 
al animals  exist  for  one  another,  and  that  to 
endure  is  a  part  of  justice,  and  that  men  do 
wrong  involuntarily  ;  and  consider  how  many 
already,  after  mutual  enmity,  suspicion,  hatred, 
and  fighting,  have  been  stretched  dead,  reduced 
to  ashes  ;  and  be  quiet  at  last.  But,  perhaps, 
thou  art  dissatisfied  with  that  which  is  assigned 
to  thee  out  of  the  universe.  Recall  to  thy  rec- 
ollection this  alternative  :  either  there  is  provi- 


Ah.  Bntontnus  131 

dence  or  atoms  [fortuitous  concurrence  of 
things]  ;  or  remember  the  arguments  by  which 
it  has  been  proved  that  the  world  is  a  kind  of 
political  community  [and  be  quiet  at  last]. 
But,  perhaps,  corporeal  things  will  still  fasten 
upon  thee.  Consider,  then,  further  that  the 
mind  mingles  not  with  the  breath,  whether 
moving  gently  or  violently,  when  it  has  once 
drawm  itself  apart  and  discovered  its  own  power, 
and  think  also  of  all  that  thou  hast  heard  and 
assented  to  about  pain  and  pleasure  [and  be 
quiet  at  last].  But,  perhaps,  the  desire  of  the 
thing  called  fame  will  torment  thee.  See  how 
soon  every  thing  is  forgotten,  and  look  at  the 
chaos  of  infinite  time  on  each  side  of  [the  pres- 
ent], and  the  emptiness  of  applause,  and  the 
changeableness  and  want  of  judgment  in  those 
who  pretend  to  give  praise,  and  the  narrowness 
of  the  space  within  which  it  is  circumscribed 
[and  be  quiet  at  last].  For  the  whole  earth  is 
a  point,  and  how  small  a  nook  in  it  is  this  thy 
dwelling,  and  how  few  are  there  in  it,  and 
what  kind  of  people  are  they  who  will  praise 
thee. 

This,  then,  remains  :  Remember  to  retire 
into  this  little  territory  of  thy  own,*  and  above 
all,  do  not  distract  or  strain  thyself,  but  be  free, 

*  "Tecum  habita,  et  noris  quam  sit  tibi  curta  supel- 
lex."— Persius,  iv.,  52. 


132  /ffi>,  Bntonfnus 

and  look  at  things  as  a  man,  as  a  human  being, 
as  a  citizen,  as  a  mortal.  But  among  the  things 
readiest  to  thy  hand  to  which  thou  shalt  turn, 
let  there  be  these,  which  are  two.  One  is  that 
things  do  not  touch  the  soul,  for  they  are  ex- 
ternal and  remain  immovable  ;  but  our  pertur- 
bations come  only  from  the  opinion  which  is 
within.  The  other  is  that  all  these  things, 
which  thou  seest,  change  immediately  and  will 
no  longer  be  ;  and  constantly  bear  in  mind  how 
many  of  these  changes  thou  hast  already  wit- 
nessed. The  universe  is  transformation  :  life  is 
opinion. 

4.  If  our  intellectual  part  is  common,  the  rea- 
son also,  in  respect  of  which  we  are  rational 
beings,  is  common  ;  if  this  is  so,  common  also 
is  the  reason  which  commands  us  what  to  do, 
and  what  not  to  do  ;  if  this  is  so,  there  is  a 
common  law  also  ;  if  this  is  so,  we  are  fellow- 
citizens  ;  if  this  is  so,  we  are  members  of  some 
political  community  ;  if  this  is  so,  the  world  is, 
in  a  manner,  a  state.*  For  of  what  other  com- 
mon political  community  will  any  one  say  that 
the  whole  human  race  are  members  ?  And 
from  thence,  from  this  common  political  com- 
munity comes  also  our  very  intellectual  faculty 
and  reasoning  faculty  and  our  capacity  for  law  ; 
or  whence  do  they  come  ?  For  as  my  earthly 
*  Compare  Cicero  De  Legibus.  i.,  7, 


dft.  Sntoninus  133 

part  is  a  portion  given  to  me  from  certain  earth, 
and  that  which  is  watery  from  another  element, 
and  that  which  is  hot  and  fiery  from  some  pe- 
culiar source  (for  nothing  comes  out  of  that 
which  is  nothing,  as  nothing  also  returns  to 
non-existence),  so  also  the  intellectual  part 
comes  from  some  source. 

5.  Death  is  such  as  generation  is,  a  mystery 
of  nature  ;  a  composition  out  of  the  same  ele- 
ments, and  a  decomposition  into  the  same  ;  and 
altogether  not  a  thing  of  which  any  man  should 
be  ashamed,  for  it  is  not  contrary  to  [the  nature 
of]  a  reasonable  animal,  and  not  contrary  to  the 
reason  of  our  constitution. 

6.  It  is  natural  that  these  things  should  be 
done  by  such  persons,  it  is  a  matter  of  neces- 
sity ;  and  if  a  man  will  not  have  it  so,  he  will 
not  allow  the  fig-tree  to  have  juice.  But,  by 
all  means,  bear  this  in  mind,  that  within  a  very 
short  time  both  thou  and  he  will  be  dead  ;  and 
soon  not  even  your  names  w7ill  be  left  behind. 

7.  Take  away  thy  opinion,  and  then  there  is 
taken  away  the  complaint,  "I  have  been 
harmed."  Take  away  the  complaint,  "I  have 
been  harmed,"  and  the  harm  is  taken  away. 

8.  That  which  does  not  make  a  man  worse 
than  he  was,  also  does  not  make  his  life  worse, 
nor  does  it  harm  him,  either  from  without  or 
from  within. 


134  flh*  Bntoninus 

9.  The  nature  of  that  which  is  [universally] 
useful  has  been  compelled  to  do  this. 

10.  Consider  that  everything  which  happens, 
happens  justly,  and  if  thou  observest  care« 
fully,  thou  wilt  find  it  to  be  so.  I  do  not  say 
only  with  respect  to  the  continuity  of  the  se- 
ries of  things,  but  with  respect  to  what  is  just, 
and  as  if  it  were  done  by  one  who  assigns  to 
each  thing  its  value  Observe,  then,  as  thou 
hast  begun  ;  and  whatever  thou  doest,  do  it  in 
conjunction  with  this,  the  being  good,  and  in 
the  sense  in  which  a  man  is  properly  under- 
stood to  be  good.  Keep  to  this  in  every  ac- 
tion. 

11.  Do  not  have  such  an  opinion  of  things 
as  he  has  who  does  thee  wrong,  or  such  as  he 
wishes  thee  to  have,  but  look  at  them  as  they 
are  in  truth. 

12.  A  man  should  always  have  these  two 
rules  in  readiness  :  the  one,  to  do  only  what- 
ever the  reason  of  the  ruling  and  legislative 
faculty  may  suggest  for  the  use  of  men  ;  the 
other,  to  change  thy  opinion,  if  there  is  any 
one  at  hand  who  sets  thee  right  and  moves 
thee  from  any  opinion.  But  this  change  of 
opinion  must  proceed  only  from  a  certain  per- 
suasion, as  of  what  is  just  or  of  common  ad- 
vantage, and  the  like,  not  because  it  appears 
pleasant  or  brings  reputation. 


/lib.  Bntoninus  135 

13.  Hast  thou  reason  ?  I  have.  Why,  then, 
dost  not  thou  use  it  ?  For  if  this  does  its  own 
work,  what  else  dost  thou  wish  ? 

14.  Thou  hast  existed  as  a  part.  Thou  shalt 
disappear  in  that  which  produced  thee;  but  ra- 
ther thou  shalt  be  received  back  into  its  semi- 
nal principle  by  transmutation. 

15.  Many  grains  of  frankincense  on  the  same 
altar :  one  falls  before,  another  falls  after ;  but 
it  makes  no  difference. 

16.  Within  ten  days  thou  wilt  seem  a  god  to 
those  to  whom  thou  art  now  a  beast  and  an  ape, 
if  thou  wilt  return  to  thy  principles  and  the 
worship  of  reason. 

17.  Do  not  act  as  if  thou  wert  going  to  live 
ten  thousand  years.  Death  hangs  over  thee. 
While  thou  livest,  while  it  is  in  thy  power,  be 
good. 

18.  How  much  trouble  he  avoids  who  does 
not  look  to  see  what  his  neighbor  says  or  does 
or  thinks,  but  only  to  what  he  does  himself, 
that  it  may  be  just  and  pure;  or  as  Agathon  f 
says,  look  not  round  at  the  depraved  morals  of 
others,  but  run  straight  along  the  line  without 
deviating  from  it. 

19.  He  who  has  a  vehement  desire  for  posthu- 
mous fame  does  not  consider  that  every  one  of 
those  who  remember  him  will  himself  also  die 
very  soon  ;  then  again  also  they  who  have  sue- 


136  /lib.  Bntoninus 

ceeded  them,  until  the  whole  remembrance 
shall  have  been  extinguished  as  it  is  transmitted 
through  men  who  foolishly  admire  and  perish. 
But  suppose  that  those  who  will  remember  are 
even  immortal,  and  that  the  remembrance  will 
be  immortal,  what  then  is  this  to  thee  ?  And  I 
say  not  what  is  it  to  the  dead,  but  what  is  it  to 
the  living.  What  is  praise,  except  f  indeed  so 
far  as  it  has  f  a  certain  utility  ?  For  thou  now 
rejectest  unseasonably  the  gift  of  nature,  cling- 
ing to  something  else.  .  .  .f 

20.  Every  thing  which  is  in  any  way  beauti- 
ful is  beautiful  in  itself,  and  terminates  in  itself, 
not  having  praise  as  part  of  itself.  Neither 
worse  then  nor  better  is  a  thing  made  by  being 
praised.  I  affirm  this  also  of  the  things  which 
are  called  beautiful  by  the  vulgar  ;  for  example, 
material  things  and  works  of  art.  That  which 
is  really  beautiful  has  no  need  of  any  thing  ; 
not  more  than  law,  not  more  than  truth,  not 
more  than  benevolence  or  modesty.  Which  of 
these  things  is  beautiful  because  it  is  praised,  or 
spoiled  by  being  blamed  ?  Is  such  a  thing  as  an 
emerald  made  worse  than  it  was,  if  it  is  not 
praised  ?  or  gold,  ivory,  purple,  a  lyre,  a  little 
knife,  a  flower,  a  shrub  ? 

21.  If  souls  continue  to  exist,  how  does  the 
air  contain  them  from  eternity  ?  But  how  does 
the  earth  contain  the  bodies  of  those  who  have 


/lib.  antoninus  137 

been  buried  from  time  so  remote  ?  For  as  here 
the  mutation  of  these  bodies  after  a  certain  con- 
tinuance, whatever  it  may  be,  and  their  dissolu- 
tion make  room  for  other  dead  bodies  ;  so  the 
souls  which  are  removed  into  the  air  after  sub- 
sisting for  some  time  are  transmuted  and 
diffused,  and  assume  a  fiery  nature  by  being 
received  into  the  seminal  intelligence  of  the 
universe,  and  in  this  way  make  room  for  the 
fresh  souls  which  come  to  dwell  there.  And 
this  is  the  answer  which  a  man  might  give  on 
the  hypothesis  of  souls  continuing  to  exist.  But 
we  must  not  only  think  of  the  number  of  bodies 
which  are  thus  buried,  but  also  of  the  number 
of  animals  which  are  daily  eaten  by  us  and  the 
other  animals.  For  what  a  number  is  consumed, 
and  thus  in  a  manner  buried  in  the  bodies  of 
those  who  feed  on  them  ?  And  nevertheless  this 
earth  receives  them  by  reason  of  the  changes 
[of  these  bodies]  into  blood,  and  the  transfor- 
mations into  the  aerial  or  the  fiery  element. 

What  is  the  investigation  into  the  truth  in 
this  matter  ?  The  division  into  that  which  is 
material  and  that  which  is  the  cause  of  form 
[the  formal]     (vii.,  29). 

22.  Do  not  be  whirled  about,  but  in  every 
movement  have  respect  to  justice,  and  on  the 
occasion  of  every  impression  maintain  the  fac- 
ulty of  comprehension  [or  understanding]. 


138  flh.  Bntontnus 

23.  Every  thing  harmonizes  with  me,  which 
is  harmonious  to  thee,  O  Universe.  Nothing 
for  me  is  too  early  nor  too  late,  which  is  in  due 
time  for. thee.  Every  thing  is  fruit  to  me  which 
thy  seasons  bring,  O  Nature  ;  from  thee  are  all 
things,  to  thee  all  things  return.  The  poet  says, 
Dear  city  of  Cecrops  ;  and  wilt  not  thou  say, 
Dear  city  of  Zeus  ? 

24.  Occupy  thyself  with  few  things,  says  the 
philosopher,  if  thou  wouldst  be  tranquil.  But 
consider  if  it  would  not  be  better  to  say,  Do 
what  is  necessary,  and  whatever  the  reason  of 
the  animal  which  is  naturally  social  requires, 
and  as  it  requires.  For  this  brings  not  only  the 
tranquillity  which  comes  from  doing  well,  but 
also  that  which  comes  from  doing  few  things, 
For  the  greatest  part  of  what  we  say  and  do  be- 
ing unnecessary,  if  a  man  takes  this  away,  he 
will  have  more  leisure  and  less  uneasiness.  Ac- 
cordingly on  every  occasion  a  man  should  ask 
himself,  Is  this  one  of  the  unnecessary  things? 
Now  a  man  should  take  away  not  only  unneces- 
sary acts,  but  also  unnecessary  thoughts,  for 
thus  superfluous  acts  will  not  follow  after. 

25.  Try  how  the  life  of  the  good  man  suits 
thee,  the  life  of  him  who  is  satisfied  with  his 
portion  out  of  the  whole,  aud  satisfied  with  his 
own  just  acts  and  benevolent  disposition. 

26.  Hast  thou  seen  those  things  ?     Look  also 


to.  Bntoninus  139 

at  these.  Do  not  disturb  thyself.  Make  thy- 
self all  simplicity.  Does  any  one  do  wrong  ? 
It  is  to  himself  that  he  does  the  wrong.  Has 
any  thing  happened  to  thee  ?  Well  ;  out  of  the 
universe  from  the  beginning  every  thing  which 
happens  has  been  apportioned  and  spun  out  to 
thee.  In  a  word,  thy  life  is  short.  Thou  must 
turn  to  profit  the  present  by  the  aid  of  reason 
and  justice.     Be  sober  in  thy  relaxation. 

27.  Either  it  is  a  well-arranged  universe*  or 
a  chaos  huddled  together,  but  still  a  universe. 
But  can  a  certain  order  subsist  in  thee,  and  dis- 
order in  the  All  ?  And  this  too  when  all  things 
are  so  separated  and  diffused  and  sympathetic. 

28.  A  black  character,  a  womanish  character, 
a  stubborn  character — bestial,  childish,  animal, 
stupid,  counterfeit,  scurrilous,  fraudulent,  tyran- 
nical. 

29.  If  he  is  a  stranger  to  the  universe  who 
does  not  know  what  is  in  it,  no  less  is  he  a 
stranger  who  does  not  know  what  is  going  on 
in  it.  He  is  a  runaway,  who  flies  from  social 
reason  ;  he  is  blind,  who  shuts  the  eyes  of  the 
understanding  ;  he  is  poor,  who  has  need  of  an- 
other, and  has  not  from  himself  all  things  which 
are  useful  for  life.  He  is  an  abscess  on  the  uni- 
verse who  withdraws  and  separates  himself  from 

*  Antoninus  here  uses  the  word  koo-juo?  both  in  the 
sense  of  the  Universe  and  of  Order  :  and  it  is  difficult  to 
express  his  meaning. 


i4o  flfo.  Bntoninus 

the  reason  of  our  common  nature  through  being 
displeased  with  the  things  which  happen,  for 
the  same  nature  produces  this,  and  has  produced 
thee  too  ;  he  is  a  piece  rent  asunder  from  the 
state,  who  tears  his  own  soul  from  that  of  rea- 
sonable animals,  which  is  one. 

30.  The  one  is  a  philosopher  without  a  tunic, 
and  the  other  without  a  book  ;  here  is  another 
half  naked :  Bread  I  have  not,  he  says,  and  I 
abide  by  reason — And  I  do  not  get  the  means 
of  living  out  of  my  learning, f  and  I  abide  [by 
my  reason], 

31.  Love  the  art,  poor  as  it  may  be,  which 
thou  hast  learned,  and  be  content  with  it ;  and 
pass  through  the  rest  of  life  like  one  who  has 
intrusted  to  the  gods  with  his  whole  soul  all 
that  he  has,  making  thyself  neither  the  tyrant 
nor  the  slave  of  any  man. 

32.  Consider,  for  example,  the  times  of  Ves- 
pasian. Thou  wilt  see  all  these  things — people 
marrying,  bringing  up  children,  sick,  dying, 
warring,  feasting,  trafficking,  cultivating  the 
ground,  flattering,  obstinately  arrogant,  sus- 
pecting, plotting,  wishing  for  some  to  die, 
grumbling  about  the  present,  loving,  heaping 
up  treasure,  desiring  consulship,  kingly  power. 
Well  then,  that  life  of  these  people  no  longer 
exists  at  all.  Again,  remove  to  the  times  of 
Trajan.     Again,  all  is  the  same.     Their  life  too 


/HV  Bntoninus  141 

is  gone.  In  like  manner  view  also  the  other 
epochs  of  time  and  of  whole  nations,  and  see 
how  many  after  great  efforts  soon  fell  and  were 
resolved  into  the  elements.  But  chiefly  thou 
shouldst  think  of  those  whom  thou  hast  thyself 
known  distracting  themselves  about  idle  things, 
neglecting  to  do  what  was  in  accordance  with 
their  proper  constitution,  and  to  hold  firmly  to 
this  and  to  be  content  with  it.  And  herein  it  is 
necessary  to  remember  that  the  attention  given 
to  every  thing  has  its  proper  value  and  propor- 
tion. For  thus  thou  wilt  not  be  dissatisfied,  if 
thou  appliest  thyself  to  smaller  matters  no  fur- 
ther than  is  fit. 

33.  The  words  which  were  formerly  familiar 
are  now  antiquated  ;  so  also  the  names  of  those 
who  were  famed  of  old,  are  now  in  a  manner 
antiquated — Camillus,  Caeso,  Volesus,  Leonna- 
tus,  and  a  little  after  also  Scipio  aud  Cato,  then 
Augustus,  then  also  Hadrianus  and  Antoninus. 
For  all  things  soon  pass  away  and  become  a 
mere  tale,  and  complete  oblivion  soon  buries 
them.  And  I  say  this  of  those  who  have  shone 
in  a  wondrous  way.  For  the  rest,  as  soon  as 
they  have  breathed  out  their  breath,  they  are 
gone,  and  no  man  speaks  of  them.  And,  to 
conclude  the  matter,  what  is  even  an  eternal  re- 
membrance ?  A  mere  nothing.  What  then  is 
that  about  which  we  ought  to  employ  our  seri- 


142  /ifc.  Bntoninus 

ous pains?  This  one  thing,  thoughts  just,  and 
acts  social,  and  words  which  never  lie,  and  a 
disposition  which  gladly  accepts  all  that  hap- 
pens, as  necessary,  as  usual,  as  flowing  from  a 
principle  and  source  of  the  same  kind. 

34.  Willingly  give  thyself  up  to  Clotho  [one 
of  the  fates],  allowing  her  to  spin  thy  thread  | 
into  whatever  things  she  pleases. 

35.  Every  thing  is  only  for  a  day,  both  that 
which  remembers  and  that  which  is  remembered. 

36.  Observe  constantly  that  all  things  take 
place  by  change,  and  accustom  thyself  to  con- 
sider that  the  nature  of  the  universe  loves 
nothing  so  much  as  to  change  the  things  which 
are  and  to  make  new  things  like  them.  For 
every  thing  that  exists  is  in  a  manner  the  seed 
of  that  which  will  be.  But  thou  art  thinking 
only  of  seeds  which  are  cast  into  the  earth  or 
into  a  womb  :  but  this  is  a  very  vulgar  notion. 

37.  Thou  wilt  soon  die,  and  thou  art  not  yet 
simple,  nor  free  from  perturbations,  nor  without 
suspicion  of  being  hurt  by  external  things,  nor 
kindly  disposed  towards  all  ;  nor  dost  thou  yet 
place  wisdom  only  in  acting  justly. 

38.  Examine  men's  ruling  principles,  even 
those  of  the  wise,  what  kind  of  things  they 
avoid,  and  what  kind  they  pursue. 

39.  What  is  evil  to  thee  does  not  subsist  in 
the  ruling  principle  of  another ;  nor  yet  in  any 


dfc.  Bntoninus  143 

turning  and  mutation  of  thy  corporeal  covering. 
Where  is  it  then  ?  It  is  in  that  part  of  thee  in 
which  subsists  the  power  of  forming  opinions 
about  evils.  I,et  this  power  then  not  form 
[such]  opinions,  and  all  is  well.  And  if  that 
which  is  nearest  to  it,  the  poor  body,  is  cut, 
burnt,  filled  with  matter  and  rottenness,  never- 
theless let  the  part  which  forms  opinions  about 
these  things  be  quiet,  that  is,  let  it  judge  that 
nothing  is  either  bad  or  good  which  can  happen 
equally  to  the  bad  man  and  the  good.  For 
that  which  happens  equally  to  him  who  lives 
contrary  to  nature  and  to  him  who  lives  accord- 
ing to  nature,  is  neither  according  to  nature 
nor  contrary  to  nature. 

40.  Constantly  regard  the  universe  as  one 
living  being,  having  one  substance  and  one 
soul ;  and  observe  how  all  things  have  refer- 
ence to  one  perception,  the  perception  of  this 
one  living  being  ;  and  how  all  things  act  with 
one  movement ;  and  how  all  things  are  the  co- 
operating causes  of  all  things  which  exist  ;  ob- 
serve too  the  continuous  spinning  of  the  thread 
and  the  contexture  of  the  web. 

41.  Thou  art  a  little  soul  bearing  about  a 
corpse,  as  Epictetus  used  to  say  (i.,  c.  19). 

42.  It  is  no  evil  for  things  to  undergo  change, 
and  no  good  for  things  to  subsist  in  consequence 
of  change. 


i44  /Ifc.  Bntonfnus 

43.  Time  is  like  a  river  made  up  of  the  events 
which  happen,  and  a  violent  stream  ;  for  as 
soon  as  a  thing  has  been  seen,  it  is  carried 
away,  and  another  comes  in  its  place,  and  this 
will  be  carried  away  too. 

44.  Every  thing  which  happens  is  as  familiar 
and  well  known  as  the  rose  in  spring  and  the 
fruit  in  summer ;  for  such  is  disease,  and  death, 
and  calumny,  and  treachery,  and  whatever  else 
delights  fools  or  vexes  them. 

45.  In  the  series  of  things  those  which  follow 
are  always  aptly  fitted  to  those  which  have  gone 
before ;  for  this  series  is  not  like  a  mere  enume- 
ration of  disjointed  things,  which  has  only  a 
necessary  sequence,  but  it  is  a  rational  connec- 
tion ;  and  as  all  existing  things  are  arranged 
together  harmoniously,  so  the  things  which 
come  into  existence  exhibit  no  mere  succes- 
sion, but  a  certain  wonderful  relationship 
(vi.,  38  ;  vii.,  9  ;  vii.,  75,  note). 

46.  Always  remember  the  saying  of  Heracli- 
tus,  that  the  death  of  earth  is  to  become  water, 
and  the  death  of  water  is  to  become  air,  and 
the  death  of  air  is  to  become  fire,  and  reversely. 
And  think  too  of  him  who  forgets  whither  the 
way  leads,  and  that  men  quarrel  with  that  with 
which  they  are  most  constantly  in  communion, 
the  reason  which  governs  the  universe  ;  and 
the  things  which  they  daily  meet  with  seem  to 


/Ifc.  Bntonfnus  H5 

them  strange  :  and  consider  that  we  ought  not 
to  act  and  speak  as  if  we  were  asleep,  for  even 
in  sleep  we  seem  to  act  and  speak  ;  and  thatf 
we  ought  not,  like  children  who  learn  from 
their  parents,  simply  to  act  and  speak  as  we 
have  been  taught,  f 

47.  If  any  god  told  thee  that  thou  shalt  die 
to-morrow,  or  certainly  on  the  day  after  to- 
morrow, thou  wouldst  not  care  much  whether 
it  was  on  the  third  day  or  on  the  morrow,  un- 
less thou  wast  in  the  highest  degree  mean- 
spirited, — for  how  small  is  the  difference  ? — so 
think  it  no  great  thing  to  die  after  as  many 
years  as  thou  canst  name  rather  than  to- 
morrow. 

48.  Think  continually  how  many  physicians 
are  dead  after  often  contracting  their  eyebrows 
over  the  sick  ;  and  how  many  astrologers  after 
predicting  with  great  pretensions  the  deaths  of 
others  ;  and  how  many  philosophers  after  end- 
less discourses  on  death  or  immortality  ;  how 
many  heroes  after  killing  thousands  ;  and  how 
many  tyrants  who  have  used  their  power  over 
men's  lives  with  terrible  insolence  as  if  they 
were  immortal  ;  and  how  many  cities  are  en- 
tirely dead,  so  to  speak,  Helice  *  and  Pompeii 
and  Herclanum,  and  others  innumerable.     Add 

*  Ovid,  Met.  xv.,  293  : 

Si  quseras  Helicen  et  Burin  Achaidas  urbes, 
Invenies  sub  aquis. 


146  /Ifc.  Bntoninu5 

to  the  reckoning  all  whom  thou  hast  known, 
one  after  another.  One  man  after  burying 
another  has  been  laid  out  dead,  and  another 
buries  him ;  and  all  this  in  a  short  time.  To 
conclude,  always  observe  how  ephemeral  and 
worthless  human  things  are,  and  what  was 
yesterday  a  little  mucous,  to-morrow  will  be  a 
mummy  or  ashes.  Pass  then  through  this  little 
space  of  time  comformably  to  nature,  and  end 
thy  journey  in  content,  just  as  an  olive  falls  off 
when  it  is  ripe,  blessing  nature  who  produced 
it,  and  thanking  the  tree  on  which  it  grew. 

49.  Be  like  the  promontory  against  which  the 
waves  continually  break,  but  it  stands  firm  and 
tames  the  fury  of  the  water  around  it. 

Unhappy  am  I,  because  this  has  happened  to 
me — not  so,  but  happy  am  I,  though  this  has 
happened  to  me,  because  I  continue  free  from 
pain,  neither  crushed  by  the  present  nor  fearing 
the  future.  For  such  a  thing  as  this  might 
have  happened  to  every  man  ;  but  every  man 
would  not  have  continued  free  from  pain  on 
such  an  occasion.  Why  then  is  that  rather  a 
misfortune  than  this  a  good  fortune  ?  And  dost 
thou  in  all  cases  call  that  a  man's  misfortune, 
which  is  not  a  deviation  from  man's  nature  ? 
And  does  a  thing  seem  to  thee  to  be  a  deviation 
from  man's  nature,  when  it  is  not  contrary  to 
the  will  of  man's  nature  ?     Well,  thou  knowest 


/Ifc.  Bntoninus  147 

the  will  of  nature.  Will  then  this  which  has 
happened  prevent  thee  from  being  just,  mag- 
nanimous, temperate,  prudent,  secure  against 
inconsiderate  opinions  and  falsehood ;  will  it 
prevent  thee  from  having  modesty,  freedom, 
and  every  thing  else  by  the  presence  of  which 
man's  nature  obtains  all  that  is  its  own?  Re- 
member too  on  every  occasion  which  leads  thee 
to  vexation  to  apply  this  principle :  not  that 
this  is  a  misfortune,  but  that  to  bear  it  nobly  is 
good  fortune. 

50.  It  is  a  vulgar,  but  still  a  useful  help  tow- 
ards contempt  of  death,  to  pass  in  review  those 
who  have  tenaciously  stuck  to  life.  What  more 
then  have  they  gained  than  those  who  have 
died  early  ?  Certainly  they  lie  in  their  tombs 
somewhere  at  last,  Cadicianus,  Fabius,  Julianus, 
Lepidus,  or  any  one  else  like  them,  who  have 
carried  out  many  to*be  buried,  and  then  wrere 
carried  out  themselves.  Altogether  the  interval 
is  small  [between  birth  and  death]  ;  and  con- 
sider with  how  much  trouble,  and  in  company 
with  what  sort  of  people,  and  in  what  a  feeble 
body  this  interval  is  laboriously  passed.  Do 
not  then  consider  life  a  thing  of  any  value,  f 
For  look  to  the  immensity  of  time  behind  thee, 
and  to  the  time  which  is  before  thee,  another 
boundless  space.  In  this  infinity  then  what 
is    the    difference     between     him    who    lives 


148  /nb.  Bntoninus 

three   days  and  him  who  lives  three  genera- 
tions ?  * 

51.  Always  run  the  short  way  ;  and  the  short 
way  is  the  natural ;  accordingly  say  and  do 
every  thing  in  conformity  with  the  soundest 
reason.  For  such  a  purpose  frees  a  man  from 
trouble,!  and  warfare,  and  all  artifice  and 
ostentatious  display. 

*  An  allusion  to  Homer's  Nestor  who  was  living  at  the 
war  of  Troy  among  the  third  generation,  like  old  Parr 
with  his  hundred  and  fifty-two  years,  and  some  others 
in  modern  times  who  have  beaten  Parr  by  twenty  or 
thirty  years,  if  it  be  true  ;  and  yet  they  died  at  last.  The 
word  is  Tpiyzp-qvlov  in  Antoninus.  Nestor  is  named 
Tpiye'pwi-  by  some  writers  ;  but  here  perhaps  there  is  an 
allusion  to  Homer's  Pepjji/ios  iitnoTa  Weoxwp. 


IN  the  morning  when  thou  risest  unwillingly, 
let  this  thought  be  present — I  am  rising  to 
the  work  of  a  human  being.  Why  then  am  I 
dissatisfied  if  I  am  going  to  do  the  things  for 
which  I  exist  and  for  which  I  was  brought  into 
the  world?  Or  have  I  been  made  for  this,  to 
lie  in  the  bedclothes  and  keep  myself  warm? 
But  this  is  more  pleasant.  Dost  thou  exist  then 
to  take  thy  pleasure,  and  not  at  all  for  action  or 
exertion.  Dost  thou  not  see  the  little  plants, 
the  little  birds,  the  ants,  the  spiders,  the  bees 
working  together  to  put  in  order  their  several 
parts  of  the  universe  ?  And  art  thou  unwilling 
to  do  the  work  of  a  human  being,  and  dost 
thou  not  make  haste  to  do  that  which  is  accord- 
ing to  thy  nature  ?  But  it  is  necessary  to  take 
rest  also.  It  is  necessary  ;  however  nature  has 
fixed  bounds  to  this  too  ;  she  has  fixed  bounds 
both  to  eating  and  drinking,  and  yet  thou  goest 
beyond  these  bounds,  beyond  what  is  sufficient ; 
yet  in  thy  acts  it  is  not  so,  but  thou  stoppest 


150  /lib.  Bntonfnus 

short  of  what  thou  canst  do.  So  thou  lovest 
not  thyself,  for  if  thou  didst,  thou  wouldst  love 
thy  nature  and  her  will.  But  those  who  love 
their  several  arts  exhaust  themselves  in  work- 
ing at  them  unwashed  and  without  food ;  but 
thou  valuest  thy  own  nature  less  than  the 
turner  values  the  turning  art,  or  the  dancer  the 
dancing  art,  or  the  lover  of  money  values  his 
money,  or  the  vain-glorious  man  his  little  glory. 
And  such  men,  when  they  have  a  violent  affec- 
tion to  a  thing,  choose  neither  to  eat  nor  to 
sleep  rather  than  to  perfect  the  things  which 
they  care  lor.  But  are  the  acts  which  concern 
society  more  vile  in  thy  eyes  and  less  worthy  of 
thy  labor  ? 

2.  How  easy  it  is  to  repel  and  to  wipe  away 
every  impression  which  is  troublesome  or  unsuit- 
able, and  immediately  to  be  in  all  tranquillity. 

3.  Judge  every  word  and  deed  which  are 
according  to  nature  to  be  fit  for  thee  ;  and  be 
not  diverted  by  the  blame  which  follows  from 
any  people  or  by  their  words,  but  if  a  thing  is 
good  to  be  done  or  said,  do  not  consider  it  un- 
worthy of  thee.  For  those  persons  have  their 
peculiar  leading  principle  and  follow  their  pecu- 
liar movement ;  which  things  do  thou  not  re- 
gard, but  go  straight  on,  following  thy  own 
nature  and  the  common  nature  ;  and  the  way  of 
both  is  one. 


/lft.  Bntonfnus  151 

4.  I  go  through  the  things  which  happen 
according  to  nature  until  I  shall  fall  and  rest, 
breathing  out  my  breath  into  that  element  out 
of  which  I  daily  draw  it  in,  and  falling  upon 
that  earth  out  of  which  my  father  collected  the 
seed,  and  my  mother  the  blood,  and  my  nurse 
the  milk  ;  out  of  which  during  so  many  years 
I  have  been  supplied  with  food  and  drink ; 
which  bears  me  when  I  tread  on  it  and  abuse 
it  for  so  many  purposes. 

5.  Thou  sayest,  Men  cannot  admire  the  sharp- 
ness of  thy  wits — be  it  so ;  but  there  are  many 
other  things  of  which  thou  canst  not  say,  I  am 
not  formed  for  them  by  nature.  Show  those 
qualities  then  which  are  altogether  in  thy 
power,  sincerity,  gravity,  endurance  of  labor, 
aversion  to  pleasure,  contentment  with  thy 
portion  and  with  few  things,  benevolence, 
frankness,  no  love  of  superfluity,  freedom  from 
trifling  magnanimity.  Dost  thou  not  see  how 
many  qualities  thou  art  immediately  able  to 
exhibit,  in  which  there  is  no  excuse  of  natural 
incapacity  and  unfitness,  and  yet  thou  still  re- 
mainest  involuntarily  below  the  mark  ?  or  art 
thou  compelled  through  being  defectively  fur- 
nished by  nature,  to  murmur,  and  to  be  stingy, 
and  to  natter,  and  to  find  fault  with  thy  poor 
body,  and  to  try  to  please  men,  and  to  make 
great  display,  and  to  be  so  restless  in  thy  mind  ? 


152  dft,  Bntoninus 

No,  by  the  gods  ;  but  thou  mightest  have  been 
delivered  from  these  things  long  ago.  Only  if 
in  truth  thou  canst  be  charged  with  being  rather 
slow  and  dull  of  comprehension,  thou  must  ex- 
ert thyself  about  this  also,  not  neglecting  it  nor 
yet  taking  pleasure  in  thy  dulness. 

6.  One  man,  when  he  has  done  a  service  to 
another,  is  ready  to  set  it  down  to  his  account 
as  a  favor  conferred.  Another  is  not  ready  to 
do  this,  but  still  in  his  own  mind  he  thinks  of 
the  man  as  his  debtor,  and  he  knows  what  he 
has  done.  A  third  in  a  manner  does  not  even 
know  what  he  has  done,  but  he  is  like  a  vine 
which  has  produced  grapes,  and  seeks  for 
nothing  more  after  it  has  once  produced  its 
proper  fruit.  As  a  horse  when  he  has  run,  a 
dog  when  he  has  tracked  the  game,  a  bee  when 
it  has  made  the  honey,  so  a  man  when  he  has 
done  a  good  act,  does  not  call  out  for  others  to 
come  and  see,  but  he  goes  on  to  another  act,  as 
a  vine  goes  on  to  produce  again  the  grapes  in 
season.  Must  a  man  then  be  one  of  these,  who 
in  a  manner  act  thus  without  observing  it  ?  Yes. 
But  this  very  thing  is  necessary,  the  observation 
of  what  a  man  is  doing  ;  for,  it  may  be  said,  it 
is  characteristic  of  the  social  animal  to  perceive 
that  he  is  working  in  a  social  manner,  and  in- 
deed to  wish  that  his  social  partner  also  should 
perceive   it.     It.  is  true  what  thou  sayest,  but 


/Ifc.  Hntoninus  153 

thou  dost  not  rightly  understand  what  is  now- 
said  ;  and  for  this  reason  thou  wilt  become  one 
of  those  of  whom  I  spoke  before,  for  even  they 
are  misled  by  a  certain  show  of  reason.  But  if 
thou  wilt  choose  to  understand  the  meaning  of 
what  is  said,  do  not  fear  that  for  this  reason 
thou  wilt  omit  any  social  act. 

7.  A  prayer  of  the  Athenians  :  Rain,  rain,  O 
dear  Zeus,  down  on  the  ploughed  fields  of  the 
Athenians  and  on  the  plains.  In  truth  we 
ought  not  to  pray  at  all,  or  we  ought  to  pray  in 
this  simple  and  noble  fashion. 

8.  Just  as  we  must  understand  when  it  is  said, 
That  iEsculapius  prescribed  to  this  man  horse- 
exercise,  or  bathing  in  cold  water,  or  going 
without  shoes  ;  so  we  must  understand  it  when 
it  is  said,  That  the  nature  of  the  universe  pre- 
scribed to  this  man  disease  or  mutilation  or 
loss  or  any  thing  else  of  the  kind.  For  in  the 
first  case  Prescribed  means  something  like 
this  :  he  prescribed  this  for  this  man  as  a  thing 
adapted  to  procure  health  ;  and  in  the  second 
case  it  means,  That  which  happens*  to  [or 
suits]  every  man  is  fixed  in  a  manner  for  him 
suitably  to  his  destiny.  For  this  is  what  we 
mean  when  we  say  that  things  are  suitable  to 
us,  as  the  workmen  say  of  squared  stones  in 

*  In  this  section  there  is  a  play  on  the  meaning  of 
crvixfiaiveiv- 


154  /ifc.  Bntontnus 

walls  or  the  pyramids,  that  they  are  suitable, 
when  they  fit  them  to  one  another  in  some 
kind  of  connection.  For  there  is  altogether 
one  fitness  [harmony].  And  as  the  universe  is 
made  up  out  of  all  bodies  to  be  such  a  body  as 
it  is,  so  out  of  all  existing  causes  necessity 
[destiny]  is  made  up  to  be  such  a  cause  as  it 
is.  And  even  those  who  are  completely  ignorant 
understand  what  I  mean,  for  they  say,  It  [ne- 
cessity, destiny]  brought  this  to  such  a  person. 
This  then  was  brought  and  this  was  prescribed 
to  him.  Let  us  then  receive  these  things,  as 
well  as  those  which  ^sculapius  prescribes. 
Many,  as  a  matter  of  course,  even  among  his 
prescriptions  are  disagreeable,  but  we  accept 
them  in  the  hope  of  health.  Let  the  perfecting 
and  accomplishment  of  the  things,  which  the 
common  nature  judges  to  be  good,  be  judged  by 
thee  to  be  of  the  same  kind  as  thy  health.  And 
so  accept  every  thing  which  happens,  even  if  it 
seem  disagreeable,  because  it  leads  to  this,  to 
the  health  of  the  universe  and  to  the  prosperity 
and  felicity  of  Zeus  [the  universe].  For  he 
would  not  have  brought  on  any  man  what  he 
has  brought,  if  it  were  not  useful  for  the  whole. 
Neither  does  the  nature  of  any  thing,  whatever 
it  may  be,  cause  any  thing  which  is  not  suita- 
ble to  that  which  is  directed  by  it.  For  two 
reasons  then  it  is  right  to  be  content  with  that 


/lib.  Bntontnus  155 

which  happens  to  thee  ;  the  one,  because  it  was 
done  for  thee  and  prescribed  for  thee,  and  in  a 
manner  had  reference  to  thee,  originally  from 
the  most  ancient  causes  spun  with  thy  destiny  ; 
and  the  other,  because  even  that  which  comes 
severally  to  every  man  is  to  the  power  which 
administers  the  universe  a  cause  of  felicity  and 
perfection,  nay  even  its  very  continuance.  For 
the  integrity  of  the  whole  is  mutilated,  if  thou 
cuttest  off  any  thing  whatever  from  the  con- 
junction and  the  continuity  either  of  the  parts 
or  of  the  causes.  And  thou  dost  cut  off,  as  far 
as  it  is  in  thy  power,  when  thou  art  dissatisfied, 
and  in  a  manner  triest  to  put  any  thing  out  of 
the  way. 

9.  Be  not  disgusted,  nor  discouraged,  nor  dis- 
satisfied, if  thou  dost  not  succeed  in  doing  every 
thing  according  to  right  principles ;  but  when 
thou  hast  failed,  return  back  again,  and  be 
content  if  the  greater  part  of  what  thou  doest 
is  consistent  with  man's  nature,  and  love  this 
to  which  thou  returnest ;  and  do  not  return  to 
philosophy  as  if  she  were  a  master,  but  act  like 
those  who  have  sore  eyes  and  apply  a  bit  of 
sponge  and  egg,  or  as  another  applies  a  plaster, 
or  drenching  with  water.  For  thus  thou  wilt 
not  fail  to  f  obey  reason,  and  thou  wilt  repose 
in  it.  And  remember  that  philosophy  requires 
only  the  things  which  thy  nature  requires  ;  but 


156  dfc.  Bntoninus 

thou  wouldst  have  something  else  which  is  not 
according  to  nature.  It  may  be  objected,  Why 
what  is  more  agreeable  than  this  [which  I  am 
doing]  ?  But  is  not  this  the  very  reason  why 
pleasure  deceives  us  ?  And  consider  if  mag- 
nanimity, freedom,  simplicity,  equanimity, 
piety,  are  not  more  agreeable.  For  what  is 
more  agreeable  than  wisdom  itself,  when  thou 
thinkest  of  the  security  and  the  happy  course 
of  all  things  which  depend  on  the  faculty  of 
understanding  and  knowledge  ? 

10.  Things  are  in  such  a  kind  of  envelopment 
that  they  have  seemed  to  philosophers,  not  a 
few  nor  those  common  philosophers,  altogether 
unintelligible  ;  nay  even  to  the  Stoics  them- 
selves they  seem  difficult  to  understand.  And 
all  our  assent  is  changeable  ;  for  where  is  the 
man  who  never  changes  ?  Carry  thy  thoughts 
then  to  the  objects  themselves,  and  consider 
how  short-lived  they  are  and  worthless,  and 
that  they  may  be  in  the  possession  of  a  filthy 
wretch  or  a  whore  or  a  robber.  Then  turn  to 
the  morals  of  those  who  live  with  thee,  and  it 
is  hardly  possible  to  endure  even  the  most 
agreeable  of  them,  to  say  nothing  of  a  man 
being  hardly  able  to  endure  himself.  In  such 
darkness  then  and  dirt  and  in  so  constant  a  flux 
both  of  substance  and  of  time,  and  of  motion 
and  of   things   moved,    what    there   is    worth 


dft.  Bntoninus  157 

being  highly  prized  or  even  an  object  of  serious 
pursuit,  I  cannot  imagine.  But  on  the  contrary- 
it  is  a  man's  duty  to  comfort  himself,  and  to 
wait  for  the  natural  dissolution  and  not  to  be 
vexed  at  the  delay,  but  to  rest  in  these  princi- 
ples only  :  the  one,  that  nothing  will  happen 
to  me  which  is  not  conformable  to  the  nature 
of  the  universe  ;  and  the  other,  that  it  is  in  my 
power  never  to  act  contrary  to  my  god  and 
daemon  :  for  there  is  no  man  who  will  compel 
me  to  this. 

11.  About  what  am  I  now  employing  my  own 
soul  ?  On  every  occasion  I  must  ask  myself 
this  question,  and  inquire,  what  have  I  now  in 
this  part  of  me  which  they  call  the  ruling  prin- 
ciple? and  whose  soul  have  I  now?  that  of  a 
child,  or  of  a  young  man,  or  of  a  feeble  woman 
or  of  a  tyrant,  or  of  a  domestic  animal,  or  of  a 
wild  beast? 

12.  What  kind  of  things  those  are  which  ap- 
pear good  to  the  many,  we  may  learn  even  from 
this.  For  if  any  man  should  conceive  certain 
things  as  being  really  good,  such  as  prudence, 
temperance,  justice,  fortitude,  he  would  not 
after  having  first  conceived  these  endure  to 
listen  to  any  thing  f  which  should  not  be  in 
harmony  with  what  is  really  good.f  But  if  a 
man  has  first  conceived  as  good  the  things 
which  appear  to  the  many  to  be  good,  he  will 


158  Ifo.  Bntonfnus 

listen  and  readily  receive  as  very  applicable 
that  which  was  said  by  the  comic  writer. 
fThus  even  the  many  perceive  the  difference,  f 
For  were  it  not  so,  this  saying  would  not 
offend  and  would  not  be  rejected  [in  the  first 
case],  while  we  receive  it  when  it  is  said  of 
wealth,  and  of  the  means  which  further  luxury 
and  fame,  as  said  fitly  and  wittily.  Go  on  then 
and  ask  if  we  should  value  and  think  those 
things  to  be  good,  to  which  after  their  first  con- 
ception in  the  mind  the  words  of  the  comic 
writer  might  be  aptly  applied — that  he  who  has 
them,  through  pure  abundance  has  not  a  place 
to  ease  himself  in. 

13.  I  am  composed  of  the  formal  and  the  ma- 
terial ;  and  neither  of  them  will  perish  into 
non-existence,  as  neither  of  them  came  into 
existence  out  of  non-existence.  Every  part  of 
me  then  will  be  reduced  by  change  into  some 
part  of  the  universe,  and  that  again  will  change 
into  another  part  of  the  universe,  and  so  on 
forever.  And  by  consequence  of  such  a  change 
I  too  exist,  and  those  who  begot  me,  and  so  on 
forever  in  the  other  direction.  For  nothing 
hinders  us  from  saying  so,  even  if  the  universe 
is  administered  according  to  definite  periods 
[of  revolution]. 

14.  Reason  and  the  reasoning  art  [philosophy] 
are  powers  which  are  sufficient  for  themselves 


dft.  Bntoninus  159 

and  for  their  own  works.  They  move  then 
from  a  first  principle  which  is  their  own,  and 
they  make  their  way  to  the  end  which  is  pro- 
posed to  them ;  and  this  is  the  reason  why  such 
acts  are  named  Catorthoseis  or  right  acts,  which 
word  signifies  that  they  proceed  by  the  right 
road. 

15.  None  of  these  things  ought  to  be  called 
a  man's,  which  do  not  belong  to  a  man,  as  man. 
They  are  not  required  of  a  man,  nor  does  man's 
nature  promise  them,  nor  are  they  the  means 
of  man's  nature  attaining  its  end.  Neither 
then  does  the  end  of  man  lie  in  these  things, 
nor  yet  that  which  aids  to  the  accomplishment 
of  this  end,  and  that  which  aids  towards  this 
end  is  that  which  is  good.  Besides,  if  any  of 
these  things  did  belong  to  man,  it  would  not  be 
right  for  a  man  to  despise  them  and  to  set  him- 
self against  them  ;  nor  would  a  man  be  worthy 
of  praise  who  showed  that  he  did  not  want 
these  things,  nor  would  he  who  stinted  himself 
in  any  of  them  be  good,  if  indeed  these  things 
were  good.  But.  now  the  more  of  these  things 
a  man  deprives  himself  of,  or  of  other  things 
like  them,  or  even  when  he  is  deprived  of  any 
of  them,  the  more  patiently  he  endures  the 
loss,  just  in  the  same  degree  Jie  is  a  better 
man. 

16.  Such  as  are  thy  habitual  thoughts,  such 


160  /ifc.  Sntonfnus 

also  will  be  the  character  of  thy  mind  ;  for  the 
soul  is  dyed  by  the  thoughts.  Dye  it  then  with 
a  continuous  series  of  such  thoughts  as  these  : 
for  instance,  that  where  a  man  can  live,  there 
he  can  also  live  well.  But  he  must  live  in  a 
palace  ; — well  then,  he  can  also  live  well  in  a 
palace.  And  again,  consider  that  for  whatever 
purpose  each  thing  has  been  constituted,  for 
this  it  has  been  constituted,  and  towards  this 
it  is  carried  ;  and  its  end  is  in  that  towards 
which  it  is  carried  ;  and  where  the  end  is,  there 
also  is  the  advantage  and  the  good  of  each 
thing.  Now  the  good  for  the  reasonable  ani- 
mal is  society ;  for  that  we  are  made  for  society 
has  been  shown  above.*  Is  it  not  plain  that 
the  inferior  exist  for  the  sake  of  the  superior  ? 
but  the  things  which  have  life  are  superior 
to  those  which  have  not  life,  and  of  those 
which  have  life  the  superior  are  those  which 
have  reason. 

17.  To  seek  what  is  impossible  is  madness  ; 
and  it  is  impossible  that  the  bad  should  not  do 
something  of  this  kind. 

18.  Nothing  happens  to  any  man  which  he  is 
not  formed  by  nature  to  bear.  The  same  things 
happen  to  another,  and  either  because  he  does 
not  see  that  thev  have  happened  or  because 
he  would  show  a  great  spirit  he  is  firm  and  re- 

•  ii.,  1. 


/Ifc.  Bntonfnus  161 

mains  unharmed.  It  is  a  shame  then  that  igno 
ranee  and  conceit  should  be  stronger  than 
wisdom. 

19.  Things  themselves  touch  not  the  soul, 
not  in  the  least  degree  ;  nor  have  they  admis- 
sion to  the  soul,  nor  can  they  turn  or  move  the 
soul ;  but  the  soul  turns  and  moves  itself  alone, 
and  whatever  judgments  it  may  think  proper  to 
make,  such  it  makes  for  itself  the  things  which 
present  themselves  to  it. 

20.  In  one  respect  man  is  the  nearest  thing 
to  me,  so  far  as  I  must  do  good  to  men  and  en- 
dure them.  But  so  far  as  some  men  make  them- 
selves obstacles  to  my  proper  acts,  man  becomes 
to  me  one  of  the  things  which  are  indifferent, 
no  less  than  the  sun  or  wind  or  a  wild  beast. 
Now  it  is  true  that  these  may  impede  my  action, 
but  they  are  no  impediments  to  my  affects  and 
disposition,  which  have  the  power  of  acting 
conditionally  and  changing  ;  for  the  mind  con- 
verts and  changes  every  hindrance  to  its  activ- 
ity into  an  aid  ;  and  so  that  which  is  a  hindrance 
is  made  a  furtherance  to  an  act  ;  and  that  which 
is  an  obstacle  on  the  road  helps  us  on  this  road. 

21.  Reverence  that  which  is  best  in  the  uni- 
verse ;  and  this  is  that  which  makes  use  of  all 
things  and  directs  all  things.  And  in  like  man- 
ner also  reverence  that  which  is  best  in  thyself; 
and  this  is  of  the  same  kind  as  that.     For  in 


i62  dfc.  Butontnua 

thyself  also,  that  which  makes  use  of  every  thing 
else,  is  this,  and  thy  life  is  directed  by  this. 

22.  That  which  does  no  harm  to  the  state, 
does  no  harm  to  the  citizen.  In  the  case  of 
every  appearance  of  harm  apply  this  rule :  if 
the  state  is  not  harmed  by  this,  neither  am  I 
harmed.  But  if  the  state  is  harmed,  thou  must 
not  be  angry  with  him  who  does  harm  to  the 
state.     Show  him  where  his  error  is. 

23.  Often  think  of  the  rapidity  with  which 
things  pass  by  and  disappear,  both  the  things 
which  are  and  the  things  which  are  produced. 
For  substance  is  like  a  river  in  a  continual  flow, 
and  the  activities  of  things  are  in  constant 
change,  and  the  causes  work  in  infinite  varie- 
ties ;  and  there  is  hardly  any  thing  which  stands 
still.  And  consider  this  which  is  near  to  thee, 
this  boundless  abyss  of  the  past  and  of  the  future, 
in  which  all  things  disappear.  How  then  is  he 
not  a  fool  who  is  puffed  up  with  such  things  or 
plagued  about  them  and  makes  himself  mis- 
erable ?  for  they  vex  him  only  for  a  time,  and  a 
short  time. 

24.  Think  of  the  universal  substance,  of  which 
thou  hast  a  very  small  portion  ;  and  of  universal 
time,  of  which  a  short  and  indivisible  interval 
has  been  assigned  to  thee  ;  and  of  that  which  is 
fixed  by  destiny,  and  how  small  a  part  of  it  thou 
art. 


dfo,  Bntoninus  163 

25.  Does  another  do  me  wrong?  Let  him 
look  to  it.  He  has  his  own  disposition,  his  own 
activity.  I  now  have  what  the  universal  nature 
wills  me  to  have  ;  and  I  do  what  my  nature  now 
wills  me  to  do. 

26.  Let  the  part  of  thy  soul  which  leads  and 
governs  be  undisturbed  by  the  movements  in 
the  flesh,  whether  of  pleasure  or  of  pain  ;  and 
let  it  not  unite  with  them,  but  let  it  circum- 
scribe itself  and  limit  those  affects  to  their  parts. 
But  when  these  affects  rise  up  to  the  mind  by 
virtue  of  that  other  sympathy  that  naturally  ex- 
ists in  a  body  which  is  all  one,  then  thou  must 
not  strive  to  resist  the  sensation,  for  it  is  natu- 
ral ;  but  let  not  the  ruling  part  of  itself  add  to 
the  sensation  the  opinion  that  it  is  either  good 
or  bad. 

27.  Live  with  the  gods.  And  he  does  live 
with  the  gods,  who  constantly  shows  to  them 
that  his  own  soul  is  satisfied  with  that  which  is 
assigned  to  him,  and  that  it  does  all  that  the 
daemon  wishes,  which  Zeus  hath  given  to  every 
man  for  his  guardian  and  guide,  a  portion  of 
himself.  And  this  is  every  man's  understand- 
ing and  reason. 

28.  Art  thou  angry  with  him  whose  arm-pits 
stink  ?  art  thou  angry  with  him  whose  mouth 
smells  foul  ?  What  good  will  this  anger  do  thee  ? 
He  has  such  a  mouth,  he  has  such  arm-pits  ;  it 


164  dft.  Bntoninus 

is  necessary  that  such  an  emanation  must  come 
from  such  things — but  the  man  has  reason,  it 
will  be  said,  and  he  is  able,  if  he  takes  pains,  to 
discover  wherein  he  offends — I  wish  thee  well 
of  thy  discovery.  Well  then,  and  thou  hast 
reason ;  by  thy  rational  faculty  stir  up  his  ra- 
tional faculty  ;  show  him  his  error,  admonish 
him.  For  if  he  listens,  thou  wilt  cure  him,  and 
there  is  no  need  of  anger,  [f  Neither  tragic 
actor  nor  whore. f]* 

29.  As  thou  intendest  to  live  when  thou  art 
gone  out,  ...  so  it  is  in  thy  power  to  live  here. 
But  if  men  do  not  permit  thee,  then  get  away 
out  of  life,  yet  so  as  if  thou  wert  suffering  no 
harm.  The  house  is  smoky,  and  I  quit  it.| 
Why  dost  thou  think  that  this  is  any  trouble  ? 
But  so  long  as  nothing  of  the  kind  drives  me 
out,  I  remain,  am  free,  and  no  man  shall  hinder 
me  from  doing  what  I  choose  ;  and  I  choose  to 
do  what  is  according  to  the  nature  of  the  rational 
and  social  animal. 

30.  The  intelligence  of  the  universe  is  social. 
Accordingly  it  has  made  the  inferior  things  for 

*This  is  imperfect  or  corrupt,  or  both.  There  is  also 
something  wrong  or  incomplete  in  the  beginning  of  S. 
29,  where  he  says  ws  e£eA0<W  c^y  Siavo;?,,  which  Gataker 
translates  "  as  if  thou  wast  about  to  quit  life  ; "  but  we 
cannot  translate  e£*\0J)i>  in  that  way.  Other  translations 
are  not  much  more  satisfactory.  I  have  translated  it 
literally  and  left  it  imperfect. 

fEpictetus,  i.,  25,  18. 


/IB.  Bntontnus  165 

the  sake  of  the  superior,  and  it  has  fitted  the 
superior  to  one  another.  Thou  seest  how  it 
has  subordinated,  coordinated,  and  assigned  to 
every  thing  its  proper  portion,  and  has  brought 
together  into  concord  with  one  another  the 
things  which  are  the  best. 

31.  How  hast  thou  behaved  hitherto  to  the 
gods,  thy  parents,  brethren,  children,  teachers; 
to  those  who  looked  after  thy  infancy,  to  thy 
friends,  kinsfolk,  to  thy  slaves?  Consider  if 
thou  hast  hitherto  behaved  to  all  in  such  a  way 
that  this  may  be  said  of  thee  : 

Never  has  wronged  a  man  in  deed  or  word. 

And  call  to  recollection  both  how  many  things 
thou  hast  passed  through,  and  how  many  things 
thou  hast  been  able  to  endure  ;  and  that  the 
history  of  thy  life  is  now  complete  and  thy 
service  is  ended ;  and  how  many  beautiful 
things  thou  hast  seen  ;  and  how  many  pleasures 
and  pains  thou  hast  despised  ;  and  how  many 
things  called  honorable  thou  hast  spurned  ;  and 
to  how  many  ill-minded  folks  thou  hast  shown 
a  kind  disposition. 

32.  Why  do  unskilled  and  ignorant  souls  dis- 
turb him  who  has  skill  and  knowledge  ?  What 
soul  then  has  skill  and  knowledge  ?  That  which 
knows  no  beginning  and  end,  and  knows  the 
reason  which  pervades  all  substance  and  through 


166  dfc.  Bntoninus 

all  time  by  fixed  periods  [revolutions]  adminis- 
ters the  universe. 

33.  Soon,  very  soon,  thou  wilt  be  ashes, 
or  a  skeleton,  and  either  a  name  or  not  even 
a  name ;  but  name  is  sound  and  echo.  And 
the  things  which  are  much  valued  in  life 
are  empty  and  rotten  and  trifling,  and  [like] 
little  dogs  biting  one  another,  and  little  chil- 
dren quarrelling,  laughing,  and  then  straight- 
way weeping.  But  fidelity  and  modesty  and 
justice  and  truth  are  fled 

Up  to  Olympus  from  the  wide-spread  earth. 

Hesiod,  Works,  etc.,  v.  197. 

What  then  is  there  which  still  detains  thee 
here?  if  the  objects  of  sense  are  easily  changed 
and  never  stand  still,  and  the  organs  of  percep- 
tion are  dull  and  easily  receive  false  impres- 
sions ;  and  the  poor  soul  itself  is  an  exhalation 
from  blood.  But  to  have  good  repute  amidst 
such  a  world  as  this  is  an  empty  thing.  Why 
then  dost  thou  not  wait  in  tranquillity  for  thy 
end,  whether  it  is  extinction  or  removal  to  an- 
other state  ?  And  until  that  time  comes,  what 
is  sufficient  ?  Why,  what  else  than  to  venerate 
the  gods  and  bless  them,  and  to  do  good  to  men, 
and  to  practise  tolerance  and  self-restraint ;  * 

*  This  is  the  Stoic  precept  at/e^ou  koI  anexov.  The  first 
part  teaches  us  to  be  content  with  men  and  things  as 
they  are.  The  second  part  teaches  us  the  virtue  of  self- 
restraint,  or  the  government  of  our  passions. 


dlb.  Bntoninus  167 

but  as  to  every  thing  which  is  beyond  the  limits 
of  the  poor  flesh  and  breath,  to  remember  that 
this  is  neither  thine  nor  in  thy  power. 

34.  Thou  canst  pass  thy  life  in  an  equable 
flow  of  happiness,  if  thou  canst  go  by  the  right 
way,  and  think  and  act  in  the  right  way. 
These  two  things  are  common  both  to  the  soul 
of  god  and  to  the  soul  of  man,  and  to  the  soul 
of  every  rational  being,  not  to  be  hindered  by 
another;  and  to  hold  good  to  consist  in  the  dis- 
position to  justice  and  the  practice  of  it,  and  in 
this  to  let  thy  desire  find  its  termination. 

35.  If  this  is  neither  my  own  badness,  nor 
an  effect  of  my  own  badness,  and  the  common 
weal  is  not  injured,  why  am  I  troubled  about 
it  ?  and  what  is  the  harm  to  the  common  weal  ? 

36.  Do  not  be  carried  along  inconsiderately  by 
the  appearance  of  things,  but  give  help  [to  all] 
according  to  thy  ability  and  their  fitness  ;  and 
if  they  should  have  sustained  loss  in  matters 
which  are  indifferent,  do  not  imagine  this  to  be 
a  damage.  For  it  is  a  bad  habit.  But  as  the 
old  man,  when  he  went  away,  asked  back  his 
foster-child's  top,  remembering  that  it  was  a 
top,  so  do  thou  in  this  case  also. 

When  thou  art  calling  out  on  the  rostra,  hast 
thou  forgotten,  man,  what  these  things  are? 
Yes ;  but  they  are  objects  of  great  concern  to 
these  people — wilt  thou  too  then  be  made  a  fool 


168  /ID>.  Bntoninus 

for  these  things  ? — I  was  once  a  fortunate  man, 
but  I  lost  it,  I  know  not  how.  But  fortunate 
means  that  a  man  has  assigned  to  himself  a 
good  fortune :  and  a  good  fortune  is  good  dis- 
position of  the  soul,  good  emotions,  good 
actions.* 

*  This  section  is  unintelligible.  Many  of  the  words 
may  be  corrupt,  and  the  general  purport  of  the  section 
cannot  be  discovered.  Perhaps  several  things  have  been 
improperly  joined  in  one  section.  I  have  translated  it 
nearly  literally.  Different  translators  give  the  section  a 
different  turn,  and  the  critics  have  tried  to  mend  what 
they  cannot  understand. 


VI. 


THE  substance  of  the  universe  is  obedient 
and  compliant ;  and  the  reason  which 
governs  it  has  in  itself  no  cause  for  doing  evil, 
for  it  has  no  malice,  nor  does  it  do  evil  to  any- 
thing, nor  is  any  thing  harmed  by  it.  But  all 
things  are  made  and  perfected  according  to  this 
reason. 

2.  Let  it  make  no  difference  to  thee  whether 
thou  art  cold  or  warm,  if  thou  art  doing  thy 
duty  ;  and  whether  thou  art  drowsy  or  satisfied 
with  sleep;  and  whether  ill-spoken  of  or 
praised  ;  and  whether  dying  or  doing  something 
else.  For  it  is  one  of  the  acts  of  life,  this  act  by 
which  we  die ;  it  is  sufficient  then  in  this  act  also 
to  do  well  what  we  have  in  hand     (vi.,  22,  28). 

3.  Look  within.  Let  neither  the  peculiar 
quality  of  any  thing  nor  its  value  escape  thee. 

4.  All  existing  things  soon  change,  and  they 
will  either  be  reduced  to  vapor,  if  indeed  all 
substance  is  one,  or  they  will  be  dispersed. 

5.  The  reason  which  governs  knows  what  its 
own  disposition  is,  and  what  it  does,  and  on 
what  material  it  works. 


i7o  /lib,  Bntoninus 

6.  The  best  way  of  avenging  thyself  is  not  to 
become  [like  the  wrong-doer]. 

7.  Take  pleasure  in  one  thing  and  rest  in  it, 
in  passing  from  one  social  act  to  another  social 
act,  thinking  of  God. 

8.  The  ruling  principle  is  that  which  rouses 
and  turns  itself,  and  while  it  makes  itself  such 
as  it  is  and  such  as  it  wills  to  be,  it  also  makes 
every  thing  which  happens  appear  to  itself  to 
be  such  as  it  wills. 

9.  In  conformity  to  the  nature  of  the  universe 
every  single  thing  is  accomplished,  for  certainly 
it  is  not  in  conformity  to  any  other  nature  that 
each  thing  is  accomplished,  either  a  nature 
which  externally  comprehends  this,  or  a  nature 
which  is  comprehended  within  this  nature,  or  a 
nature  external  and  independent  of  this  (xi.,  1., 
vi.,  40;  viii.,  50). 

10.  The  universe  is  either  a  confusion,  and  a 
mutual  involution  of  things,  and  a  dispersion  ; 
or  it  is  unity  and  order  and  providence.  If  then 
it  is  the  former,  why  do  I  desire  to  tarry  in  a 
fortuitous  combination  of  things  and  such  a 
disorder?  and  why  do  I  care  about  any  thing 
else  than  how  I  shall  at  last  become  earth  ?  and 
why  am  I  disturbed,  for  the  dispersion  of  my 
elements  will  happen  whatever  I  do.  But  if  the 
other  supposition  is  true,  I  venerate,  and  I  am 
firm,  and  I  trust  in  him  who  governs  (iv.,  27). 


dfc.  Bntoninus  171 

11.  When  thou  hast  been  compelled  by  cir- 
cumstances to  be  disturbed  in  a  manner,  quick- 
ly return  to  thyself  and  do  not  continue  out  of 
tune  longer  than  the  compulsion  lasts ;  for  thou 
wilt  have  more  mastery  over  the  harmony 
by  continually  recurring  to  it. 

12.  If  thou  hadst  a  step-mother  and  a  mother 
at  the  same  time,  thou  wouldst  be  dutiful  to  thy 
step-mother,  but  still  thou  wouldst  constantly 
return  to  thy  mother.  Let  the  court  and  phi- 
losophy now  be  to  thee  step-mother  and  mother  ; 
return  to  philosophy  frequently  and  repose  in 
her,  through  whom  what  thou  meetest  with  in 
the  court  appears  to  thee  tolerable,  and  thou 
appearest  tolerable  in  the  court. 

13.  When  we  have  meat  before  us  and  such 
eatables,  we  receive  the  impression  that  this  is 
the  dead  body  of  a  fish,  and  this  is  the  dead  body 
of  a  bird  or  of  a  pig ;  and  again,  that  this  Faler- 
nian  is  only  a  little  grape  juice,  and  this  purple 
robe  is  some  sheep's  wool  dyed  with  the  blood 
of  a  shell-fish :  such  then  are  these  impressions, 
and  they  reach  the  things  themselves  and  pene- 
trate them,  and  so  we  see  what  kind  of  things 
they  are.  Just  in  the  same  way  ought  we  to  act 
all  through  life,  and  where  there  are  things 
which  appear  most  worthy  of  our  approbation, 
wTe  ought  to  lay  them  bare  and  look  at  their 
worthlessness  and  strip  them  of  all  the  words  by 


172  flfc*  antoninus 

which  they  are  exalted.  For  outward  show 
is  a  wonderful  perverter  of  the  reason,  and 
when  thou  art  most  sure  that  thou  art  employ- 
ed about  things  worth  thy  pains,  it  is  then 
that  it  cheats  thee  most.  Consider  then  what 
Crates  says  of  Xenocrates  himself. 

14.  Most  of  the  things  which  the  multitude 
admire  are  referred  to  objects  of  the  most  gen- 
eral kind,  those  which  are  held  together  by 
cohesion  or  natural  organization,  such  as  stones, 
wood,  fig-trees,  vines,  olives.  But  those  which 
are  admired  by  men,  who  are  a  little  more  reas- 
onable, are  referred  to  things  which  are  held  to- 
gether by  a  living  principal,  as  flocks,  herds. 
Those  which  are  admired  by  men  who  are  still 
more  instructed  are  the  things  which  are  held 
together  by  a  rational  soul,  not  however  a  uni- 
versal soul,  but  rational  so  far  as  it  is  a  soul 
skilled  in  some  art,  or  expert  in  some  other 
way,  or  simply  rational  so  far  as  it  possesses  a 
number  of  slaves.  But  he  who  values  a  rational 
soul,  a  soul  universal  and  fitted  for  political  life, 
regards  nothing  else  except  this  ;  and  above  all 
things  he  keeps  his  soul  in  a  condition  and  in 
an  activity  conformable  to  reason  and  social 
life,  and  he  cooperates  to  this  end  with  those 
who  are  of  the  same  kind  as  himself. 

15.  Some  things  are  hurrying  into  existence, 
and  others  are  hurrying  out  of  it ;  and  of  that 


flb.  Bntoninus  173 

which  is  coming  into  existence  part  is  already 
extinguished.  Motions  and  changes  are  con- 
tinually renewing  the  world,  just  as  the  unin- 
terrupted course  of  time  is  always  renewing  the 
infinite  duration  of  ages.  In  this  flowing  stream 
then,  on  which  there  is  no  abiding,  what  is 
there  of  the  things  which  hurry  by  on  which  a 
man  would  set  a  high  price  ?  It  would  be  just 
as  if  a  man  should  fall  in  love  with  one  of  the 
sparrows  which  fly  by,  but  it  has  already  passed 
out  of  sight.  Something  of  this  kind  is  the 
very  life  of  every  man,  like  the  exhalation  of 
the  blood  and  the  respiration  of  the  air.  For 
such  as  it  is  to  have  once  drawn  in  the  air  and 
to  have  given  it  back,  which  we  do  every  mo- 
ment, just  the  same  is  it  with  the  whole  respira- 
tory power,  Which  thou  didst  receive  at  thy  birth 
yesterday  and  the  day  before,  to  give  it  back  to 
the  element  from  which  thou  didst  first  draw  it. 
16.  Neither  is  transpiration,  as  in  plants,  a 
thing  to  be  valued,  nor  respiration,  as  in  do- 
mesticated animals  and  wild  beasts,  nor  the  re- 
ceiving of  impressions  by  the  appearances  of 
things,  nor  being  moved  by  desires  as  puppets 
by  strings,  nor  assembling  in  herds,  nor  being 
nourished  by  food  ;  for  this  is  just  like  the  act  of 
separating  and  parting  with  the  useless  part  of 
our  food.  What  then  is  worth  being  valued  ? 
To  be  received  with  clapping  of  hands  ?     No. 


i?4  /Ifc.  Bntonfnus 

Neither  must  we  value  the  clapping  of  tongues, 
for  the  praise  which  comes  from  the  many  is  a 
clapping  of  tongues.  Suppose  then  that  thou 
hast  given  up  this  worthless  thing  called  fame, 
what  remains  that  is  worth  valuing  ?  This  in 
my  opinion,  to  move  thyself  and  to  restrain 
thyself  in  conformity  to  thy  proper  constitu- 
tion, to  which  end  both  all  employments  and 
arts  lead.  For  every  art  aims  at  this,  that  the 
thing  which  has  been  made  should  be  adapted  to 
the  work  for  which  it  has  been  made  ;  and  both 
the  vine-planter  who  looks  after  the  vine,  and 
the  horse-breaker,  and  he  who  trains  the  dog, 
seek  this  end.  But  the  education  and  the 
teaching  of  youth  aim  at  something.  In  this 
then  is  the  value  of  the  education  and  the 
teaching.  And  if  this  is  well,  thou  wilt  not 
seek  any  thing  else.  Wilt  thou  not  cease  to 
value  many  other  things  too  ?  Then  thou  wilt 
be  neither  free,  nor  sufficient  for  thy  own  hap- 
piness, nor  without  passion.  For  of  necessity 
thou  must  be  envious,  jealous,  and  suspicious 
of  those  who  can  take  away  those  things,  and 
plot  against  those  who  have  that  which  is 
valued  by  thee.  Of  necessity  a  man  must  be 
altogether  in  a  state  of  perturbation  who  wants 
any  of  these  things  ;  and  besides,  he  must  often 
find  fault  with  the  gods.  But  to  reverence  and 
honor  thy  own  mind  will  make  thee  content 


flh.  Bntonfnus  175 

with  thyself,  and  in  harmony  with  society,  and 
in  agreement  with  the  gods,  that  is,  praising  all 
that  they  give  and  have  ordered. 

17.  Above,  below,  all  around  are  the  move- 
ments of  the  elements.  But  the  motion  of 
virtue  is  in  none  of  these  :  it  is  something  more 
divine,  and  advancing  by  a  way  hardly  observed 
it  goes  happily  on  its  road. 

18.  How  strangely  men  act.  They  will  not 
praise  those  who  are  living  at  the  same  time 
and  living  with  themselves ;  but  to  be  them- 
selves praised  by  posterity,  by  those  whom  they 
have  never  seen  or  ever  will  see,  this  they  set 
much  value  on.  But  this  is  very  much  the 
same  as  if  thou  shouldst  be  grieved  because 
those  who  have  lived  before  thee  did  not  praise 
thee. 

19.  If  a  thing  is  difficult  to  be  accomplished 
by  thyself,  do  not  think  that  it  is  impossible  for 
man  :  but  if  any  thing  is  possible  for  man  and 
conformable  to  his  nature,  think  that  this  can 
be  attained  by  thyself  too. 

20.  In  the  gymnastic  exercises  suppose  that  a 
man  has  torn  thee  with  his  nails,  and  by  dash- 
ing against  thy  head  has  inflicted  a  wound. 
Well,  we  neither  show  any  signs  of  vexation, 
nor  are  we  offended,  nor  do  we  suspect  him 
afterwards  as  a  treacherous  fellow  ;  and  yet  we 
are  on  our  guard  against  him,  not,  however,  as 


i76  /ft.  antonlnus 

an  enemy,  nor  yet  with  suspicion,  but  we 
quietly  get  out  of  his  way.  Something  like  this 
let  thy  behavior  be  in  all  the  other  parts  of  life  ; 
let  us  overlook  many  things  in  those  who  are 
like  antagonists  in  the  gymnasium.  For  it  is 
in  our  power,  as  I  said,  to  get  out  of  the  way, 
and  to  have  no  suspicion  nor  hatred. 

21.  If  any  man  is  able  to  convince  me  and 
show  me  that  I  do  not  think  or  act  right,  I  will 
gladly  change ;  for  I  seek  the  truth,  by  which 
no  man  was  ever  injured.  But  he  is  injured 
who  abides  in  his  error  and  ignorance. 

22.  I  do  my  duty  :  other  things  trouble  me 
not ;  for  they  are  either  things  without  life,  or 
things  without  reason,  or  things  that  have 
rambled  and  know  not  the  way. 

23.  As  to  the  animals  which  have  no  reason 
and  generally  all  things  and  objects,  do  thou, 
since  thou  hast  reason  and  they  have  none, 
make  use  of  them  with  a  generous  and  liberal 
spirit.  But  towards  human  beings,  as  they 
have  reason,  behave  in  a  social  spirit.  And  on 
all  occasions  call  on  the  gods,  and  do  not  per- 
plex thyself  about  the  length  of  time  in  which 
thou  shalt  do  this ;  for  even  three  hours  so 
spent  are  sufficient. 

24.  Alexander  the  Macedonian  and  his  groom, 
by  death  were  brought  to  the  same  state  ;  for 
either  they  were  received  among  the  same  sem- 


dft.  Bntontnus  177 

inal   principles  of  the  universe,   or  they  were 
alike  dispersed  among  the  atoms. 

25.  Consider  how  many  things  in  the  same 
indivisible  time  take  place  in  each  of  us,  things 
which  concern  the  body  and  things  which  con- 
cern the  soul :  and  so  thou  wilt  not  wonder  if 
many  more  things,  or  rather  all  things  which 
come  into  existence  in  that  which  is  the  one 
and  all,  which  we  call  Cosmos,  exist  in  it  at  the 
same  time. 

26.  If  any  man  should  propose  to  thee  the 
question,  how  the  name  Antoninus  is  written, 
wouldst  thou  with  a  straining  of  the  voice  utter 
each  letter?  What  then  if  they  grow  angry, 
wilt  thou  be  angry  to  ?  Wilt  thou  not  go  on 
with  composure  and  number  every  letter? 
Just  so  then  in  this  life  also  remember  that 
every  duty  is  made  up  of  certain  parts.  These 
it  is  thy  duty  to  observe  and  without  being  dis- 
turbed or  showing  anger  towards  those  who  are 
angry  with  thee  to  go  on  thy  way  and  finish 
that  which  is  set  before  thee. 

27.  How  cruel  it  is  not  to  allow  men  to  strive 
after  the  things  which  appear  to  them  to  be 
suitable  to  their  nature  and  profitable  !  And 
yet  in  a  manner  thou  dost  not  allow  them  to  do 
this,  when  thou  art  vexed  because  they  do 
wrong.  For  they  are  certainly  moved  towards 
things  because  they  suppose  them  to  be  suitable 


178  dfc.  Bntoninus 

to  their  nature  and  profitable  to  them.  But  it 
is  not  so.  Teach  them  then,  and  show  them 
without  being  angry. 

28.  Death  is  a  cessation  of  the  impressions 
through  the  senses,  and  of  the  pulling  of  the 
strings  which  move  the  appetites,  and  of  the 
discursive  movements  of  the  thoughts,  and  of 
the  service -to  the  flesh  (ii.,   12). 

29.  It  is  a  shame  for  the  soul  to  be  first  to 
give  way  in  this  life,  when  thy  body  does  not 
give  way. 

30.  Take  care  that  thou  art  not  made  into  a 
Caesar,  that  thou  art  not  dyed  with  this  dye ; 
for  such  things  happen.  Keep  thyself  then 
simple,  good,  pure,  serious,  free  from  affecta- 
tion, a  friend  of  justice,  a  worshipper  of  the 
gods,  kind,  affectionate,  strenuous  in  all  proper 
acts.  Strive  to  continue  to  be  such  as  philoso- 
phy wished  to  make  thee.  Reverence  the 
gods,  and  help  men.  Short  is  life.  There  is 
only  one  fruit  of  this  terrene  life,  a  pious  dispo- 
sition and  social  acts.  Do  every  thing  as  a 
disciple  of  Antoninus.  Remember  his  con- 
stancy in  every  act  which  was  conformable  to 
reason,  and  his  evenness  in  all  things,  and  his 
piety,  and  the  serenity  of  his  countenance,  and 
his  sweetness,  and  his  disregard  of  empty  fame, 
and  his  efforts  to  understand  things  ;  and  how 
he  would  never  let  any  thing  pass  without  hav- 


/lib.  Bntoninua  170 

ing  first  most  carefully  examined  it  and  clearly- 
understood  it ;  and  how  he  bore  with  those  who 
blamed  him  unjustly  without  blaming  them  in 
return ;  how  he  did  nothing  in  a  hurry ;  and 
how  he  listened  not  to  calumnies,  and  how 
exact  an  examiner  of  manners  and  actions  he 
was  ;  and  not  given  to  reproach  people,  nor 
timid,  nor  suspicious,  nor  a  sophist;  and  with 
how  little  he  was  satisfied,  such  as  lodging, 
bed,  dress,  food,  servants  ;  and  how  laborious 
and  patient ;  and  how  he  was  able  on  account 
of  his  sparing  diet  to  hold  out  to  the  evening, 
not  even  requiring  to  relieve  himself  by  any 
evacuations  except  at  the  usual  hour ;  and  his 
firmness  and  uniformity  in  his  friendships  ; 
and  how  he  tolerated  freedom  of  speech  in 
those  who  opposed  his  opinions  ;  and  the  pleas- 
ure that  he  had  when  any  man  showed  him  any 
thing  better  ;  and  how  religious  he  was  without 
superstition.  Imitate  all  this  that  thou  mayest 
have  as  good  a  conscience,  when  thy  last  hour 
comes,  as  he  had  (i.,  16). 

31.  Return  to  thy  sober  senses  and  call  thy- 
self  back  ;  and  when  thou  hast  roused  thyself 
from  sleep  and  hast  perceived  that  they  were 
only  dreams  which  troubled  thee,  now  in  thy 
waking  hours  look  at  these  [the  things  about 
thee]  as  thou  didst  look  at  those  [the  dreams]. 

32.  I  consist  of  a  little  body  and  a  soul.    Now 


180  tfft.  antonfnus 

to  this  little  body  all  things  are  indifferent,  for 
it  is  not  able  to  perceive  differences.  But  to 
the  understanding  those  thing  only  are  indiffer- 
ent, which  are  not  the  works  of  its  own  activity. 
But  whatever  things  are  the  works  of  its  own 
activity,  all  these  are  in  its  power.  And  of 
these,  however,  only  those  which  are  done  with 
reference  to  the  present ;  for  as  to  the  future 
and  the  past  activities  of  the  mind,  even  these 
are  for  the  present  indifferent. 

33.  Neither  the  labor  which  the  hand  does 
nor  that  of  the  foot  is  contrary  to  nature,  so  long 
as  the  foot  does  the  foot's  work  and  the  hand  the 
hand's.  So  then  neither  to  a  man  as  a  man  is 
his  labor  contrary  to  nature,  so  long  as  it  does 
the  things  of  a  man.  But  if  the  labor  is  not  con- 
trary to  his  nature,  neither  is  it  an  evil  to  him. 

34.  How  many  pleasures  have  been  enjoyed 
by  robbers,  patricides,  tyrants. 

35.  Dost  thou  not  see  how  the  handicrafts- 
men accommodate  themselves  up  to  a  certain 
point  to  those  who  are  not  skilled  in  their  craft 
— nevertheless  they  cling  to  the  reason  [the 
principles]  of  their  art  and  do  not  endure  to 
depart  from  it  ?  Is  it  not  strange  if  the  archi- 
tect and  the  physician  shall  have  more  respect 
to  the  reason  [the  principles]  of  their  own  arts 
than  man  to  his  own  reason,  which  is  common 
to  him  and  the  gods  ? 


/Ifo.  Bntoninus  181 

36.  Asia,  Europe,  are  corners  of  the  universe  : 
all  the  sea  a  drop  in  the  universe  ;  Athos  a  little 
clod  of  the  universe  :  all  the  present  time  is  a 
point  in  eternity.  All  things  are  little,  change- 
able, perishable.  All  things  come  from  thence, 
from  that  universal  ruling  power  either  directly 
proceeding  or  by  way  of  sequence.  And  accord- 
ingly the  lion's  gaping  jaws,  and  that  which  is 
poisonous,  and  every  harmful  thing,  as  a  thorn, 
as  mud,  are  after-products  of  the  grand  and 
beautiful.  Do  not  then  imagine  that  they  are 
of  another  kind  from  that  which  thou  dost  ven- 
erate, but  form  a  just  opinion  of  the  source  of 
all  (vii.,  75). 

37.  He  who  has  seen  present  things  has  seen 
all,  both  every  thing  which  has  taken  place 
from  all  eternity  and  every  thing  which  will  be 
for  time  without  end ;  for  all  things  are  of  one 
kin  and  of  one  form. 

38.  Frequently  consider  the  connection  of  all 
things  in  the  universe  and  their  relation  to  one 
another.  For  in  a  manner  all  things  are  impli- 
cated with  one  another,  and  all  in  this  way  are 
friendly  to  one  another  ;  for  one  thing  comes  in 
order  after  another,  and  this  is  by  virtue  of 
the  active  f  movement  and  mutual  conspiration 
and  the  unity  of  the  substance  (ix.,  1). 

39.  Adapt  thyself  to  the  things  with  which 
thy  lot  has  been  cast :  and  the  men  among 


182  dft.  Bntoninus 

whom  thou  hast    received    thy   portion,  love 
them,  but  do  it  truly  [sincerely]. 

40.  Every  instrument,  tool,  vessel,  if  it  does 
that  for  which  it  has  been  made,  is  well,  and 
yet  he  who  made  it  is  not  there.  But  in  the 
things  which  are  held  together  by  nature  there 
is  within  and  there  abides  in  them  the  power 
which  made  them  ;  wherefore  the  more  is  it  fit 
to  reverence  this  power,  and  to  think,  that,  if 
thou  dost  live  and  act  according  to  its  will, 
every  thing  in  thee  is  in  conformity  to  intelli- 
gence. And  thus  also  in  the  universe,  the 
things  which  belong  to  it  are  in  conformity  to 
intelligence. 

41.  Whatever  of  the  things  which  are  not 
within  thy  power  thou  shalt  suppose  to  be  good 
for  thee  or  evil,  it  must  of  necessity  be  that,  if 
such  a  bad  thing  befall  thee  or  the  loss  of  such 
a  good  thing,  thou  wilt  blame  the  gods,  and 
hate  men  too,  those  who  are  the  cause  of  the 
misfortune  or  the  loss,  or  those  who  are  sus- 
pected of  being  likely  to  be  the  cause  ;  and 
indeed  we  do  much  injustice,  because  we  make 
a  difference  between  these  things  [because  we 
do   not  regard  these  things  as  indifferent]. f* 

*  Gataker  translates  this,  "because  we  strive  to  get 
these  things,"  comparing  the  use  of  6ia</>epe<r0cu  in  v.,  1, 
and  x.,  27,  and  ix..  38,  where  it  appears  that  his  reference 
should  be  xi.,  10.  He  may  be  right  in  his  interpretation, 
but  I  doubt. 


/Ifc.  Bntonmus  183 

But  if  we  judge  only  those  things  which  are  in 
our  power  to  be  good  or  bad,  there  remains 
no  reason  either  for  finding  fault  with  God 
or  standing  in  a  hostile  attitude  to  man.* 

42.  We  are  all  working  together  to  one  end, 
some  with  knowledge  and  design,  and  others 
without  knowing  what  they  do  ;  as  men  also 
when  they  are  asleep,  of  whom  it  is  Heraclitus, 
I  think,  who  says  that  they  are  laborers  and  co- 
operators  in  the  things  which  take  place  in  the 
universe.  But  men  cooperate  after  different 
fashions  :  and  even  those  cooperate  abundant- 
ly, who  find  fault  with  what  happens  and  those 
who  try  to  oppose  it  and  to  hinder  it ;  for  the 
universe  had  need  even  of  such  men  as  these. 
It  remains  then  for  thee  to  understand  among 
what  kind  of  workmen  thou  placest  thyself;  for 
he  who  rules  all  things  will  certainly  make 
a  right  use  of  thee,  and  he  will  receive  thee 
among  some  part  of  the  cooperators  and  of 
those  whose  labors  conduce  to  one  end.  But  be 
not  thou  such  a  part  as  the  mean  and  ridiculous 
verse  in  the  play,  which  Chrysippus  speaks  of.f 

43.  Does  the  sun  undertake  to  do  the  work  of 
the  rain,  or  iEsculapius  the  work  of  the  Fruit- 
bearer  [the  earth]  ?  And  how  is  it  with  respect 
to  each  of  the  stars,  are  they  not  different  and 
yet  they  work  together  to  the  same  end  ? 

*  Cicero,  De  Natura  Deorum,  iii.,  32. 
f  Plutarch,  adversus  Stoicos,  c.  14. 


184  /lib*  Bntoninus 

44.  If  the  gods  have  determined  about  me 
and  about  the  things  which  must  happen  to 
me,  they  have  determined  well,  for  it  is  not 
easy  even  to  imagine  a  deity  without  fore- 
thought ;  and  as  to  doing  me  harm,  why 
should  they  have  any  desire  towards  that  ?  for 
what  advantage  would  result  to  them  from  this 
or  to  the  whole,  which  is  the  special  object  of 
their  providence  ?  But  if  they  have  not  deter- 
mined about  me  individually,  they  have  cer- 
tainly determined  about  the  whole  at  least,  and 
the  things  which  happen  by  way  of  sequence 
in  this  general  arrangement  I  ought  to  accept 
with  pleasure  and  to  be  content  with  them. 
But  if  they  determine  about  nothing — which  it 
is  wicked  to  believe,  or  if  we  do  believe  it,  let 
us  neither  sacrifice  nor  pray  nor  swear  by  them, 
nor  do  any  thing  else  which  we  do  as  if  the 
gods  were  present  and  lived  with  us — but  if, 
however,  the  gods  determine  about  none  of  the 
things  which  concern  us,  I  am  able  to  deter- 
mine about  myself,  and  I  can  inquire  about  that 
which  is  useful ;  and  that  is  useful  to  every 
man  which  is  conformable  to  his  own  constitu- 
tion  and  nature.  But  my  nature  is  rational  and 
social  ;  and  my  city  and  country,  so  far  as  I  am 
Antoninus,  is  Rome,  but  so  far  as  I  am  a  man, 
it  is  the  world.  The  things  then  which  are  use- 
ful to  these  cities  are  alone  useful  to  me. 


dfc.  Bntontnus  185 

45.  Whatever  happens  to  every  man,  this  is 
for  the  interest  of  the  universal :  this  might  be 
sufficient.  But  further  thou  wilt  observe  this 
also  as  a  general  truth,  if  thou  dost  observe, 
that  whatever  is  profitable  to  any  man  is  profit- 
able also  to  other  men.  But  let  the  word  profit- 
able be  taken  here  in  the  common  sense  as 
said  of  things  of  the  middle  kind  [neither  good 
nor  bad]. 

46.  As  it  happens  to  thee  in  the  amphitheatre 
and  such  places,  that  the  continual  sight  of  the 
same  things  and  the  uniformity  make  the  spec- 
tacle wearisome,  so  it  is  in  the  whole  of  life  ; 
for  all  things  above,  below,  are  the  same  and 
from  the  same.     How  long  then  ? 

47.  Think  continually  that  all  kinds  of  men 
and  of  all  kinds  of  pursuits  and  of  all  nations 
are  dead,  so  that  thy  thoughts  come  down  even 
to  Philistion  and  Phoebus  and  Origanion.  Now 
turn  thy  thoughts  to  the  other  kinds  [of  men]. 
To  that  place  then  we  must  remove,  where 
there  are  so  many  great  orators,  and  so  many 
noble  philosophers,  Heraclitus,  Pythagoras, 
Socrates  ;  so  many  heroes  of  former  days,  and 
bo  many  generals  after  them,  and  tyrants  ; 
besides  these,  Eudoxus,  Hipparchus,  Archi- 
medes, and  other  men  of  acute  natural  talents, 
great  minds,  lovers  of  labor,  versatile,  confi- 
dent, mockers  even  of  the  perishable  andephem- 


186  /IB,  Bntontnus 

eral  life  of  man,  as  Menippus  and  such  as  are 
like  him.  As  to  all  these  consider  that  they 
have  long  been  in  the  dust.  What  harm  then 
is  this  to  them ;  and  what  to  those  whose 
names  are  altogether  unknown  ?  One  thing 
here  is  worth  a  great  deal,  to  pass  thy  life  in 
truth  and  justice,  with  a  benevolent  disposition 
even  to  liars  and  unjust  men. 

48.  When  thou  wishest  to  delight  thyself, 
think  of  the  virtues  of  those  who  live  with 
thee ;  for  instance,  the  activity  of  one,  and  the 
modesty  of  another,  and  the  liberality  of  a 
third,  and  some  other  good  quality  of  a  fourth. 
For  nothing  delights  so  much  as  the  examples 
of  the  virtues,  when  they  are  exhibited  in  the 
morals  of  those  who  live  with  us  and  present 
themselves  in  abundance,  as  far  as  is  pos- 
sible. Wherefore  we  must  keep  them  before 
us. 

49.  Thou  art  not  dissatisfied,  I  suppose,  be- 
cause thou  weighest  only  so  many  litrae  and 
not  three  hundred.  Be  not  dissatisfied  then 
that  thou  must  live  only  so  many  years  and  not 
more  ;  for  as  thou  art  satisfied  with  the  amount 
of  substance  which  has  been  assigned  to  thee, 
so  be  content  with  the  time. 

50.  Let  us  try  to  persuade  them  [men].  But 
act  even  against  their  will,  when  the  principles 
of  justice  lead  that  way.     If,  however,  any  man 


/lib,  Bntoninus  187 

by  using  force  stands  in  thy  way,  betake  thy- 
self to  contentment  and  tranquillity,  and  at  the 
same  time  employ  the  hindrance  towards  the 
exercise  of  some  other  virtue ;  and  remember 
that  thy  attempt  was  with  a  reservation  [condi- 
tionally], that  thou  didst  not  desire  to  do  im- 
possibilities. What  then  didst  thou  desire  ? 
Some  such  effort  as  this.  But  thou  attainest 
thy  object,  if  the  things  to  which  thou  wast 
moved  are  [not]  accomplished,  f 

51.  He  who  loves  fame  considers  another 
man's  activity  to  be  his  own  good  ;  and  he  who 
loves  pleasure,  his  own  sensations  ;  but  he  who 
has  understanding,  considers  his  own  acts  to  be 
his  own  good. 

52.  It  is  in  our  power  to  have  no  opinion 
about  a  thing,  and  not  to  be  disturbed  in  our 
soul ;  for  things  themselves  have  no  natural 
power  to  form  our  judgments. 

53.  Accustom  thyself  to  attend  carefully  to 
what  is  said  by  another,  and  as  much  as  it  is 
possible,  be  in  the  speaker's  mind. 

54.  That  which  is  not  good  for  the  swarm, 
neither  is  it  good  for  the  bee. 

55.  If  sailors  abused  the  helmsman  or  the 
sick  the  doctor,  would  they  listen  to  anybody 
else  ;  or  how  could  the  helmsman  secure  the 
safety  of  those  in  the  ship  or  the  doctor  the 
health  of  those  whom  he  attends  ? 


i88  /ifo.  Bntontnus 

56.  How  many  together  with  whom  I  came 
into  the  world  are  already  gone  out  of  it. 

57.  To  the  jaundiced  honey  tastes  bitter,  and 
to  those  bitten  by  mad  dogs  water  causes  fear  ; 
and  to  little  children  the  ball  is  a  fine  thing. 
Why  then  am  I  angry  ?  Dost  thou  think  that  a 
false  opinion  has  less  power  than  the  bile  in 
the  jaundiced  or  the  poison  in  him  who  is  bit- 
ten by  a  mad  dog  ? 

58.  No  man  will  hinder  thee  from  living  ac- 
cording to  the  reason  of  thy  own  nature  ;  noth- 
ing will  happen  to  thee  contrary  to  the  reason 
of  the  universal  nature. 

59.  What  kind  of  people  are  those  whom  men 
wish  to  please,  and  for  what  objects,  and  by 
what  kind  of  acts  ?  How  soon  will  time  cover 
all  things,  and  how  many  it  has  covered  already. 


vn. 


WHAT  is  badness  ?  It  is  that  which  thou 
hast  often  seen.  And  on  the  occasion 
of  every  thing  which  happens  keep  this  in 
mind,  that  it  is  that  which  thou  hast  often 
seen.  Everywhere  up  and  down  thou  wilt  find 
the  same  things,  with  which  the  old  histories 
are  filled,  those  of  the  middle  ages  and  those  of 
our  own  day  ;  with  which  cities  and  houses  are 
filled  now.  There  is  nothing  new  ;  all  things 
are  both  familiar  and  short-lived. 

2.  How  can  our  principles  become  dead,  un- 
less the  impressions  [thoughts]  which  corres- 
pond to  them  are  extinguished  ?  But  it  is  in 
thy  power  continuously  to  fan  these  thoughts 
into  a  flame.  I  can  have  that  opinion  about 
any  thing,  which  I  ought  to  have.  If  I  can, 
why  am  I  disturbed  ?  The  things  which  are 
external  to  my  mind  have  no  relation  at  all  to 
my  mind.  Let  this  be  the  state  of  thy  affects, 
and  thou  standest  erect.  To  recover  thy  life  is 
in  thy  power.     Look  at  things  again  as  thou 


190  /lib.  Bntonimis 

didst  use  to  look  at  them  ;  for  in  this  consists 
the  recovery  of  thy  life. 

3.  The  idle  business  of  show,  plays  on  the 
stage,  flocks  of  sheep,  herds,  exercises  with 
spears,  a  bone  cast  to  little  dogs,  a  bit  of  bread 
into  fish-ponds,  laborings  of  ants  and  burden- 
carrying,  runnings  about  of  frightened  little 
mice,  puppets  pulled  by  strings — [all  alike]. 
It  is  thy  duty  then  in  the  midst  of  such  things 
to  show  good  humor  and  not  a  proud  air ;  to 
understand,  however,  that  every  man  is  worth 
just  so  much  as  the  things  are  worth  about 
which  he  busies  himself. 

4.  In  discourse  thou  must  attend  to  what  is 
said,  and  in  every  movement  thou  must  observe 
what  is  doing.  And  in  the  one  thou  shouldst 
see  immediately  to  what  end  it  refers,  but  in 
the  other  watch  carefully  what  is  the  thing 
signified. 

5.  Is  my  understanding  sufficient  for  this  or 
not  ?  If  it  is  sufficient,  I  use  it  for  the  work  as 
an  instrument  given  by  the  universal  nature. 
But  if  it  is  not  sufficient,  then  either  I  retire 
from  the  work  and  give  way  to  him  who  is  able 
to  do  it  better,  unless  there  be  some  reason  why 
I  ought  not  to  do  so  ;  or  I  do  it  as  well  as  I  can, 
taking  to  help  me  the  man  who  with  the  aid  of 
my  ruling  principle  can  do  what  is  now  fit  and 
useful  for  the  general  good.     For  whatsoever 


flh.  Bntonfnus  191 

either  by  myself  or  with  another  I  can  do, 
ought  to  be  directed  to  this  only,  to  that  which 
is  useful  and  well  suited  to  society. 

6.  How  many  after  being  celebrated  by  fame 
have  been  given  up  to  oblivion  ;  and  how  many 
who  have  celebrated  the  fame  of  others  have 
long  been  dead. 

7.  Be  not  ashamed  to  be  helped  ;  for  it  is  thy 
business  to  do  thy  duty  like  a  soldier  in  the 
assault  on  a  town.  How  then,  if  being  lame 
thou  canst  not  mount  up  on  the  battlements 
alone,  but  with  the  help  of  another  it  is  pos- 
sible ? 

8.  Let  not  future  things  disturb  thee,  for  thou 
wilt  come  to  them,  if  it  shall  be  necessary,  hav- 
ing with  thee  the  same  reason  which  now  thou 
usest  for  present  things. 

9.  All  things  are  implicated  with  one  another, 
and  the  bond  is  holy  ;  and  there  is  hardly  any 
thing  unconnected  with  any  other  thing.  For 
things  have  been  coordinated,  and  they  com- 
bine to  form  the  same  universe  [order].  For 
there  is  one  universe  made  up  of  all  things,  and 
one  god  who  pervades  all  things,  and  one  sub- 
stance,* and  one  law,  [one]  common  reason  in 
all  intelligent  animals,  and  one  truth  ;  if  indeed 
there   is   also   one  perfection    for  all    animals 

*  "  One  substance,"  p.  36,  note  6. 


192  /ifc.  Bntoninus 

which  are  of  the  same  stock  and  participate  in 
the  same  reason. 

10.  Every  thing  material  soon  disappears  in 
the  substance  of  the  whole  ;  and  every  thing 
formal  [causal]  is  very  soon  taken  back  into 
the  universal  reason  ;  and  the  memory  of  every 
thing  is  very  soon  overwhelmed  in  time. 

ii.  To  the  rational  animal  the  same  act  is  ac- 
cording to  nature  and  according  to  reason. 

12.  Be  thou  erect,  or  be  made  erect  (iii.,  5). 

13.  Just  as  it  is  with  the  members  in  those 
bodies  which  are  united  in  one,  so  it  is  with 
rational  beings  which  exist  separate,  for  they 
have  been  constituted  for  one  cooperation. 
And  the  perception  of  this  will  be  more  appar- 
ent to  thee,  if  thou  often  sayest  to  thyself  that  I 
am  a  member  [//.sAoS]  of  the  system  of  rational 
beings.  But  if  [using  the  letter  r]  thou  sayest 
thou  art  a  part  [//f'pof],  thou  doest  not  yet  love 
men  from  thy  heart ;  beneficence  does  not  yet 
delight  thee  for  its  own  sake*;  thou  still  doest 
it  barely  as  a  thing  of  propriety,  and  not  yet  as 
doing  good  to  thyself. 

14.  I^et  there  fall  externally  what  will  on  the 
parts  which  can  feel  the  effects  of  this  fall. 
For  those  parts  which  have  felt  will  complain, 

*  I  have  used  Gataker's  conjecture  KaraA^/cn/cd)?  instead 
of  the  common  reading  KaTaAi)77Ti/ca>s  :  compare  iv.,  20 ; 
ix.,  42. 


dfc.  Sntontnua  193 

if  they  choose.  But  I,  unless  I  think  what  has 
happened  is  an  evil,  am  not  injured.  And  it  is 
in  my  power  not  to  think  so. 

15.  Whatever  any  one  does  or  says,  I  must  be 
good,  just  as  if  the  gold,  or  the  emerald,  or  the 
purple  were  always  saying  this,  Whatever  any 
one  does  or  says,  I  must  be  emerald  and  keep 
my  color. 

16.  The  ruling  faculty  does  not  disturb  itself ; 
I  mean,  does  not  frighten  itself  or  cause  itself 
pain.f  But  if  any  one  else  can  frighten  or  pain 
it,  let  him  do  so.  For  the  faculty  itself  will  not 
by  its  own  opinion  turn  itself  into  such  ways. 
Let  the  body  itself  take  care,  if  it  can,  that  it 
suffer  nothing,  and  let  it  speak  if  it  suffers. 
But  the  soul  itself,  that  which  is  subject  to  fear, 
to  pain,  which  has  completely  the  power  of 
forming  an  opinion  about  these  things,  will  suf- 
fer nothing,  for  it  will  never  deviate  f  into  such 
a  judgment.  The  leading  principle  in  itself 
wants  nothing,  unless  it  makes  a  want  for  it- 
self ;  and  therefore  it  is  both  free  from  pertur- 
bation and  unimpeded,  if  it  does  not  disturb 
and  impede  itself. 

17.  Eudaemonia  [happiness]  is  a  good  dae- 
mon, or  a  good  thing.  What  then  art  thou 
doing  here,  O  imagination  ?  Go  away,  I  intreat 
thee  by  the  gods,  as  thou  didst  come,  for  I  want 
thee  not.     But  thou  art  come  according  to  thy 


194  flh.  Bntoninus 

old  fashion.     I  am  not  angry  with  thee  :  only- 
go  away. 

18.  Is  any  man  afraid  of  change  ?  Why  what 
can  take  place  without  change  ?  What  then  is 
more  pleasing  or  more  suitable  to  the  universal 
nature  ?  And  canst  thou  take  a  bath  unless  the 
wood  undergoes  a  change  ?  And  canst  thou  be 
nourished  unless  the  food  undergoes  a  change  ? 
And  can  any  thing  else  that  is  useful  be  ac- 
complished without  change?  Dost  thou  not 
see  then  that  for  thyself  also  to  change  is  just 
the  same,  and  equally  necessary  for  the  univer- 
sal nature  ? 

19.  Through  the  universal  substance  as 
through  a  furious  torrent  all  bodies  are  carried, 
being  by  their  nature  united  with  and  cooperat- 
ing with  the  whole,  as  the  parts  of  our  body 
with  one  another.  How  many  a  Chrysippus, 
how  many  a  Socrates,  how  many  an  Bpictetus 
has  time  already  swallowed  up  ?  And  let  the 
same  thought  occur  to  thee  with  reference  to 
every  man  and  thing  (v.,  23  ;  vi.,  15). 

20.  One  thing  only  troubles  me,  lest  I  should 
do  something  which  the  constitution  of  man 
does  not  allow,  or  in  the  way  which  it  does  not 
allow,  or  what  it  does  not  allow  now. 

21.  Near  is  thy  forgetfulness  of  all  things  ; 
and  near  the  forgetfulness  of  thee  by  all. 

22.  It  is  peculiar  to  man  to  love  even  those 


dfc.  Bntontnus  195 

wlio  do  wrong.  And  this  happens,  if  when  they 
do  wrong  it  occurs  to  thee  that  they  are  kins- 
men, and  that  they  do  wrong  through  ignorance 
and  unintentionally,  and  that  soon  both  of  you 
w7ill  die  ;  and  above  all,  that  the  wrong-doer  has 
done  thee  no  harm,  for  he  has  not  made  thy 
ruling  faculty  worse  than  it  was  before. 

23.  The  universal  nature  out  of  the  universal 
substance,  as  if  it  were  wax,  now  moulds  a  horse, 
and  when  it  has  broken  this  up  it  uses  the 
material  for  a  tree,  then  for  a  man,  then  for 
something  else  ;  and  each  of  these  things  sub- 
sists for  a  very  short  time.  But  it  is  no  hard- 
ship for  the  vessel  to  be  broken  up,  just  as  there 
was  none  in  its  being  fastened  together  (viii., 
50). 

24.  A  scowling  look  is  altogether  unnatural  ; 
when  it  is  often  assumed,*  the  result  is  that  all 
comeliness  dies  away,  and  at  last  is  so  com- 
pletely extinguished  that  it  cannot  be  again 
lighted  up  at  all.  Try  to  conclude  from  this 
very  fact  that  it  is  contrary  to  reason.  For  if 
even  the  perception  of  doing  wrong  shall  de- 
part, what  reason  is  there  for  living  any 
longer  ? 

25.  Nature  which  governs  the  whole  will  soon 
change  all  things  wmich  thou  seest,  and  out  of 
their  substance   will   make   other  things,   and 

*  This  is  corrupt. 


196  /ift.  Bntonfnus 

again  other  things  from  the  substance  of  them, 
in  order  that  the  world  may  be  ever  new 
(xii.,  23). 

26.  When  a  man  has  done  thee  any  wrong, 
immediately  consider  with  what  opinion  about 
good  or  evil  he  has  done  wrong.  For  when 
thou  hast  seen  this,  thou  wilt  pity  him,  and 
wilt  neither  wonder  nor  be  angry.  For  either 
thou  thyself  thinkest  the  same  thing  to  be  good 
that  he  does  or  another  thing  of  the  same  kind. 
It  is  thy  duty  then  to  pardon  him.  But  if  thou 
dost  not  think  such  things  to  be  good  or  evil, 
thou  wilt  more  readily  be  well  disposed  to  him 
who  is  in  error. 

27.  Think  not  so  much  of  what  thou  hast  not 
as  of  what  thou  hast :  but  of  the  things  which 
thou  hast  select  the  best,  and  then  reflect  how 
eagerly  they  would  have  been  sought,  if  thou 
hadst  them  not.  At  the  same  time,  however, 
take  care  that  thou  dost  not  through  being  so 
pleased  with  them  accustom  thyself  to  over- 
value them,  so  as  to  be  disturbed  if  ever  thou 
shouldst  not  have  them. 

28.  Retire  into  thyself.  The  rational  princi- 
ple which  rules  has  this  nature,  that  it  is  con- 
tent with  itself  when  it  does  what  is  just,  and  so 
secures  tranquillity. 

29.  Wipe  out  the  imagination.  Stop  the 
pulling  of  the  strings.     Confine  thyself  to  the 


dR.  Bntoninus  197 

present.  Understand  well  what  happens  either 
to  thee  or  to  another.  Divide  and  distribute 
every  object  into  the  causal  [formal]  and  the 
material.  Think  of  thy  last  hour.  Let  the 
wrong  which  is  done  by  a  man  stay  there  where 
the  wrong  was  done  (viii.,  29). 

30.  Direct  thy  attention  to  what  is  said.  Let 
thy  understanding  enter  into  the  things  that 
are  doing  and  the  things  which  do  them 
(vii.,  4). 

31.  Adorn  thyself  with  simplicity  and  mod- 
esty and  with  indifference  towards  the  things 
which  lie  between  virtue  and  vice.  Love  man- 
kind. Follow  God.  The  poet  says  that  Law 
rules  all.f  And  it  is  enough  to  remember  that 
law  rules  all.f* 

32.  About  death  :  whether  it  is  a  dispersion, 
or  a  resolution  into  atoms,  or  annihilation,  it  is 
either  extinction  or  change. 

33.  About  pain  :  the  pain  which  is  intolerable 
carries  us  off ;  but  that  which  lasts  a  long  time 
is  tolerable ;  and  the  mind  maintains  its  own 
tranquillity  by  retiring  into  itself,  f  and  the 
ruling  faculty  is  not  made  worse.  But  the 
parts  which  are  harmed  by  pain,  let  them,  if 
they  can,  give  their  opinion  about  it. 

34.  About  fame  :  look  at  the  minds  [of  those 
who  seek  fame],   observe  what  they  are,   and 

*  The  end  of  this  section  is  unintelligible. 


19S  iifo.  Bntontnus 

what  kind  of  things  they  avoid,  and  what 
kind  of  things  they  pursue.  And  consider  that 
as  the  heaps  of  sand  piled  on  one  another  hide 
the  former  sands,  so  in  life  the  events  which  go 
before  are  soon  covered  by  those  which  come 
after. 

35.  From  Plato  *:  The  man  who  has  an  ele- 
vated mind  and  takes  a  view  of  all  time  and  of 
all  substance,  dost  thou  suppose  it  possible  for 
him  to  think  that  human  life  is  any  thing  great? 
It  is  not  possible,  he  said.  Such  a  man  then  will 
think  that  death  also  is  no  evil.     Certainly  not. 

36.  From  Antisthenes  :  It  is  royal  to  do  good 
and  to  be  abused. 

37.  It  is  a  base  thing  for  the  countenance  to 
be  obedient  and  to  regulate  and  compose  itself 
as  the  mind  commands,  and  for  the  mind  not 
to  be  regulated  and  composed  by  itself. 

38.  It  is  not  right  to  vex  ourselves  at  things, 
For  they  care  nought  about  it.f 

39.  To  the  immortal  gods  and  us  give  joy. 

40.  Life  must  be  reaped  like  the  ripe  ears  of 

corn  : 
One  man  is  born  ;  another  dies.J 

*  Plato,  Pol.  vi.,  486. 
•j-  From  the  Bellerophon  of  Euripides. 
J  From  the  Hypsipyle  of  Euripides.    Cicero  (Tuscul., 
iii.,  25)  has   translated   six   lines  from  Euripides,  and 
among  them  are  these  two  lines  : 

Reddenda  terrse  est  terra  :  turn  vita  omnibus 
Metenda  ut  fruges  :  Sic  jubet  necessitas. 


/Ifc,  Bntoninus  199 

41.  If  gods  care  not  for  me  and  for  my  child- 

ren, 
There  is  a  reason  for  it. 

42.  For  the  good  is  with  me,  and  the  just.* 

43.  No  joining  others  in  their  wailing,  no 
violent  emotion. 

44.  From  Plato :  f  But  I  would  make  this 
man  a  sufficient  answer,  which  is  this  :  Thou 
sayest  not  well,  if  thou  thinkest  that  a  man  who 
is  good  for  any  thing  at  all  ought  to  compute  the 
hazard  of  life  or  death,  and  should  not  rather 
look  to  this  only  in  all  that  he  does,  whether  he 
is  doing  what  is  just  or  unjust,  and  the  works 
of  a  good  or  a  bad  man. 

45.  X  For  thus  it  is,  men  of  Athens,  in  truth  : 
wherever  a  man  has  placed  himself  thinking  it 
the  best  place  for  him,  or  has  been  placed  by  a 
commander,  there  in  my  opinion  he  ought  to 
stay  and  to  abide  the  hazard,  taking  nothing 
into  the  reckoning,  either  death  or  any  thing 
else,  before  the  baseness  [of  deserting  his  post], 

46.  But,  my  good  friend,  reflect  whether  that 
which  is  noble  and  good  is  not  something  dif- 
ferent from  saving  and  being  saved  ;  forf  as  to 
a  man  living  such  or  such  a  time,  at  least  one 
who  is  really  a  man,  consider  if  this  is  not  a 
thing  to  be  dismissed  from  the  thoughts!  :  and 

*  See  Aristophanes,  Acharnenses,  v.,  661. 
f  From  the  Apologia,  c.  16. 


200  dfo.  Bntonfnus 

there  must  be  no  love  of  life  :  but  as  to  these 
matters  a  man  must  intrust  them  to  the  deity 
aud  believe  what  the  women  say,  that  no  man 
can  escape  his  destiny,  the  next  inquiry  being 
how  he  may  best  live  the  time  that  he  has  to 
live.* 

47.  Look  round  at  the  courses  of  the  stars,  as 
if  thou  wert  going  along  with  them  ;  and  con- 
stantly consider  the  changes  of  the  elements 
into  one  another ;  for  such  thonghts  purge 
away  the  filth  of  the  terrene  life. 

48.  This  is  a  fine  saying  of  Plato  :  f  That  he 
who  is  discoursing  about  men  should  look  also 
at  earthly  things  as  if  he  viewed  them  from 
some  higher  place  ;  should  look  at  them  in 
their  assemblies,  armies,  agricultural  labors, 
marriages,  treaties,  births,  deaths,  noise  of  the 
courts  of  justice,  desert  places,  various  nations 
of  barbarians,  feasts,  lamentations,  markets,  a 
mixture  of  all  things  and  an  orderly  combina- 
tion of  contraries. 

49.  Consider  the  past ;  such  great  changes 
of  political  supremacies.     Thou  mayest  foresee 


*  Plato,  Gorgias,  c.  68  (512).  In  this  passage  the  text 
of  Antoninus  has  iareof,  which  is  perhaps  right ;  but 
there  is  a  difficulty  in  the  words  w  yap  tovto  tx.ev,  to  tfv 

brrocrovSr)  \povov  rov  ye  w?  aAr/#u>?  avSpa  eareou  ecrri,  Kai  ov, 
etc.  The  conjecture  evKreov  for  eareof  does  not  mend  the 
matter. 

fit  is  said  that  this  is  not  in  the  extant  writings  of 
Plato. 


/Ifc.  Bntontnus  201 

also  the  things  which  will  be.  For  they  will 
certainly  be  of  like  form,  and  it  is  not  possible 
that  they  should  deviate  from  the  order  of  the 
things  which  take  place  now  :  accordingly  to 
have  contemplated  it  for  ten  thousand  years. 
For  what  more  wilt  thou  see  ? 

50.  That  which  has  grown  from  the  earth  to 

the  earth, 
But  that  which  has  sprung  from  heavenly 

seed, 
Back  to  heavenly  realms  returns.* 
This  is  either  a  dissolution  of  the  mutual  in- 
volution of  the  atoms,  or  a  similar  dispersion 
of  the  unsentient  elements. 

51.  With  food  and  drinks  and  cunning  magic 

arts 

Turning  the  channel's  course  to  'scape 
from  death. f 

The  breeze  which  heaven  has  sent 

We  must  endure,  and  toil  without  com- 
plaining. 

52.  Another  may  be  more  expert  in  casting 
his  opponent ;  but  he  is  not  more  social,  nor 
more  modest,  nor  better  disciplined  to  meet  all 
that  kappens,  nor  more  considerate  with  respect 
to  the  faults  of  his  neighbors. 


*  From  the  Chrysippus  of  Euripides, 
t  The  first  two  lines  are  from  the  Supplices  of  Euripi- 
des, v..  1 1 10. 


202  .flfc,  Bntonfnus 

53.  Where  any  work  can  be  done  conform- 
ably to  the  reason  which  is  common  to  gods 
and  men,  there  we  have  nothing  to  fear :  for 
where  we  are  able  to  get  profit  by  means  of  the 
activity  which  is  successful  and  proceeds  ac- 
cording to  our  constitution,  there  no  harm  is  to 
be  suspected. 

54.  Everywhere  and  at  all  times  it  is  in  thy 
power  piously  to  acquiesce  in  thy  present  con- 
dition, and  to  behave  justly  to  those  who  are 
about  thee,  and  to  exert  thy  skill  upon  thy 
present  thoughts,  that  nothing  shall  steal  into 
them  without  being  well  examined. 

55.  Do  not  look  around  thee  to  discover 
other  men's  ruling  principles,  but  look  straight 
to  this,  to  what  nature  leads  thee,  both  the  uni- 
versal nature  through  the  things  which  happen 
to  thee,  and  thy  own  nature  through  the  acts 
which  must  be  done  by  thee.  But  every  being 
ought  to  do  that  which  is  according  to  its  con- 
stitution ;  and  all  other  things  have  been  con- 
stituted for  the  sake  of  rational  beings,  just  as 
among  irrational  things  the  inferior  for  the  sake 
of  the  superior,  but  the  rational  for  the  sake  of 
one  another. 

The  prime  principle  then  in  man's  constitu- 
tion is  the  social.  And  the  second  is  not  to 
yield  to  the  persuasions  of  the  body,  for  it  is 
the  peculiar  office  of  the  rational  and  intelligent 


dB.  antontnus  203 

motion  to  circumscribe  itself,  and  never  to  be 
overpowered  either  by  the  motion  of  the  senses 
or  of  the  appetites,  for  both  are  animal ;  but  the 
intelligent  motion  claims  superiority  and  does 
not  permit  itself  to  be  overpowered  by  the 
others.  And  with  good  reason,  for  it  is  formed 
by  nature  to  use  all  of  them.  The  third  thing 
in  the  rational  constitution  is  freedom  from 
error  and  from  deception.  Let  then  the  ruling 
principle  holding  fast  to  these  things  go 
straight  on,  and  it  has  what  is  its  own. 

56.  Consider  thyself  to  be  dead,  and  to  have 
completed  thy  life  up  to  the  present  time  ;  and 
live  according  to  nature  the  remainder  which  is 
allowed  thee. 

57.  Love  that  only  which  happens  to  thee 
and  is  spun  with  the  thread  of  thy  destiny. 
For  what  is  more  suitable  ? 

58.  In  every  thing  which  happens  keep  before 
thy  eyes  those  to  whom  the  same  things  hap- 
pened, and  how  they  were  vexed,  and  treated 
them  as  strange  things,  and  found  fault  with 
them  :  and  now  where  are  they  ?  Nowhere.  Why 
then  dost  thou  too  choose  to  act  in  the  same  way  ? 
and  why  dost  thou  not  leave  these  agitations, 
which  are  foreign  to  nature,  to  those  who  cause 
them  and  those  who  are  moved  by  them  ?  and 
why  art  thou  not  altogether  intent  upon  the 
right  way  of  making  use  of  the  things  which 


304  Ifo.  Bntoninue 

happen  to  thee  ?  for  then  thou  wilt  use  them 
well,  and  they  will  be  a  material  for  thee  [to 
work  on].  Only  attend  to  thyself,  and  resolve 
to  be  a  good  man  in  every  act  which  thou  dost : 
and  remember  .  .  .* 

59.  Look  within.  Within  is  the  fountain  of 
good,  and  it  will  ever  bubble  up,  if  thou  wilt 
ever  dig. 

60.  The  body  ought  to  be  compact,  and  to 
show  no  irregularity  either  in  motion  or  atti- 
tude. For  what  the  mind  shows  in  the  face  by 
maintaining  in  it  the  expression  of  intelligence 
and  propriety,  that  ought  to  be  required  also  in 
the  whole  body.  But  all  these  things  should  be 
observed  without  affectation. 

61.  The  art  of  life  is  more  like  the  wrestler's 
art  than  the  dancer's,  in  respect  of  this,  that  it 
should  stand  ready  and  firm  to  meet  onsets 
which  are  sudden  and  unexpected. 

62.  Constantly  observe  who  those  are  whose 
approbation  thou  wishest  to  have,  and  what  rul- 
ing principles  they  possess.  For  then  thou  wilt 
neither  blame  those  who  offend  involuntarily,  nor 
wilt  thou  want  their  approbation,  if  thou  lookest 
to  the  sources  of  their  opinions  and  appetites. 

63.  Every  soul,  the  philosopher  says,  is  invol- 

*  This  section  is  obscure,  and  the  conclusion  is  so  cor- 
rupt that  it  is  impossible  to  give  any  probable  meaning 
to  it.  It  is  better  to  leave  it  as  it  is  than  to  patch  it  up,  as 
some  critics  and  translators  have  done. 


flh.  Bntonfnus  205 

untarily  deprived  of  truth  ;  consequently  in  the 
same  way  it  is  deprived  of  justice  and  temper- 
ance and  benevolence  and  every  thing  of  the 
kind.  It  is  most  necessary  to  bear  this  con- 
stantly in  mind,  for  thus  thou  wilt  be  more 
gentle  towards  all. 

64.  In  every  pain  let  this  thought  be  present, 
that  there  is  no  dishonor  in  it,  nor  does  it  make 
the  governing  intelligence  worse,  for  it  does 
not  damage  the  intelligence  either  so  far  as  the 
intelligence  is  rational  *  or  so  far  as  it  is  social. 
Indeed  in  the  case  of  most  pains  let  this  remark 
of  Epicurus  aid  thee,  that  pain  is  neither  intol- 
erable nor  everlasting,  if  thou  bearest  in  mind 
that  it  has  its  limits,  and  if  thou  addest  nothing 
to  it  in  imagination  :  and  remember  this  too, 
that  we  do  not  perceive  that  many  things  which 
are  disagreeable  to  us  are  the  same  as  pain, 
such  as  excessive  drowsiness,  and  the  being 
scorched  by  heat,  and  the  having  no  appetite. 
When  then  thou  art  discontented  about  any  of 
these  things,  say  to  thyself,  that  thou  art  yield- 
ing to  pain. 

65.  Take  care  not  to  feel  towards  the  inhuman 
as  they  feel  towards  men.f 

*  The  text  has  vAikjj,  which  it  has  been  proposed  to 
alter  to  Ao-^ixtj,  and  this  change  is  necessary.  We  shall 
then  have  in  this  section  Ao-yi<crj  and  Kot^ixiviKT]  associated, 
as  we  have  in  s.  68  AoytKjj  and  iroAiriKrj,  and  in  s.  72 

1 1  have  followed  Gataker's  conjecture  oi  anav6pu>-noi, 
instead  of  the  MSS.  reading  oi  ai/flpwn-oi. 


206  M.  Bntoninus 

66.  How  do  we  know  if  Telauges  was  not 
superior  in  character  to  Socrates  ?  for  it  is  not 
enough  that  Socrates  died  a  more  noble  death, 
and  disputed  more  skilfully  with  the  sophists, 
and  passed  the  night  in  the  cold  with  more  en- 
durance, and  that  when  he  was  bid  to  arrest 
Leon*  of  Salamis,  he  considered  it  more  noble 
to  refuse,  and  that  he  walked  in  a  swaggering 
way  in  the  streets  f — though  as  to  this  fact  one 
may  have  great  doubts  if  it  was  true.  But  we 
ought  to  inquire,  what  kind  of  a  soul  it  was 
that  Socrates  possessed,  and  if  he  was  able  to 
be  content  with  being  just  towards  men  and 
pious  towards  the  gods,  neither  idly  vexed  on 
account  of  men's  villainy,  nor  yet  making  him- 
self a  slave  to  any  man's  ignorance,  nor  receiv- 
ing as  strange  any  thing  that  fell  to  his  share 
out  of  the  universal,  nor  enduring  it  as  intoler- 
able, nor  allowing  his  understanding  to  sympa- 
thize with  the  affects  of  the  miserable  flesh. 

67.  Nature  has  not  so  mingled  f  [the  intelli- 
gence] with  the  composition  of  the  body,  as 
not  to  have  allowed  thee  the  power  of  circum- 
scribing thyself  and  of  bringing  under  subjec- 
tion to  thyself  all  that  is  thy  own  ;  for  it  is  very 
possible  to  be  a  divine  man  and  to  be  recog- 

*  L,eon  of  Salamis.    See   Plato,  Epist.   7 ;   Apolog.  c. 
20  ;  Epictetus,  iv.  i,  160  ;  iv.  7,  30. 
t  Aristophan.     Nub.  362.     on  P£ev9vet.  t'  ei>  ralaiv  6601? 


/!&.  Sntoninus  207 

nized  as  such  by  no  one.  Always  bear  this  in 
mind  ;  and  another  thing  too,  that  very  little 
indeed  is  necessary  for  living  a  happy  life.  And 
because  thou  hast  despaired  of  becoming  a  dia- 
lectician and  skilled  in  the  knowledge  of  nature, 
do  not  for  this  reason  renounce  the  hope  of 
being  both  free  and  modest  and  social  and 
obedient  to  God. 

68.  It  is  in  thy  power  to  live  free  from  all 
compulsion  in  the  greatest  tranquillity  of  mind, 
even  if  all  the  world  cry  out  against  thee  as 
much  as  they  choose,  and  even  if  wild  beasts 
tear  in  pieces  the  members  of  this  kneaded  mat- 
ter which  has  grown  around  thee.  For  what 
hinders  the  mind  in  the  midst  of  all  this  from 
maintaining  itself  in  tranquillity  and  in  a  just 
judgment  of  all  surrounding  things  and  in  a 
ready  use  of  the  objects  which  are  presented  to 
it,  so  that  the  judgment  may  say  to  the  thing 
which  falls  under  its  observation  :  This  thou  art 
in  substance  [reality],  though  in  men's  opinion 
thou  mayest  appear  to  be  of  a  different  kind  ; 
and  the  use  shall  say  to  that  which  falls  under 
the  hand  :  Thou  art  the  thing  that  I  was  seek- 
ing ;  for  to  me  that  which  presents  itself  is 
always  a  material  for  virtue  both  rational  and 
political,  and  in  a  word,  for  the  exercise  of  art, 
which  belongs  to  man  or  God.  For  every  thing 
which  happens  has  a  relationship  either  to  God 


208  /ifc.  Sntoninus 

or  man,  and  is  neither  new  nor  difficult  to  han- 
dle, but  usual  and  apt  matter  to  work  on. 

69.  The  perfection  of  moral  character  con- 
sists in  this,  in  passing  every  day  as  the  last, 
and  in  being  neither  violently  excited  nor  tor- 
pid nor  playing  the  hypocrite. 

70.  The  gods  who  are  immortal  are  not  vexed 
because  during  so  long  a  time  they  must  tole- 
rate continually  men  such  as  they  are  and  so 
many  of  them  bad  ;  and  besides  this,  they  also 
take  care  of  them  in  all  ways.  But  thou,  who 
art  destined  to  end  so  soon,  art  thou  wearied  of 
enduring  the  bad,  and  this  too  when  thou  art 
one  of  them? 

71.  It  is  a  ridiculous  thing  for  a  man  not  to 
fly  from  his  own  badness,  which  is  indeed  pos- 
sible, but  to  fly  from  other  men's  badness, 
which  is  impossible. 

72.  Whatever  the  rational  and  political  [so- 
cial] faculty  finds  to  be  neither  intelligent 
nor  social,  it  properly  judges  to  be  inferior  to 
itself. 

73.  When  thou  hast  done  a  good  act  and 
another  has  received  it,  why  dost  thou  still 
look  for  a  third  thing  besides  these,  as  fools  do, 
either  to  have  the  reputation  of  having  done  a 
good  act  or  to  obtain  a  return  ? 

74.  No  man  is  tired  of  receiving  what  is  use- 
ful.    But  it  is  useful  to  act  according  to  nature. 


/IB,  Bntoninus  209 

Do  not  then  be  tired  of  receiving  what  is  useful 
by  doing  it  to  others. 

75.  The  nature  of  the  All  moved  to  make  the 
universe.  But  now  either  every  thing  that 
takes  place  comes  by  way  of  consequence  or 
[continuity]  ;  or  even  the  chief  things  towards 
which  the  ruling  power  of  the  universe  directs 
its  own  movement  are  governed  by  no  rational 
principle.  If  this  is  remembered  it  will  make 
thee  more  tranquil  in  many  things  (vi.,  44 ; 
ix.,  28).* 

*  It  is  not  easy  to  understand  this  section.  It  has  been 
suggested  that  there  is  some  error  in  ^  aAoyio-ra,  etc. 
Sonie  of  the  translators  have  made  nothing  of  the  pass- 
age, and  they  have  somewhat  perverted  the  words.  The 
first  proposition  is,  that  the  universe  was  made  by  some 
sufficient  power.  A  beginning  of  the  universe  is  as^ 
sumed,  and  a  power  which  framed  an  order.  The  next 
question  is,  How  are  things  produced  now  ;  or,  in  other 
words,  by  what  power  do  forms  appear  in  continuous 
succession  ?  The  answer,  according  to  Antoninus,  may 
be  this :  It  is  by  virtue  of  the  original  constitution  of 
things  that  all  change  and  succession  have  been  effected 
and  are  effected.  And  this  is  intelligible  in  a  sense,  if  we 
admit  that  the  universe  is  always  one  and  the  same,  a 
continuity  of  identity ;  as  much  one  and  the  same  as  man 
is  one  and  the  same,  which  he  believes  himself  to  be, 
though  he  also  believes  and  cannot  help  believing  that 
both  in  his  body  and  in  his  thoughts  there  is  change  and 
succession.  There  is  no  real  discontinuity  then  in  the 
universe  ;  and  if  we  say  that  there  was  an  order  framed 
in  the  beginning  and  that  the  things  which  are  now  pro- 
duced are  a  consequence  of  a  previous  arrangement,  we 
speak  of  things  as  we  are  compelled  to  view  them,  as 
forming  a  series  or  succession  ;  just  as  we  speak  of  the 
changes  in  our  own  bodies  and  the  sequence  of  our  own 
thoughts.  But  as  there  are  no  intervals,  not  even  inter- 
vals infinitely  small,  between  any  two  supposed  states  of 
any  one  thing,  so  there  are  no  intervals,  not  even  infi- 
nitely small,  between  what  we  call  one  thing  and  any 


2io  /nb,  Bntoninus 

other  thing  which  we  speak  of  as  immediately  preced- 
ing or  following  it.  What  we  call  time  is  an  idea  derived 
from  our  notion  of  a  succession  of  things  or  events,  an 
idea  which  is  a  part  of  our  constitution,  but  not  an  idea 
which  we  can  suppose  to  belong  to  an  infinite  intelligence 
and  power.  The  conclusion  then  is  certain  that  the 
present  and  the  past^  the  production  of  present  things 
and  the  supposed  original  order,  out  of  which  we  say 
that  present  things  now  come,  are  one  :  and  the  present 
productive  power  and  the  so-called  past  arrangement 
are  only  different  names  for  one  thing.  I  suppose  then 
that  Antoninus  wrote  here  as  people  sometimes  talk 
now,  and  that  his  real  meaning  is  not  exactly  expressed 
by  his  words.  There  are  certainly  other  passages  from 
which,  I  think,  that  we  may  collect  that  he  had  notions 
of  production  something  like  what  I  have  expressed. 

We  now  come  to  the  alternative:  "or  even  the  chief 
things  .  .  .  principle."  I  do  not  exactly  know  what 
he  means  by  to.  Kvpt^Tara,  "  the  chief,"  or,  "the  most 
excellent,"  or  whatever  it  is.  But  as  he  speaks  else- 
where of  inferior  and  superior  things,  and  of  the 
inferior  being  for  the  use  of  the  superior,  and  of  rational 
beings  being  the  highest,  he  may  here  mean  rational 
beings.  He  also  in  this  alternative  assumes  a  governing 
power  of  the  universe,  and  that  it  acts  by  directing  its 
power  towards  these  chief  objects,  or  making  its  special, 
proper,  motion  towards  them.  And  here  he  uses  the 
noun  (opfxri)  "movement,"  which  contains  the  same 
notion  as  the  verb  (dtp^rjo-e)  "moved,"  which  he  used  at 
the  beginning  of  the  paragraph  when  he  was  speaking 
of  the  making  of  the  universe.  If  we  do  not  accept  the 
first  hypothesis,  he  says,  we  must  take  the  conclusion 
of  the  second,  that  the  "  chief  things  towards  which  the 
ruling  power  of  the  universe  directs  its  own  movement 
are  governed  by  no  rational  principle."  The  meaning- 
then  is,  if  there  is  a  meaning  in  it,  that  though  there  is 
a  governing  power,  which  strives  to  give  effect  to  its  ef- 
forts, we  must  conclude  that  there  is  no  rational  direc- 
tion of  any  thing,  if  the  power  which  first  made  the  uni- 
verse does  not  in  some  way  govern  it  still.  Besides,  if  we 
assume  that  any  thing  is  now  produced  or  now  exists 
without  the  action  of  the  supreme  intelligence,  yet  that 
this  intelligence  makes  an  effort  to  act,  we  obtain  a  con- 
clusion which  cannot  be  reconciled  with  the  nature  of  a 
supreme  power,  whose  existence  Antoninus  always  as- 
sumes. The  tranquillity  that  a  man  may  gain  from  these 
reflections  must  result  from  his  rejecting  the  second  hy- 
pothesis, and  accepting  the  first ;  whatever  may  be  the 


/!&.  Bntomnus 


exact  sense  in  which  the  Kmperor  understood  the  first. 
Or,  as  he  says  elsewhere,  if  there  is  no  providence 
which  governs  the  world,  man  has  at  least  the  power  of 
governing-  himself  according  to  the  constitution  of  his 
nature  ;  and  so  he  may  be  tranquil,  if  he  does  the  best 
that  he  can. 

If  there  is  no  error  in  the  passage,  it  is  worth  the  labor 
to  discover  the  writer's  exact  meaning  ;  for  I  think  that 
he  had  a  meaning,  though  people  may  not  agree  what  it 
was.  (Compare  ix.,  28.)  If  I  have  rightly  explained  the 
Emperor's  meaning  in  this  and  other  passages,  he  has 
touched  the  solution  of  a  great  question 


VIII. 


THIS  reflection  also  tends  to  the  removal  of 
the  desire  of  empty  fame  that  it  is  no 
longer  in  thy  power  to  have  lived  the  whole  of 
thy  life,  or  at  least  thy  life  from  thy  youth  up- 
wards, like  a  philosopher  ;  but  both  to  many 
others  and  to  thyself  it  is  plain  that  thou  art  far 
from  philosophy.  Thou  hast  fallen  into  dis- 
order then,  so  that  it  is  no  longer  easy  for  thee 
to  get  the  reputation  of  a  philosopher,  and  thy 
plan  of  life  also  opposes  it.  If  then  thou  hast 
truly  seen  where  the  matter  lies,  throw  away 
the  thought,  How  thou  shalt  seem  [to  others], 
and  be  content  if  thou  shalt  live  the  rest  of  thy 
life  in  such  wise  as  thy  nature  wills.  Observe, 
then,  what  it  wills,  and  let  nothing  else  distract 
thee ;  for  thou  hast  had  experience  of  many 
wanderings  without  having  found  happiness 
anywhere,  not  in  syllogisms,  nor  in  wealth,  nor 
in  reputation,  nor  in  enjoyment,  nor  anywhere. 
Where  is  it,  then  ?  In  doing  what  man's  nature 
requires.     How,  then,  shall  a  man  do  this  ?    If 


/IB.  antonlnua  213 

he  has  principles  from  which  come  his  effects 
and  his  acts.  What  principles?  Those  which 
relate  to  good  and  bad  :  the  belief  that  there  is 
nothing  good  for  man,  which  does  not  make 
him  just,  temperate,  manly,  free;  and  that  there 
is  nothing  bad  which  does  not  do  the  contrary 
to  what  has  been  mentioned. 

2.  On  the  occasion  of  every  act  ask  thyself, 
How  is  this  with  respect  to  me  ?  Shall  I  repent 
of  it  ?  A  little  time  and  I  am  dead,  and  all  is 
gone.  What  more  do  I  seek,  if  what  I  am  now 
doing  is  the  work  of  an  intelligent  living  being, 
and  a  social  being,  and  one  who  is  under  the 
same  law  with  God  ? 

3.  Alexander  and  Caius*  and  Pompeius,  what 
are  they  in  comparison  with  Diogenes  and 
Heraclitus  and  Socrates?  For  they  were  ac- 
quainted with  things,  and  their  causes  [forms], 
and  their  matter,  and  the  ruling  principles  of 
these  men  were  the  same  [or  conformable  to 
their  pursuits].  But  as  to  the  others,  how 
many  things  had  they  to  care  for,  and  to  how 
many  things  were  they  slaves  ? 

4.  [Consider]  that  men  will  do  the  same 
things  nevertheless,  even  though  thou  shouldst 
burst. 

5.  This  is  the  chief  thing  :  Be  not  perturbed, 

*  Caius  is  C.  Julius  Caesar,  the  dictator  ;  and  Pompeius 
is  Cn.  Pompeius,  named  Magnus. 


214  /ifc.  Bntonfnus 

for  all  things  are  according  to  the  nature  of  the 
universal  ;  and  in  a  little  time  thou  wilt  be  no- 
body and  nowhere,  like  Hadrianus  and  Augus- 
tus. In  the  next  place,  having  fixed  thy  eyes 
steadily  on  thy  business,  look  at  it,  and  at  the 
same  time  remembering  that  it  is  thy  duty  to 
be  a  good  man,  and  what  man's  nature  de- 
mands, do  that  without  turning  aside ;  and 
speak  as  it  seems  to  thee  most  just,  only  let  it 
be  with  a  good  disposition  and  with  modesty 
and  without  hypocrisy. 

6.  The  nature  of  the  universal  has  this  work 
to  do,  to  remove  to  that  place  the  things  which 
are  in  this,  to  change  them,  to  take  them  away 
hence,  and  to  carry  them  there.  All  things 
are  change,  yet  we  need  fear  any  thing  new. 
All  things  are  familiar  [to  us]  ;  but  the  distri- 
bution of  them  still  remains  the  same. 

7.  Every  nature  is  contented  with  itself  when 
it  goes  on  its  way  well ;  and  a  rational  nature 
goes  on  its  way  well,  when  in  its  thoughts  it 
assents  to  nothing  false  or  uncertain,  and  when 
it  directs  its  movements  acts  only,  and  when  it 
confines  its  desires  and  aversions  to  the  things 
which  are  in  its  power,  and  when  it  is  satisfied 
with  every  thing  that  is  assigned  to  it  by  the 
common  nature.  For  of  this  common  nature 
every  particular  nature  is  a  part,  as  the  nature 
of  the  leaf  is  a  part  of  the  nature  of  the  plant, 


/!&♦  Bntontnus  215 

except  that  in  the  plant  the  nature  of  the  leaf  is 
a  part  of  a  nature  which  has  not  perception  or 
reason,  and  is  subject  to  be  impeded ;  but  the 
nature  of  a  man  is  part  of  a  nature  which  is  not 
subject  to  impediments,  and  is  intelligent  and 
just,  since  it  gives  to  every  thing  in  equal  por- 
tions and  according  to  its  worth,  times,  sub- 
stance, cause  [form],  activity,  and  incident. 
But  examine,  not  to  discover  that  any  one 
thing  compared  with  any  other  single  thing  is 
equal  in  all  respects,  but  by  taking  all  the  parts 
together  of  one  thing  and  comparing  them  with, 
all  the  parts  together  of  another. 

8.  Thou  hast  not  leisure  [or  ability]  to  read. 
But  thou  hast  leisure  [or  ability]  to  check  ar- 
rogance :  thou  hast  leisure  to  be  superior  to 
pleasure  and  pain :  thou  hast  leisure  to  be 
superior  to  love  of  fame,  and  not  be  vexed  at 
stupid  and  ungrateful  people,  nay  even  to  care 
for  them. 

9.  Let  no  man  any  longer  hear  thee  finding 
fault  with  the  court  life  or  with  thy  own  (v.,  16). 

10.  Repentence  is  a  kind  of  self-reproof  for 
having  neglected  some  thing  useful,  but  that 
which  is  good  must  be  something  useful,  and  the 
perfect  good  man  should  look  after  it.  But  no 
such  man  would  ever  repent  of  having  refused 
any  sensual  pleasure.  Pleasure,  then,  is  neither 
good  nor  useful. 


216  dib,  Bntoninus 

ii.  This  thing,  what  is  it  in  itself,  in  its  own 
constitution.  What  is  its  substance  and  mate- 
rial ?  And  what  its  causal  nature  [or  form]  ? 
And  what  is  it  doing  in  the  world  ?  And  how 
long  does  it  subsist  ? 

12.  When  thou  risest  from  sleep  with  reluc- 
tance, remember  that  it  is  according  to  thy 
constitution  and  according  to  human  nature  to 
perform  social  acts,  bnt  sleeping  is  common 
also  to  irrational  animals.  But  that  which  is 
according  to  each  individual's  nature  is  also 
more  peculiarly  its  own,  and  more  suitable  to 
its  nature,  and  indeed  also  more  agreeable 
(v.,  I). 

13.  Constantly  and,  if  it  be  possible,  on  the 
occasion  of  every  impression  on  the  soul,  apply 
to  it  the  principles  of  Physic,  of  Ethic,  and  of 
Dialectic. 

14.  Whatever  man  thou  meetest  with,  imme- 
diately say  to  thyself:  What  opinions  has  this 
man  about  good  and  bad  ?  For  if  with  respect 
to  pleasure  and  pain  and  the  causes  of  each, 
and  with  respect  to  fame  and  ignomy ,  death  and 
life  he  has  such  and  such  opinions,  it  will  seem 
nothing  wonderful  or  strange  to  me  if  he  does 
such  and  such  things  ;  and  I  shall  bear  in  mind 
that  he  is  compelled  to  do  so.* 

*  Antoninus  v.  16  ;  Thucydid.es,  iii.  10;  ev  yap  tu  Siakkda- 
aovTi.  tt)?  yvu>ixr)<;  Kal  at  8ia<f>opai  rUtv  epybiv  KaflierravTai. 


/lib.  antoninus  217 

15.  Remember  that  as  it  is  a  shame  to  be  sur- 
prised if  the  fig-tree  produces  figs,  so  it  is  to  be 
surprised  if  the  world  produces  such  and  such 
things  of  which  it  is  productive  ;  and  for  the 
physician  and  the  helmsman  it  is  a  shame  to 
be  surprised,  if  a  man  has  a  fever,  or  if  the 
wind  is  unfavorable. 

16.  Remember  that  to  change  thy  opinion 
and  to  follow  him  who  corrects  thy  error  is  as 
consistent  with  freedom  as  it  is  to  persist  in  thy 
error.  For  it  is  thy  own,  the  activity  which  is 
exerted  according  to  thy  own  movement  and 
judgment,  and  indeed  according  to  thy  own 
understanding  too. 

17.  If  a  thing  is  in  thy  own  power,  why  dost 
thou  do  it  ?  but  if  it  is  in  the  power  of  another, 
whom  dost  thou  blame  ?  the  atoms  [chance]  or 
the  gods  ?  Both  are  foolish.  Thou  must  blame 
nobody.  For  if  thou  canst,  correct  [that  which 
is  the  cause]  ;  but  if  thou  canst  not  do  this, 
correct  at  least  the  thing  itself;  but  if  thou 
canst  not  do  even  this,  of  what  use  is  it  to  thee 
to  find  fault  ?  for  nothing  should  be  done  with- 
out a  purpose. 

18.  That  which  has  died  falls  not  out  of  the 
universe.  If  it  stays  here,  it  also  changes  here, 
and  is  dissolved  into  its  proper  parts,  which  are 
elements  of  the  universe  and  of  thyself.  And 
these  too  change,  and  they  murmur  not. 


218  /ift,  Bntoninus 

19.  Every  thing  exists  for  some  end,  a  horse, 
a  vine.  Why  dost  thou  wonder?  Even  the 
sun  will  say,  I  am  for  some  purpose,  and  the 
rest  of  the  gods  will  say  the  same.  For  what 
purpose,  then,  art  thou?  to  enjoy  pleasure? 
See  if  common  sense  allows  this. 

20.  Nature  has  had  regard  in  every  thing  no  less 
to  the  end  than  to  the  beginning  and  the  contin- 
uance, just  like  the  man  who  throws  up  a  ball. 
What  good  is  it  then  for  the  ball  to  be  thrown 
up,  or  harm  for  it  to  come  down,  or  even  to 
have  fallen  ?  and  what  good  is  it  to  the  bubble 
while  it  holds  together,  or  what  harm  when  it 
is  burst  ?    The  same  may  be  said  of  a  light  also. 

■21.  Turn  it  [the  body]  inside  out,  and  see 
what  kind  of  thing  it  is  ;  and  when  it  has  grown 
old,  what  kind  of  thing  it  becomes,  and  when 
it  is  diseased. 

Short  lived  are  both  the  praiser  and  the 
praised,  and  the  rememberer  and  the  remem- 
bered :  and  all  this  in  a  nook  of  this  part  of  the 
world  ;  and  not  even  here  do  all  agree,  no,  not 
any  one  with  himself :  and  the  whole  earth  too 
is  a  point. 

22.  Attend  to  the  matter  which  is  before  thee, 
whether  it  is  an  opinion  or  an  act  or  a  word. 

Thou  sufferest  this  justly  :  for  thou  choosest 
rather  to  become  good  to-morrow  than  to  be 
good  to-day. 


rtft.  Bntoninus  219 

23.  Am  I  doing  any  thing  ?  I  do  it  with  ref- 
erence to  the  good  of  mankind.  Does  any 
thing  happen  to  me  ?  I  receive  it  and  refer  it 
to  the  gods,  and  the  source  of  all  things,  from 
which  all  that  happens  is  derived. 

24.  Such  as  bathing  appears  to  thee — oil, 
sweat,  dirt,  filthy  water,  all  things  disgusting — 
so  is  every  part  of  life  and  every  thing. 

25.  Lucilla  saw  Verus  die,  and  then  L,ucilla 
died.  Secunda  saw  Maximus  die,  and  then  Se- 
cunda  died.  Epitynchanus  saw  Diotimus  die, 
and  then  Epitynchanus  died.  Antoninus  saw 
Faustina  die,  and  then  Antoninus  died.  Such 
is  every  thing.  Celer  saw  Hadrianus  die,  and 
then  Celer  died.  And  those  sharp-witted  men, 
either  seers  or  men  inflated  with  pride,  where 
are  they  ?  for  instance,  the  sharp-witted  men, 
Charax  and  Demetrius  the  Platonist  and  Eu- 
daemon,  and  any  one  else  like  them.  All 
ephemeral,  dead  long  ago.  Some  indeed  have 
not  been  remembered  even  for  a  short  time, 
and  others  have  become  the  heroes  of  fables, 
and  again  others  have  disappeared  even  from 
fables.  Remember  this,  then,  that  this  little 
compound,  thyself,  must  either  be  dissolved, 
or  thy  poor  breath  must  be  extinguished,  or  be 
removed  and  placed  elsewhere. 

26.  It  is  satisfaction  to  a  man  to  do  the  proper 
works  of  a  man.     Now  it  is  a  proper  work  of 


220  /IB,  Bntonfnus 

a  man  to  be  benevolent  to  his  own  kind,  to  de- 
spise the  movements  of  the  senses,  to  form  a 
just  judgment  of  plausible  appearances,  and  to 
take  a  survey  of  the  nature  of  the  universe  and 
of  the  things  which  happen  in  it. 

27.  There  are  three  relations  [between  thee 
and  other  things]  :  the  one  to  the  body  *  which 
surrounds  thee  ;  the  second  to  the  divine  cause 
from  which  all  things  come  to  all ;  and  the 
third  to  those  who  live  with  thee. 

28.  Pain  is  either  an  evil  to  the  body — then 
let  the  body  say  what  it  thinks  of  it — or  to  the 
soul ;  but  it  is  in  the  power  of  the  soul  to  main- 
tain its  own  serenity  and  tranquillity,  and  not 
to  think  that  pain  is  an  evil.  For  every  judg- 
ment and  movement  and  desire  and  aversion  is 
within,  and  no  evil  ascends  so  high. 

29.  Wipe  out  thy  imaginations  by  often  say- 
ing to  thyself :  now  it  is  in  my  power  to  let  no 
badness  be  in  this  soul,  nor  desire  for  any  per- 
turbation at  all ;  but  looking  at  all  things  I  see 
what  is  their  nature,  and  I  use  each  according 
to  its  value.  Remember  this  power  which 
thou  hast  from  nature. 

30.  Speak  both  in  the  Senate  and  to  every 


*The  text  has  alnov,  which  in  Antoninus  means 
"form,"  "formal."  Accordingly  Schultz  recommends 
either  Valkenaer's  emendation  ayyelov,  "body,"  or  Co- 
rals' <ro)fJi<xTiou.    Compare  xii  ,  13,  x.,  38. 


/Ob.  Bntomnus  221 

man,  whoever  he  may  be,   appropriately,   not 
with  any  affectation  :  use  plain  discourse. 

31.  Augustus'  court,  wife,  daughter,  descend- 
ants, ancestors,  sister,  Agrippa,  kinsmen,  inti- 
mates, friends,  Areius,*  Maecenas,  physicians, 
and  sacrificing  priests — the  whole  court  is  dead. 
Then  turn  to  the  rest,  not  considering  the  death 
of  a  single  man  [but  of  a  whole  race],  as  of  the 
Pompeii  ;  and  that  which  is  inscribed  on  the 
tombs — the  last  of  his  race.  Then  consider 
what  trouble  those  before  them  have  had  that 
they  might  leave  a  successor  ;  and  then  that  of 
necessity  some  one  must  be  the  last.  Again 
here  consider  the  death  of  a  whole  race. 

32.  It  is  thy  duty  to  order  thy  life  well  in 
every  single  act ;  and  if  every  act  does  its  duty, 
as  far  as  is  possible,  be  content  ;  and  no  one  is 
able  to  hinder  thee  so  that  each  act  shall  not  do 
its  duty.  But  something  external  will  stand  in 
the  way.  Nothing  will  stand  in  the  way  of  thy 
acting  justly  and  soberly  and  considerately. 
But  perhaps  some  other  active  power  will  be 
hindered.  Well,  but  by  acquiescing  in  the 
hindrance  and  by  being  content  to  transfer  thy 
efforts  to  that  which  is  allowed,  another  oppor- 
tunity of  action  is  immediately  put  before  thee 
in  place  of  that  which  was  hindered,  and  one 

*  Areius  (  A'peto?)  was  a  philosopher,  who  was  intimate 
with  Augustus  ;  Sueton,  Augustus,  c.  89  ;  Plutarch,  An- 
toninus, 80  ;  Dion  Cassius,  5:,  e.  16. 


222  /ifc,  Bntoninus 

which  will  adapt  itself  to  this  ordering  of  which 
we  are  speaking. 

33.  Receive  [wealth  or  prosperity]  without 
arrogance  ;  and  be  ready  to  let  it  go. 

34.  If  thou  didst  ever  see  a  hand  cut  off,  or  a 
foot,  or  a  head,  lying  anywhere  apart  from  the 
rest  of  the  body,  such  does  a  man  make  him- 
self, as  far  as  he  can,  who  is  not  content  with 
what  happens,  and  separates  himself  from 
others,  or  does  any  thing  unsocial.  Suppose 
that  thou  hast  detached  thyself  from  the  natu- 
ral unity — for  thou  wast  made  by  nature  a  part, 
but  now  thou  hast  cut  thyself  off — yet  here 
there  is  this  beautiful  provision,  that  it  is  in  thy 
power  again  to  unite  thyself.  God  has  allowed 
this  to  no  other  part,  after  it  has  been  separated 
and  cut  asunder,  to  come  together  again.  But 
consider  the  kindness  by  which  he  has  distin- 
guished man,  for  he  has  put  it  in  his  power  not 
to  be  separated  at  all  from  the  universal  ;  and 
when  he  has  been  separated,  he  has  allowed 
him  to  return  and  to  be  united  and  to  resume 
his  place  as  a  part. 

35.  As  the  nature  of  the  universal  has  given 
to  every  rational  being  all  the  other  powers 
that  it  has,f  so  we  have  received  from  it  this 
power  also.  For  as  the  universal  nature  con- 
verts and  fixes  in  its  predestined  place  every 
thing  which  stands  in  the  way  and  opposes  it, 


flh.  Bntoninus  223 

and  makes  such  things  a  part  of  itself,  so  also 
the  rational  animal  is  able  to  make  every  hin- 
drance its  own  material,  and  to  use  it  for  such 
purposes  as  it  may  have  designed.* 

36.  Do  not  disturb  thyself  by  thinking  of  the 
whole  of  thy  life.  Let  not  thy  thoughts  at  once 
embrace  all  the  various  troubles  which  thou  may- 
est  expect  to  befall  thee  ;  but  on  every  occasion 
ask  thyself,  What  is  there  in  this  which  is  in- 
tolerable and  past  bearing?  for  thou  wilt  be 
ashamed  to  confess.  In  the  next  place  remem- 
ber that  neither  the  future  nor  the  past  pains 
thee,  but  only  the  present.  But  this  is  reduced 
to  a  very  little,  if  thou  only  circumscribest  it, 
and  chidest  thy  mind,  if  it  is  unable  to  hold  out 
against  even  this. 

37.  Does  Panthea  or  Pergamus  now  sit  by  the 
tomb  of  Verus  ?  f  Does  Chaurias  or  Diotimus 
sit  by  the  tomb  of  Hadrianus  ?  That  would  be 
ridiculous.  Well,  suppose  they  did  sit  there, 
would  the  dead  be  conscious  of  it  ?  and  if  the 
dead  were  conscious,  would  they  be  pleased? 
and  if  they  were  pleased,  would  that  make 
them  immortal  ?  Was  it  not  in  the  order  of 
destiny  that  these  persons  too  should  first  be- 

*  The  text  is  corrupt  at  the  beginning  of  the  para- 
graph, but  the  meaning  will  appear  if  the  second  \oyue<l>i> 
is  changed  into  oXuv  :  though  this  change  alone  will  not 
establish  the  grammatical  completeness  of  the  text. 

t  "  Verus  "  is  a  conjecture  of  Saumaise,  and  perhaps 
the  true  reading. 


224  d&.  Bntoninus 

come  old  women  and  old  men  and  then  die? 
What  then  would  those  do  after  these  were 
dead  ?    All  this  is  foul  smell  and  blood  in  a  bag. 

38.  If  thou  canst  see  sharp,  look  and  judge 
wisely,f  says  the  philosopher. 

39.  In  the  constitution  of  the  rational  animal 
I  see  no  virtue  which  is  opposed  to  justice  ;  but 
I  see  a  virtue  which  is  opposed  to  love  of  pleas- 
ure, and  that  is  temperance. 

40.  If  thou  takest  away  thy  opinion  about 
that  which  appears  to  give  thee  pain,  thou  thy- 
self standest  in  perfect  security — Who  is  this 
self? — The  reason — But  I  am  not  reason — Be  it 
so.  I/et  then  the  reason  itself  not  trouble  it- 
self. But  if  any  other  part  of  thee  suffers,  let  it 
have  its  own  opinion  about  itself  (vii.,  16). 

41.  Hindrance  to  the  perceptions  of  sense  is 
an  evil  to  the  animal  nature.  Hindrance  to  the 
movements  [desires]  is  equally  an  evil  to  the 
animal  nature.  And  something  else  also  is 
equally  an  impediment  and  an  evil  to  the  con- 
stitution of  plants.  So  then  that  which  is  a 
hindrance  to  the  intelligence  is  an  evil  to  the 
intelligent  nature.  Apply  all  these  things  then 
to  thyself.  Does  pain  or  sensuous  pleasure 
affect  thee  ?  The  senses  will  look  to  that.  Has 
any  obstacle  opposed  thee  in  thy  efforts  towards 
an  object?  if  indeed  thou  wast  making  this 
effort  absolutely    [unconditionally,  or  without 


/IR.  Bntoninus  225 

any  reservation],  certainly  this  obstacle  is  an 
evil  to  thee  considered  as  a  rational  animal. 
But  if  thou  takest  [into  consideration]  the 
usual  course  of  things,  thou  hast  not  yet  been 
injured  nor  even  impeded.  The  things  however 
which  are  proper  to  the  understanding  no  other 
man  is  used  to  impede,  for  neither  fire,  nor 
iron,  nor  tyrant,  nor  abuse  touches  it  in  any 
way.  When  it  has  been  made  a  sphere,  it  con- 
tinues a  sphere  (xi.,  12). 

42.  It  is  not  fit  that  I  should  give  myself 
pain,  for  I  have  never  intentionally  given  pain 
even  to  another. 

43.  Different  things  delight  different  people. 
But  it  is  my  delight  to  keep  the  ruling  faculty 
sound  without  turning  away  either  from  any 
man  or  from  any  of  the  things  which  happen  to 
men,  but  looking  at  and  receiving  all  with  wel- 
come eyes  and  using  every  thing  according  to 
its  value. 

44.  See  that  thou  secure  this  present  time  to 
thyself;  for  those  who  rather  pursue  posthu- 
mous fame  do  not  consider  that  the  men  of  after- 
time  will  be  exactly  such  as  these  whom  they 
cannot  bear  now  ;  and  both  are  mortal.  And 
what  is  it  in  any  way  to  thee  if  these  men  of 
after-time  utter  this  or  that  sound,  or  have  this 
or  that  opinion  about  thee? 

45.  Take  me  and  cast  me  where  thou  wilt  ; 


226  dfc.  Bntotiinus 

for  there  I  shall  keep  my  divine  part  tranquil— 
that  is,  content,  if  it  can  feel  and  act  con- 
formably to  its  proper  constitution.  Is  this 
[change  of  place]  sufficient  reason  why  my 
soul  should  be  unhappy  and  worse  than  it  was, 
depressed,  expanded,  shrinking,  affrighted  ? 
and  what  wilt  thou  find  which  is  sufficient 
reason  for  this  ?  * 

46.  Nothing  can  happen  to  any  man  which  is 
not  a  human  accident,  nor  to  an  ox  which  is 
not  according  to  the  nature  of  an  ox,  nor  to  a 
vine  which  is  not  according  to  the  nature  of  a 
vine,  nor  to  a  stone  which  is  not  proper  to  a 
stone.  If  then  there  happens  to  each  thing 
both  what  is  usual  and  natural,  why  shouldst 
thou  complain  ?  For  the  common  nature  brings 
nothing  which  may  not  be  borne  by  thee. 

47.  If  thou  art  pained  by  any  external  thing, 
it  is  not  this  thing  that  disturbs  thee,  but  thy 
own  judgment  about  it.  And  it  is  in  thy  power 
to  wipe  out  this  judgment  now.  But  if  any 
thing  in  thy  own  disposition  gives  thee  pain, 
who  hinders  thee  from  correcting  thy  opin- 
ion ?  And  even  if  thou  art  pained  because 
thou  art  not  doing  some  particular  thing  whicl. 
seems  to  thee  to  be  right,  why  dost  thou  nc 

*  bpeyoixeyr)  in  this  passage  seems  to  have  a  passive 
sense.  It  is  difficult  to  find  an  apt  expression  for  it  and 
some  of  the  other  words.  A  comparison  with  xi.,  12,  will 
help  to  explain  the  meaning. 


d&.  BntoninuS  227 

rather  act  than  complain  ?  But  some  insupera- 
ble obstacle  is  in  the  way  ?  Do  not  be  grieved 
then,  for  the  cause  of  its  not  being  done  de- 
pends on  thee.  But  it  is  not  worth  while  to 
live,  if  this  cannot  be  done.  Take  thy  depar- 
ture then  from  life  contentedly,  just  as  he  dies 
who  is  in  full  activity,  and  well  pleased  too 
with  the  things  which  are  obstacles. 

48.  Remember  that  the  ruling  faculty  is  in- 
vincible, when  self-collected  it  is  satisfied  with 
itself,  if  it  does  nothing  which  it  does  not 
choose  to  do,  even  if  it  resist  from  mere  ob- 
stinacy. What  then  will  it  be  when  it  forms  a 
judgment  about  any  thing  aided  by  reason  and 
deliberately  ?  Therefore  the  mind  which  is 
free  from  passions  is  a  citadel,  for  man  has 
nothing  more  secure  to  which  he  can  fly  for 
refuge  and  for  the  future  be  inexpugnable.  He 
then  who  has  not  seen  this  is  an  ignorant  man  ; 
but  he  who  has  seen  it  and  does  not  fly  to  this 
refuge  is  unhappy. 

49.  Say  nothing  more  to  thyself  than  what 
the  first  appearances  report.  Suppose  that  it 
has  been  reported  to  thee  that  a  certain  person 
speaks  ill  of  thee.  This  has  been  reported  ;  but 
that  thou  hast  been  injured,  that  has  not  been 
reported.  I  see  that  my  child  is  sick.  I  do 
see  ;  but  that  he  is  in  danger,  I  do  not  see. 
Thus  then  always   abide  by  the  first  appear- 


228  dfc,  Hntontnus 

ances,  and  add  nothing  thyself  from  within, 
and  then  nothing  happens  to  thee.  Or  rather, 
add  something,  like  a  man  who  knows  every 
thing  that  happens  in  the  world. 

50.  A  cucumber  is  bitter — throw  it  away. 
There  are  briars  in  the  road — turn  aside  from 
them.  This  is  enough.  Do  not  add,  And  why 
were  such  things  made  in  the  world  ?  For  thou 
wilt  be  ridiculed  by  a  man  who  is  acquainted 
with  nature,  as  thou  wouldst  be  ridiculed  by  a 
carpenter  and  shoemaker  if  thou  didst  find  fault 
because  thou  seest  in  their  workshop  shavings 
and  cuttings  from  the  things  which  they  make. 
And  yet  they  have  places  into  which  they  can 
throw  these  shavings  and  cuttings,  and  the  uni- 
versal nature  has  no  external  space  ;  but  the 
wondrous  part  of  her  art  is  that  though  she  has 
circumscribed  herself,  every  thing  within  her 
which  appears  to  decay  and  to  grow  old  and  to 
be  useless  she  changes  into  herself,  and  again 
makes  other  new  things  from  these  very  same, 
so  that  she  requires  neither  substance  from 
without  nor  wants  a  place  into  which  she  may 
cast  that  which  decays.  She  is  content  then 
with  her  own  space,  and  her  own  matter  and 
her  own  art. 

51.  Neither  in  thy  actions  be  sluggish  nor  in 
thy  conversation  without  method,  nor  wander- 
ing in  thy  thoughts,  nor  let  there  be  in  thy  soul 


/lib.  Bntoninus  229 

inward  contention  nor  external  effusion,  nor  in 
life  be  so  busy  as  to  have  no  leisure. 

Suppose  that  men  kill  thee,  cut  thee  in 
pieces,  curse  thee.  What  then  can  these  things 
do  to  prevent  thy  mind  from  remaining  pure, 
wise,  sober,  and  just?  For  instance,  if  a  man 
should  stand  by  a  limpid  pure  spring,  and  curse 
it,  the  spring  never  ceases  sending  up  potable 
water  ;  and  if  he  should  cast  clay  into  it  or  filth, 
it  will  speedily  disperse  them  and  wash  Lhem 
out,  and  will  not  be  at  all  polluted.  How  then 
shalt  thou  possess  a  perpetual  fountain  [and  not 
a  mere  well]  ?  By  forming  thyself  hourly  to 
freedom  conjoined  with  contentment, f  sim- 
plicity, and  modesty. 

52.  He  who  does  not  know  what  the  world 
is,  does  not  know  where  he  is.  And  he  who 
does  not  know  for  what  purpose  the  world  ex- 
ists, does  not  know  who  he  is,  nor  what  the  world 
is.  But  he  who  has  failed  in  any  one  of  these 
things  could  not  even  say  for  what  purpose  he 
exists  himself.  What  then  dost  thou  think  of 
him  who  [avoids  or]  seeks  the  praise  of  those 
who  applaud,  of  men  who  know  not  either 
where  they  are  or  who  they  are  ? 

53.  Dost  thou  wish  to  be  praised  by  a  man 
who  curses  himself  thrice  every  hour  ?  wouldst 
thou  wish  to  please  a  man  who  does  not 
please  himself?     Does  a  man    please  himself 


230  jflfc.  Bntontnus 

who    repents   of   nearly   every   thing   that  he 
does  ? 

54.  No  longer  let  thy  breathing  only  act  in 
concert  with  the  air  which  surrounds  thee,  but 
let  thy  intelligence  also  now  be  in  harmony 
with  the  intelligence  which  embraces  all  things. 
For  the  intelligent  power  is  no  less  diffused  in 
all  parts  and  pervades  all  things  for  him  who  is 
willing  to  draw  it  to  him  than  the  aerial  power 
for  him  who  is  able  to  respire  it. 

55.  Generally,  wickedness  does  no  harm  at 
all  to  the  universe ;  and  particularly,  the  wick- 
edness [of  one  man]  does  no  harm  to  another. 
It  is  only  harmful  to  him  who  has  it  in  his 
power  to  be  released  from  it,  as  soon  as  he  shall 
choose. 

56.  To  my  own  free  will  the  free  will  of  my 
neighbor  is  just  as  indifferent  as  his  poor  breath 
and  flesh.  For  though  we  are  made  especially 
for  the  sake  of  one  another,  still  the  ruling 
power  of  each  of  us  has  its  own  office,  for  other- 
wise my  neighbor's  wickedness  would  be  my 
harm,  which  God  has  not  willed  in  order  that 
my  unhappiness  may  not  depend  on  another. 

57.  The  sun  appears  to  be  poured  down,  and 
in  all  directions  indeed  it  is  diffused,  yet  it  is 
not  effused.  For  this  diffusion  is  extension. 
Accordingly  its  rays  are  called  Extensions 
[aHTiveS]  because  they  are  extended  [  and  rov 


dfc.  Bntoninus  231 

ixTEivetiQai'].*  But  one  may  judge  what  kind 
of  a  thing  a  ray  is,  if  he  looks  at  the  sun's  light 
passing  through  a  narrow  opening  into  a  dark- 
ened room,  for  it  is  extended  in  a  right  line, 
and  as  it  were  is  divided  when  it  meets  with  any 
solid  body  which  stands  in  the  way  and  inter- 
cepts the  air  beyond  ;  but  there  the  light  remains 
fixed  and  does  not  glide  or  fall  off.  Such  then 
ought  to  be  the  out-pouring  and  diffusion  of  the 
understanding,  and  it  should  in  no  way  be  an 
effusion,  but  an  extension,  and  it  should  make 
no  violent  or  impetuous  collision  with  the  ob- 
stacles which  are  in  its  way  ;  nor  yet  fall  down, 
but  be  fixed  and  enlighten  that  which  receives 
it.  For  a  body  will  deprive  itself  of  the  illumi- 
nation, if  it  does  not  admit  it. 

58.  He  who  fears  death  either  fears  the  loss 
of  sensation  or  a  different  kind  of  sensation. 
But  if  thou  shalt  have  no  sensation,  neither 
wilt  thou  feel  any  harm  ;  and  if  thou  shalt  ac- 
quire another  kind  of  sensation,  thou  wilt  be  a 
different  kind  of  living  being  and  thou  wilt  not 
cease  to  live. 

59.  Men  exist  for  the  sake  of  one  another. 
Teach  them  then  or  bear  with  them. 

60.  In  one  way  an  arrow  moves,  in  another 
way  the  mind.  The  mind  indeed  both  when  it 
exercises   caution    and   when    it    is   employed 

*  A  piece  of  bad  etymology. 


232 


iifc.  Bntoninus 


about  inquiry,  moves  straight  onward  not  the 
less,  and  to  its  object. 

61.  Enter  into  every   man's  ruling  faculty; 
and  also  let  every  other  man  enter  into  thine.* 
*  Compare  Epictetus,  iii.,  9,  12. 


IX. 


HE  who  acts  unjustly  acts  impiously.  For 
since  the  universal  nature  has  made  ra- 
tional animals  for  the  sake  of  one  another  to 
help  one  another  according  to  their  deserts,  but 
in  no  way  to  injure  one  another,  he  who  trans- 
gresses her  will,  is  clearly  guilty  of  impiety 
towards  the  highest  divinity.  And  he  too  who 
lies  is  guilty  of  impiety  to  the  same  divinity  ; 
for  the  universal  nature  is  the  nature  of  things 
that  are  ;  and  things  that  are  have  a  relation 
to  all  things  that  come  into  existence.*      And 

*  "  As  there  is  not  any  action  or  natural  event,  which 
we  are  acquainted  with,  so  single  and  unconnected  as 
not  to  have  a  respect  to  some  other  actions  and  events, 
so,  possibly  each  of  them,  when  it  has  not  an  immediate, 
may  yet  have  a  remote,  natural  relation  to  other  actions 
and  events,  much  beyond  the  compass  of  this  present 
world."  Again:  "Things  seemingly  the  most  insig- 
nificant imaginable,  are  perpetually  observed  to  be  ne- 
cessary conditions  to  other  things  of  the  greatest  im- 
portance ;  so  that  any  one  thing  whatever,  may,  for 
aught  we  know  to  the  contrary,  be  a  necessary  condition 
to  any  other."  "  Butler's  Analogy,"  chap.  vii.  See  all 
the  chapter.  Some  critics  take  xa  vndpxovTa  in  this  pas- 
sage of  Antoninus  to  be  the  same  as  to.  ovto.  ;  but  if  that 
were  so,  he  might  have  said  Trpb?  d\\r)Ka  instead  of  n-pb? 

Ta  vwdpxouTa-      Perhaps  the  meaning  of  Trpbs  rd  VTrdp\ovTa 

may  be  "  to  all  prior  things."     If  so,  the  translation  is 
still  correct.    See  vi.,  38. 


234  d&»  Bntoninue 

further,  this  universal  nature  is  named  truth, 
and  is  the  prime  cause  of  all  things  that  are 
true.  He  then  who  lies  intentionally  is  guilty 
of  impiety  inasmuch  as  he  acts  unjustly  by  de- 
ceiving ;  and  he  also  who  lies  unintentionally, 
inasmuch  as  he  is  at  variance  with  the  universal 
nature,  and  inasmuch  as  he  disturbs  the  order 
by  fighting  against  the  nature  of  the  world  ; 
for  he  fights  against  it,  who  is  moved  of  himself 
to  that  which  is  contrary  to  truth,  for  he  had  re- 
ceived powers  from  nature  through  the  neglect 
of  which  he  is  not  able  now  to  distinguish  false- 
hood from  truth.  And  indeed  he  who  pursues 
pleasure  as  good,  and  avoids  pain  as  evil,  is 
guilty  of  impiety.  For  of  necessity  such  a  man 
must  often  find  fault  with  the  universal  nature, 
alleging  that  it  assigns  things  to  the  bad  and 
the  good  contrary  to  their  deserts,  because  fre- 
quently the  bad  are  in  the  enjoyment  of  pleasure 
and  possess  the  things  which  procure  pleasure, 
but  the  good  have  pain  for  their  share  and  the 
things  which  cause  pain.  And  further,  he  who 
is  afraid  of  pain  will  sometimes  also  be  afraid 
of  some  of  the  things  which  will  happen  in  the 
world,  and  even  this  is  impiety.  And  he  who 
pursues  pleasure  will  not  abstain  from  injustice, 
and  this  is  plainly  impiety.  Now  with  respect 
to  the  things  towards  which  the  universal  na- 
ture is  equally  affected — for  it  would  not  have 


dfo.  Bntoninus  235 

made  both,  unless  it  was  equally  affected  tow- 
ards both — towards  these  they  who  wish  to 
follow  nature  should  be  of  the  same  mind  with 
it,  and  equally  affected.  With  respect  to  pain, 
then,  and  pleasure,  or  death  and  life,  or  honor 
and  dishonor,  which  the  universal  nature  em- 
ploys equally,  whoever  is  not  equally  affected 
is  manifestly  acting  impiously.  And  I  say  that 
the  universal  nature  employs  them  equally,  in- 
stead of  saying  that  they  happen  alike  to  those 
who  are  produced  in  continuous  series  and  to 
those  who  come  after  them  by  virtue  of  a  cer- 
tain original  movement  of  Providence,  accord- 
ing to  which  it  moved  from  a  certain  beginning 
to  this  ordering  of  things,  having  conceived 
certain  principles  of  the  things  which  were  to 
be,  and  having  determined  powers  productive 
of  beings  and  of  changes  and  of  such  like 
successions  (vii.,  75). 

2.  It  would  be  a  man's  happiest  lot  to  depart 
from  mankind  without  having  had  any  taste  of 
lying  and  hypocrisy  and  luxury  and  pride. 
However  to  breathe  out  one's  life  when  a  man 
has  had  enough  of  these  things  is  the  next  best 
voyage,  as  the  saying  is.  Hast  thou  determined 
to  abide  with  vice,  and  has  not  experience  yet 
induced  thee  to  fly  from  this  pestilence?  For 
the  destruction  of  the  understanding  is  a  pesti- 
lence, much  more  indeed  than  any  such  cor- 


236  /Hb.  Bntoninus 

ruption  and  change  of  this  atmosphere  which 
surrounds  us.  For  this  corruption  is  a  pestilence 
of  animals  so  far  as  they  are  animals  ;  but  the 
other  is  a  pestilence  of  men  so  far  as  they  are 
men. 

3.  Do  not  despise  death,  but  be  well  content 
with  it,  since  this  too  is  one  of  those  things 
which  nature  wills.  For  such  as  it  is  to  be 
young  and  to  grow  old,  and  to  increase  and  to 
reach  maturity,  and  to  have  teeth  and  beard 
and  gray  hairs,  and  to  beget,  and  to  be  preg- 
nant and  to  bring  forth,  and  all  the  other  nat- 
ural operations  which  the  seasons  of  thy  life 
bring,  such  also  is  dissolution.  This,  then,  is 
consistent  with  the  character  of  a  reflecting 
man,  to  be  neither  careless  nor  impatient  nor 
contemptuous  with  respect  to  death,  but  to  wait 
for  it  as  one  of  the  operations  of  nature.  As 
thou  now  waitest  for  the  time  when  the  child 
shall  come  out  of  thy  wife's  womb,  so  be  ready 
for  the  time  when  thy  soul  shall  fall  out  of  this 
envelope.*  But  if  thou  requirest  also  a  vulgar 
kind  of  comfort  which  shall  reach  thy  heart, 
thou  wilt  be  made  best  reconciled  to  death  by 
observing  the  objects  from  which  thou  art  go- 
ing to  be  removed,  and  the  morals  of  those  with 
whom  thy  soul  will  no  longer  be  mingled.  For 
it  is  no  way  right  to  be  offended  with  men,  but 
*  Note  21  of  the  Philosophy,  p.  64. 


/Hb.  Bntoninus  237 

it  is  thy  duty  to  care  for  them  and  to  bear  with 
them  gently  ;  and  yet  to  remember  that  thy  de- 
parture will  be  not  from  men  who  have  the 
same  principles  as  thyself.  For  this  is  the  only 
thing,  if  there  be  any,  which  could  draw  us  the 
contrary  way  and  attach  us  to  life,  to  be  per- 
mitted to  live  with  those  who  have  the  same 
principles  as  ourselves.  But  now  thou  seest  how 
great  is  the  trouble  arising  from  the  discordance 
of  those  who  live  together,  so  that  thou  mayst 
say,  Come  quick,  O  death,  lest  perchance  I, 
too,  should  forget  myself. 

4.  He  who  does  wrong  does  wrong  against 
himself.  He  who  acts  unjustly  acts  unjustly 
to  himself,  because  he  makes  himself  bad. 

5.  He  often  acts  unjustly  who  does  not  do  a 
certain  thing ;  not  only  he  who  does  a  certain 
thing. 

6.  Thy  present  opinion  founded  on  under- 
standing, and  thy  present  conduct  directed  to 
social  good,  and  thy  present  disposition  of  con- 
tentment with  every  thing  which  happens  f — 
that  is  enough. 

7.  Wipe  out  imagination  :  check  desire  :  ex- 
tinguish appetite  :  keep  the  ruling  faculty  in  its 
own  power. 

8.  Among  the  animals  which  have  not  reason 
one  life  is  distributed  ;  but  among  reasonable 
animals   one  intelligent    soul    is    distributed ; 


238  dft.  Bntonfnus 

just  as  there  is  one  earth  of  all  thing  which  are 
of  an  earthy  nature,  and  we  see  by  one  light, 
and  breathe  one  air,  all  of  us  that  have  the 
faculty  of  vision  and  all  that  have  life. 

9.  All  things  which  participate  in  any  thing 
which  is  common  to  them  all  move  towards 
that  which  is  of  the  same  kind  with  themselves. 
Every  thing  which  is  earthy  turns  towards  the 
earth,  every  thing  which  is  liquid  flows  to- 
gether, and  every  thing  which  is  of  an  aerial 
kind  does  the  same,  so  that  they  require  some- 
thing to  keep  them  asunder,  and  the  application 
of  force.  Fire  indeed  moves  upwards  on  ac- 
count of  the  elemental  fire,  but  it  is  so  ready  to 
be  kindled  together  with  all  the  fire  which  is 
here,  that  even  every  substance  which  is  some- 
what dry,  is  easily  ignited,  because  there  is  less 
mingled  with  it  of  that  which  is  a  hindrance  to 
ignition.  Accordingly  then  every  thing  also 
which  participates  in  the  common  intelligent 
nature  moves  in  like  manner  towards  that 
which  is  of  the  same  kind  with  itself,  or  moves 
even  more.  For  so  much  as  it  is  superior  in 
comparison  with  all  other  things,  in  the  same 
degree  also  is  it  more  ready  to  mingle  with  and 
to  be  fused  with  that  which  is  akin  to  it.  Ac- 
cordingly among  animals  devoid  of  reason  we 
find  swarms  of  bees,  and  herds  of  cattle,  and  the 
nurture  of  young  birds,  and  in  a  manner,  loves ; 


tf&.  Bntonfnus  239 

for  even  in  animals  there  are  souls,  and  that 
power  which  brings  them  together  is  seen  to 
exert  itself  in  the  superior  degree,  and  in  such 
a  way  as  never  has  been  observed  in  plants  nor 
in  stones  nor  in  trees.  But  in  rational  animals 
there  are  political  communities  and  friendships, 
and  families  and  meetings  of  people ;  and  in 
wars,  treaties  and  armistices.  But  in  the  things 
which  are  still  superior,  even  though  they  are 
separated  from  one  another  unity  in  a  manner 
exists,  as  in  the  stars.  Thus  the  ascent  to  the 
higher  degree  is  able  to  produce  a  sympathy 
even  in  things  which  are  separated.  See,  then, 
what  now  takes  place.  For  only  intelligent  an- 
imals have  now  forgotten  this  mutual  desire  and 
inclination,  and  in  them  alone  the  property  of 
flowing  together  is  not  seen.  But  still  though 
men  strive  to  avoid  [this  union],  they  are 
caught  and  held  by  it,  for  their  nature  is  too 
strong  for  them  ;  and  thou  wilt  see  what  I  say, 
if  thou  only  observest.  Sooner,  then,  will  one 
find  any  thing  earthy  which  comes  in  contact 
with  no  earthy  thing  than  a  man  altogether 
separated  from  other  men. 

10.  Both  man  and  God  and  the  universe  pro- 
duce fruit ;  at  the  proper  seasons  each  produces 
it.  But  if  usage  has  especially  fixed  these 
terms  to  the  vine  and  like  things,  this  is  noth- 
ing.    Reason  produces  fruit  both  for  all  and  for 


240  /ifc.  Bntoninus 

itself,    and   there  are  produced  from  it  other 
things  of  the  same  kind  as  reason  itself. 

11.  If  thou  art  able,  correct  by  teaching 
those  who  do  wrong  ;  but  if  thou  canst  not,  re- 
member that  indulgence  is  given  to  thee  for 
this  purpose.  And  the  gods,  too,  are  indulgent 
to  such  persons  ;  and  for  some  purposes  they 
even  help  them  to  get  health,  wealth,  reputa- 
tion ;  so  kind  they  are.  And  it  is  in  thy  power 
also  ;  or  say,  who  hinders  thee  ? 

12.  Labor  not  as  one  who  is  wretched,  nor 
yet  as  one  who  would  be  pitied  or  admired  ;  but 
direct  thy  will  to  one  thing  only,  to  put  thyself 
in  motion  and  to  check  thyself,  as  the  social 
reason  requires. 

13.  To-day  I  have  got  out  of  all  trouble,  or 
rather  I  have  cast  out  all  trouble,  for  it  was  not 
outside,  but  within  and  in  my  opinions. 

14.  All  things  are  the  same,  familiar  in  expe- 
rience, and  ephemeral  in  time,  and  worthless  in 
the  matter.  Every  thing  now  is  just  as  it  was 
in  the  time  of  those  whom  we  have  buried. 

15.  Things  stand  outside  of  us,  themselves  by 
themselves,  neither  knowing  aught  of  them- 
selves, nor  expressing  any  judgment.  What  is 
it,  then,  which  does  judge  about  them  ?  The 
ruling  faculty. 

16.  Not  in  passivity,  but  in  activity  lie  the 
evil  and  the  good  of  the  rational  social  animal 


/lib.  Hntoninus  241 

just  as  his  virtue  and  his  vice  lie  not  in  passiv- 
ity, but  in  activity.* 

17.  For  the  stone  which  has  been  thrown  up 
it  is  no  evil  to  come  down,  nor  indeed  any  good 
to  have  been  carried  up  (viii.,  20). 

18.  Penetrate  inwards  into  men's  leading 
principles,  and  thou  wilt  see  what  judges  thou 
art  afraid  of,  and  what  kind  of  judges  they  are 
themselves. 

19.  All  things  are  changing  :  and  thou  thy- 
self art  in  continuous  mutation  and  in  a  man- 
ner in  continuous  destruction,  and  the  whole 
universe  too. 

20.  It  is  thy  duty  to  leave  another  man's 
wrongful  act  there  where  it  is  (vii.,  29  ;  ix.,  38). 

21.  Termination  of  activity,  cessation  from 
movement  and  opinion,  and  in  a  sense  their 
death,  is  no  evil.  Turn  thy  thoughts  now  to 
the  consideration  of  thy  life,  thy  life  as  a  child, 
as  a  youth,  thy  manhood,  thy  old  age,  for  in 
these  also  every  change  was  a  death.  Is  this 
any  thing  to  fear  ?  Turn  thy  thoughts  now  to 
thy  life  under  thy  grandfather,  then  to  thy  life 
under  thy  mother,  then  to  thy  life  under  thy 
father  ;  and  as  thou  findest  many  other  differ- 
ences and  changes  and  terminations,  ask  thy- 
self, Is  this  any  thing  to  fear  ?     In  like  manner, 

*  "  Virtutis  omnis  laus  in  actione  consistit." — Cicero, 
De  Off.,  i.,  6. 


242  /lib.  Bntontnus 

then,  neither  are  the  termination  and  cessation 
and  change  of  thy  whole  life  a  thing  to  be  afraid 
of. 

22.  Hasten  [to  examine]  thy  own  ruling  fac- 
ulty and  that  of  the  universe  and  that  of  thy 
neighbor  :  thy  own  that  thou  mayst  make  it 
just :  and  that  of  the  universe,  that  thou  mayst 
remember  of  what  thou  art  a  part ;  and  that  of 
thy  neighbor,  that  thou  mayst  know  whether 
he  has  acted  ignorantly  or  with  knowledge, 
and  that  thou  mayst  also  consider  that  his  rul- 
ing faculty  is  akin  to  thine. 

23.  As  thou  thyself  art  a  component  part  of  a 
social  system,  so  let  every  act  of  thine  be  a  com- 
ponent part  of  social  life.  Whatever  act  of 
thine  then  has  no  reference  either  immediately 
or  remotely  to  a  social  end,  this  tears  asunder 
thy  life,  and  does  not  allow  it  to  be  one,  and  it 
is  of  the  nature  of  a  mutiny,  just  as  when  in  a 
popular  assembly  a  man  acting  by  himself 
stands  apart  from  the  general  agreement. 

24.  Quarrels  of  little  children  and  their  sports, 
and  poor  spirits  carrying  about  dead  bodies 
[such  is  every  thing]  ;  and  so  what  is  exhibited 
in  the  representation  of  the  mansions  of  the 
dead  *  strikes  our  eyes  more  clearly. 

*  rb  tt)s  NeKvias  may  be,  as  Gataker  conjectures,  a  dra- 
matic representation  of  the  state  of  the  dead.  Schultz 
supposes  that  it  may  be  also  a  reference  to  the  Ne'xiua  of 
the  Odyssey  (lib.  xi.). 


/lft,  Bntontnus  243 

25.  Examine  into  the  quality  of  the  form  of 
an  object,  and  detach  it  altogether  from  its  ma- 
terial part,  and  then  contemplate  it ;  then  de- 
termine the  time,  the  longest  which  a  thing  of 
this  peculiar  form  is  naturally  made  to  endure. 

26.  Thou  hast  endured  infinite  troubles 
through  not  being  contented  with  thy  ruling 
faculty,  when  it  does  the  things  which  it  is 
constituted  by  nature  to  do.  But  enough  f  [of 
this]. 

27.  When  another  blames  thee  or  hates  thee, 
or  when  men  say  about  thee  any  thing  injuri- 
ous, approach  their  poor  souls,  penetrate  with- 
in, and  see  what  kind  of  men  they  are.  Thou 
wilt  discover  that  there  is  no  reason  to  take  any 
trouble  that  these  men  may  have  this  or  that 
opinion  about  thee.  However  thou  must  be 
well  disposed  towards  them,  for  by  nature  they 
are  friends.  And  the  gods  too  aid  them  in  all 
ways,  by  dreams,  by  signs,  towards  the  attain- 
ment of  those  things  on  which  they  set  a 
value,  f 

28.  The  periodic  movements  of  the  universe 
are  the  same,  up  and  down  from  age  to  age. 
And  either  the  universal  intelligence  puts  it- 
self in  motion  for  every  separate  effect,  and  if 
this  is  so,  be  thou  content  with  that  which  is 
the  result  of  its  activity ;  or  it  puts  itself  in  mo- 
tion once,  and  every  thing  else  comes  by  way 


244  /1ft.  Bntoninus 

of  sequence  *  in  a  manner  ;  or  indivisible  ele- 
ments are  the  origin  of  all  things.  In  a  word, 
if  there  is  a  god,  all  is  well;  and  if  chance  rules, 
do  not  thou  also  be  governed  by  it  (vi.,  44 ;  vii., 

75). 

Soon  will  the  earth  cover  us  all  :  then  the 
earth,  too,  will  change,  and  the  things  also 
which  result  from  change  will  continue  to 
change  forever,  and  these  again  forever.  For 
if  a  man  reflects  on  the  changes  and  transfor- 
mations which  follow  one  another  like  wave 
after  wave  and  their  rapidity,  he  will  despise 
every  thing  which  is  perishable  (xii.,  21). 

29.  The  universal  cause  is  like  a  winter  tor- 
rent :  it  carries  every  thing  along  with  it.  But 
how  worthless  are  all  these  poor  people  who 
are  engaged  in  matters  political,  and,  as  they 
suppose,  are  playing  the  philosopher !  All 
drivellers.  Well  then,  man  :  do  what  nature 
now  requires.  Set  thyself  in  motion,  if  it  is  in 
thy  power,  and  do  not  look  about  thee  to  see  if 
any  one  will  observe  it :  nor  yet  expect  Plato's 
Republic ;  f  but  be  content  if  the  smallest  thing 
goes  on  well,  and  consider  such  an  event  to  be 
no  small  matter.     For  who  can  change  men's 

*  The  words  which  immediately  follow  ko.t'  inaKo\ov6- 
rja-Lv  are  corrupt.  But  the  meaning  is  hardly  doubtful. 
(Compare  vii.,  75.) 

t  Those  who  wish  to  know  what  Plato's  Republic  isr 
may  now  study  it  in  the  accurate  translation  of  Davies 
and  Vaughan. 


/lib.  Bntoninus  245 

opinions  ?  and  without  a  change  of  opinions 
what  else  is  there  than  the  slavery  of  men  who 
groan  while  they  pretend  to  obey  ?  Come  now 
and  tell  me  of  Alexander  and  Philippus  and 
Demetrius  of  Phalerum.  They  themselves  shall 
judge  whether  they  discovered  what  the  com- 
mon nature  required,  and  trained  themselves 
accordingly.  But  if  they  acted  like  tragedy  he- 
roes, no  one  has  condemned  me  to  imitate  them. 
Simple  and  modest  is  the  work  of  philosophy. 
Draw  me  not  aside  to  insolence  and  pride. 

30.  Look  down  from  above  on  the  countless 
herds  of  men  and  their  countless  solemnities, 
and  the  infinitely  varied  voyagings  in  storms 
and  calms,  and  the  differences  among  those 
who  are  born,  who  live  together,  and  die.  And 
consider,  too,  the  life  lived  by  others  in  olden 
time,  and  the  life  of  those  who  will  live  after 
thee,  and  the  life  now  lived  among  barbarous 
nations,  and  how  many  know  not  even  thy 
name,  and  how  many  will  soon  forget  it,  and 
how  they  who  perhaps  now  are  praising  thee 
will  very  soon  blame  thee,  and  that  neither  a 
posthumous  name  is  of  any  value,  nor  reputa- 
tion, nor  any  thing  else. 

31.  Let  there  be  freedom  from  perturbations 
with  respect  to  the  things  which  come  from  the 
external  cause  ;  and  let  there  be  justice  in  the 
things  done  by  virtue  of  the  internal  cause  ; 


246  /lib.  Bntontnus 

that  is,  let  there  be  movement  and  action  ter- 
minating in  this,  in  social  acts,  for  this  is  ac- 
cording to  thy  nature. 

32.  Thou  canst  remove  out  of  the  way  many 
useless  things  among  those  which  disturb  thee, 
for  they  lie  entirely  in  thy  opinion  ;  and  thou 
wilt  then  gain  for  thyself  ample  space  by  com- 
prehending the  whole  universe  in  thy  mind, 
and  by  contemplating  the  eternity  of  time,  and 
observing  the  rapid  change  of  every  several 
thing,  how  short  is  the  time  from  birth  to  dis- 
solution, and  the  illimitable  time  before  birth 
as  well  as  the  equally  boundless  time  after  dis- 
solution. 

33.  All  that  thou  seest  will  quickly  perish, 
and  those  who  have  been  spectators  of  its  dis- 
solution will  very  soon  perish  too.  And  he  who 
dies  at  the  extremest  old  age  will  be  brought 
into  the  same  condition  with  him  who  died  pre- 
maturely. 

34.  What  are  these  men's  leading  principles, 
and  about  what  kind  of  things  are  they  busy, 
and  for  what  kind  of  reasons  do  they  love  and 
honor?  Imagine  that  thou  seest  their  poor 
souls  laid  bare.  When  they  think  that  they  do 
harm  by  their  blame  or  good  by  their  praise, 
what  an  idea  ! 

35.  Loss  is  nothing  else  than  change.  But 
the  universal  nature  delights  in  change,  and  in 


/lib.  Bntonfnus  247 

obedience  to  her  ail  things  are  now  done  well, 
and  from  eternity  have  been  done  in  like  form, 
and  will  be  such  to  time  without  end.  What, 
then,  dost  thou  say  ?  That  all  things  have  been 
and  all  things  always  will  be  bad,  and  that  no 
power  has  ever  been  found  in  so  many  gods  to 
rectify  these  things,  but  the  world  has  been 
condemned  to  be  bound  in  never-ceasing  evil  ? 
(iv.,  45  ;  vii.,  18). 

36.  The  rottenness  of  the  matter  which  is  the 
foundation  of  every  thing  !  water,  dust,  bones, 
filth  :  or  again,  marble  rocks,  the  callosities  of 
the  earth  ;  and  gold  and  silver,  the  sediments  ; 
and  garments,  only  bits  of  hair ;  and  purple 
dye,  blood  ;  and  every  thing  else  is  of  the  same 
kind.  And  that  which  is  of  the  nature  of  breath 
is  also  another  thing  of  the  same  kind,  chang- 
ing from  this  to  that. 

37.  Enough  of  this  wretched  life  and  mur- 
muring and  apish  tricks.  Why  art  thou  dis- 
turbed ?  What  is  there  new  in  this  ?  What  un- 
settles thee?  Is  it  the  form  of  the  thing?  Look 
at  it.  Or  is  it  the  matter  ?  Look  at  it.  But  be- 
sides these  there  is  nothing.  Towards  the  gods, 
then,  now  become  at  last  more  simple  and  bet- 
ter. It  is  the  same  whether  we  examine  these 
things  for  a  hundred  years  or  three. 

38.  If  any  man  has  done  wrong,  the  harm  is 
his  own.     But  perhaps  he  has  not  done  wrong. 


248  /lib.  Bntontnus 

39.  Bither  all  things  proceed  from  one  intel- 
ligent source  and  come  together  as  in  one  body, 
and  the  part  ought  not  to  find  fault  with  what 
is  done  for  the  benefit  of  the  whole  ;  or  there 
are  only  atoms,  and  nothing  else  than  mixture 
and  dispersion.  Why,  then,  art  thou  disturbed? 
Say  to  the  ruling  faculty,  Art  thou  dead,  art 
thou  corrupted,  art  thou  playing  the  hypocrite, 
art  thou  become  a  beast,  dost  thou  herd  and  feed 
with  the  rest  ?  * 

40.  Either  the  gods  have  no  power  or  they 
have  power.  If,  then,  they  have  no  power,  why 
dost  thou  pray  to  them  ?  But  if  they  have 
power,  why  dost  thou  not  pray  for  them  to  give 
thee  the  faculty  of  not  fearing  any  of  the  things 
which  thou  fearest,  or  of  not  desiring  any  of  the 
things  which  thou  desirest,  or  not  being  pained 
at  any  thing,  rather  than  pray  that  any  of  these 
things  should  not  happen  or  happen  ?  for  cer- 
tainly if  they  can  cooperate  with  men,  they  can 
cooperate  for  these  purposes.  But  perhaps  thou 
wilt  say  the  gods  have  placed  them  in  thy 
power.  Well,  then,  is  it  not  better  to  use  what 
is  in  thy  power  like  a  free  man  than  to  desire 
in  a  slavish  and  abject  way  what  is  not  in  thy 
power  ?     And  who  has  told  thee  that  the  gods 

*  There  is  some  corruption  at  the  end  of  this  section  ; 
but  I  think  that  the  translation  expresses  the  Emperor's 
meaning.  Whether  intelligence  rules  all  things  or 
chance  rules,  a  man  must  not  be  disturbed.  He  must 
use  the  power  that  he  has,  and  be  tranquil. 


dR.  Bntoninus  249 

do  not  aid  us  even  in  the  things  which  are  in 
our  power?  Begin,  then  to  pray  for  such 
things,  and  thou  wilt  see.  One  man  prays  thus  : 
How  shall  I  be  able  to  lie  with  that  woman  ? 
Do  thou  pray  thus  :  How  shall  I  not  desire  to 
lie  with  her  ?  Another  prays  thus  :  How  shall 
I  be  released  from  this  ?  Another  prays  :  How 
shall  I  not  desire  to  be  released  ?  Another  thus : 
How  shall  I  not  lose  my  little  son  ?  Thou  thus  : 
How  shall  I  not  be  afraid  to  lose  him  ?  In  fine, 
turn  thy  prayers  this  way,  and  see  what  comes. 
41.  Epicurus  says,  In  my  sickness  my  con- 
versation was  not  about  my  bodily  sufferings, 
nor,  says  he,  did  I  talk  on  such  subjects  to  those 
who  visited  me  ;  but  I  continued  to  discourse 
on  the  nature  of  things  as  before,  keeping  to  this 
main  point,  how  the  mind,  while  participating 
in  such  movements  as  go  on  in  the  poor  flesh, 
shall  be  free  from  perturbations  and  maintain 
its  proper  good.  Nor  did  I,  he  says,  give  the 
physicians  an  opportunity  of  putting  on  solemn 
looks,  as  if  they  were  doing  something  great, 
but  my  life  went  on  well  and  happily.  Do, 
then,  the  same  that  he  did  both  in  sickness,  if 
thou  art  sick,  and  in  any  other  circumstances  ; 
for  never  to  desert  philosophy  in  any  events  that 
may  befall  us,  nor  to  hold  trifling  talk  either 
with  an  ignorant  man  or  with  one  unacquainted 
with  nature,  is  a  principle  of  all  schools  of  phi- 


250  jfl&.  Bntoninus 

losophy ;  but  to  be  intent  only  on  that  which 
thou  art  now  doing  and  on  the  instrument  by 
which  thou  doest  it. 

42  When  thou  art  offended  with  any  man's 
shameless  conduct,  immediately  ask  thyself,  Is 
it  possible,  then,  that  shameless  men  should  not 
be  in  the  world  ?  It  is  not  possible.  Do  not, 
then,  require  what  is  impossible.  For  this  man 
also  is  one  of  those  shameless  men  who  must  of 
necessity  be  in  the  world.  Let  the  same  con- 
siderations be  present  to  thy  mind  in  the  case 
of  the  knave,  and  the  faithless  man,  and  of 
every  man  who  does  wrong  in  any  way.  For  at 
the  same  time  that  thou  dost  remind  thyself 
that  it  is  impossible  that  such  kind  of  men 
should  not  exist,  thou  wilt  become  more  kindly 
disposed  towards  every  one  individually.  It  is 
useful  to  perceive  this,  too,  immediately  when 
the  occasion  arises,  what  virtue  nature  has  given 
to  man  to  oppose  to  every  wrongful  act.  For 
she  has  given  to  man,  as  an  antidote  against  the 
stupid  man,  mildness,  and  against  another  kind 
of  man  some  other  power.  And  in  all  cases  it 
is  possible  for  thee  to  correct  by  teaching  the 
man  who  is  gone  astray.  Besides  wherein  hast 
thou  been  injured  ?  For  thou  wilt  find  that  no 
one  amongst  those  against  whom  thou  art 
irritated  has  done  any  thing  by  which  thy  mind 
could  be  made  worse  ;  but  that  which  is  evil  to 


flh.  Bntoninus  251 

thee  and  harmful  has  its  foundation  only  in  the 
mind.  And  what  harm  is  done,  or  what  is  there 
strange,  if  the  man  who  has  not  been  instructed 
does  the  acts  of  an  uninstructed  man  ?  Con- 
sider whether  thou  shouldst  not  rather  blame 
thyself,  because  thou  didst  not  expect  such  a 
man  to  err  in  such  a  way.  For  thou  hadst 
means  given  thee  by  thy  reason  to  suppose  that  it 
was  likely  that  he  would  commit  this  error,  and 
yet  thou  hast  forgotten  and  art  amazed  that  he 
has  erred.  But  most  of  all  when  thou  blamest 
a  man  as  faithless  or  ungrateful,  turn  to  thyself. 
For  the  fault  is  manifestly  thy  own,  whether 
thou  didst  trust  that  a  man  who  had  such  a  dis- 
position would  keep  his  promise,  or  when  con- 
ferring thy  kindness  thou  didst  not  confer  it 
absolutely,  nor  yet  in  such  a  way  as  to  have 
received  from  thy  very  act  all  the  profit.  For 
what  more  dost  thou  want  when  thou  hast  done 
a  man  a  service  ?  art  thou  not  content  that  thou 
has  done  something  comformable  to  thy  nature, 
and  dost  thou  seek  to  be  paid  for  it  ?  just  as  if 
the  eye  demanded  a  recompense  for  seeing,  or 
the  feet  for  walking.  For  as  these  members  are 
formed  for  particular  purposes,  and  by  working 
according  to  their  several  constitutions  obtain 
what  is  their  own  ;  *  so  also  as  man  is  formed  by 

*  'An-e^ei  to  ISiov.  This  sense  of  dtre^etj'  occurs  in  xi.,  i, 
and  iv.,  49,  also  in  St  Matthew,  vi.,  2,  anexovai  tov 
u-ktOov,  and  in  Epictetus. 


252 


/Ift.  Bntoninu6 


nature  to  acts  of  benevolence,  when  he  has  done 
any  thing  benevolent  or  in  any  other  way  con- 
ducive to  the  common  interest,  he  has  acted 
comformably  to  his  constitution,  and  he  gets 
what  is  his  own. 


WII/T  thou,  then,  my  soul,  never  be  good 
and  simple  and  one  and  naked,  more 
manifest  than  the  body  which  surrounds  thee  ? 
Wilt  thou  never  enjoy  an  affectionate  and  con- 
tented disposition?  Wilt  thou  never  be  full 
and  without  a  want  of  any  kind,  longing  for 
nothing  more,  nor  desiring  any  thing,  either 
animate  or  inanimate,  or  the  enjoyment  of 
pleasures  ?  nor  yet  desiring  time  wherein  thou 
shalt  have  longer  enjoyment,  or  place,  or  pleas- 
ant climate,  or  society  of  men  with  whom  thou 
mayest  live  in  harmony  ?  but  wilt  thou  be  satis- 
fied with  thy  present  condition,  and  pleased 
with  all  that  is  about  thee,  and  wilt  thou  con- 
vince thyself  that  thou  hast  every  thing  and  that 
it  comes  from  the  gods,  that  every  thing  is  well 
for  thee,  and  will  be  well  what  ever  shall  please 
them,  and  whatever  they  shall  give  for  the  con- 
servation of  the  perfect  living  being,*  the  good 

*  That  is  God,  (iv.,  40),  as  he  is  defined  by  Zeno.     But 
the  confusion  between  gods  and  God  is  strange. 


254  /Ifc.  Bntonfnus 

and  just  and  beautiful,  which  generates  and 
holds  together  all  things,  and  contains  and  em- 
braces all  things  which  are  dissolved  for  the 
production  of  other  like  things?  Wilt  thou 
never  be  such  that  thou  shalt  so  dwell  in  com- 
munity with  gods  and  men  as  neither  to  find 
fault  with  them  at  all,  nor  to  be  condemned  by 
them  ? 

2.  Observe  what  thy  nature  requires,  so  far 
as  thou  art  governed  by  nature  only  :  then  do  it 
and  accept  it,  if  thy  nature,  so  far  as  thou  art  a 
living  being,  shall  not  be  made  worse  by  it. 
And  next  thou  must  observe  what  thy  nature 
requires  so  far  as  thou  art  a  living  being.  And 
all  this  thou  mayest  allow  thyself,  if  thy  nature 
so  far  as  thou  art  a  rational  animal,  shall  not  be 
made  worse  by  it.  But  the  rational  animal  is 
consequently  also  a  political  [social]  animal. 
Use  these  rules,  then,  and  trouble  thyself  about 
nothing  else. 

3.  Every  thing  which  happens  either  happens 
in  such  wise  as  thou  art  formed  by  nature  to 
bear  it,  or  as  thou  art  not  formed  by  nature  to 
bear  it.  If,  then,  it  happens  to  thee  in  such 
way  as  thou  art  formed  by  nature  to  bear  it, 
do  not  complain,  but  bear  it  as  thou  art  formed 
by  nature  to  bear  it.  But  if  it  happens  in  such 
wise  as  thou  art  not  formed  by  nature  to  bear 
it,  do  not  complain,  for  it  will  perish  after  it 


/lib.  Bntoninug  255 

has  consumed  thee.  Remember,  however,  that 
thou  art  formed  by  nature  to  bear  every  thing, 
with  respect  to  which  it  depends  on  thy  own 
opinion  to  make  it  endurable  and  tolerable,  by 
thinking  that  it  is  either  thy  interest  or  thy  duty 
to  do  this. 

4.  If  a  man  is  mistaken,  instruct  him  kindly 
and  show  him  his  error.  But  if  thou  art  not 
able,  blame  thyself,  or  blame  not  even  thyself. 

5.  Whatever  may  happen  to  thee,  it  was  pre- 
pared for  thee  from  all  eternity  ;  and  the  impli- 
cation of  causes  was  from  eternity  spinning  the 
thread  of  thy  being,  and  of  that  which  is  inci- 
dent to  it  (iii.,  11;  iv.,  26). 

6.  Whether  the  universe  is  [a  concourse  of] 
atoms,  or  nature  [is  a  system],  let  this  first  be 
established,  that  I  am  a  part  of  the  whole  which 
is  governed  by  nature  ;  next,  I  am  in  a  manner 
intimately  related  to  the  parts  which  are  of  the 
same  kind  with  myself.  For  remembering  this, 
inasmuch  as  I  am  a  part,  I  shall  be  discontented 
with  none  of  the  things  which  are  assigned  to 
me  out  of  the  whole  ;  for  nothing  is  injurious 
to  the  part,  if  it  is  for  the  advantage  of  the 
whole.  For  the  whole  contains  nothing  which 
is  not  for  its  advantage  ;  and  all  natures  indeed 
have  this  common  principle,  but  the  nature  of 
the  universe  has  this  principle  besides,  that  it 
cannot  be  compelled  even  by  any  external  cause 


256  /ifc.  Bntoninus 

to  generate  any  thing  harmful  to  itself.  By 
remembering,  then,  that  I  am  a  part  of  such  a 
whole,  I  shall  be  content  with  every  thing  that 
happens.  And  inasmuch  as  I  am  in  a  manner 
intimately  related  to  the  parts  which  are  of  the 
same  kind  with  myself,  I  shall  do  nothing  un- 
social, but  I  shall  rather  direct  myself  to  the 
things  which  are  of  the  same  kind  with  myself, 
and  I  shall  turn  all  my  efforts  to  the  common 
interest,  and  divert  them  from  the  contrary. 
Now,  if  these  things  are  done  so,  life  must  flow 
on  happily,  just  as  thou  mayest  observe  that 
the  life  of  a  citizen  is  happy,  who  continues  a 
course  of  action  which  is  advantageous  to  his 
fellow-citizens,  and  is  content  with  whatever  the 
state  may  assign  to  him. 

7.  The  parts  of  the  whole,  every  thing,  I 
mean,  which  is  naturally  comprehended  in  the 
universe,  must  of  necessity  perish  ;  but  let  this 
be  understood  in  this  sense,  that  they  must  un- 
dergo change.  But  if  this  is  naturally  both  an 
evil  and  a  necessity  for  the  parts,  the  whole 
would  not  continue  in  a  good  condition, 
the  parts  being  subject  to  change  and  consti- 
tuted so  as  to  perish  in  various  ways.  For 
whether  did  nature  herself  design  to  do  evil  to 
the  things  which  are  parts  of  herself,  and  to 
make  them  subject  to  evil  and  of  necessity  fall 
into  evil,  or  have  such  results  happened  with- 


/Hb.  Bntoninus  257 

out  her  knowing  it  ?  Both  these  suppositions, 
indeed,  are  incredible.  But  if  a  man  should 
even  drop  the  term  Nature  [as  an  efficient 
power],  and  should  speak  of  these  things  as 
natural,  even  then  it  would  be  ridiculous  to  af- 
firm at  the  same  time  that  the  parts  of  the 
whole  are  in  their  nature  subject  to  change, 
and  at  the  same  time  to  be  surprised  or  vexed 
as  if  something  were  happening  contrary  to 
nature,  particularly  as  the  dissolution  of  things 
is  into  those  things  of  which  each  thing  is 
composed.  For  there  is  either  a  dispersion  of 
the  elements  out  of  which  every  thing  has  been 
compounded,  or  a  change  from  the  solid  to  the 
earthy  and  from  the  airy  to  the  aerial,  so  that 
these  parts  are  taken  back  into  the  universal 
reason,  whether  this  at  certain  periods  is  con- 
sumed by  fire  or  renewed  by  eternal  changes. 
And  do  not  imagine  that  the  solid  and  the  airy 
part  belong  to  thee  from  the  time  of  genera- 
tion. For  all  this  received  its  accretion  only 
yesterday  and  the  day  before,  as  one  may  say, 
from  the  food  and  the  air  which  is  inspired. 
This,  then,  which  has  received  [the  accretion], 
changes,  not  that  which  thy  mother  brought 
forth.  But  suppose  that  this  [which  thy 
mother  brought  forth]  implicates  thee  very 
much  with  that  other  part,  which  has  the 
peculiar   quality    [of  change],  this  is   nothing 


258  dfc.  Bntonfnus 

in   fact  in   the   way   of    objection   to   what  is 
said.* 

8.  When  thou  hast  assumed  these  names, 
good,  modest,  true,  rational,  a  man  of  equani- 
mity, and  magnanimous,  take  care  that  thou 
dost  not  change  these  names ;  and  if  thou 
shouldst  lose  them,  quickly  return  to  them. 
And  remember  that  the  term  Rational  was  in- 
tended to  signify  a  discriminating  attention  to 
every  several  thing  and  freedom  from  negli- 
gence ;  and  that  Equanimity  is  the  voluntary 
acceptance  of  the  things  which  are  assigned  to 
thee  by  the  common  nature ;  and  that  Mag- 
nanimity is  the  elevation  of  the  intelligent 
part  above  the  pleasurable  or  painful  sensa- 
tions of  the  flesh,  and  above  that  poor  thing 
called  fame,  and  death,  and  all  such  things. 
If,  then,  thou  maintainest  thyself  in  the  pos- 
session of  these  names,  without  desiring  to  be 
called  by  these  names  by  others,  thou  wilt  be 
another  person  and  wilt  enter  on  another  life. 
For  to  continue  to  be  such  as  thou  hast  hither- 
to been,  and  to  be  torn  in  pieces  and  denied  in 

*  The  end  of  this  section  is  perhaps  corrupt.  The 
meaning  is  very  obscure.  I  have  given  that  meaning 
which  appears  to  be  consistent  with  the  whole  argu- 
ment. The  Emperor  here  maintains  that  the  essential 
part  of  man  is  unchangeable,  and  that  the  other  parts, 
if  they  change  or  perish,  do  not  affect  that  which  really 
constitutes  the  man.  See  the  Philosophy  of  Antoni- 
nus, p.  47,  note  13.  Schultz  supposed  "thy  mother  ' 
to  mean  nature,  >?  (f>vVts-    But  I  doubt  about  that 


/Ifc.  Bntonfnus  259 

such  a  life,  is  the  character  of  a  very  stupid 
man,  and  one  overfond  of  his  life,  and  like 
those  half-devoured  fighters  with  wild  beasts, 
who,  though  covered  with  wounds  and  gore, 
still  entreat  to  be  kept  to  the  following  day, 
though  they  will  be  exposed  in  the  same  state 
to  the  same  claws  and  bites.*  Therefore,  fix 
thyself  in  the  possession  of  these  few  names : 
and  if  thou  art  able  to  abide  in  them,  abide  as 
if  thou  wast  removed  to  certain  islands  of  the 
Happy,  f  But  if  thou  shalt  perceive  that  thou 
fallest  out  of  them,  and  dost  not  maintain  thy 
hold,  go  courageously  into  some  nook  where 

*  See  Seneca,  Epp.  70,  on  these  exhibitions  which 
amused  the  people  in  those  days.  These  fighters  were 
the  Bestiarii,  some  of  whom  may  have  been  criminals, 
but  even  if  they  were,  the  exhibition  was  equally  char- 
acteristic of  the  depraved  habits  of  the  spectators. 

t  The  islands  of  the  Happy,  or  the  Fortunatee  Insulae, 
are  spoken  of  by  the  Greek  and  Roman  writers.  They 
were  the  abode  of  heroes,  like  Achilles  and  Diomedes, 
as  we  see  in  the  Scolion  of  Harmodius  and  Aristogiton. 
Sertorius  heard  of  the  islands  at  Cadiz  from  some  sailors 
who  had  been  there,  and  he  had  a  wish  to  go  and  live  in 
them  and  rest  from  his  troubles.  (Plutarch,  Sertorius, 
c.  8.)  In  the  Odyssey,  Proteus  told  Menelaus  that  he 
should  not  die  in  Argos,  but  be  removed  to  a  place  at  the 
boundary  of  the  earth  where  Rhadamanthus  dwelt 
(Odyssey,  iv.,  565)  : 

For  there  in  sooth  man's  life  is  easiest  : 
Nor  snow  nor  raging  storm  nor  rain  is  there, 
But  ever  gently  breathing  gales  of  Zephyr 
Oceanus  sends  up  to  gladden  man. 

It  is  certain  that  the  writer  of  the  Odyssey  only  fol- 
lows some  old  legend  without  having  any  knowledge  of 
any  place  which  corresponds  to  his  description.  The 
two  islands  which  Sertorius  heard  of  may  be  Madeira 
and  the  adjacent  island.    Compare  Pindar,  Ol.  ii.,  129. 


260  dfc.  Bntontnus 

thou  shalt  maintain  them,  or  even  depart  at 
once  from  life,  not  in  passion,  but  with  sim- 
plicity and  freedom  and  modesty,  after  doing 
this  one  [laudable]  thing  at  least  in  thy  life,  to 
have  gone  out  of  it  thus.  In  order,  however, 
to  the  remembrance  of  these  names,  it  will 
greatly  help  thee  if  thou  rememberest  the 
gods,  and  that  they  wish  not  to  be  nattered, 
but  wish  all  reasonable  beings  to  be  made  like 
themselves  ;  and  if  thou  rememberest  that  what 
does  the  work  of  a  fig-tree  is  a  fig-tree,  and 
that  what  does  the  work  of  a  dog  is  a  dog, 
and  that  what  does  the  work  of  a  bee  is  a  bee, 
and  that  what  does  the  work  of  a  man  is  a 
man. 

9.  Mimi,*  war,  astonishment,  torpor,  slavery, 
will  daily  wipe  out  those  holy  principles  of 
thine.  fHow  many  things  without  studying 
nature  dost  thou  imagine,  and  how  many  dost 
thou  neglect  ?f  But  it  is  thy  duty  so  to  look 
on  and  so  to  do  every  thing,  that  at  the  same 
time  the  power  of  dealing  with  circumstances 
is  perfected,  and  the  contemplative  faculty  is 
exercised,  and  the  confidence  which  comes 
from  the  knowledge  of  each  several  thing  is 
maintained  without  showing  it,  but  yet  not 

*  Corais  conjectured  /aZo-os  "hatred  "  in  place  of  Mimi, 
Roman  plays  in  which  action  and  gesticulation  were  all 
or  nearly  all. 

t  This  is  corrupt.    See  the  edition  of  Schultz. 


dfe.  Bntoninus  261 

concealed.  For  when  wilt  thou  enjoy  simplici- 
ty when  gravity,  and  when  the  knowledge  of 
every  several  thing,  both  what  it  is  in  sub- 
stance, and  what  place  it  has  in  the  universe, 
and  how  long  it  is  formed  to  exist,  and  of  what 
things  it  is  compounded,  and  to  whom  it  can 
belong,  and  who  are  able  both  to  give  it  and 
take  it  away  ? 

10.  A  spider  is  proud  when  it  has  caught  a  fly, 
and  another  when  he  has  caught  a  poor  hare, 
and  another  when  he  has  taken  a  little  fish  in 
a  net,  and  another  when  he  has  taken  wild 
boars,  and  another  when  he  has  taken  bears, 
and  another  when  he  has  taken  Sarmatians. 
Are  not  these  robbers,  if  thou  examinest  their 
opinions  ?  * 

11.  Acquire  the  contemplative  way  of  seeing 
how  all  things  change  into  one  another,  and 
constantly  attend  to  it,  and  exercise  thyself 
about  this  part  [of  philosophy].  For  nothing 
is  so  much  adapted  to  produce  magnanimity. 
Such  a  man  has  put  off  the  body,  and  as  he 
sees  that  he  must,  no  one  knows  how  soon,  go 
away  from  among  men  and  leave  every  thing 
here,  he  gives  himself  up  entirely  to  just  doing 
in  all  his  actions,  and  in  every  thing  else  that 

*  Marcus  means  to  say  that  conquerors  are  robbers. 
He  hhnself  warred  against  Sarmatians,  and  was  a  rob- 
ber, as  he  says,  like  the  rest.  But  compare  the  life  of 
Avidius  Casslus,  c.  4,  by  Vulcatius. 


262  /ifo.  Bntoninus 

happens  he  resigns  himself  to  the  universal 
nature.  But  as  to  what  any  man  shall  say  or 
think  about  him  or  do  against  him,  he  never 
even  thinks  of  it,  being  himself  contented  with 
these  two  things,  with  acting  justly  in  what  he 
now  does,  and  being  satisfied  with  what  is  now 
assigned  to  him  ;  and  he  lays  aside  all  distract- 
ing and  busy  pursuits,  and  desires  nothing  else 
than  to  accomplish  the  straight  course  through 
the  law,*  and  by  accomplishing  the  straight 
course  to  follow  God. 

12.  What  need  is  there  of  suspicious  fear, 
since  it  is  in  thy  power  to  inquire  what  ought 
to  be  done  ?  And  if  thou  seest  clear,  go  by  this 
way  content,  without  turning  back  :  but  if  thou 
dost  not  see  clear,  stop  and  take  the  best  ad- 
visers. But  if  any  other  things  oppose  thee,  go 
on  according  to  thy  powers  with  due  considera- 
tion, keeping  to  that  which  appears  to  be  just. 
For  it  is  best  to  reach  this  object,  and  if  thou 
dost  fail,  let  thy  failure  be  in  attempting  this. 
He  who  follows  reason  in  all  things  is  both 
tranquil  and  active  at  the  same  time,  and  also 
cheerful  and  collected. 

13.  Inquire  of  thyself  as  soon  as  thou  wakest 
from  sleep  whether  it  will  make  any  difference 
to  thee,  if  another  does  what  is  just  and  right. 

*  By  the  law,  he  means  the  divine  law,  obedience  to 
the  will  of  God. 


jflfc,  Bntontnus  263 

It    will    make    no    difference    (vi.,    32 ;    viii., 

55). 

Thou  hast  not  forgotten,  I  suppose,  that  those 
who  assume  arrogant  airs  in  bestowing  their 
praise  or  blame  on  others,  are  such  as  they  are 
at  bed  and  at  board,  and  thou  hast  not  forgotten 
what  they  do,  and  what  they  avoid  and  what 
they  pursue,  and  how  they  steal  and  how  they 
rob,  not  with  hands  and  feet,  but  with  their 
most  valuable  part,  by  means  of  which  there  is 
produced,  when  a  man  chooses,  fidelity,  mod- 
esty, truth,  law,  a  good  daemon  [happiness]  ? 
(vii.,  17). 

14.  To  her  who  gives  and  takes  back  all,  to 
nature,  the  man  who  is  instructed  and  modest 
says,  Give  what  thou  wilt ;  take  back  what 
thou  wilt.  And  he  says  this  not  proudly,  but 
obediently  and  well  pleased  with  her. 

15.  Short  is  the  little  which  remains  to  thee 
of  life.  Live  as  on  a  mountain.  For  it  makes 
no  difference  whether  a  man  lives  there  or  here, 
if  he  lives  everywhere  in  the  world  as  in  a  state 
[political  community].  Let  men  see,  let  them 
know  a  real  man  who  lives  according  to  na- 
ture. If  they  cannot  endure  him,  let  them 
kill  him.  For  that  is  better  than  to  live  thus 
[as  men  do]. 

16.  No  longer  talk  at  all  about  the  kind  of 
man  that  a  good  man  ought  to  be,  but  be  such. 


264  /IB.  Bntonfnus 

17.  Constantly  contemplate  the  whole  of 
time  and  the  whole  of  substance,  and  consider 
that  all  individual  things  as  to  substance  are  a 
grain  of  a  fig,  and  as  to  time  a  turning  of  a 
gimlet. 

18.  Look  at  every  thing  that  exists,  and  ob- 
serve that  it  is  already  in  dissolution  and  in 
change,  and  as  it  were  putrefaction  or  disper- 
sion, or  that  every  thing  is  so  constituted  by  na- 
ture as  to  die. 

19.  Consider  what  men  are  when  they  are  eat- 
ing, sleeping,  generating,  easing  themselves  and 
so  forth.  Then  what  kind  of  men  they  are  when 
they  are  imperious  |  and  arrogant,  or  angry  and 
scolding  from  their  elevated  place.  But  a  short 
time  ago  to  how  many  they  were  slaves  and 
what  things  ;  and  after  a  little  time  consider  in 
what  a  condition  they  will  be. 

20.  That  is  for  the  good  of  each  thing,  which 
the  universal  nature  brings  to  each.  And  it  is 
for  its  good  at  the  time  when  nature  brings  it. 

21.  "  The  earth  loves  the  shower  "  ;  and  "  the 
solemn  aether  loves"  ;  and  the  universe  loves 
to  make  whatever  is  about  to  be.  I  say  then  to 
the  universe,  that  I  love  as  thou  lovest.  And  is 
not  this  too  said,  that  "this  or  that  loves  [is 
wont]  to  be  produced  ?  "  * 

*  These  words  from  Euripides.  They  are  cited  by 
Aristotle,  Ethic  Nicom.  viii.,  i.  Athenaeus  (xiii.,  296)  and 
^>toboeus  quote  seven  complete  lines  beginning  epa  fiiy 


dfo.  Bntontnug  265 

22.  Either  thou  livest  here  and  hast  already 
accustomed  thyself  to  it,  or  thou  art  going  away, 
and  this  was  thy  own  will ;  or  thou  art  dying 
and  hast  discharged  thy  duty.  But  besides 
these  things  there  is  nothing.  Be  of  good  cheer, 
then. 

23.  Let  this  always  be  plain  to  thee,  that  this 
piece  of  land  is  like  any  other ;  and  that  all 
things  here  are  the  same  with  things  on  the  top 
of  a  mountain,  or  on  the  sea-shore,  or  wherever 
thou  choosest  to  be.  For  thou  wilt  find  just 
what  Plato  says,  Dwelling  within  the  walls  of  a 
city  as  in  a  shepherd's  fold  on  a  mountain. 
[The  three  last  words  are  omitted  in  the  trans- 
lation.] * 

24.  What  is  my  ruling  faculty  now  to  me? 

and  of  what  nature  am  I  now  making  it  ?  and 

for  what  purpose  am  I  now  using  it  ?  Is  it  void 

of  understanding  ?  is  it  loosed  and  rent  asunder 

from   social  life  ?  is  it  melted  into  and  mixed 

with  the  poor  flesh  so  as  to  move  together  with 

it? 

6/x/3pou  yala.  There  is  a  similar  fragment  of  ilvschylus, 
Danaides,  also  quoted  by  Athenaeus. 

It  was  the  fashion  of  the  Stoics  to  work  on  the  mean- 
ings of  words.  So  Antoninus  here  takes  the  verb  </><.Aet, 
"loves,"  which  has  alsothesense  of  "is  wont,"  "uses," 
and  the  like.  He  finds  in  the  common  language  of  man- 
kind a  philosophical  truth,  and  most  great  truths  are 
expressed  in  the  common  language  of  life  ;  some  under- 
stand them,  but  most  people  utter  them  without  know- 
ing how  much  they  mean. 

;  Plato,  Theaet.  174  D.  E.  But  compare  the  original 
with  the  use  that  Antoninus  has  made  of  it. 


266  /K>,  antonfnus 

25.  He  who  flies  from  his  master  is  a  runaway; 
but  the  law  is  master,  and  he  who  breaks  the 
law  is  a  runaway.  And  he  also  who  is  grieved 
or  angry  or  afraid, f  is  dissatisfied  because  some- 
thing has  been  or  is  or  shall  be  of  the  things 
which  are  appointed  by  him  who  rules  all 
things,  and  he  is  Law,  and  assigns  to  every  man 
what  is  fit.  He  then  who  fears  or  is  grieved  or 
is  angry  is  a  runaway."* 

26.  A  man  deposits  seed  in  a  womb  and  goes 
away,  and  then  another  cause  takes  it,  and  la- 
bors on  it  and  makes  a  child.  What  a  thing 
from  such  a  material !  Again,  the  child  passes 
food  down  through  the  throat,  and  then  another 
cause  takes  it  and  makes  perception  and  motion, 
and  in  fine  life  and  strength  and  other  things ; 
how  many  and  how  strange  !  Observe  then  the 
things  which  are  produced  in  such  a  hidden 
way,  and  see  the  power  just  as  we  see  the  power 
which  carries  things  downwards  and  upwards, 
not  with  the  eyes,  but  still  no  less  plainly  (vii., 

75). 

27.  Constantly  consider  how  all  things  such 

as  they  now  are,  in  time  past  also  were ;  and 

consider  that  they  will  be  the  same  again.  And 

place  before  thy  eyes  entire  dramas  and  stages 

of  the  same  form,   whatever  thou  hast  learned 

*  Antoninus  is  here  playing  on  the  etymology  of 
vd/ixos,  law,  assignment,  that  which  assigns  (ye/uei)  to 
every  man  his  portion 


dfc.  Bntonfttus  267 

from  thy  experience  or  from  older  history  ;  for 
example,  the  whole  court  ofHadrianus,  and  the 
whole  court  of  Antoninus,  and  the  whole  court 
of  Philippus,  Alexander,  Croesus  ;  for  all  those 
were  such  dramas  as  we  see  now,  only  with 
different  actors. 

28.  Imagine  every  man  who  is  grieved  at  any 
thing  or  discontented  to  be  like  a  pig  which  is 
sacrificed  and  kicks  and  screams. 

Like  this  pig  also  is  he  who  on  his  bed  in  si- 
lence laments  the  bonds  in  which  we  are  held. 
And  consider  that  only  to  the  rational  animal  is 
it  given  to  follow  voluntarily  what  happens  ; 
but  simply  to  follow  is  a  necessity  imposed  on 
all. 

29.  Severally  on  the  occasion  of  every  thing 
that  thou  doest,  pause  and  ask  thyself,  if  death 
is  a  dreadful  thing  because  it  deprives  thee  of 
this. 

30.  When  thou  art  offended  at  any  man's 
fault,  forthwith  turn  to  thyself  and  reflect  in 
what  like  manner  thou  dost  err  thyself ;  for  ex- 
ample, in  thinking  that  money  is  a  good  thing, 
or  pleasure,  or  a  bit  of  reputation,  and  the  like. 
For  by  attending  to  this  thou  wilt  quickly  for- 
get thy  anger,  if  this  consideration  also  is  added, 
that  the  man  is  compelled  :  for  what  else  could 
he  do  ?  or,  if  thou  art  able,  take  away  from  him 
the  compulsion. 


268  fa,  Bntoninus 

31.  When  thou  hast  seen  Satyron  *  the  Socra- 
tic,f  think  of  either  Butyches  or  Hymen,  and 
when  thou  hast  seen  Euphrates,  think  of  Buty- 
chion  or  Silvauus,  and  when  thou  hast  seen  Al- 
ciphron  think  of  Tropseophorus,  and  when 
thou  hast  seen  Xenophon  think  of  Crito  f  or 
Severus,  and  when  thou  hast  looked  on  thyself, 
think  of  any  other  Caesar,  and  in  the  case  of 
every  one  do  in  like  manner.  Then  let  this 
thought  be  in  thy  mind,  Where  then  are  those 
men  ?  Nowhere,  or  nobody  knows  where.  For 
thus  continuously  thou  wilt  look  at  human 
things  as  smoke  and  nothing  at  all,  especially  if 
thou  refiectest  at  the  same  time  that  what  has 
once  changed  will  never  exist  again  in  the  in- 
finite duration  of  time.  But  thou,  in  what  a 
brief  space  of  time  is  thy  existence  ?  And  why 
art  thou  not  content  to  pass  through  this  short 
time  in  an  orderly  way  ?  What  matter  and  op- 
portunity [for  thy  activity]  art  thou  avoiding  ? 
For  what  else  are  all  these  things,  except  exer- 
cises for  the  reason,  when  it  has  viewed  care- 
fully and  by  examination  into  their  nature  the 

*  Nothing  is  known  of  Satyron  or  Saty rion  ;  nor,  I  be- 
lieve, of  Eutyches  or  Hymen.  Euphrates  is  honorably 
mentioned  by  Epictetus"(iii.,  15,  8;  iv.,8, 17).  Pliny  (Epp. 
i.,  10),  speaks  very  highly  of  him.  He  obtained  the  per- 
mission of  the  Emperor  Hadrian  to  drink  poison  be- 
cause he  was  old  and  in  bad  health  (Dion  Cassius,  69,  c.  8). 

1  Crito  is  the  friend  of  vSocrates  ;  and  he  was,  itappears, 
also  a  friend  of  Xenophon.  When  the  Emperor  says 
"  seen  "  (iSuir),  he  does  not  mean  with  the  eyes. 


.flfc.  Bntoninus  269 

things  which  happen  in  life  ?  Persevere  then 
until  thou  shalt  have  made  these  things  thy 
own,  as  the  stomach  which  is  strengthened 
makes  all  things  its  own,  as  the  blazing  fire 
makes  flame  and  brightness  out  of  every  thing 
that  is  thrown  into  it. 

32.  Let  it  not  be  in  any  man's  power  to  say 
truly  of  thee  that  thou  art  not  simple  or  that 
thou  art  not  good  ;  but  let  him  be  a  liar  who- 
ever shall  think  any  thing  of  this  kind  about 
thee  ;  and  this  is  altogether  in  thy  power.  For 
who  is  he  that  shall  hinder  thee  from  being 
good  and  simple  ?  Do  thou  only  determine  to 
live  no  longer,  unless  thou  shalt  be  such.  For 
neither  does  reason  allow  [thee  to  live],  if  thou 
art  not  such.* 

33.  What  is  that  which  as  to  this  material 
[our  life]  can  be  done  or  said  in  the  way  most 
conformable  to  reason.  For  whatever  this  may 
be,  it  is  in  thy  power  to  do  it  or  to  say  it,  and 
do  not  make  excuses  that  thou  art  hindered. 
Thou  wilt  not  cease  to  lament  till  thy  mind  is 
in  such  a  condition  that,  what  luxury  is  to  those 
who  enjoy  pleasure,  such  shall  be  to  thee,  in  the 
matter  which  is  subjected  and  presented  to  thee, 
the  doing  of  the  things  which  are  conformable 
to  man's  constitution  ;  for  a  man  ought  to  con- 
sider as  an  enjoyment  every  thing  which  it  is 

♦Compare  Epictetus  L,  29,  28. 


270  /I6.  Bntoninus 

in  his  power  to  do  according  to  his  own  nature. 
And  it  is  in  his  power  everywhere.  Now,  it  is 
not  given  to  a  cylinder  to  move  everywhere  by 
its  own  motion,  nor  yet  to  water  nor  to  fire,  nor 
to  any  thing  else  which  is  governed  by  nature 
or  an  irrational  soul,  for  the  things  which  check 
them  and  stand  in  the  way  are  many.  But  in- 
telligence and  reason  are  able  to  go  through 
every  thing  that  opposes  them,  and  in  such 
manner  as  they  are  formed  by  nature  and  as 
they  choose.  Place  before  thy  eyes  this  facility 
with  which  the  reason  will  be  carried  through 
all  things,  as  fire  upwards,  as  a  stone  down- 
wards, as  a  cylinder  down  an  inclined  surface, 
and  seek  for  nothing  further.  For  all  other  ob- 
stacles either  affect  the  body  only  which  is  a 
dead  thing  ;  or,  except  through  opinion  and  the 
yielding  of  the  reason  itself,  they  do  not  crush 
nor  do  any  harm  of  any  kind ;  for  if  they  did, 
he  who  felt  it  would  immediately  become  bad. 
Now,  in  the  case  of  all  things  which  have  a  cer- 
tain constitution,  whatever  harm  may  happen 
to  any  of  them,  that  which  is  so  affected  be- 
comes consequently  worse  ;  but  in  the  like  case, 
a  man  becomes  both  better,  if  one  may  say  so, 
and  more  worthy  of  praise  by  making  a  right 
use  of  these  accidents.  And  finally  remember 
that  nothing  harms  him  who  is  really  a  citizen, 
which  does  not  harm  the  state  ;  nor  yet  does 


/lft.  Bntontnus  271 

any  thing  harm  the  state,  which  does  not  harm 
law  [order]  ;  and  of  these  things  which  are 
called  misfortunes  not  one  harms  law.  What 
then  does  not  harm  law  does  not  harm  either 
state  or  citizen. 

34.  To  him  who  is  penetrated  by  true  prin- 
ciples even  the  briefest  precept  is  sufficient,  and 
any  common  precept,  to  remind  him  that  he 
should  be  free  from  grief  and  fear.  For  ex- 
example — 

leaves,  some  the  wind  scatters  on  the  ground — 
So  is  the  race  of  men.* 

Leaves,  also,  are  thy  children  ;  and  leaves,  too, 
are  they  who  cry  out  as  if  they  were  worthy  of 
credit  and  bestow  their  praise,  or  on  the  con- 
trary curse,  or  secretly  blame  and  sneer ;  and 
leaves,  in  like  manner,  are  those  who  shall  re- 
ceive and  transmit  a  man's  fame  to  after-times. 
For  all  such  things  as  these  "are  produced  in 
the  season  of  spring,"  as  the  poet  says  ;  then 
the  wind  casts  them  down  ;  then  the  forest  pro- 
duces other  leaves  in  their  places.  But  a  brief 
existence  is  common  to  all  things,  and  yet  thou 
avoidest  and  pursuest  all  things  as  if  they  would 
be  eternal.  A  little  time,  and  thou  shalt  close 
thy  eyes  ;  and  him  who  has  attended  thee  to 
thy  grave  another  soon  will  lament. 

*  Homer,  II.,  vi.,  146. 


272  dfc.  Bntonfnus 

35.  The  healthy  eye  ought  to  see  all  visible 
things  and  not  to  say,  I  wish  for  green  things  ; 
for  this  is  the  condition  of  a  diseased  eye.  And 
the  healthy  hearing  and  smelling  ought  to  be 
ready  to  perceive  all  that  can  be  heard  and 
smelled.  And  the  healthy  stomach  ought  to  be 
with  respect  to  all  food  just  as  the  mill  with  re- 
spect to  all  things  which  it  is  formed  to  grind. 
And  accordingly  the  healthy  understanding 
ought  to  be  prepared  for  every  thing  which 
happens  ;  but  that  which  says,  Let  my  dear 
children  live,  and  let  all  men  praise  whatever 
I  may  do,  is  an  eye  which  seeks  for  green 
things,  or  teeth  which  seek  for  soft  things. 

36.  There  is  no  man  so  fortunate  that  there 
shall  not  be  by  him  when  he  is  dying  some  who 
are  pleased  with  what  is  going  to  happen.* 
Suppose  that  he  was  a  good  and  wise  man,  will 
there  not  be  at  last  some  one  to  say  to  himself, 
Let  us  at  last  breathe  freely  being  relieved  from 
this  schoolmaster?  It  is  true  that  he  was  harsh 
to  none  of  us,  but  I  perceived  that  he  tacitly 
condemns  us.  This  is  what  is  said  of  a  good  man. 
But  in  our  own  case  how  many  other  things  are 
there  for  which  there  are  many  who  wish  to  get 
rid  of  us.     Thou  wilt  consider  this  then  when 


*  He  says  ko.k6v,  but  as  he  affirms  in  other  places  that 
death  is  no  evil,  he  must  mean  what  others  may  call  an 
evil,  and  he  means  only  "  what  is  going  to  happen." 


flb,  Bntoninus  273 

thou  art  dying,  and  thou  wilt  depart  more  con- 
tentedly by  reflecting  thus :  I  am  going  away 
from  such  a  life,  in  which  even  my  associates  in 
behalf  of  whom  I  have  striven  so  much,  prayed, 
and  cared,  themselves  wish  me  to  depart,  hoping 
perchance  to  get  some  little  advantage  by  it. 
Why  then  should  a  man  cling  to  a  longer  stay 
here?  Do  not,  however,  for  this  reason  go  away 
less  kindly  disposed  to  them,  but  preserving  thy 
own  character  and  friendly  and  benevolent  and 
mild,  and  on  the  other  hand  not  as  if  thou  wast 
torn  away ;  but  as  when  a  man  dies  a  quiet 
death,  the  poor  soul  is  easily  separated  from 
the  body,  such  also  ought  thy  departure  from 
men  to  be,  for  nature  united  thee  to  them  and 
associated  thee.  But  does  she  now  dissolve 
the  union  ?  Well,  I  am  separated  as  from  kins- 
men, not,  however,  dragged  resisting,  but  with- 
out compulsion  ;  for  this  too  is  one  of  the  things 
according  to  nature. 

37.  Accustom  thyself  as  much  as  possible  on 
the  occasion  of  any  thing  being  done  by  any 
person  to  inquire  with  thyself,  For  what  object 
is  this  man  doing  this  ?  but  begin  with  thyself, 
and  examine  thyself  first. 

38.  Remember  that  this  which  pulls  the 
strings  is  the  thing  which  is  hidden  within  ;  this 
is  the  power  of  persuasion,  this  is  life,  this,  if 
one  may  say  so,  is  man.   In  contemplating  thy- 


274 


tffc.  Bntontnus 


self  never  include  the  vessel  which  surrounds 
thee,  and  these  instruments  which  are  attached 
about  it.  For  they  are  like  to  an  axe,  differing 
only  in  this,  that  they  grow  to  the  body.  For 
indeed  there  is  no  more  use  in  these  parts  with- 
out the  cause  which  moves  and  checks  them, 
than  in  the  weaver's  shuttle,  and  the  writer's 
pen,  and  the  driver's  whip.* 

*  See  The  Philosophy  of  Antoninus,  note  f,  p.  62. 


XI. 


THBSB  are  the  properties  of  the  rational 
soul;  it  sees  itself,  analyses  itself,  and 
makes  itself  such  as  it  chooses  ;  the  fruit  which 
it  bears  itself  enjoys — for  the  fruits  of  plants 
and  that  in  animals  which  corresponds  to  fruits 
others  enjoy — it  obtains  its  own  end,  wherever 
the  limit  of  life  may  be  fixed.  Not  as  in  a  dance 
and  in  a  play  and  in  such  like  things,  where 
the  whole  action  is  incomplete  if  any  thing 
cuts  it  short ;  but  in  every  part  and  wherever  it 
may  be  stopped,  it  makes  what  has  been  set  be- 
fore it  full  and  complete,  so  that  it  can  say,  I 
have  what  is  my  own.  And  further  it  traverses 
the  whole  universe,  and  the  surrounding 
vacuum,  and  surveys  its  form,  and  it  extends 
itself  into  the  infinity  of  time,  and  embraces 
and  comprehends  the  *  periodical  renovation  of 
all  things,  and  it  comprehends  that  those  who 
come  after  us  will  see  nothing  new,  nor  have 
those  before  us  seen  any  thing  more,  but  in  a 

*  Ti)v  7repto6cAC7]v  na\iyyeveaiap.     See  v.,  13,  32  ;  X.,  7. 


276  /lib.  Bntoninus 

manner  he  who  is  forty  years  old,  if  he  has  any 
understanding  at  all,  has  seen  by  virtue  of  the 
uniformity  that  prevails  all  things  which  have 
been  and  all  that  will  be.  This  too  is  a  property 
of  the  rational  soul,  love  of  one's  neighbor,  and 
truth  and  modesty,  and  to  value  nothing  more 
than  itself,  which  is  also  the  property  of  Law.* 
Thus  then  right  reason  differs  not  at  all  from 
the  reason  of  justice. 

2.  Thou  wilt  set  little  value  on  pleasing  song 
and  dancing  and  the  pancratium,  if  thou  wilt 
distribute  the  melody  of  the  voice  into  its  sev- 
eral sounds,  and  ask  thyself  as  to  each,  if  thou 
art  mastered  by  this  ;  for  thou  wilt  be  prevented 
by  shame  from  confessing  it ;  and  in  the  matter 
of  dancing,  if  at  each  movement  and  attitude 
thou  wilt  do  the  same  ;  and  the  like  also  in 
the  matter  of  the  pancratium.  In  all  things, 
then,  except  virtue  and  the  acts  of  virtue, 
remember  to  apply  thyself  to  their  several 
parts,  and  by  this  division  to  come  to  value 
them  little  ;  and  apply  this  rule  also  to  thy 
whole  life. 

3.  What  a  soul  that  is  which  is  ready,  if  at 
any  moment  it  must  be  separated  from  the  body, 
and  ready  either  to  be  extinguished  or  dispersed, 
or  continue  to  exist ;  but  so  that  this  readiness 
comes  from  a  man's  own  judgment,  not  from 

*I,aw  is  the  order  by  which  all  things  are  governed. 


/lib.  Bntoninus  277 

mere  obstinacy,  as  with  the  Christians,*  but 
considerately  and  with  dignity  and  in  a  way  to 
persuade  another,  without  tragic  show. 

4.  Have  I  done  something  for  the  general  in- 
terest ?  Well  then  I  have  had  my  reward.  Let 
this  always  be  present  to  thy  mind,  and  never 
stop  [doing  such  good]. 

5.  What  is  thy  art?  to  be  good.  And  how  is 
this  accomplished  well  except  by  general  prin- 
ciples, some  about  the  nature  of  the  universe, 
and  others  about  the  proper  constitution  of 
man? 

6.  At  first  tragedies  were  brought  on  the  stage 
as  means  of  reminding  men  of  the  things 
which  happen  to  them,  and  that  it  is  according 
to  nature  for  things  to  happen  so,  and  that,  if 
you  are  delighted  with  what  is  shown  on  the 
stage,  you  should  not  be  troubled  with  that 
which  takes  place  on  the  larger  stage.  For  you 
see  that  these  things  must  be  accomplished  thus, 
and  that  even  they  bear  them  who  cry  outf  "  O 
Cithaeron."  And,  indeed,  some  things  are  said 
well  by  the  dramatic  writers,  of  which  kind  is 
the  following  especially  : 

Me  and  my  children  if  the  gods  neglect, 
This  has  its  reason  too.  % 

*  See  the  Life  of  Antoninus.  This  is  the  only  passage 
in  which  the  Emperor  speaks  of  the  Christians.  Epic- 
tetus  (iv.,  7,  6)  names  them  Galilsei. 

t  Sophocles,  CEdipus  Rex. 

JSee  vii.,  38,  40,  41. 


278  /ifc.  Bntoninus 

And  again — 

We  must  not  chafe  and  fret  at  that  which  happens. 
And— 

life's  harvest  reap  like  the  wheat's  fruitful  ear. 

And  other  things  of  the  same  kind. 

After  tragedy  the  old  comedy  was  introduced, 
which  had  a  magisterial  freedom  of  speech,  and 
by  its  very  plainness  of  speaking  was  useful  in 
reminding  men  to  beware  of  insolence  ;  and  for 
this  purpose  too  Diogenes  used  to  take  from 
these  writers. 

But  as  to  the  middle  comedy  which  came 
next,  observe  what  it  was,  and  again,  for  what 
object  the  new  comedy  was  introduced,  which 
gradually  sunk  down  into  a  mere  mimic  artifice. 
That  some  good  things  are  said  even  by  these 
writers,  everybody  knows ;  but  the  whole  plan 
of  such  poetry  and  dramaturgy,  to  what  end 
does  it  look ! 

7.  How  plain  does  it  appear  that  there  is  not 
another  condition  of  life  so  well  suited  for 
philosophizing  as  this  in  which  thou  now  hap- 
penest  to  be. 

8.  A  branch  cut  off  from  the  adjacent  branch 
must  of  necessity  be  cut  off  from  the  whole  tree 
also.  So  too  a  man  when  he  is  separated  from 
another  man  has  fallen  off  from  the  whole  social 
community.     Now  as  to  a  branch,  another  cuts 


/lib.  Bntoninus  279 

it  off,  but  a  man  by  his  own  act  separates  him- 
self from  his  neighbor  when  he  hates  him  and 
turns  away  from  him,  and  he  does  not  know 
that  he  has  at  the  same  time  cut  himself  off 
from  the  whole  social  system.  Yet  he  has  this 
privilege  certainly  from  Zeus  who  framed  soci- 
ety, for  it  is  in  our  power  to  grow  again  to  that 
which  is  near  to  us,  and  again  to  become  a  part 
which  helps  to  make  up  the  whole.  However, 
if  it  often  happens,  this  kind  of  separation,  it 
makes  it  difficult  for  that  which  detaches  itself 
to  be  brought  to  unity  and  to  be  restored  to  its 
former  condition.  Finally,  the  branch  which, 
from  the  first  grew  together  with  the  tree,  and 
has  continued  to  have  one  life  with  it,  is  not 
like  that  which  after  being  cut  off  is  then  in- 
grafted, for  this  is  something  like  what  the 
gardeners  mean  when  they  say  that  it  grows 
with  the  rest  of  the  tree,  but  f  that  it  has  not  the 
same  mind  with  it. 

9.  As  those  who  try  to  stand  in  thy  way  when 
thou  art  proceeding  according  to  right  reason, 
will  not  be  able  to  turn  thee  aside  from  thy 
proper  action,  so  neither  let  them  drive  thee 
from  thy  benevolent  feelings  towards  them,  but 
be  on  thy  guard  equally  in  both  matters,  not 
only  in  the  matter  of  steady  judgment  and  ac- 
tion, but  also  in  the  matter  of  gentleness  to- 
wards those  who  try  to  hinder   or   otherwise 


28o  /lib.  Bntoninus 

trouble  thee.  For  this  also  is  a  weakness,  to  be 
vexed  at  them,  as  well  as  to  be  diverted  from 
thy  course  of  action  and  to  give  way  through 
fear  ;  for  both  are  equally  deserters  from  their 
post,  the  man  who  does  it  through  fear,  and  the 
man  who  is  alienated  from  him  who  is  by  nature 
a  kinsman  and  a  friend. 

10.  There  is  no  nature  which  is  inferior  to 
art,  for  the  arts  imitate  the  natures  of  things. 
But  if  this  is  so,  that  nature  which  is  the  most 
perfect  and  the  most  comprehensive  of  all  na- 
tures, cannot  fall  short  of  the  skill  of  art.  Now 
all  arts  do  the  inferior  things  for  the  sake  of  the 
superior  ;  therefore  the  universal  nature  does  so 
too.  And,  indeed,  hence  is  the  origin  of  justice, 
and  in  justice  the  other  virtues  have  their  foun- 
dation ;  for  justice  will  not  be  observed,  if  we 
either  care  for  middle  things  [things  indifferent], 
or  are  easily  deceived  and  careless  and  change- 
able (v.,  16,  30;  vii.,  55). 

11.  If  the  things  do  not  come  to  thee,  the 
pursuits  and  avoidances  of  which  disturb  thee, 
still  in  a  manner  thou  goest  to  them.  Let  then 
thy  judgment  about  them  be  at  rest,  and  they 
will  remain  quiet,  and  thou  wilt  not  be  seen 
either  pursuing  or  avoiding. 

12.  The  spherical  form  of  the  soul  maintains 
its  figure,  when  it  is  neither  extended  towards 
any   object,  nor   contracted  inwards,  nor  dis- 


dft.  Bntontnus  281 

persed,  nor  sinks  down,  but  is  illuminated  by 
light,  by  which  it  sees  the  truth  of  all  things 
and  the  truth  that  is  in  itself  (viii.,  41,  45  ; 
xii.,  3). 

13.  Suppose  any  man  shall  despise  me.  Let 
him  look  to  that  himself.  But  I  will  look  to 
this,  that  I  be  not  discovered  doing  or  saying 
any  thing  deserving  of  contempt.  Shall  any  man 
hate  me  ?  Let  him  look  to  it.  But  I  will  be  mild 
and  benevolent  towards  every  man,  and  ready 
to  show  even  him  his  mistake,  not  reproach- 
fully, nor  yet  as  making  a  display  of  my  endur- 
ance, but  nobly  and  honestly,  like  the  great 
Phocion,  unless  indeed  he  only  assumed  it.  For 
the  interior  [parts]  ought  to  be  such,  and  a  man 
ought  to  be  seen  by  the  gods  neither  dissatis- 
fied with  any  thing  nor  complaining.  For  what 
evil  is  it  to  thee,  if  thou  art  now  doing  what  is 
agreeable  to  thy  own  nature,  and  art  satisfied 
with  that  which  at  this  moment  is  suitable  to 
the  nature  of  the  universe,  since  thou  art  a  hu- 
man being  placed  at  thy  post  in  order  that  what 
is  for  the  common  advantage  may  be  done  in 
some  way  ? 

14.  Men  despise  one  another  and  flatter  one 
another ;  and  men  wish  to  raise  themselves 
above  one  another,  and  crouch  before  one  an- 
other. 

15.  How  unsound  and  insincere  is   he   who 


2S2  /ift,  Bntoninus 

says,  I  have  determined  to  deal  with  thee  in  a 
fair  way. — What  art  thou  doing,  man  ?  There 
is  no  occasion  to  give  this  notice.  It  will  soon 
show  itself  by  acts.  The  voice  ought  to  be 
plainly  written  on  the  forehead.  Such  as  a 
man's  character  is,fhe  immediately  shows  it  in 
his  eyes,  just  as  he  who  is  beloved  forthwith 
reads  every  thing  in  the  eyes  of  lovers.  The 
man  who  is  honest  and  good  ought  to  be  ex- 
actly like  a  man  who  smells  strong,  so  that  the 
bystander  as  soon  as  he  comes  near  him  must 
smell  whether  he  choose  or  not.  But  the  affec- 
tation of  simplicity  is  like  a  crooked  stick.* 
Nothing  is  more  disgraceful  than  a  wolfish 
friendship  [false  friendship].  Avoid  this  most 
of  all.  The  good  and  simple  and  benevolent 
show  all  these  things  in  the  eyes,  and  there  is 
no  mistaking. 

16.  As  to  living  in  the  best  way,  this  power  is 
in  the  soul,  if  it  be  indifferent  to  things  which 
are  indifferent.  And  it  will  be  indifferent,  if  it 
looks  on  each  of  these  things  separately  and  all 
together,  and  if  it  remembers  that  not  one  of 
them  produces  in  us  an  opinion  about  itself,  nor 
comes  to  us  ;  but  these  things  remain  immova- 

*  Instead  of  o-KaA/xrj  Saumaise  reads  <r/caju./3rj.  There  is 
a  Greek  proverb,  <TKanfibi>  £ii\ov  ovSenor'  bpdov  :  "  You 
cannot  make  a  crooked  stick  straight." 

The  wolfish  friendship  is  an  illusion  to  the  fable  of  the 
sheep  and  the  wolves. 


fib.  Bntontnus  283 

ble,  and  it  is  we  ourselves  who  produce  the 
judgments  about  them,  and,  as  we  may  say, 
write  them  in  ourselves,  it  being  in  our  power 
not  to  write  them,  and  it  being  in  our  power,  if 
perchance  these  judgments  have  imperceptibly 
got  admission  to  our  minds,  to  wipe  them  out ; 
and  if  we  remember  also  that  such  attention 
will  only  be  for  a  short  time,  and  then  life  will 
be  at  an  end.  Besides,  what  trouble  is  there  at 
all  in  doing  this  ?  For  if  these  things  are  ac- 
cording to  nature,  rejoice  in  them,  and  they  will 
be  easy  to  thee  ;  but  if  contrary  to  nature,  seek 
what  is  comformable  to  thy  own  nature,  and 
strive  towards  this,  even  if  it  bring  no  reputa- 
tion ;  for  every  man  is  allowed  to  seek  his  own 
good. 

17.  Consider  whence  each  thing  is  come,  and 
of  what  it  consists,  f  and  into  what  it  changes, 
and  what  kind  of  a  thing  it  will  be  when  it  has 
changed,  and  that  it  will  sustain  no  harm. 

18.  [If  any  have  offended  against  thee,  con- 
sider first]  :  What  is  my  relation  to  men,  and 
that  we  are  made  for  one  another ;  and  in  an- 
other respect,  I  was  made  to  be  set  over  them, 
as  a  ram  over  the  flock  or  a  bull  over  the  herd. 
But  examine  the  matter  from  first  principles, 
from  this  :  If  all  things  are  not  mere  atoms,  it 
is  nature  which  orders  all  things  :  if  this  is  so, 
the  inferior  things  exist  for  the  sake  of  the  su- 


284  dfc.  Bntontnus 

perior,  and  these  for  the  sake  of  one  another 
(ii.,  i;  ix.,39;  v.,  16;  iii.,  4). 

Second,  consider  what  kind  of  men  they  are 
at  table,  in  bed,  and  so  forth  ;  and  particularly, 
under  what  compulsions  in  respect  of  opinions 
they  are  ;  and  as  to  their  acts,  consider  with 
what  pride  they  do  what  they  do  (viii.,  14  ;  ix., 

34).    ' 

Third,  that  if  men  do  rightly  what  they  do, 
we  ought  not  to  be  displeased  :  but  if  they  do 
not  right,  it  is  plain  that  they  do  so  involun- 
tarily and  in  ignorance.  For  as  every  soul  is 
unwillingly  deprived  of  the  truth,  so  also  is  it 
unwillingly  deprived  of  the  power  of  behaving 
to  each  man  according  to  his  deserts.  Accord- 
ingly men  are  pained  when  they  are  called  un- 
just, ungrateful,  and  greedy,  and  in  a  word 
wrong-doers  to  their  neighbors  (vii.,  62,  63  ;  ii., 
1 ;  vii.,  26 ;  viii.,  29). 

Fourth,  consider  that  thou  also  doest  many 
things  wrong,  and  that  thou  art  a  man  like 
others  ;  and  even  if  thou  dost  abstain  from  cer- 
tain faults,  still  thou  hast  the  disposition  to 
commit  them,  though  either  through  cowardice, 
or  concern  about  reputation  or  some  such  mean 
motive,  thou  dost  abstain  from  such  faults  (i.,17). 

Fifth,  consider  that  thou  dost  not  even  under- 
stand whether  men  are  doing  wrong  or  not,  for 
many  things  are  done  with  a  certain  reference 


dft.  Bntoninus  285 

to  circumstances.  And  in  short,  a  man  must 
learn  a  great  deal  to  enable  him  to  pass  a  cor- 
rect judgment  on  another  man's  acts  (ix.,  38; 
iv.,  51). 

Sixth,  consider  when  thou  art  much  vexed  or 
grieved,  that  man's  life  is  only  a  moment,  and 
after  a  short  time  we  are  all  laid  out  dead  (vii., 
58;  iv.,48). 

Seventh,  that  it  is  not  men's  acts  which  dis- 
turb us,  for  those  acts  have  their  foundation  in 
men's  ruling  principles,  but  it  is  our  own  opin- 
ions which  disturb  us.  Take  away  these  opinions 
then,  and  resolve  to  dismiss  thy  judgment  about 
an  act  as  if  it  were  something  grievous,  and  thy 
anger  is  gone.  How  then  shall  I  take  away 
these  opinions  ?  By  reflecting  that  no  wrongful 
act  of  another  brings  shame  on  thee  :  for  unless 
that  which  is  shameful  is  alone  bad,  thou  also 
must  of  necessity  do  many  things  wrong,  and 
become  a  robber  and  every  thing  else  (v.,  25  ; 
vii.,  16). 

Eighth,  consider  how  much  more  pain  is 
brought  on  us  by  the  anger  and  vexation 
caused  by  such  acts  than  by  the  acts  themselves, 
at  which  we  are  angry  and  vexed  (iv.,  39,  49 ; 
vii.,  24). 

Ninth,  consider  that  a  good  disposition  is  in- 
vincible, if  it  be  genuine,  and  not  an  affected 
smile  and  acting  a  part.  For  what  will  the  most 


286  /lib,  Bntoninus 

violent  man  do  to  thee,  if  thou  continuest  to  be 
of  a  kind  disposition  towards  him,  and  if,  as  op- 
portunity offers,  thou  gently  admonishest  him 
and  calmly  correctest  his  errors  at  the  very 
time  when  he  is  trying  to  do  thee  harm,  saying, 
Not  so,  my  child  ;  we  are  constituted  by  nature 
for  something  else  :  I  shall  certainly  not  be  in- 
jured, but  thou  art  injuring  thyself,  my  child. 
And  show  him  with  gentle  tact  and  by  gen- 
eral principles  that  this  is  so,  and  that  even  bees 
do  not  do  as  he  does,  nor  any  animals  which 
are  formed  by  nature  to  be  gregarious.  And 
thou  must  do  this  neither  with  any  double 
meaning  nor  in  the  way  of  reproach,  but  affec- 
tionately and  without  any  rancour  in  thy  soul  ; 
and  not  as  if  thou  wert  lecturing  him,  nor  yet 
that  any  bystander  may  admire,  but  either  when 
he  is  alone,  and  if  others  are  present  ...  * 

Remember  these  nine  rules,  as  if  thou  hadst 
received  them  as  a  gift  from  the  Muses,  and 
begin  at  last  to  be  a  man  while  thou  livest. 
But  thou  must  equally  avoid  flattering  men  and 
being  vexed  at  them,  for  both  are  unsocial  and 
lead  to  harm.  And  let  this  truth  be  present  to 
thee  in  the  excitement  of  anger,  that  to  be 
moved  by  passion  is  not  manly,  but  that  mild- 
ness and  gentleness,  as  they  are  more  agreeable 
to  human  nature,  so  also  are  they  more  manly  ; 

*  It  appears  that  there  is  a  defect  in  the  text  here. 


tfft,  Bntonfnus  287 

and  he  who  possesses  these  qualities  possesses 
strength,  nerves,  and  courage,  and  not  the  man 
who  is  subject  to  fits  of  passion  and  discontent. 
For  in  the  same  degree  in  which  a  man's  mind 
is  nearer  to  freedom  from  all  passion,  in  the 
same  degree  also  is  it  nearer  to  strength  :  and 
as  the  sense  of  pain  is  a  characteristic  of  weak- 
ness, so  also  is  anger.  For  he  who  yields  to 
pain  and  he  who  yields  to  anger,  both  are 
wounded  and  both  submit. 

But  if  thou  wilt,  receive  also  a  tenth  present 
from  the  leader  of  the  Muses  [Apollo],  and  it 
is  this — that  to  expect  bad  men  not  to  do  wrong 
is  madness,  for  he  who  expects  this  desires  an 
impossibility.  But  to  allow  men  to  behave  so 
to  others,  and  to  expect  them  not  to  do  thee 
any  wrong,  is  irrational  and  tyrannical. 

19.  There  are  four  principal  aberrations  of 
the  superior  faculty  against  which  thou  shouldst 
be  constantly  on  thy  guard,  and  when  thou 
hast  detected  them,  thou  shouldst  wipe  them  out 
and  say  on  each  occasion  thus  :  This  thought 
is  not  necessary  ;  this  tends  to  destroy  social 
union ;  this  which  thou  art  going  to  say  comes 
not  from  the  real  thoughts  ;  for  thou  shouldst 
consider  it  among  the  most  absurd  of  things 
for  a  man  not  to  speak  from  his  real  thoughts. 
But  the  fourth  is  when  thou  shalt  reproach  thy- 
self for  any  thing,   for  this  is  an  evidence  of 


288  .flfc.  Bntontnus 

the  diviner  part  within  thee  being  overpowered 
and  yielding  to  the  less  honorable  and  to  the 
perishable  part,  the  body,  and  to  its  gross 
pleasures  (iv.,  24;  ii.,  16). 

20.  Thy  aerial  part  and  all  the  fiery  parts 
which  are  mingled  in  thee,  though  by  nature 
they  have  an  upward  tendency,  still  in  obedi- 
ence to  the  disposition  of  the  universe  they  are 
overpowered  here  in  the  compound  mass  [the 
body].  And  also  the  whole  of  the  earthly  part 
in  thee  and  the  watery,  though  their  tendency 
is  downward,  still  are  raised  up  and  occupy  a 
position  which  is  not  their  natural  one.  In 
this  manner,  then,  the  elemental  parts  obey 
the  universal,  for  when  they  have  been  fixed 
in  a^'  place  perforce  they  remain  there  until 
again  the  universal  shall  sound  the  signal  foi 
dissolution.  Is  it  not,  then,  strange  that  thy 
intelligent  part  only  should  be  disobedient  and 
discontented  with  its  own  place  ?  And  yet  no 
force  is  imposed  on  it,  but  only  those  things 
which  are  conformable  to  its  nature  ;  still  it 
does  not  submit,  but  is  carried  in  the  opposite 
direction.  For  the  movement  towards  injustice 
and  intemperance  and  to  anger,  and  grief,  and 
fear  is  nothing  else  than  the  act  of  one  who 
deviates  from  nature.  And  also  when  the  rul- 
ing faculty  is  discontented  with  any  thing  that 
happens,  then,  too,  it  deserts  its  post ;  for  it  is 


/lib.  Bntomnus  289 

constituted  for  piety  and  reverence  towards  the 
gods  no  less  than  for  justice.  For  these  quali- 
ties also  are  comprehended  under  the  generic 
term  of  contentment  with  the  constitution  of 
things,  and,  indeed,  they  are  prior*  to  acts 
of  justice. 

21.  He  who  has  not  one  and  always  the  same 
object  in  life,  cannot  be  one  and  the  same  all 
through  his  life.  But  what  I  have  said  is  not 
enough,  unless  this  also  is  added,  what  this 
object  ought  to  be.  For  as  there  is  not  the 
same  opinion  about  all  the  things  which  in 
some  way  or  other  are  considered  by  the  ma- 
jority to  be  good,  but  only  about  some  certain 
things,  that  is,  things  which  concern  the  com- 

*  The  word  rrpecrPvTepa,  which  is  here  translated 
"prior,"  may  also  mean  "  superior "  ;  but  Antoninus 
seems  to  say  that  piety  and  reverence  of  the  gods  pre- 
cede all  virtues,  and  that  other  virtues  are  derived  from 
them,  even  justice,  which  in  another  passage  (xi.,  10)  he 
makes  the  foundation  of  all  virtues.  The  ancient  no- 
tion of  justice  is  that  of  giving  to  every  one  his  due.  It 
is  not  a  legal  definition,  as  some  have  supposed,  but  a 
moral  rule  which  law  cannot  in  all  cases  enforce.  Be- 
sides law  has  its  own  rules,  which  are  sometimes  moral 
and  sometimes  immoral ;  but  it  enforces  them  all  sim- 
ply because  they  are  general  rules,  and  if  it  did  not  or 
could  not  enforce  them,  so  far  law  would  not  be  law. 
Justice,  or  the  doing  what  is  just,  implies  a  universal 
rule  and  obedience  to  it ;  and  as  we  all  live  under  uni- 
versal Law,  which  commands  both  our  body  and  our  in- 
telligence, and  is  the  law  of  our  nature,  that  is  the  law 
of  the  whole  constitution  of  man,  we  must  endeavor  to 
discover  what  this  supreme  Law  is.  It  is  the  will  of  the 
power  that  rules  all.  Ey  acting  in  obedience  to  this  will 
we  do  justice,  and  by  consequence  every  thing  else  that 
we  ought  to  do. 


290  dfc.  Bntontnus 

mon  interest ;  so  also  ought  we  to  propose  to 
ourselves  an  object  which  shall  be  of  a  com- 
mon kind  [social]  and  political.  For  he  who 
directs  all  his  own  efforts  to  this  object  will 
make  all  his  acts  alike,  and  thus  will  always  be 
the  same. 

22.  Think  of  the  country  mouse  and  of  the 
town  mouse,  and  of  the  alarm  and  trepidation 
of  the  town  mouse.* 

23.  Socrates  used  to  call  the  opinions  of  the 
many  by  the  name  of  Lamiae,  bugbears  to 
frighten  children. 

24.  The  Lacedaemonians  at  their  public  spec- 
tacles used  to  set  seats  in  the  shade  for  stran- 
gers, but  themselves  sat  down  anywhere. 

25.  Socrates  excused  himself  to  Perdiccas  f 
for  not  going  to  him,  saying  :  It  is  because  I 
would  not  perish  by  the  worst  of  all  ends,  that 
is,  I  would  not  receive  a  favor  and  then  be  un- 
able to  return  it. 

26.  In  the  writings  of  the  [Bphesians]  J 
there  was  this  precept,  constantly  to  think  of 
some  one  of  the  men  of  former  times  who  prac- 
tised virtue. 

27.  The  Pythagoreans  bid  us  in  the  morning 

*  The  story  is  told  by  Horace  in  his  Satires  (ii.,  6),  and 
by  others  since,  but  not  better. 

t  Perhaps  the  Emperor  made  a  mistake  here,  for 
other  writers  say  that  it  was  Aichelaus,  the  son  of  Per- 
diccas, who  invited  Socrates  to  Macedonia. 

I  Gataker  suggested   EwiKovpeiW  for   E^eo-iW. 


/lib.  Bntoninus  291 

look  to  the  heavens  that  we  may  be  reminded 
of  those  bodies  which  continually  do  the  same 
things  and  in  the  same  manner  perform  their 
work,  and  also  be  reminded  of  their  purity  and 
nudity.     For  there  is  no  veil  over  a  star. 

28.  Consider  what  a  man  Socrates  was  when 
he  dressed  himself  in  a  skin,  after  Xanthippe 
had  taken  his  cloak  and  gone  out,  and  what 
Socrates  said  to  his  friends  who  were  ashamed 
of  him  and  drew  back  from  him  when  they  saw 
him  dressed  thus. 

29.  Neither  in  writing  nor  in  reading  wilt 
thou  be  able  to  lay  down  rules  for  others  be- 
fore thou  shalt  have  first  learned  to  obey  rules 
thyself.     Much  more  is  this  so  in  life. 

30.  A  slave  thou  art ;  free  speech  is  not  for 
thee. 

31.  And  my  heart  laughed  within  (Od., 

ix.,  413). 

32.  And  virtue  they  will  curse,  speaking 
harsh  words  (Hesiod,  "Work  and  Days,"  184). 

33.  To  look  for  the  fig  in  winter  is  a  mad- 
man's act;  such  is  he  who  looks  for  his  child 
when  it  is  no  longer  allowed  (Epictetus,  iii., 
24,  87). 

34.  When  a  man  kisses  his  child,  said  Epicte- 
tus, he  should  whisper  to  himself,  "To-morrow 
perchance  thou  wilt  die." — But  those  are  words 
of  bad   omen.     "  No  word   is   a  word  of  bad 


292  dfc.  Bntontnus 

omen,"  said  Epictetus,  "which  expresses  any 
work  of  nature  ;  or  if  it  is  so,  it  is  also  a  word 
of  bad  omen  to  speak  of  the  ears  of  corn  being 
reaped  "  (Epictetus,  iii.,  24,  88). 

35.  The  unripe  grape,  the  ripe  bunch,  the 
dried  grape,  all  are  changes,  not  into  nothing, 
but  into  something  which  exists  not  yet  (Epic- 
tetus, iii.,  24). 

36.  No  man  can  rob  us  of  our  free  will  (Epic- 
tetus, iii.,  22,  105). 

37.  Epictetus  also  said  a  man  must  discover 
an  art  [or  rules]  with  respect  to  giving  his  as- 
sent ;  and  in  respect  to  his  movements  he  must 
be  careful  that  they  be  made  with  regard  to  cir- 
cumstances, that  they  be  consistent  with  social 
interests,  that  they  have  regard  to  the  value  of 
the  object ;  and  as  to  sensual  desire,  he  should 
altogether  keep  away  from  it ;  and  as  to  avoid- 
ance [aversion]  he  should  not  show  it  with  re- 
spect to  any  of  the  things  which  are  not  in  our 
power. 

38.  The  dispute,  then,  he  said,  is  not  about 
any  common  matter,  but  about  being  mad  or  not. 

39.  Socrates  used  to  say  :  What  do  you  want  ? 
Souls  of  rational  men  or  irrational? — Souls  of 
rational  men.  Of  what  rational  men  ?  Sound 
or  unsound? — Sound.  Why  then  do  you  not 
seek  for  them  ? — Because  we  have  them.  Why, 
then,  do  you  fight  and  quarrel  ? 


XII. 


ALL  those  things  at  which  thou  wishest  to 
arrive  by  a  circuitous  road,  thou  canst 
have  now,  if  thou  dost  not  refuse  them  to  thy- 
self. And  this  means,  if  thou  wilt  take  no 
notice  of  all  the  past,  and  trust  the  future  to 
providence,  and  direct  the  present  only  con- 
formably to  piety  and  justice.  Conformably  to 
piety,  that  thou  mayst  be  content  with  the  lot 
which  is  assigned  to  thee,  for  nature  designed 
it  for  thee  and  thee  for  it.  Conformably  to  jus- 
tice, that  thou  mayst  always  speak  the  truth 
freely  and  without  disguise,  and  do  the  things 
which  are  agreeable  to  law  and  according  to  the 
worth  of  each.  And  let  neither  another  man's 
wickedness  hinder  thee,  nor  opinion  nor  voice, 
nor  yet  the  sensations  of  the  poor  flesh  which 
has  grown  about  thee,  for  the  passive  part  will 
look  to  this.  If,  then,  whatever  the  time  may 
be  when  thou  shalt  be  near  to  thy  departure, 
neglecting  every  thing  else  thou  shalt  respect 
only  thy  ruling  faculty  and  the  divinity  within 


294  tffc.  Bntoninus 

thee,  and  if  thou  shalt  be  afraid  not  because 
thou  must  some  time  cease  to  live,  but  if  thou 
shalt  fear  never  to  have  begun  to  live  according 
to  nature — then  thou  wilt  be  a  man  worthy 
of  the  universe  which  has  produced  thee,  and 
thou  wilt  cease  to  be  a  stranger  in  thy  native 
land,  and  to  wonder  at  things  which  happen 
daily,  as  if  they  were  something  unexpected, 
and  to  be  dependent  on  this  or  that. 

2.  God  sees  the  minds  (ruling  principles)  of 
all  men  bared  of  the  material  vesture  and  rind 
and  impurities.  For  with  his  intellectual  part 
alone  he  touches  the  intelligence  only  which 
has  flowed  and  been  derived  from  himself  into 
these  bodies.  And  if  thou  also  usest  thyself  to 
do  this,  thou  wilt  rid  thyself  of  thy  much  trou- 
ble. For  he  who  regards  not  the  poor  flesh 
which  envelops  him,  surely  will  not  trouble 
himself  by  looking  after  raiment  and  dwelling 
and  fame  and  such  like  externals  and  show. 

3.  The  things  are  three  of  which  thou  art 
composed,  a  little  body,  a  little  breath  [life], 
intelligence.  Of  these  the  first  two  are  thine, 
so  far  as  it  is  thy  duty  to  take  care  of  them  ; 
but  the  third  alone  is  properly  thine.  There- 
fore if  thou  shalt  separate  from  thyself,  that 
is,  from  thy  understanding,  whatever  others 
do  or  say,  and  whatever  thou  hast  done  or 
said  thyself,  and  whatever  future  things  trou- 


dfc.  Bntonfnus  295 

ble  thee  because  they  may  happen,  and  what- 
ever in  the  body  which  envelops  thee,  or  in 
the  breath  [life],  which  is  by  nature  associ- 
ated with  the  body,  is  attached  to  thee  inde- 
pendent of  thy  will,  and  whatever  the  external 
circumfluent  vortex  whirls  round,  so  that  the 
intellectual  power  exempt  from  the  things  of 
fate  can  live  pure  and  free  by  itself,  doing  what 
is  just  and  accepting  what  happens  and  saying 
the  truth  ;  if  thou  wilt  separate,  I  say,  from  this 
ruling  faculty  the  things  which  are  attached  to 
it  by  the  impressions  of  sense,  and  the  things 
of  time  to  come  and  of  time  that  is  past,  and 
wilt  make  thyself  like  Empedocles'  sphere — 

All  round,  and  in  its  joyous  rest  reposing  ;  * 
and  if  thou  shalt  strive  to  live  only  what  is  really 
thy  life,  that  is,  the  present — then  thou  wilt  be 
able  to  pass  that  portion  of  life  wmich  remains 
for  thee  up  to  the  time  of  thy  death,  free  from 
perturbations,  nobly,  and  obedient  to  thy  own 
daemon  [to  the  god  that  is  within  thee]  (ii., 
13,  17  ;  iii.,  5,  6  ;  xi.,  12). 

4.  I  have  often  wondered  how  it  is  that  every 
man  loves  himself  more  than  all  the  rest  of 
men,  but  yet  sets  less  value  on  his  own  opinion 
of  himself  than  on  the  opinion  of  others.     If, 

*  The  verse  of  Empedocles  is  corrupt  in  Antoninus. 
It  has  been  restored  by  Peyron  from  a  Turin  MS.  thus  : 
%<f>aipo<;  KVKXoTeprjs  fJLOvir)  jreo  yr)0ei  yaiojy. 


296  dfc.  Bntonfnus 

then,  a  god  or  a  wise  teacher  should  present 
himself  to  a  man  and  bid  him  to  think  of  noth- 
ing and  to  design  nothing  which  he  would  not 
express  as  soon  as  he  conceived  it,  he  could  not 
endure  it  even  for  a  single  day.*  So  much 
more  respect  have  we  to  what  our  neighbors 
shall  think  of  us  than  to  what  we  shall  think 
of  ourselves. 

5.  How  can  it  be  that  the  gods,  after  having 
arranged  all  things  well  and  benevolently  for 
mankind,  have  overlooked  this  alone,  that  some 
men,  and  very  good  men,  and  men  who,  as  we 
may  say,  have  had  most  communion  with  the 
divinity,  and  through  pious  acts  and  religious 
observances  have  been  most  intimate  with  the 
divinity,  when  they  have  once  died  should 
never  exist  again,  but  should  be  completely 
extinguished  ? 

But  if  this  is  so,  be  assured  that  if  it  ought  to 
have  been  otherwise,  the  gods  would  have  done 
it.  For  if  it  were  just,  it  would  also  be  possi- 
ble ;  and  if  it  were  according  to  nature,  nature 
would  have  had  it  so.  But  because  it  is  not  so, 
if  in  fact  it  is  not  so,  be  thou  convinced  that  it 
ought  not  to  have  been  so  :  for  thou  seest  even 
of  thyself  that  in  this  inquiry  thou  art  disputing 
with  the  Deity ;  and  we  should  not  thus  dispute 
with  the  gods,  unless  they  were  most  excellent 

*  Hi.,  4. 


&>.  Bntontnus  297 

and  most  just ; — but  if  this  is  so,  they  would 
not  have  allowed  any  thing  in  the  ordering  of 
the  universe  to  be  neglected  unjustly  and  irra- 
tionally. 

6.  Practice  thyself  even  in  the  things  which 
thou  despairest  of  accomplishing.  For  even 
the  left  hand,  which  is  ineffectual  for  all  other 
things  for  want  of  practice,  holds  the  bridle 
more  vigorously  than  the  right  hand,  for  it  has 
been  practised  in  this. 

7.  Consider  in  what  condition  both  in  body 
and  soul  a  man  should  be  when  he  is  overtaken 
by  death  ;  and  consider  the  shortness  of  life, 
the  boundless  abyss  of  time  past  and  future, 
the  feebleness  of  all  matter. 

8.  Contemplate  the  formative  principles 
[forms]  of  things  bare  of  their  coverings  ;  the 
purposes  of  actions  ;  consider  what  pain  is, 
what  pleasure  is,  and  death,  and  fame  ;  who  is 
to  himself  the  cause  of  his  uneasiness  ;  how  no 
man  is  hindered  by  another  ;  that  every  thing 
is  opinion. 

9.  In  the  application  of  thy  principles  thou 
must  be  like  the  pancratiast,  not  like  the  glad- 
iator ;  for  the  gladiator  lets  fall  the  sword  which 
he  uses  and  is  killed ;  but  the  other  always  has  his 
hand,  and  needs  to  do  nothing  else  than  use  it. 

10.  See  what  things  are  in  themselves,  divid- 
ing them  into  matter,  form,  and  purpose. 


29S  dfc,  Bntoninus 

ii.  What  a  power  man  has  to  do  nothing 
except  what  God  will  approve,  and  to  accept  all 
that  God  may  give  him. 

12.  With  respect  to  that  which  happens  con- 
formably to  nature,  we  ought  to  blame  neither 
gods,  for  they  do  nothing  wrong,  either  volun- 
tarily or  involuntarily  ;  nor  men,  for  they  do 
nothing  wrong  except  involuntarily.  Conse- 
quently we  should  blame  nobody  (ii.,  n,  12, 
13  ;  vii.,  62  ;  viii.,  17). 

13.  How  ridiculons,  and  what  a  stranger  he 
is  who  is  surprised  at  any  thing  which  happens 
in  life. 

14.  Either  there  is  a  fatal  necessity  and  in- 
vincible order,  or  a  kind  providence,  or  a 
confusion  without  a  purpose  and  without  a 
director  (iv.,  27).  If,  then,  there  is  an  invinci- 
ble necessity,  why  dost  thou  resist?  But  if 
there  is  a  providence  which  allows  itself  to  be 
propitiated,  make  thyself  worthy  of  the  help 
of  the  divinity.  But  if  there  is  a  confusion 
without  a  governor,  be  content  that  in  such  a 
tempest  thou  hast  in  thyself  a  certain  ruling 
intelligence.  And  even  if  the  tempest  carry 
thee  away,  let  it  carry  away  the  poor  flesh,  the 
poor  breath,  every  thing  else  ;  for  the  intelli- 
gence at  least  it  will  not  carry  away. 

15.  Does  the  light  of  the  lamp  shine  without 
losing  its  splendor  until  it  is  extinguished  ?  and 


/IB.  antoninus  299 

shall  the  truth  which  is  in  thee  and  justice  and 
temperance  be  extinguished  [before  thy  death]  ? 

16.  When  a  man  has  presented  the  appear- 
ance of  having  done  wrong,  [say,]  How,  then, 
do  I  know  if  this  is  a  wrongful  act  ?  And  even 
if  he  has  done  wrong,  how  do  I  know  that  he 
has  not  condemned  himself?  and  so  this  is  like 
tearing  his  own  face.  Consider  that  he,  who 
would  not  have  the  bad  man  do  wrong,  is  like 
the  man  who  would  not  have  the  fig-tree  to 
bear  juice  in  the  figs,  and  infants  to  cry,  and 
the  horse  to  neigh,  and  whatever  else  must  of 
necessity  be.  For  what  must  a  man  do  who 
has  such  a  character  ?  If,  then,  thou  art  irri- 
table,f  cure  this  man's  disposition.* 

17.  If  it  is  not  right,  do  not  do  it ;  if  it  is  not 
true,  do  not  say  it.     [For  let  thy  efforts  be — ]  f 

18.  In  every  thing  always  observe  what  the 
thing  is  which  produces  for  thee  an  appearance, 
and  resolve  it  by  dividing  it  into  the  formal, 
the  material,  the  purpose,  and  the  time  within 
which  it  must  end. 

19.  Perceive  at  last  that  thou  hast  in  thee 
something  better  and  more  divine  than  the 
things  which  cause  the  various  affects,  and  as  it 

*  The  interpreters  translate  -yopyd?  by  the  words  "  acer, 
validusque,"  and  "skilful."  But  in  Epictetus  (ii.,  16, 
20,  iii.,  10,  12)  -yopyos  means  "  vehement,"  "  prone  to 
anger,"  "irritable." 

t  There  is  something  wrong  here,  or  incomplete. 


300  dib,  Hntonfnus 

were  pull  thee  by  the  strings.  What  is  there 
now  in  my  mind  ?  is  it  fear,  or  suspicion,  or  de- 
sire, or  any  thing  of  the  kind  ?  (v.,  n). 

20.  First,  do  nothing  inconsiderately,  nor 
without  a  purpose.  Second,  make  thy  acts 
refer  to  nothing  else  than  to  a  social  end. 

21.  Consider  that  before  long  thou  wilt  be 
nobody  and  nowhere,  nor  will  any  of  the  things 
exist  which  thou  now  seest,  nor  any  of  those 
who  are  now  living.  For  all  things  are  formed 
by  nature  to  change  and  be  turned  and  to  per- 
ish, in  order  that  other  things  in  continuous 
succession  may  exist  (ix.,  28). 

22.  Consider  that  every  thing  is  opinion,  and 
opinion  is  in  thy  power.  Take  away  then, 
when  thou  choosest,  thy  opinion,  and  like  a 
mariner  who  has  doubled  the  promontory,  thou 
wilt  find  calm,  every  thing  stable,  and  a  wave- 
less  bay. 

23.  Any  one  activity,  whatever  it  may  be, 
when  it  has  ceased  at  its  proper  time,  suffers  no 
evil  because  it  has  ceased  ;  nor  he  who  has  done 
this  act,  does  he  suffer  any  evil  for  this  reason 
that  the  act  has  ceased.  In  like  manner  then 
the  whole  which  consists  of  all  the  acts,  which 
is  our  life,  if  it  cease  at  its  proper  time,  suffers 
no  evil  for  this  reason  that  it  has  ceased  ;  nor 
he  who  has  terminated  this  series  at  the  proper 
time,    has   he  been   ill    dealt  with.      But  the 


/Bb.  Bntoninus  301 

proper  time  and  the  limit  nature  fixes,  some- 
times as  in  old  age  the  peculiar  nature  of  man, 
but  always  the  universal  nature,  by  the  change 
of  whose  parts  the  whole  universe  continues 
ever  young  and  perfect.*  And  every  thing 
which  is  useful  to  the  universal  is  always  good 
and  in  season.  Therefore  the  termination  of 
life  for  every  man  is  no  evil,  because  neither  is 
it  shameful,  since  it  is  both  independent  of  the 
will  and  not  opposed  to  the  general  interest, 
but  it  is  good,  since  it  is  seasonable  and  profit- 
able to  and  congruent  with  the  universal. 
For  thus  too  he  is  moved  by  the  deity  who 
is  moved  in  the  same  manner  with  the  deity 
and  moved  towards  the  same  things  in  his  mind. 
24.  These  three  principles  thou  must  have  in 
readiness.  In  the  things  which  thou  doest  do 
nothing  either  inconsiderately  or  otherwise 
than  as  justice  herself  would  act ;  but  with  re- 
spect to  what  may  happen  to  thee  from  without, 
consider  that  it  happens  either  by  chance  or  ac- 
cording to  providence,  and  thou  must  neither 
blame  chance  nor  accuse  providence.  Second, 
consider  what  every  being  is  from  the  seed  to 
the  time  of  its  receiving  a  soul,  and  from  the 
reception  of  a  soul  to  the  giving  back  of  the 
same,  and  of  what  things  every  being  is  com- 
pounded and  into  what  things  it  is  resolved. 
*  vii.,  25. 


302  /r>»  Bntonfnua 

Third,  if  thou  shouldst  suddenly  be  raised  up 
above  the  earth,  and  shouldst  look  down  on 
human  things,  and  observe  the  variety  of  them 
how  great  it  is,  and  at  the  same  time  also 
shouldst  see  at  a  glance  how  great  is  the  num- 
ber of  beings  who  dwell  all  around  in  the  air 
and  the  ether,  consider  that  as  often  as  thou 
shouldst  be  raised  up,  thou  wouldst  see  the 
same  things,  sameness  of  form  and  shortness 
of  duration.     Are  these  things  to  be  proud  of? 

25.  Cast  away  opinion  ;  thou  art  saved.  Who 
then  hinders  thee  from  casting  it  away  ? 

26.  When  thou  art  troubled  about  any  thing, 
thou  hast  forgotten  this,  that  all  things  happen 
according  to  the  universal  nature  ;  and  forgot- 
ten this,  that  a  man's  wrongful  act  is  nothing 
to  thee  ;  and  further  thou  hast  forgotten  this, 
that  every  thing  which  happens  always  hap- 
pened so  and  will  happen  so,  and  now  happens 
so  everywhere  ;  forgotten  this  too,  how  close  is 
the  kinship  between  a  man  and  the  whole 
human  race,  for  it  is  a  community,  not  of  a  lit- 
tle blood  or  seed,  but  of  intelligence.  And  thou 
hast  forgotten  this  too,  that  every  man's  intel- 
ligence is  a  god,  and  is  an  efflux  of  the  deity  ;  * 
and  forgotten  this,  that  nothing  is  a  man's 
own,  but  that  his  child  and  his  body  and  his 
very  soul  came  from  the  deity ;  forgotten  this, 

*  See  Epictetus,  ii.,  8,  9,  etc. 


dfc.  Bntoninug  303 

that  every  thing  is  opinion;  and  lastly  thou 
hast  forgotten  that  every  man  lives  the  present 
time  only,  and  loses  only  this. 

27.  Constantly  bring  to  thy  recollection  those 
who  have  complained  greatly  about  any  thing, 
those  who  have  been  most  conspicuous  by  the 
greatest  fame,  or  misfortunes,  or  enmities,  or 
fortunes  of  any  kind  ;  then  think  where  are 
they  all  now  ?  Smoke  and  ash  and  a  tale,  or 
not  even  a  tale.  And  let  there  be  present  to 
thy  mind  also  every  thing  of  this  sort,  how 
Fabius  Catullinus  lived  in  the  country,  and 
Lucius  Lupus  in  his  gardens,  and  Stertinius  at 
Baiae,  and  Tiberius  at  Caprese,  and  Velius 
Rufus  [or  Rufus  at  Velia]  ;  and  in  fine  think 
of  the  eager  pursuit  of  any  thing  conjoined 
with  pride  ;*  and  how  worthless  every  thing  is 
after  which  men  violently  strain ;  and  how 
much  more  philosophical  it  is  for  a  man  in  the 
opportunities  presented  to  him  to  show  himself 
just,  temperate,  obedient  to  the  gods,  and  to  do 
this  with  all  simplicity  ;  for  the  pride  which  is 
proud  of  its  want  of  pride  is  the  most  intoler- 
able of  all. 

28.  To  those  who  ask,  Where  has  thou  seen 
the  gods,  or  how  dost  thou  comprehend  that 
they  exist  and  so  worshipest  them  ?  I  answer, 
in  the  first  place,  they  may  be  seen  even  with 

*  neT   oiijo-ews.     Olijais  Kai  tu^os,  Epict.  i.    8,  6. 


304  .flft.  Bntoninus 

the  eyes  ;  *  in  the  second  place,  neither  have  I 
seen  even  my  own  soul,  and  yet  I  honor  it.  Thus 
then  with  respect  to  the  gods,  from  what  I  con- 
stantly experience  of  their  power,  from  this  I 
comprehend  that  they  exist  and  I  venerate  them. 

29.  The  safety  of  life  is  this,  to  examine 
every  thing  all  through,  what  it  is  itself,  what 
is  its  material,  what  the  formal  part ;  with  all 
thy  soul  to  do  justice  and  to  say  the  truth. 
What  remains  except  to  enjoy  life  by  joining 
one  good  thing  to  another  so  as  not  to  leave 
even  the  smallest  intervals  between  ? 

30.  There  is  one  light  of  the  sun,  though  it 

*  "  Seen  even  with  the  eyes."  It  is  supposed  that  this 
may  be  explained  by  the  Stoic  doctrine,  that  the  uni- 
verse is  a  god  or  living  being  (iv.,  40),  and  that  the  celes- 
tial bodies  are  gods  (viii.,  19).  But  the  Emperor  may 
mean  that  we  know  that  the  gods  exist,  as  he  afterwards 
states  it,  because  we  see  what  they  do  ;  as  we  know  that 
man  has  intellectual  powers, because  we  see  what  he  does, 
and  in  no  other  way  do  we  know  it.  This  passage  then 
will  agree  with  the  passage  in  the  Epistle  to  the  Romans 
(i.,  v.  20),  and  with  the  Epistle  to  the  Colossians  (i.,  v.  15), 
in  which  Jesus  Christ  is  named  "  the  image  of  the  invis- 
ible God  "  ;  and  with  the  passage  in  the  Gospel  of  St. 
John  (xiv. ,  v.  9). 

Gataker,  whose  notes  are  a  wonderful  collection  of 
learning,  and  all  of  it  sound  and  good,  quotes  a  passage 
of  Calvin  which  is  founded  on  St.  Paul's  language  (Rom. 
i.,  z-.  20)  :  ''  God  by  creating  the  universe  Tor  world,  muu- 
dum],  being  himself  invisible,  has  presented  himself  to 
our  eyes  conspicuously  in  a  certain  visible  form."  Ke 
also  quotes  Seneca  (De  Belief,  iv.,  c.  8)  :  "  Quocunque  te 
flexeris,  ibi  ilium  videbis  occurrentem  tibi :  nihil  ab  illo 
vacat,  opus  suum  ipse  implet."  Compare  also  Cicero, 
De  Senectute  (c.  22),  Xenophon's  Cyropsedia  (viii.,  7), 
and  Mem.  iv.,  3  ;  also  Epictetus,  i.,  6,  de  Providentia.  I 
think  that  my  interpretation  of  Antoninus  is  right. 


flh.  Bntomnu6  305 

is  interrupted  by  walls,  mountains,  and  other 
things  infinite.  There  is  one  common  sub- 
stance,* though  it  is  distributed  among  count- 
less bodies  which  have  their  several  qualities. 
There  is  one  soul,  though  it  is  distributed 
among  infinite  natures  and  individual  circum- 
scriptions [or  individuals].  There  is  one  intel- 
ligent soul,  though  it  seems  to  be  divided. 
Now  in  the  things  which  have  been  mentioned 
all  the  other  parts,  such  as  those  which  are  air 
and  matter,  are  without  sensation  and  have  no 
fellowship  ;  and  yet  even  these  parts  the  intel- 
ligent principle  holds  together  and  the  gravita- 
tion towards  the  same.  But  intellect  in  a 
peculiar  manner  tends  to  that  which  is  of  the 
same  kin,  and  combines  with  it,  and  the  feeling 
for  communion  is  not  interrupted. 

31.  What  dost  thou  wish?  to  continue  to  ex- 
ist? Well,  dost  thou  wish  to  have  sensation  ? 
movement  ?  growth  ?  and  then  again  to  cease  to 
grow  ?  to  use  thy  speech  ?  to  think  ?  What  is 
there  of  all  these  things  which  seems  to  thee 
worth  desiring  ?  But  if  it  is  easy  to  set  little 
value  on  all  these  things,  turn  to  that  which 
remains,  which  is  to  follow  reason  and  God. 
But  it  is  inconsistent  with  honoring  reason  and 
God  to  be  troubled  because  by  death  a  man  will 
be  deprived  of  the  other  things. 
*  iv.,  40. 


3o6  dfo.  Bntoninus 

2,2.  How  small  a  part  of  the  boundless  and 
unfathomable  time  is  assigned  to  every  man  ? 
for  it  is  very  soon  swallowed  up  in  the  eternal. 
And  how  small  a  part  of  the  whole  substance  ? 
and  how  small  a  part  of  the  universal  soul?  and 
on  what  a  small  clod  of  the  whole  earth  thou 
creepest  ?  Reflecting  on  all  this  consider  noth- 
ing to  be  great,  except  to  act  as  thy  nature  leads 
thee,  and  to  endure  that  which  the  common 
nature  brings. 

33.  How  does  the  ruling  faculty  make  use  of 
itself?  for  all  lies  in  this.  But  every  thing  else, 
whether  it  is  in  the  power  of  thy  will  or  not,  is 
only  lifeless  ashes  and  smoke. 

34.  This  reflection  is  most  adapted  to  move 
us  to  contempt  of  death,  that  even  those  who 
think  pleasure  to  be  a  good  and  pain  an  evil 
still  have  despised  it. 

35.  The  man  to  whom  that  only  is  good 
which  comes  in  due  season,  and  to  whom  it  is  the 
same  thing  whether  he  has  done  more  or  fewer 
acts  conformable  to  right  reason  and  to  whom 
it  makes  no  difference  whether  he  contemplates 
the  world  for  a  longer  or  shorter  time — for  this 
man  neither  is  death  a  terrible  thing  (iii.,  7  ; 
vi.,  23;  x.,  20;  xii.,  23). 

36.  Man,  thou  hast  been  a  citizen  in  this 
great  state  [the  world]  ;  *  what  difference  does 

*  ii.,  16  ;  iii.,  11  ;  iv.r  29. 


/lib.  Bntoninus  307 

it  make  to  thee  whether  for  five  years  (or 
three)  ?  for  that  which  is  conformable  to  the 
laws  is  just  for  all.  Where  is  the  hardship  then, 
if  no  tyrant  nor  yet  an  unjust  judge  sends  thee 
away  from  the  state,  but  nature  who  brought 
thee  into  it  ?  the  same  as  if  a  praetor  who  has 
employed  an  actor  dismisses  him  from  the 
stage.* — "  But  I  have  not  finished  the  five  acts, 
but  only  three  of  them." — Thou  sayest  well,  but 
in  life  the  three  acts  are  the  whole  drama  ;  for 
what  shall  be  a  complete  drama  is  determined 
by  him  who  was  once  the  cause  of  its  composi- 
tion, and  now  of  its  dissolution  ;  but  thou  art 
the  cause  of  neither.  Depart  then  satisfied,  for 
he  also  who  releases  thee  is  satisfied. 
*iii.,8;  xi.,  i. 


GENERAL    INDEX. 


The  paragraphs  (par.)  are  those  of  the  sections. 


Active,  man  is  by  nature,  ix.  16. 
Advice  from  the  good  to  be  taken,  vi.  21 ;  viii.  16. 
Affectation,  vii.  60  ;  viii.  30  ;  xi.  18  (par.  9),  19. 
Anger  discouraged,  vi.  26,  27 ;  xi.  18. 
Anger,  offences  of,  ii.  10. 
Anger,  uselessness  of,  v.  28 ;  viii.  4. 
Appearances  not  to  be  regarded,  v.  36  ;  vi.  3,  13. 
Astonishment  should  not  be  felt  at  any  thing  that  hap- 
pens, viii.  15  ;  xii.  1,  13. 
Attainment,  what  is  within  every  one's,  vii.  67  ;  viii.  8. 
Attention  to  what  is  said  or  done,  vi.  53  ;  vii.  4,  30  ;  viii.  22. 

Bad,  the,  ii.  1. 
Beautiful,  the,  ii.  1. 


Causal.    See  Formal. 

Change  keeps  the  world  ever  new,  vii.  25 ;  viii.  50 ;  xii.  23. 

Change,  law  of,  iv.  3,  36 ;  v.  13,  23  ;  vi.  4,  15,  36 ;  vii.  18  ; 

viii.  6 ;  ix.  19,  28  (par.  2),  35  ;  x.  7,  18 ;  xii.  21. 
Change,  no  evil  in,  iv.  42. 
Christians,  the,  xi.  3. 
Circle,  things  come  round  in  a,  ii.  14. 
Comedy,  new,  xi.  6. 
Comedy,  old,  xi.  6. 


310  IFnfcej 

Complaining,  uselessness  of,  viii.  17,  50. 
Connection.    See  Universe. 
Conquerors  are  robbers,  x.  10. 
Contentment.    See  Resignation. 
Cooperation.    See  Mankind  and  Universe. 

Daemon,  the,  ii.  13,  17 ;  iii.  6,  7,  16 ;  v.  10,  27 ;  xii.  3. 
Death,  ii.  11,  12,  17  ;  iii.  3,  7 ;  iv.  5  ;  v.  33;  vi.  2,  24,  28 ;  vii. 

32  ;  viii.  20,  58 ;  ix.  3,  21  ;  x.  36 ;  xii.  23,  34,  35. 
Death  inevitable,  iii.  3 ;  iv.  3,  6,  32,  48,  50  ;  v.  33  ;  vi.  47 ; 

viii.  25,  31. 
Desire,  offences  of,  ii.  10. 
Destiny,  iii.  11 ;  iv.  26 ;  v.  8,  24 ;  vii.  57 ;  x.  5. 
Discontent.    See  Resignation. 

Doubts  discussed,  vi.  10  ;  vii.  75  ;  ix.  28,  39 ;  xii.  5,  14. 
Duty,  all-importance  of,  vi.  2,  22 ;  x.  22. 

Earth,  insignificance  of  the,  iii.  10  ;  iv.  3  (par.  2)  ;  vi.  36; 

viii.  21 ;  xii.  32. 
Earthly  things,  transitory  nature  of,  ii.  12,  17 ;  iv.  32,  33, 

35,  48  ;  v.  23  ;  vi.  15,  36  ;  vii.  21,  34 ;  viii.  21,  25  ;  x.  18,  31  ; 

xii.  27. 
Earthly  things,  worthlessness  of,  ii.  12 ;  v.  10,  33 ;  vi.  15 ; 

vii.  3  ;  ix.  24,  26  ;  xi.  2  ;  xii.  27. 
Equanimity,  x.  8. 

Example,  we  should  not  follow  bad,  vi.  6  ;  vii.  65. 
Existence,  meanness  of,  viii.  24. 
Existence,  the  object  of,  v.  1 ;  viii.  19. 
External  things  cannot  really  harm  a  man,  or  affect  the 

soul,  ii.  11  ;  iv.  3,  8,  39,  49  (par.  2)  ;  v.  35  ;  vii.  64 ;  viii.  1, 

32,  51  (par.  2) ;  ix.  31 ;  x.  33. 

Failure,  x.  12. 

Fame,  worthlessness  of,  iii.  10 ;  iv.  3,  19,  33  ;  v.  33 ;  vi.  16, 

18  ;  vii.  34  ;  viii.  1,  44 ;  ix.  30. 
Fear,  what  we  ought  to,  xii.  1. 
Fellowship.    See  Mankind. 
Few  things  necessary  for  a  virtuous  and  happy  life,  ii.  5 ; 

iii.  10  ;  vii.  67 ;  x.  8. 


•ffn&ej  3" 

Flattery,  xi.  18  (par.  10). 

Formal,  the,  and  the  material,  iv.  21  (par.  2);  v.  13;  vii. 

10,  29 ;  viii.  11 ;  ix.  25  ;  xii.  8,  10,  18. 
Future,  we  should  not  be  anxious  about  the,  vii.  8  ;  viii. 

36;  xii.  1. 

Gods,  perfect  justice  of  the  xii.  5  (par.  2). 

Gods,  the,  vi.  44 ;  xii.  28. 

Gods,  the,  cannot  be  evil,  ii.  11  ;  vi.  44. 

Good,  the,  ii.  1. 

Habit  of  thought,  v.  16. 

Happiness,  what  is  true,  v.  9,  34  ;  viii.  1 ;  x.  33. 

Help  to  be  accepted  from  others,  vii.  7. 

Heroism,  true,  xi.  18  (par.  10). 

Ignorance.    See  Wrong-doing. 

Independence.    See  Self-reliance. 

Indifferent  things,  ii.  11  ;  iv.  39  ;  vi.  32  ;  ix.  I. 

Individual,  the.    See  Interests. 

Infinity.    See  Time. 

Ingratitude.    See  Mankind. 

[njustice,  ix.  1. 

Intelligent  soul,  rational  beings  participate  in  the  same, 

iv.  40  ;  ix.  8,  9 ;  x.  1  ;  xii.  26,  30. 
Interests  of  the  whole  and  the  individual  identical,  iv. 

23  ;  v.  8  ;  vi.  45,  54  ;  x.  6,  20,  33  ;  xii.  23. 

Justice,  v.  34  ;  x.  11 ;  xi.  10. 
Justice  and  reason  identical,  xi.  1. 
Justice  prevails  everywhere,  iv.  10. 

Leisure,  we  ought  to  have  some,  viii.  51. 
Life,  a  good,  everywhere  possible,  v.  16. 
Life  can  only  be  lived  once,  ii.  14  ;  x.  31. 
Life,  shortness  of,  ii.  4,  17  ;  iii.  io,  14 ;  iv.  17, 48,50;  vi.  15, 

36,  56  ;  x.  31,  34- 
Life  to  be  made  a  proper  use  of,  without  delay,  ii.  4  ;  iii. 

1,  14  ;  iv.  17,  37 ;  vii.  56  ;  viii.  22  ;  x.  31 ;  xii.  1. 
Life2  whether  long  or  short,  matters  not,  vi.  49  ;  ix.  33  ; 

xii.  36. 


312  ITnDej 

Magnaminity,  x.  8. 

Mankind,    cooperation    and    fellowship    of,    one    with 

another,  ii.  i,  16 ;  iii.  4,  11  •  iv.  4,  33  ;  v.  16,  20 ;   vi.  7,  14, 

23,  39  ;  vii.  5,  13,  22,  55  ;  viii.  12,  26,  34,  43,  59 ;  ix.  1,  9,  23, 

31,  42  ;  x.  36  ;  xi.  8.  21  ;  xii.  20. 
Mankind,  folly  and  baseness  of,  v.  10  ;  ix.  2,  3,  29  ;  x  15, 

i9- 
Mankind,  ingratitude  of,  x.  36. 
Material,  the.    See  Formal. 

Nature,  after  products  of,  iii.  2  ;  vi.  36. 

Nature,  bounds  fixed  by,  v.  1. 

Nature,  man  formed  by,  to  bear  all  that  happens  to  him, 

v.  18  ;  viii.  46. 
Nature,  nothing  evil,  which  is  according  to,  ii.  17  ;  vi.  33. 
Nature  of  the  universe.      See  Universe,   nothing  that 

happens  is  contrary  to  the  nature  of  the. 
Nature,  perfect  beauty  of,  iii.  2  ;  vi.  36. 
Nature,  we  should  live  according  to,  iv.  48,  51  ;  v.  3,  25  \ 

vi.  16  ;  vii.  15,  55  ;  viii.  1,  54 ;  x.  33. 
New,  nothing,  under  the  sun,  ii.  14 ;    iv.  44  ;   vi.  37,  46 ; 

vii.  1.  49  ;  viii.  6  ;  ix.  14 ;  x.  27 ;  xi.  1. 

Object,  we  should  always  act  with  a  view  to  some,  ii.  7, 
16  ;  iii.  4 ;  iv.  2  ;  viii.  17  ;  x.  37  ;  xi.  21  ;  xii.  20. 

Obsolete,  all  things  become,  iv.  33. 

Omission,  sins  of,  ix.  5. 

Opinion,  iv.  3,  7,  12,  39  ;  vi.  52,  57  ;  vii.  2,  14,  16,  26,  68  ;  viii. 
14,  29,  40,  47,  49  ;  ix.  13,  29,  32,  42  ;  x.  3  ;  xi.  16,  18  ;  xii. 
22,  25. 

Others'  conduct  not  to  be  inquired  into,  iii.  4  ;  iv.  18  ;  v. 
25- 

Others,  opinion  of,  to  be  disregarded,  viii.  1  ;  x.  8,  11 ;  xi. 
13 ;  xii.  4. 

Others,  we  should  be  lenient  towards,  ii.  13  ;  iii.  11  ;  iv. 
3 ;  v.  33  ;  vi.  20,  27  ;  vii.  26, 62,  63,  70  ;  ix.  11,  27  ;  x.  4  ;  xi. 
9,  13,  18  ;  xii.  16. 

Others,  we  should  examine  the  ruling  principles  of,  iv. 
38  ;  ix.  18,  22,  37,  34. 

Ourselves  often  to  blame,  for  expecting  men  to  act  con- 
trary to  their  nature,  ix.  42. 


•ffnOej  313 

Ourselves,  reformation  should  begin  with,  xi.  29. 
Ourselves,  we  should  judge,  x.  30;  xi.  18. 

Pain,  vii.  33,  64  ;  viii.  28. 

Perfection  not  to  be  expected  in  this  world,  ix.  29. 

Perseverance,  v.  9  ;  x.  12. 

Persuasion,  to  be  used,  vi.  50. 

Perturbation,  vi.  16  ;  vii.  58  ;  ix.  31. 

Pessimism,  ix.  35. 

Philosophy,  v.  9  ;  vi.  12  ;  ix.  41. 

Pleasure,  he  who  pursues,  is  guilty  of  impiety,  ix.  1. 

Pleasures  are  enjoyed  by  the  bad,  vi.  34  ;  ix.  1. 

Power,  things  in  our  own,  v.  5,  10 ;  vi.  32,  41,  52,  58  ;  vii. 
2,  14,  54,  68  ;  x.  32,  33. 

Power,  things  not  in  our  own,  v.  33  .  vi.  41. 

Practice  is  good,  even  in  things  which  we  despair  of  ac- 
complishing, xii.  6. 

Praise,  worthlessness  of,  iii.  4  ;  iv.  20  ;  vi.  16,  59  ;  vii.  62  ; 
viii-  52>  53  ;  ix.  34- 

Prayer,  the  right  sort  of,  v.  7  ;  ix.  40. 

Present  time  the  only  thing  a  man  really  possesses,  ii. 
14  ;  iii.  10  ;  viii.  44  ;  xii.  3. 

Procrastination.   See  Iyife  to  be  made  a  proper  use  of,  etc. 

Puppet  pulled  by  strings  of  desire,  ii.  2  ;  iii.  16 ;  vi.  16, 
28  ;  vii.  3,  29  ;   xii.  19. 

Rational  soul.    See  Ruling  part. 

Rational  soul,  spherical  form  of  the,  viii.  41 ;  xi.  12  ;  xii. 

3  (and  see  Ruling  part). 
Reason,  all-prevailing,  v.  32  ;  vi.  1,  40. 
Reason  and  nature  identical,  vii.  11. 
Reason,  the,  can  adapt  every  thing  that  happens  to  its 

own  use,  v.  20  ;  vi.  8  ;  vii.  68  ;  viii.  35  ;  x.  31. 
Reason,  we  should  live  according  to.    See  Nature. 

Repentance  does  not  follow  renouncement  of  pleasure, 

viii.  10. 
Resignation  and  contentment,  iii.  4,  16  ;  iv.  23,  31,  33,  34  ; 

v.  8,  33  ;  vi.  16,  44,  49  ;  vii.  27,  57  ;  ix.  37  ;  x.  1,  11,  14,  25, 

28,  35- 


3H  Undej 

Revenge,  best  kind  of,  vi.  6. 

Rising-  from  bed,  v.  i ;  viii.  12. 

Ruling  part,  the,  ii.  25  iv.  1  ;  v.  11,  19,  21,  26 ;  vi.  14,  35 ; 

vii.  16,  55  (par.  2) ;  viii.  45,  48,  56,  57,  60,  61 ;  ix.  15,  26  ;  x. 

24,  33,  38  ;  xi-  1,  J9,  20  ;  xii.  3,  14. 

Self-reliance  and  steadfastness  of  soul,  iii.  5,  12  ;  iv.  11,  29, 
49  (par.  1) ;  v.  3,  34  ;  vi.  44  ;  vii.  12,  15  ;  ix.  28,  29 ;  xii.  14. 

Self-restraint,  v.  33. 

Self,  we  should  retire  into,  iv.  3  (par.  2)  ;  vii.  28,  33,  59  ; 
viii.  48. 

Senses,  movements  of  the,  to  be  disregarded,  v.  31 ;  vii. 
55  (par.  2)  ;  viii.  26,  39  ;  x.  8  ;  xi.  19  ;  xii.  1. 

Sickness,  behavior  in,  ix.  41. 

Social.    See  Mankind. 

Steadfastness  of  soul.    See  Self-reliance. 

Substance,  the  universal,  iv.  40  ;  v.  24 ;  vii.  19,  23  ;  xii.  30. 

Suicide,  v.  29  ;  viii.  47  ;  x.  8. 

Time  compared  to  a  river,  iv.  43. 

Time,  infinity  of,  iv.  3,  50 ;  v.  24  ;  ix.  32  ;  xii.  7,  32. 

Tragedy,  xi.  6. 

Tranquillity  of  soul,  iv.  3 ;  vi.  11 ;  vii.  68  ;  viii.  28. 

Ugly,  the,  ii.  1. 

Unintelligible  things,  v.  10. 

Universe,  harmony  of  the,  iv.  27,  45  ;  v.  8. 

Universe,  intimate  connection  and  cooperation  of  all 

things  in  the,  one  with  another,  ii.  3,  9  ;  iv.  29  ;  v.  8,  y>: 

vi.  38,  42,  43  ;  vii.  9,  19,  68 ;  viii.  7 ;  ix.  1  ;  x.  1. 
Universe,  nothing  that  dies  falls  out  of  the,  viii.  18,  50 ; 

x.  7. 
Universe,  nothing  that  happens  is  contrary  to  the  nature 

of  the,  v.  8,  10  ;  vi.  9,  58  ;  viii.  5 .  xii.  26. 
Unnecessary  things,  v.  15. 
Unnecessary  thoughts,  words,  and  actions,  iii.  4 ;  iv.  24. 

Vain  professions,  x.  16  ;  xi.  15. 

Virtue,  vi.  17. 

Virtue  its  own  reward,  v.  6  ;  vii.  73 ;  ix.  42  ;  xl  4. 


fln&es 


315 


Virtue,  omnipotence  of,  iv.  16. 

Virtue,  pleasure  in  contemplating,  vi.  48. 

Whole,  integrity  of  the,  to  be  preserved,  v.  8. 
Whole,  the.    See  Interests. 
Wickedness  has  always  existed,  vii.  1. 
Wickedness  must  exist  in  the  world,  viii.  15,  50 


ix.  42; 


xi.  18  (par.  11)  ;  xii.  16. 
Worst  evil,  the,  ix.  2. 
Worth  and  importance,  things  of  real,  iv.  33  ;  v.  10 ;  vi. 

16,  30,  47  ;  vii.  20,  44,  46,  58,  66 ;  viii.  2,  3,  5  ;  ix.  6,  12  ;  at. 

8,  11  ;  xii.  1,  27,  31,  33. 
Wrong-doing  cannot  really  harm  any  one,  vii.  22 ;  viii. 

55  ;  ix.  42  ;  x.  13  (par.  1)  ;  xi.  18  (par.  7). 
Wrong-doing  injures  the  wrong-doer,  iv.  26 ;  ix.  4,  38  ; 

xi.  18  (par.  3). 
Wrong-doing  owing  to  ignorance,  ii.  1, 13  ;  vi.  27  ;  vii.  22, 

26,  62,  63  ;  xi.  18  ;  xii.  12. 
Wrong-doing  to  be  left  where  it  is,  vii.  29  ;  ix.  30. 


Bricl  Boofclets 

i.  The  Gold  Bug.     By  Edgar  Allan  Poe. 

2.  Rab  and  his  Friends  and  Marjorie 

Fleming.     By  John  Brown,  M.D. 

3.  The  Culprit  Fay. 

By  Joseph  Rodman  Drake. 

4.  Our  Best  Society. 

By  George  William  Curtis. 

5.  Sonnets  from  the  Portuguese. 

By  Elizabeth  Barrett  Browning. 

6.  The  School  for  Scandal. 

By  Richard  Brinsley  Sheridan. 

7.  The  Rivals. 

By  Richard  Brinsley  Sheridan. 

8.  The  Good-Natured  Man. 

By  Oliver  Goldsmith. 

9.  Sweetness  and  Light. 

By  Matthew  Arnold. 

10.  Lyrics.     By  Robert  Browning. 

11.  L' Allegro  and  II  Penseroso. 

By  John  Milton. 
it.  Thanatopsis,  Flood  of  Years,  etc 
By  William  Cullen  Bryant. 


Briel  2Boofclets 

13.  Cnarity  and  Humor,  and  Nil  Nisi  Bo- 

num.     By  William  M.  Thackeray. 

14.  She  Stoops  to  Conquer. 

By  Oliver  Goldsmith. 

15.  Nothing  to  Wear. 

By  William  Allen  Butler. 

16.  Rime  of  the  Ancient  Mariner. 

By  Samuel  T.  Coleridge. 

17.  Elegy  in  a  Country  Churchyard,  etc. 

By  Thomas  Gray. 

18.  The  House  of  Life. 

By  Dante  Gabriel  Rossetti. 

19.  Lays  of  Ancient  Rome. 

By  Lord  Macaulay. 

20.  Epictetus,  Selections  from. 

21.  Marcus  Aurelius.     Thoughts. 

22.  Sesame  and  Lilies.     By  John  Ruskin. 

23.  The  Rose  and  the  Ring. 

By  William  M.  Thackeray. 

24.  The  Nibelungen  Lied. 

By  Thomas  Carlyle. 

25.  Ideas  of  Truth.     By  John  Ruskin. 

26.  Eve  of  St.  Agnes.     By  John  Keats. 


Briel  .IBoofelets 

27.  King  of  the  Golden  River. 

By  John  Ruskin. 

28.  The  Legend  of  Sleepy  Hollow. 

By  Washington  Irving. 

29.  Rip  Van  Winkle. 

By  Washington  Irving. 

30.  Ideals  of  the  Republic. 

31.  Verses  and  Flyleaves. 

By  Charles  S.  Calverle 

32.  Novels  by  Eminent  Hands. 

By  W.  M.  Thackeray. 

33.  Cranford.     By  Mrs.  Gaskell. 

34.  Vicar  of  Wakefield. 

By  Oliver  Goldsmith. 

35.  Tales  by  Heinrich  Zschokke. 

36.  Rasselas.      By  Samuel  Johnson. 

37.  Shakespeare's  Sonnets. 

38.  Wit  and  Humour  of  Charles  Lamb. 

39.  The  Travels  of  Baron  Munchausen. 

40.  The  Fables  of  ^Esop. 

4 1    The  Autobiography  of  Benjamin  Frank- 
lin. 


Betel  booklets 

42.  The  Sayings  of  Poor  Richard. 

By  Benjamin  Franklin. 

43.  A  Christmas  Carol. 

By  Charles  Dickens. 

44.  The  Cricket  on  the  Hearth. 

By  Charles  Dickens. 

45.  The  Blessed  Damozel. 

By  D.  G.  Rossetti. 

46.  The  Story  without  an  End. 

By  F.  W.  Carove\ 

47.  The  Rubaiyat  of  Omar  Khayydm. 

48.  Father  Tom  and  the  Pope. 

By  Samuel  Ferguson. 

49.  Love  and  Skates. 

By  Theodore  Winthrop. 

50.  The  Princess.     By  Alfred  Tennyson. 

51.  The  Child  in  the  House. 

By  Walter  Pater. 

52.  The  Poems  of  Edgar  Allan  Poe. 

53.  The  Sonnets  of  Michael  Angelo  Buo- 

narroti. 

54.  On  Friendship.     By    R.    W.    Emerson 

and  Marcus  Tullius  Cicero. 
55-56.  The  Sketch-Book. 

By  Washington  Irving.      2  vols. 
57.  Robert  Louis  Stevenson. 
By  Leslie  Stephen. 


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